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Preface 
This study is the result of a long-held interest in the history of 
Finnish shipping and, in particular, the great transformation 
which took place within it during the latter half of the 19th 
century. It is also partly a result of an equally long frustration with 
pre-1918 Finnish shipping statistics. Their inadequacy caused 
many problems in investigating the history of shipping, which 
could only be solved by going rather deeply into primary source 
material — if such existed. 
For a number of years, I had been aware that the register-books 
of the old Finnish mutual marine insurance association contained 
detailed data on the voyages of several hundred Finnish ships, 
data which might considerably compensate the shortcomings of 
the official statistics. I also knew that there were a number of 
shipping accounts from the late 19th century still in existence — as 
was demonstrated in the dissertation of Jan-Erik Börman (1979) 
which I had the pleasure of supervising — but whether they were 
representative enough of all national shipping was uncertain. It 
was only in spring 1986 that I had the opportunity to devote some 
time to these sources, when the Finnish Academy granted money 
for a pilot study on Finnish shipping and seamen (1870-1930). 
My first contacts with the registers of the Finnish marine insurance 
association were so encouraging — fascinating might be a better 
description — that I immediately started to plan a system for 
collecting this data, and then used the summer and early autumn 
of 1986 to do the work. When the Finnish Academy granted me a 
scholarship for the academic year 1987-88, I was able to continue 
by going to the provincial archives and collecting data from 
shipping accounts. 
It was clear from the beginning that the time I could afford for 
5 
the work would be limited. This meant that the ratio of results to 
total effort had to be kept reasonably high. Thus, I had to 
concentrate on the main trends of national development and leave 
all the interesting details and local specialities unstudied. I also 
had to rely mainly on periodical samples instead of complete year-
to-year observations. This, of course, means that the picture I am 
able to paint is in some respects summary, it may be even sketchy, 
and there is no doubt that other studies will be able to add many 
details. 
Now that the work is complete — at least technically, for no 
serious scientific work is ever "complete" — I have the pleasant 
duty of thanking people and institutions who have helped me to 
do it. Not infrequently, scholars regard their studies as examples of 
original and innovative thinking. More often than not, however, 
they depend heavily on ideas drawn from previous studies and 
discussions with other colleagues, even though the author himself 
is no longer able to trace all such influences. Of fellow maritime 
historians, Professor Lewis R. (Skip) Fischer not only provoked 
many ideas and much inspiration with his numerous articles and 
through many private discussions, but he also read parts of the 
manuscript and gave valuable comments and suggestions. I am 
also in debt to several other members of the so-called Maritime 
Economic History Group for comments and inspiring discussion 
when I presented part of this study at a conference in Bergen in 
August, 1989. 
The Finnish Academy furnished me with the necessary 
financial help without which I would probably still be in the 
planning stages. While I was collecting the material, I was greatly 
aided by the staff of many archives, and John Hackman and Kim 
Montin from Åbo Akademi deserve special thanks. I would like to 
thank the Finnish Historical Society for accepting my study in 
their series, and Professors Viljo Rasila and Markku Kuisma, who 
read the manuscript, for suggesting that the Society do so. Last but 
not least, I wish to thank Joan Nordlund M.A. for a considerate, 
skillful and thorough language revision. 
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I. Introduction: World trade 
and Finnish shipping in the 
latter half of the 19th 
century 
The growth of international maritime transport 
During the latter half of the 19th century and the decade before the 
first world war, international trade grew at an impressive pace. 
According to recent estimates, the volume of world exports 
quadrupled between 1840 and 1870, and again between 1870 and 
1913.1 As exports of cheap and bulky raw materials, such as grain, 
coal and wood, grew at the same rate or probaly even a little faster,2 
this must have implied similar growth in the physical volume of 
goods exchange. Since the bulk of these commodities was 
transported over narrower or wider stretches of water, expanding 
maritime transport must have been a precondition for this growth 
in international trade. 
Global merchant tonnage, however, did not increase quite as 
quickly as trade: from 1850 until the First World War it seems to 
have grown four-fold.3 Yet, the actual carrying capacity increased 
1 	 Maddison, Phases of Capitalist Development, p 254. 
2 	 At least the volume of trade in primary products grew about as fast as total 
world exports. See e.g. Lewis, Growth and Fluctuations 1870-1913, p. 282-
283. 
3 Cf. e.g. Palmer, "The British shipping industry", p. 90; Gjölberg, ökonomi,  
teknologi og historie, appendix table 1; Fischer — Nordvik, "Maritime 
transport and the integration of the North Atlantic economy", table III. 
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much more as steamships superseded sailing vessels. Because the 
former were able to maintain almost constant speed irrespective of 
wind conditions, they could in practice carry much more tonnage 
in a given time than the famed clippers, and as their fuel economy 
improved — thanks to compound and triple expansion engines 
and better boilers — this advantage was exploited over longer and 
longer routes. In the late 19th century, the carrying capacity of a 
steamship was generally calculated to be three times as much as 
that of a sailing vessel; one "steam-ton" was thus thought to equal 
three "sail-tons". In practice, the ratio seems to have varied 
depending on the state of steam technology and actual trade, but 
1:3 is, in any case, a good rough approximation.4 Using this ratio, it 
may be claimed that the transport capacity of the world merchant 
fleet increased more than ten-fold between 1870 and 1913. This 
suggests an average growth of almost 4% per annum, a little higher 
than the volume growth in world exports between 1870 and 1913. 
As cargo carrying capacity increased much faster than merchant 
tonnage, it became possible — at least in theory — to carry goods 
more cheaply by sea. Even in reality, the market situation was such 
that ocean freight in general decreased.5 Although freight 
development was very uneven and depended in the short term 
more on business cycles than technical innovations, the net result 
was that distance became less and less of a constraint on the 
international exchange of goods. The question whether this was an 
autonomous factor favouring the growth of overseas trade falls 
outside the scope of this work, however. One thing does seem 
fairly certain: what happened in this period was the continuation 
of a general trend of sinking freight rates.6 
Paradoxically enough, this important development in sea 
transport has not attracted much interest in economic history 
during the last two or three decades. Although text-books 
invariably stress the importance of the so-called transport 
revolution, it is only seldom that the discussion goes beyond the 
4 	 E.g. official Finnish statistics often used the ratio 1:3. For examples of actual 
ratios of performance see e.g. Gjölberg, Ökonomi ... , appendix table 1. 
5 E.g. Fischer and Nordvik, "Maritime transport", p. 537-538. 
6 	 North, "Sources of productivity change in ocean shipping". See also note 8. 
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traditional topics, canals and railways.' This obvious bias in 
favour of land transport of course reflects the actual state of 
research: in the era of "New Economic History", shipping has not 
been one of the favourite subjects. There may be many reasons for 
this, but one of the most important, I think, is the difficulty of 
collecting the quantitative data which is needed in modern 
economic history. Not only has shipping the reputation of being a 
very special industry, all aspects of which are not easily grasped by 
a "landlubber", but it is also, and above all, a very international 
business.As early as by the middle of the 19th century, many 
national authorities managed to collect rather comprehensive 
statistics of, say, manufacturing industry or railways, which have 
proved quite satisfactory in calculating the kind of production 
statistics which the modern system of national accounting 
requires. As for shipping, however, the authorities failed to register 
much more than just the quantitative development of tonnage, 
while data on what was done with the ships and what income they 
generated was almost impossible to collect for anything but 
domestic traffic. Thus, most national shipping statistics cannot 
furnish an economic historian with the ready-made data to enable 
him to construct proper production statistics: for example, 
continuous data on freight income was produced only in Sweden 
and Norway. The lack of data limits the knowledge of late 19th-
century shipping to such an extent that it is hardly possible to 
embark upon an exhaustive discussion about its role in the 
"transport revolution". 
Perhaps it is natural that the working methods of modern 
economic history have been applied to the history of shipping only 
during the last decade or so.8 As far as the latter part of the 19th 
century is concerned, examples of this new approach can be found 
in many North Atlantic countries, most notably perhaps Norway 
and Canada. Norway is immensely favoured by its excellent 
7 A good example is Philip S. Bagwell's fine book The Transport Revolution, 




	 One notable exception must, however, be noted: Douglass C. North published 
some important articles on maritime transports in the 1950s. Cf. i.a. "Ocean 
freight rates and economic development." journal of Economic History, XVIII 
(1958). 
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shipping statistics,9 while Canadian historians have been 
furnished with a labourious collection of primary material from 
ships' registers, crew-lists and other primary material. The work 
done by the Atlantic Canada Shipping Project has, however, 
clearly demonstrated that such sources yield a rich return — at 
least if one is prepared to invest a lot of labour in extracting and 
processing the data.10 
The state of affairs described above inevitably means that the 
accumulation of knowledge about the "transport revolution" in 
shipping cannot be a rapid process. Although there are a few 
aspects, such as the development of freight rates or the diffusion of 
conferences and fixed tariffs in line services, where sweeping 
overall assessments and truly international studies seem possible, 
most of the data must obviously be collected from national sources 
concerning national fleets. That is the only way to produce results 
which are empirically sound. Whether these jigsaw pieces can also 
make up a reliable overall picture of international shipping in 
general depends, of course, a lot on how comparable and how 
well-interlocking the national pieces are. Obviously, some general 
agreement about the basic variables and parameters will be needed 
but, fortunately, there is already a well-tried and universally 
applied frame of analysis in the form of the system of national 
accounting. Experiences from international studies of economic 
growth are encouraging: comparisons of multinational data have 
not produced insurmountable problems. 
Finnish shipping in an international setting 
The objective of this study is to create a piece of the jigsaw puzzle 
which may, some time in the future, form part of something more 
universal. At first sight, this piece may seem very small and 
unimportant. Although the Finnish merchant marine had 
9 	 Good examples of how these statistics can be used are Gjölberg, Ökonomi ... 
and Fischer — Nordvik, "Maritime transport" (see especially the freight 
index computed from Norwegian freight income data, p. 537). 
10 A good and rather detailed description of this data base can be found in 
Fischer and Sager, "An approach to the quantitative analysis of British 
shipping records". 
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experienced unusually rapid and almost continuous growth since 
the 1830s — its tonnage had actually trebled in four decades11—
around 1870, it was, at best, only about two per cent of world 
tonnage, and just before the first world war this dropped to below 
one per cent. What is more, since the country is situated at the far 
end of a sea lane, a good thousand nautical miles from the coasts of 
England and the main arteries of world trade, its shipping does not 
seem too international either. 
Yet, Finnish shipping was not quite as "parochial" as its 
background would suggest. True, in actual figures, the merchant 
fleet was rather modest, but compared with the requirements of 
foreign trade, or the size of the country, it became relatively large 
during the last "golden era" of sail. The following comparison 
shows this quite clearly (table 1:1). 
TABLE 1:1. Tonnage per population in certain countries, 1870. 
Country 
Merchant fleet, 
1,000 net tons 
Net tons per 
1,000 inhabitants 
United Kingdom 5,691 182 
United States' 1,520 69 
France 1,072 28 
Italy 1,012 38 
Norway 974 561 
Germany2 939 23 
Atlantic Canada (1869)3 807 222 
Spain (1874) 625 65 
Netherlands 447 124 
Sweden 347 83 
Finland 265 150 
Greece (1873) 233 160 
Denmark 182 102 
1 Inland lake and canal fleets not included. 
2 The same area as the subsequent German Empire. 
3 Tonnage refers to the Maritime Provinces and Quebec. 
Source: Mitchell, European historical statistics; Historical statistics of the 
United States; Palmer, "The British shipping industry 1850-
1914," table 1; Matthews, "The shipping industry of Atlantic 
Canada," app. table I. 
11 Kaukiainen, "Merenkulku", p. 462, 465. 
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Population is, of course, not a perfect parameter to measure the 
size of an economy, and a maritime economy in particular; neither 
are the tonnage figures of different countries always fully 
comparable (all those presented in table 1:1 refer to official 
registration and therefore must contain lots of errors; see chapter 
II). The figures should not be understood as anything more than 
just a very rough comparison, but even as such they indicate 
certain interesting things. Above all, it can be seen that the Finnish 
merchant marine was, relatively speaking, not so small — in terms 
of tons per head of population only Norway, Canada, the United 
Kingdom and Greece could present higher figures. 
Neither was Finnish shipping confined to the nearest coastal or 
Baltic waters. Quite on the contrary, a very large proportion was 
engaged on international tramp trade between Britain and the 
Mediterranean, on the North Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico, to 
South America and the Far East, sometimes even to Australia, New 
Zealand and the west coast of America.12 Even though the official 
shipping statistics cannot tell how common such long distance 
trading was, a rough indication of the frequency can be found in 
the annual reports, which were sent from the coastal towns to the 
central government. They were made at the end of the year, when 
the sailing season in Finnish waters was practically over; 
nevertheless, a good majority — in the 1860s often around 80% of 
all coastal town tonnage — was reported as still being away on 
voyages.13 Many shipowners did not send their vessels on a single 
haul out and back home, but on a series of voyages: they usually 
took an export cargo to Britain, Spain or Italy and, after unloading 
it, spent two, three or even more years carrying cargoes thousands 
of miles away from home. Thus, much of the Finnish merchant 
marine was actually employed in the great staple trades of world 
shipping, and it quite obviously fared well in freight competition, 
since the rapid growth of tonnage continued up to the 1870s. 
In the heyday of sail, Finnish shipping was a thriving industry 
and a fully fledged member of the international (or rather, North 
Atlantic) maritime community. What happened once steam began 
its breakthrough into maritime transport, was, however, a very 
12 	 See e.g. Hautala, "From the Black Sea to the Atlantic".  
13 See e.g. Hautala, "Merimiesten karkaaminen suomalaisilta laivoilta", p. 105. 
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different story, and made Finland a clear exception from the norm. 
The vigorous growth came to an end in the late 1870s, and did not 
resume to the same extent before World War I. The Finnish 
merchant marine was thus not able to follow the general growth in 
shipping, and even in technical development it fell behind. While 
most maritime nations adopted the new technology with such 
speed that, by the late 1870s, many great West European ports 
registered more arrivals and departures for steam than for sailing 
ships,14 in Finland it was very slow to start. At the turn of the 
century, most European countries had more tonnage in steam than 
in sail, but Finland was just beginning to build an ocean-going 
steam-fleet (see table 1:2). 
Even though the figures in table 1:2 are again based on official 
registration figures and cannot be trusted too much, they do paint a 
rather dramatic picture. By about 1890, Finland, although clearly 
behind the average among maritime nations, was in company with 
three other laggards, Norway, USA and Canada. In 1913, she was 
quite alone, so far behind all the other North Atlantic and 
Mediterranean countries that her merchant marine could simply 
be called backward. Even Russia and Greece, which in many 
respects were less developed countries than Finland, had — both 
relatively and in actual numbers — far larger steam-fleets. 
This remarkable technical stagnation inevitably also denoted 
unsatisfactory growth in the shipping industry. The greater 
transport potential of steamships meant that, at the end of the 
century, most of the increase in shipping was due to the increase in 
steam-tonnage and this gain naturally fell to the countries which 
had built the largest steam-fleets. Between 1875 and 1913, the 
average rate of growth in world tonnage computed in "sail-tons" (1 
steam-ton = 3 sail-tons) was around 3.5 per cent a year. This was 
also the rate which was achieved in most important national fleets, 
but in Finland the corresponding figure was only 1.9.15 
From being a rather typical maritime nation of the 1860s and 
1870s, Finland thus stagnated into a very atypical one. This does 
not, however, mean that the case becomes less interesting in terms 
of international shipping, rather on the contrary. A comparison of 
14 	 See e.g. Kiaer, Tabeller vedkommende Skibsfartsbevagelsen 1872-1894. 
15 	 The rates computed from tonnage figures in the sources mentioned in table 1, 
above. 
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TABLE 1:2. Steam-tonnage' percentage share of total merchant 
tonnage, 1892 and 1913. 
Nation 1892 1913 
United Kingdom 59.7 93.0 
Germany 48.1 85.3 
France 55.1 61.9 
Denmark 38.0 83.4 
Sweden 31.3 82.6 
Norway 14.4 65.7 
Netherlands 57.9 94.2 
Belgium 98.6 94.5 
Spain 69.8 97.3 
Italy 24.8 71.1 
Greece 24.6 76.0 
Russia 38.9 67.2 
USA (1890, 1910) 12.9 40.0 
Atlantic Canada (1892, 1910) 13.7 51.2 
Finland 10.1 18.2 
1 	 Including motor-vessels. 
Source: See table 1:1. 
typical and exceptional cases may reveal quite important 
developmental features, such as what was the role of the different 
factors of production, and how did their relative prices affect the 
choice of optimal technology. From the beginning, Finland was a 
peripheral country with an abundance of certain natural resources, 
very similar to Canada on the one hand and in sharp contrast to 
Britain on the other. Irrespective of whether Finland can be linked 
with any general models of development, however, she was the 
last western maritime nation to stick to sail. In order to understand 
the transition from sail to steam, it is quite important to 
understand why she remained such an "old faithful". 
It may certainly be questioned whether data drawn from a single 
national fleet can be applied to the international shipping industry 
in general. It would be against common sense to claim that the 
Finnish merchant marine could be used as a representative sample 
of world sailing-ship or other maritime trades. However, since 
Finnish ships normally carried freight under similar conditions to 
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vessels of other nationalities, it is equally obvious that, within 
individual trades, they must have performed in much the same 
way as the great mass. Consequently, it is to be expected that 
certain parts of the Finnish merchant marine were typical of fleets 
with roughly similar occupation or production profiles. This 
certainly applies to the big sailing vessels engaged in world trade. 
Thus, the fascination of the case lies not only in the unique 
aspects, but equally in the features typical of the trade worldwide. 
Shipping and the Finnish economy 
Finnish shipping was, of course, not only part of international 
shipping but also part of the Finnish economy. In the latter role it 
contributed to the national income and, as a carrier of a larger or 
smaller share of the foreign trade of the country, to the balance of 
payments. Conversely, other sectors of the economy affected 
shipping. First, the structure and development of foreign trade had 
a bearing on how much traffic there was to and from the Finnish 
ports, and how many domestic ships could be employed. Second, 
the development and profitability of other industries offered 
alternative possibilities for investment, and the attraction of such 
"landward opportunities" could significantly affect the interest in 
shipbuilding and other shipping investments. 
The development of Finnish foreign trade undoubtedly 
favoured shipping. The volume of exports, in particular, grew 
during the latter part of the 19th century at an impressive pace. 
Since these, in an increasing degree, consisted of bulky timber 
products, cargo space requirements grew about 18-fold in six 
decades, or on average 5 % a year (see table 1:3). 
There was, still, one inherent weakness in the structure of 
Finnish foreign trade. The physical volume of exports was always 
much higher than that of imports, because a high proportion of the 
latter consisted of manufactured and other valuable goods. 
According to the shipping statistics, in the 1870s, about two and a 
half times as much loaded tonnage left Finnish ports as arrived, 
and this ratio remained remarkably consistent throughout the 
whole period.16 For a shipowner, this meant unbalanced demand 
16 These figures did not, however, include trade with Russia: because much 
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TABLE 1:3. Cargo space required by the most important Finnish 
export items. 1,000 register tons. 
1850/52 1870/72 1890/92 1910/12 
Sawn wood 68 255 444 827 
Other timber 24 41 84 916 
Tar, pitch 19 26 15 3 
Other (incl. pulp, paper) 2 18 46 255 
Total 113 320 589 2,001 
Source: Finnish official statistics, ser. I and IA (shipping and foreign 
trade, foreign trade). Conversions to register tons made by the 
author according to the maximum amounts which in practice 
could be stowed per net reg. ton. It has been assumed that the 
average "stowage factor" for wood cargo increased from 1870/72 
to 1910/12 by about 40 %. This was due to the increasing number 
of steamships which could carry much more deck cargo than 
sailing ships. 
for cargo space, and that many vessels had to return home in 
ballast or, at best, only partly loaded." 
The volume of imports, however, increased quite at the same 
rate as that of exports. Therefore, it may be said that the growth of 
foreign trade — in spite of the skewed demand for maritime 
transport — gave very good support to the development of Finnish 
shipping. To transport Finnish timber was not, however, the 
privilege of Finnish ship-owners. On the contrary, real 
competition developed after the 1860s on Finnish as well as on 
other Baltic wood freight markets. This was at first the result of a 
change in economic policy: liberalistic trends were gaining 
momentum both in Russia and Finland. In the 18th century, 
Sweden had restricted competition in export and import transport 
by a navigation act (produktplakatet, which was much like the 
corresponding British act) and by collecting extra high customs 
grain was imported from St. Petersburg and Estonia, the excess volume of 
exports over imports was much lower in this case, at best c. 30 %. 
17 Kaukiainen, "The Transition from Sail to Steam ... ", p. 173-174. 
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dues from foreign ships, especially those exporting iron or 
timber.78 The Grand Duchy of Finland still used this protective 
legislation after its cession from Sweden to Russia, but the system 
was gradually undermined. Russia had been making trade 
agreements with several countries since the 1840s (e.g. in 1843 
with Great Britain, 1845 with Sardinia and Naples, 1846 with 
France and the Netherlands, and special treaties with Sweden, 
Denmark and the USA had already existed) which reciprocally 
gave the same rights to foreign and domestic ships.19 These treaties 
actually anticipated the abolition of navigation acts (e.g. by Britain 
in 1849, by the Netherlands 1850, by France 1866) and the coming 
of the free trade era. Still, in the Finnish customs tariffs of 1859, 
1869 and 1886 (the last of which was valid until World War I), the 
dues for foreign ships were in principle increased by 50 %.2° 
However, since existing trade agreements were already making 
exceptions for the ships of all the important European maritime 
nations before the 1860s, the stipulations of the produktplakatet 
and extra high customs only applied in some rare cases. 
Certain liberalistic reforms also increased competition between 
domestic shipowners. According to the old Swedish mercantile 
system, only burghers in the specially privileged seaports could 
send their ships on foreign trade missions or import goods from 
foreign countries. This privileged group gradually grew and after 
1830, all towns on the coast were allowed fully to engage in foreign 
shipping and trade.21 The trading rights of peasants22 living on the 
coast were also increased in much the same way. Originally these 
people were only entitled to engage in domestic shipping and 
trade with their own produce, but after the 1830s, export shipping 
18 	 Hecscher, Sveriges ekonomiska historia från Gustav Vasa 11:1 p. 111. 
19 Harmaja, Suomen tullipolitiikka, p. 731-831, Cf. Pollard, European 
Economic Integration 1815-1970 (London 1974), p. 115-117. 
20 Special regulations, 1 §, customs tariffs 30.4.1859, 29.7.1869, 22.12.1886 
 
(Finlands Författnings Samling).  
21  Möller," 
 Merkantilismin aikakausi", p. 102-103, 109. 
22 	 This restricted shipping by peasants is called bondeseglation in Swedish (Fi. 
talonpoikaispurjehdus), that is: peasant shipping. In practice, the same 
restrictions also applied to other non-urban people, including the nobility. I 
will use the expressions "peasant" or "rural" shipping only as a contrast with 
shipping by shipowners (or companies) home from towns, but with no 
reference to their actual social or industrial status. 
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to all ports in the Baltic was allowed. After the Crimean war they 
were also permitted to carry freight to all North Sea ports, and this 
interim privilege was continued until 1868.23 In that year, all the 
traditional privileges of different towns were abandoned, and all 
shipowners irrespective of home port were given full and equal 
rights for shipping trade. As these new rights were also made use 
of by many "peasant" seafarers, the liberalistic reforms in practice 
widened the geographic background of shipping and drastically 
increased the number of entrepreneurs. Such an increase in the 
domestic supply of maritime transport might have narrowed the 
profit-margins of the previously privileged shipowners. 
The structure of Finnish export trade also enabled foreign ships 
easily to exploit the new "free trade" situation. Since wood was a 
relatively cheap mass product, there were no particularly stringent 
transport requirements, and thus a producer usually had no need 
to exert any control over shipments by using his own ships or 
those of a well-known business associate. Thus he normally sold 
sawn goods f.o.b.,24 that is, he left all the transport arrangements to 
the foreign buyer, or his agent. As the latter had no special 
preferences for Finnish vessels, this meant, of course, that 
competition between them and foreign ships became an everyday 
reality. 
The competitive position of shipping also seemed to change a 
lot compared with other domestic industries. This happened 
simply because other industries, not only manufacturing and 
forestry, but even agriculture and domestic trade, experienced 
unprecedented growth from the 1870s on. Just to mention a couple 
of examples, the production volume of manufacturing industry 
(handicrafts included) grew ten-fold between 1870 and 1913, and 
investments in machinery five-fold.25 Earlier, there were not so 
many lucrative alternatives to shipping and foreign trade: the 
sawmill industry, for example, was strictly controlled and its 
production limited. After 1860, however, it was allowed to grow 
23 Kaukiainen, Suomen talonpoikaispurjehdus 1800-luvun alkupuoliskolla, p.  
50-56; Börman, Aboländsk bygdeseglation, p. 30-34. 
24 See e.g. Ahvenainen, Suomen sahateollisuuden historia, p. 294. 
25 Heikkinen — Hjerppe, Suomen teollisuus ja teollinen käsityö 1860-1913,  
app. table 8; Hjerppe — Peltonen — Pihkala, "Investoinnit ja niiden rahoitus 
Suomessa 1860-1979", p. 2. 
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freely, and as the demand for sawn goods increased in West 
Europe, there was a real boom.26 Whether investment in sawmills 
gave a better return on capital than shipping still remains to be 
seen, but in any case it can be said that, after the 1860s, it 
represented an increasingly attractive alternative. Accordingly, the 
opportunity costs of shipping (that is, the "price" of choosing 
shipping instead of any other good business alternative) did 
increase. 
The problem of backwardness 
The sluggish development of the Finnish merchant marine since 
the 1870s seems all the more remarkable against the background of 
the huge growth in export cargo from Finland. Never before had 
domestic production created such an increase in demand for 
shipping services, but for one reason or another, Finnish 
shipowners failed to grasp this opportunity. This inevitably 
implies that there must have been a fundamental change in the 
economics of shipping at the time when most countries were 
experiencing transition from sail to steam. A history of Finnish 
shipping between 1860 and 1913 cannot be written without some 
explanation of this change being given. 
In principle, there are two different possible reasons. The 
decline could have simply resulted from the fact that Finnish ships 
became uncompetitive after the 1870s, that they could no longer 
find their share of international transport (including transport 
from Finland). If this was true, the change quite naturally seems to 
have been connected with the technical transition from sail to 
steam and from wooden hulls to iron and steel. However, if sail 
lost out to the competition and the future was destined to belong to 
steam, the obvious question is why Finnish shipowners did not 
acquire modern technology; even if big steamships were not built 
in the country, they could be bought from abroad. This question 
leads to the second possible reason: the technical change probably 
coincided with a decline in the relative profitability of shipping. If 
"landward opportunities" seemed to give a better return on 
26 Ahvenainen op.cit., p. 157-160. 209-211, 283-285. 
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investment, it may be supposed that lots of shipowners made a 
rational decision and ceased to invest in shipping. This situation 
might, of course, have resulted from the first alternative: if Finnish 
ships could no longer successfully compete in standard freight 
trade, the profitability of shipping could have sunk so low that this 
alone was enough to make it an unattractive proposition. However, 
at least in theory — and some recent studies seem to point in the 
same direction — it is equally possible that profitability did not 
decline too much, that even sailing ships could still have produced 
a fair return on investment after the 1870s. Since the general trend 
in Finland was that "landward opportunities" developed very 
quickly, it was possibly the resultant profitability which showed 
the greatest change. 
There is no systematic overall analysis of Finnish shipping 
during this period. However, the decline is so important and 
obvious that it has been touched upon in many general text books 
and popular writing. There is also a wealth of studies with a 
narrower scope: histories of coastal towns, parishes and shipping 
companies, and even some of these contain more or less general 
explanations for the decline of shipping. As early as in 1883, the 
official shipping statistics noted that the Finnish merchant marine 
had significantly declined, and attributed this decline quite simply 
to the growth of steam;27 the logic obviously was that steam was so 
superior that domestic sailing vessels were bound to suffer. 
Technical transformation was inevitably a central point in later 
interpretations as well, although different authors have explained 
its actual effects in different ways. In 1910, Ernst Krogius, then 
director of Finland's greatest steamship company, voiced his 
opinion that the unfavourable development had resulted from the 
traditional and all too cautious attitudes of the shipowners. He 
thought that if the capital earned by sailing vessels had at the time 
been shrewdly and wisely invested in steam, the situation would 
have been much better.28 
The rivalry between shipping and alternative opportunities was 
already apparent in the 1920s. In his history of the shipping of 
Turku (Abo) 1856-1926, Oscar Nikula pointed out that 
27 	 Bidrag till Finlands Officiella Statistik 1:5, p. 2. 
28 Krogius, "Sjöfart", p. 1-2. 
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shipowners in this town started in the 1870s to invest more and 
more in manufacturing industry.29 He thought that both the 
depression in the freight market and the rapid technical 
developments made shipping less profitable than before. The 
same general opinion was later shared by Jorma Pohjanpalo, 
who studied the development of regular line services in Finnish 
shipping. He also stressed the importance of capital, or rather 
the lack of it, by pointing out that steamships were much 
more expensive than sailing vessels, and thus a direct lack 
of capital hampered the technical transition.30 The problem of 
capital is also stressed by Bruno Suviranta in his history of the 
Finnish Steamship Company (Finska Angfartygs Aktiebolaget)  
1883-1958. Furthermore, he drew attention to the importance of 
shipbuilding and the shipping companies. According to him the 
competitiveness of Finnish shipping depended on domestic 
shipbuilding and was not geared to the new situation. Neither 
were traditional single-ship companies capable of raising the 
capital needed to buy steamships.31  
All the views presented above — and they are just a selection — 
seem to be based on the assumption that sailing ships, at least 
wood-hulled ones, became unprofitable some time between the 
1870s and the turn of the century. None of the authors could, 
however, present any solid and representative data on the actual 
levels of profitability; indeed, studies on this important aspect are 
very few. The only one in which there is an attempt to tackle the 
problem in a systematic way is Jan-Erik Börmans investigation of 
shipping in the Turku archipelago (1850-1920). His figures 
suggest that profitability really did sink substantially from the 
1870s,32 but his source material was not very large, and the 
question is whether the study area was representative of the whole 
country. A slightly different picture can be found in the history of 
Aland sailing shipping by Georg Kåhre, who — although not really 
analyzing profitability — presents many examples of quite 
profitable sailing ships.33 Apart from these two works, there are 
29 Nikula, Åbo sjöfarts historia, p. 18-19. 
30 Pohjanpalo, Suomen kauppamerenkulku, p. 57. 
31  Suviranta, Suomen höyrylaiva osakeyhtiö, p. 11-14. 
32 	 Börman, Åboländsk bygdeseglation, p. 214 seg.  
33 	 Kåhre, Den åländska segelsjöfartens historia, p. 446-447. 
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just two case-studies of one owner with two ships and a single 
brig.34 The question, therefore, seems still to be far from answered. 
The Finnish experience had certain similarities with what was 
happening in Norway and Canada. The importance of "landward 
opportunities" in explaining the decline of shipping has been 
amply demonstrated in the studies of the "Atlantic Canada 
Shipping Project".35 In a paper published in 1982, Lewis R. 
Fischer, Eric W. Sager and Rosemary E. Omner estimated that 
Canadian sailing ships may still have been fairly profitable in the 
1880s and 1890s: according to them, gross profits (that is, with no 
deduction for depreciation) ranged between fourteen and twenty 
per cent of the depreciated value of the ships.36 Even though these 
results were not unreservedly accepted by all scholars,37 they at 
least present a serious challenge to the belief that sailing ships had 
become totally unprofitable after the 1870s. As far as Norway was 
concerned, Ole Gjölberg actually had already reached a similar 
conclusion in his doctoral dissertation (1979): according to him, 
Norwegian shipowners were slow to adopt steam-technology 
simply because their sailing ships still gave a better return on 
invested capital than steamships in the 1880s (and later around 
1900-1905).38 Even this study may give rise to some doubt, as it 
was executed on a macro level by exploiting general figures of 
costs and production, without empirical data on actual 
profitability. Subsequently, however, Lewis R. Fisher and Helge 
W. Nordvik found detailed accounting data in the archives of a 
Norwegian shipowner, Peter Jebsen, and this also suggests that 
sailing ships could have been profitable during "the twilight of 
sail".39 Thus it seems that, in these cases, technical backwardness 
34 Saarinen, "Rosenlew-yhtymän purjelaivanvarustuksesta"; Norrvik, Briggen 
Carl Gustaf. 
35 	 See espec. Sager — Fischer — Omner. "Landward and seaward opportunities 
in Canada's age of sail" and Sager — Panting, "Staple economies and the rise 
and decline of the shipping industry". 
36 Fischer — Sager — Omner, "The shipping industry and regional economic 
development ... ", p. 44-45. 
37 	 See the commentary by Peter N. Davies and discussion in Merchant Shipping 
and Economic Development ... , p. 55-63. 
38 	 A good summary of his findings is Gjölberg, "The substitution of steam for 
sail in Norwegian ocean shipping." 
39 	 Fischer — Nordvik, "From Broager to Bergen", espec. p. 51, 58. 
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was not simply a result of ignorance and conservatism, but could 
have had something to do with actual economic realities. 
The organization of this study 
The question of profitability, especially that of sailing ships, seems 
to have a key role in any explanation of Finnish technical 
backwardness in shipping. Yet, if this study is also going to fulfil 
its aims as a case study of international shipping, lots of other 
questions must be answered, as well. Above all, a wealth of solid 
data must be collected so that all the explanations can be based on 
sufficient empirical evidence. Altogether they should form a 
systematic total analysis of Finnish shipping, or rather foreign 
shipping, around 1860-1913. To leave domestic waterborne 
transport outside this study seems fully justified because it had 
very little relevance to the problem areas described above.4o 
"Total analysis" may sound a rather dangerous expression, as 
there can be so many different kinds of "total", depending on 
different theoretical and other considerations. As this is a study of 
economic history, the theoretical framework as well as the 
analytical tools are, quite naturally, derived from contemporary 
macro economics. Accordingly, the "total", at a theoretical level, 
comprises factors and activities which are summed up under the 
umbrella of "total production" and, at an empirical level, it means 
the systematic descriptive framework known as the system of 
national accounting. Its various elements make it possible not only 
to gauge the total production of an industry, and its relative 
importance in a national economy, but also to estimate how 
effectively the existing factors of production were exploited in the 
actual historical situation. Different macro-level parameters of 
productivity are, indeed, very valuable when the competitiveness 
of an industry is being considered. The system also has the huge 
practical benefit that it — as was pointed out before — offers a 
40 This choice is also motivated by the hard realities of available data. Finnish 
shipping statistics, as those of most other countries, contain very little data 
on domestic shipping. Moreover, "shipping" normally implies foreign 
shipping. 
2 — Sailing into Twilight 
	 33 
widely accepted statistical convention, and should thus produce 
comparable results. 
Notwithstanding its merits, macro-level analysis also has 
obvious limitations. Above all, it is a descripitive method, which 
tells rather little about the reasoning and motives of those who in 
reality made the investment and deployment decisions. Therefore, 
in order to understand and explain economic development, 
something should also be known about the behaviour of those who 
were involved; in other words, things must be examined at the 
business or entrepreneurial level. This, quite naturally, again 
emphasises the question of profitability, which in most cases was 
the first consideration of the shipowner when he made his day-to-
day business decisions. Whether or not a ship (or a shipping 
company) was profitable can easily be determined from 
contemporary accounting material, but it is good to remember that 
maximum profit was not always the sole consideration. Even if one 
believes that the majority of entrepreneurs did react in an 
economically rational way, the possibility that the general 
conditions of rationality varied a lot cannot be excluded. The 
choice between alternatives, whether "seaward", "landward" or 
other, did not only depend on the potential profitability of each, 
but equally on which were actually known and thought possible. 
Giving up shipping in favour of a manufacturing investment was 
much easier for an owner who already had interests in various 
industries than for one who was only experienced in shipping. To 
be realistic, it is not always possible, or reasonable, to penetrate the 
mental and material environment of individual shipowners in 
such detail. In any case, if one is prepared to face the labour of 
analysing profitability, one must also be able to put it into a proper 
chronological and spatial context, if the analysis is to be of any real 
value. 
The empirical part of this study is divided in three main 
sections: 1) The factors of production (the development of tonnage, 
its value, capital costs and cycles of investment plus labour), 
2) Production (the actual deployment of tonnage in different trades 
and transport produced) and 3) Economic returns (freight income 
and value-added, main items of expense, net income and its 
variations). As is quite obvious, the macro-level analysis will have 
some precedence in the first two sections, while the business-level 
will be more important in the third. Throughout, however, both 
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levels will be intermingled in some degree, and thus the study 
bears more resemblance to a traditional historical work than to an 
exercise in macro economics. 
In one respect the division may seem illogical: the value of 
production will not be dealt with in section 2 but in the following 
one, together with the business economic aspects of productivity. 
This is simply for practical reasons: the three sections also 
correspond to the three main types of source: data on tonnage, 
which in principle covers the whole merchant marine; data on 
voyages, which covers a large though not random part of the 
tonnage; and accounting data on the economic results of shipping, 
which forms a still smaller, and obviously also less representative, 
sample. In a work like this, where the scantiness and unreliability 
of the source material is a very real constraint, the evaluation of 
material is essential. It is therefore practical to structure the study 
according to the different types of material. Thus, all the sections 
begin with a descipition of the sources and the problems in using 
them, and all the criticisms are, if possible, presented there. This 
has a practical merit: if a reader is not interested in such matters, 
he may easily skip over this part and move on to the results. The 
empirical findings are summarized in the concluding chapter and 
the questions posed above answered, if possible. The overall aim is 
to place Finnish shipping in the wider contexts of national 
economy and international sea transport. 
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II. Factors of production 
1. The development of tonnage 
In the late nineteenth century, there was virtually no other 
industry in which fixed capital had as central a position as in 
shipping. Not only was shipping more capital-intensive than the 
average manufacturing industry, but the production equipment, 
the ships, were usually, to the professionals in the trade, not just 
valuable assets but also sources of pride and images of perfection. 
To put it more prosaically, the type and quality of ships more or 
less reflected the nature of the trade in which they were used, and 
the amount of investment involved also bore some relation to 
expectations of economic returns. Of course there were also major 
restraints, which meant that not all owners actually built or bought 
the optimal tonnage, at least not in the technical sense; apart from 
customs, conventions and other psychological factors, the amount 
of capital which was available rather effectively limited the choice 
of investment. 
Thus, changes in tonnage reveal many essential features in the 
development of shipping. The tonnage figures are also a natural 
starting point for more penetrating studies and more subtle 
analyses. Even in a purely technical sense, there is a need for a 
reliable picture of tonnage development: to be meaningful, most 
data concerning the actual use of ships and the production of 
shipping must be related to the tonnage of the vessels involved. In 
order to extrapolate data covering only one section or a sample of 
the merchant marine and apply it to the entire national fleet or a 
major part of it, the total tonnages must be known. 
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Problems with the data 
Data on the tonnage of the Finnish merchant fleet which fulfils the 
basic needs mentioned above cannot be found in available, 
published statistics. True, there is an official shipping series dating 
from 1856,1 but it leaves much to be desired. Above all, it contains 
a lot of inconsistencies, which means that the figures are not 
always comparable over time. 
The most obvious problem — and also the most important one 
in a quantitative sense — is that what was meant by a "ship" or 
"shipping" depended more on convention than on any systematic 
definition. From the beginning of the period in question, and up to 
1879, the statistics included all sailing vessels larger than 10 lästs 
(which equals about 19 register tons) from towns, while vessels 
from coastal parishes were included if they were at least five lästs 
(or 9 reg.tons). Practically all steam-propelled vessels, even boats, 
were also counted.2 From 1879 onwards, when ship-measurement 
was changed to tons, the statistics also included urban sailing 
ships smaller than 19 tons.3 This practice continued until 1890, 
when it was decreed that no ship below 19 net tons needed to be 
registered4 and, accordingly, they were dropped from the statistics. 
Apart from these changes in the lower limit, there were also, not 
unexpectedly, changes in the size-classes into which the fleet was 
divided. 
Even in a qualitative sense, the definition of "ship" was vague 
and not in accordance with any systematic definition of 
"shipping". In the early 1860s, all sailing vessels included in the 
statistics seem to have been real merchantmen, but later even 
sailing barges and lighters with no rig whatsoever were regarded as 
1 Finnish official statistics, ser. I, foreign trade and shipping 1856-1902, ser. 
IB, shipping 1903—. 
2 	 The size-limits were recorded in the published tables. That there was no such 
limit for steam vessels can easily be seen from the extremely low last-figures 
of certain towns. Very small steamboats were also frequently listed in 
published ship lists (Finlands skeppskalender) of the time. 
3 	 E.g. in the tonnage statistics of 1882 there was a size-category "under 20 tons" 
and later, in the 1880s, the class was "from 10 to 20 tons". In all cases, such 
small vessels were recorded from certain towns. 
4 Amendment to the navigation law 11.11.1889 §4, the act of ship registers 
11.11.1889 (Finlands Författnings Samling).  
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sailing vessels. This was because even lighters had to be registered 
from 1873, but in practice such vessels were intended for 
transporting goods down rivers or in harbours, for example, when 
loading ships lying in the roads, and thus they do not represent 
proper "shipping" but rather "auxiliary activities to shipping". 
Quite the same applies to tugs, which were systematically 
included in the number of steamships, as were, later, a few 
salvation vessels and icebreakers. Since the amount and tonnage of 
lighters in particular increased a great deal after the 1890s,5 these 
additions make the picture of the real merchant tonnage quite 
distorted. 
The implicit concept of "shipping" in Finnish statistics also 
differs from established international conventions in another 
respect. It included two large fleets from the inland waters of Lakes 
Ladoga and Saimaa. This was because both lakes were connected 
with the sea, the former by the River Neva and the latter by a canal, 
and the vessels could, at least in theory, sail the oceans. In 
practice, however, it was extremely unusual for any vessel from 
Ladoga to sail further than St.Petersburg. Ships of the Saimaa fleet 
were more often seen in the Gulf of Finland, but even then such 
vessels formed a small minority, and, moreover, most of them only 
went to St.Petersburg. 
The change in ship measument from traditional lästs to register 
tons in 18776 accounts for one additional inconsistency. The two 
measuments were very different in priciple: the old system 
measured a ship's ability to carry heavy cargo, while the new one 
directly measured the volume of its holds. In practice, however, 
the change was not that sudden; until 1866, ships were, indeed, 
measured by loading them down with (usually) iron (according to 
a 1778 Act with a few practical amendments), but after that, the 
läst-measurement became in essence a measurement of volume (of 
the increase in displacement when a ship was loaded),' and so the 
subsequent change to register tons was not very drastic. For 
average sailing ships, the new tonnage could be estimated quite 
5 	 The total amount and tonnage of lighters has been recorded in the text tables 
of shipping statistics since 1895. 
6 	 Finlands Författnings Samling 4.10.1876. 
7 Ibid, 25.7.1866. 
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accurately by multiplying the last-figure by 1.85.8 For steamships, 
however, this straightforward procedure produced highly 
erroneous tonnages. The weight of machines, boilers and bunkers 
made them poor carriers of heavy freight and, moreover, according 
to the 1866 Act, they were measured as if they were not loaded as 
far down as sailing vessels.9 This resulted in lost-figures which 
were much lower than those of sailing vessels with the same 
volume of cargo-space. A study of 25 steamships over 19 register 
tons measured according to both methods showed that the 
relationship of tonnage and last-figures was, on average, no less 
than 2.8.10 This means that great care must be taken when 
comparing steamer tonnage at different times. Only since the late 
1880s, when old ships were properly remeasured, can the tonnage 
be taken at face value. 
Apart from all these incongruencies, there are also lots of errors 
in the published statistics. Before late 1870s, the data was derived 
from ship lists compiled by the so-called "seamen's houses"  
(sjömanshus, authorities which controlled the employment of 
seamen, collected certain navigation dues and also provided a 
primitive social security system for seafarers) in every seaport, and 
by länsmän (baillifs) in the coastal districts." Even though these 
lists may sometimes have missed a ship, or contained some other 
errors, they gave a realistic general picture of the merchant fleet. 
	
8 	 This was the official conversion rate according to the act of 4.10.1876, which 
applied to ships which still had the old läst-figures. 
9 Ships were measured unloaded and the load waterline was determined by 
measuring a certain distance down from the gunwale. The distance was a 
percentage of the depth of the hold, and this percentage was highest for 
paddle-wheel steamships, second highest for propeller steamers and lowest 
for sailing vessels. 
10 This sample was collected from the published ship lists (Finlands 
Skeppskalender) of the 1870s and 1880s. 
	
11 	 "Seamen's houses" were already making ship lists in the 18th century. After 
1809 they were regularly collected by the governors of provinces (1än) and 
sent to the Finnish Senate. Corresponding lists of rural vessels have been 
made by baillifs since 1841, and were also sent to the Senate. Both can be 
found among the letter-acts of either the Economic Department (Ekono-
midepartementet) or the Office of Finance (Finansexpeditionen). After 1860 
they were collected in special series (Fartygsförteckningar, ser. Ef) in the 
latter. They can also be found in the archives of provincial governments 
(länstyrelse) and/or the archives of local officials (kronofogde, länsman).  
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During the last quarter of the century, however, a new system of 
collecting the data gradually developed. In 1873, a new law 
stipulated that every vessel over 10 lästs should be enrolled on an 
official ship-list in the care of the town magistrates before it could 
have a certificate and be used in merchant shipping. Ships over the 
same minimum size from rural districts also had to register in the 
nearest town.12 The following year, a new act extended the 
authority of the sjömanshus to the rural districts as well: rural 
skippers and sailors either became members of the one in the 
nearest town or, if ship-owners preferred, the district could have a 
"house" of its own.13 This reform also brought the rural ships into 
the ship-listing system of the "seamen's houses" (and as these lists 
were used when making Finlands Skeppskalender, the published 
list of the merchant fleet, the rural ships appeared in this 
publication too). Quite logically, most of the local länsmän ceased 
to compile their own lists, but the new registration system in the 
care of magistrates was not "watertight" for many years, and the 
sjömanshus had problems at first in listing ships from rural 
districts.14 For some reason or other, neither of these sources of 
information was developed into a comprehensive system of data 
collection, and this was fatal as far as the quality of the statistics 
was concerned. The existence of parallel but neither totally 
overlapping nor reliable data soon created an almost chaotic 
situation. As early as 1881, there was an official warning that the 
tonnage data (concerning the figures for 1876-78) was very 
defective, and for 1881, 1883-84 and 1887-91 no official 
tonnage statistics were published at al1.19 
In 1889, the ship-lists of the magistrates were reorganized into a 
12 The navigation law 9.6.1873 §4 (Finlands Författnings Samling).  
13 	 Act 30.4.1874 (Finlands Författn. Samling).  
14 Series fartygsförteckningar (Ef), finansexpeditionen. Ship-lists from 
magistrates can be found from c. 1875 onwards, but not for all towns. Lists 
from a couple of Bothnian sjömanshus contain data on "rural" ships from 
around 1875, but in most cases this happened only at the end of the decade, 
especially after rural districts had "houses" of their own. Most of the 
länsmän' s lists from 1874 and 1875 observe only vessels over 25 or 50 lästs,  
and later such lists were compiled only in Ostrobothnian districts, obviously 
because there were lots of small vessels which were not under the authority 
of a local sjömanshus.  
15 Finnish Official Statistics, ser. I, 1876-1892. 
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network of ship registers covering the whole country.16 This was 
soon followed by a reorganization of the statistical system. As 
before, data on registered ships was published in Finlands 
Skeppskalender, but it now became an official publication and, 
beginning in 1892, the official tonnage-statistics (as at 31.12. each 
year) were computed from it.17 However, this did not improve the 
reliability of the statistics, almost the contrary. The ship-lists of the 
1870s may have missed some vessels, but the new registers soon 
contained too many. This is, of course, a typical feature of any 
system of registration which is made an absolute precondition for 
carrying on a trade. While no owner (that is, of a vessel over 19 
tons) could fail to register his ship, it was much less important to 
keep the details up to date and to delete ships which no longer 
existed. Moreover, in some cases a deletion could not be made 
before certain juridical formalities had been carried out.18 
Sometimes even the owners did not receive reliable information 
about their ships for months or years. Perhaps the most ambiguous 
situation arose when a ship was laid up: this may have been done 
just to wait for better freight, but if the laying-up became final, 
there was no one who could tell when the ship ceased to be a ship. 
Naturally, just in case a buyer might be found, the owner liked to 
keep the ship registered as long as it was still afloat. In most cases, 
missing entries in ships' registers were completed later, and even 
laid-up vessels were eventually deleted, but this did not help the 
ship-lists or statistics, which were compiled according to the 
current state of knowledge at the end of each year. Thus they 
16 	 Act 11.11.1889, in force from 1.3.1890. It gave much more detailed rules than 
the 1873 act about the contents of the registers and how and when the owner 
should inform about e.g. the selling or wrecking of a ship. It also stipulated 
that the whole country should be divided into register districts which were 
the same as customs-house districts. 
17 Preface to section II, Finnish Official Statistics ser, I, 1892—. After 1892 
Finlands Skeppskalender was published only every three years, and the 
intervening years were covered by a supplement which only contained data 
on changes in the merchant marine. In practice, the work was done by the 
statistical office of the Board of Customs (Tullstyrelsen), the archives of 
which still contain one volume called "Skeppsreigister" for the years 1895-
1905 (Bg 1). 
18 E.g. if there was a mortgage on a ship, it could not be removed from the 
register before the claim was settled. 
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lacked data on many changes which had already taken place. 
There are cases of ships not being deleted from the registers 
until ten years or more after their sinking, condemnation or final 
laying-up.19 How common this was is much more difficult to say. 
To get some idea of the magnitude of the inflated figures which 
crept into the statistics, I made a comparison between the excellent 
list of 'land ships (c. 1850-1915) compiled by Georg Kåhre,20 and 
the official published ship-list (Finlands skeppskalender). Ships 
which, according to Kåhre, were sold, wrecked or condemned on a 
known date between 1901-11, were examined more closely in 
ships' calendars. Of 55 such ships, 29 were deleted from the 
register the year after the actual end of their career in 'land, which 
is as good as can be expected. In fact, not a single deletion was 
effected during the year in question; 13 were deleted two years 
later, and in five cases the delay was at least four years. Of course, 
it is possible that there are some errors in Kåhre's data, but since he 
used not only literary sources but also information from still (then) 
living ships' masters, such cases cannot be many. All these delays 
imply a cumulative error of 5-6 per cent over ten years, but as 
Kåhre's list obviously lacks reliable data on most of the laid-up 
ships, the excess which crept into the official statistics of the 
Aland merchant fleet must have been greater still. 
There is no way of computing corrected figures starting with any 
estimated percentages of exessive tonnage. Neither is it necessary, 
fortunately, since there exists a series of primary sources which is 
more reliable and almost as comprehensive as the shipping 
statistics and published ship-lists. As was mentioned earlier, the 
sjömanshus also made ship-lists for their respective districts and 
sent them at the end of every year to higher authorities.21 Every 
ship which was engaged in foreign trade had to pay a small 
navigation-due, and this, as well as the recruiting of crews, was 
19 See e.g.  Hoppu, "Suomen merenkulkutilaston uudistaminen"; Kaukiainen, 
Koiviston merenkulun historia, p. 267; Börman, Åboländsk bygdeseglation, 
p. 21. 
20 	 Kåhre, Den åländska segelsjöfartens historia, appendix. 
21 Up to and incl. 1887 they form the series Ef in the archives of the 
finansexpeditionen, 1888-1891 they are in the letter-acts of the office of 
trade and industry (handels- och industriexpeditionen) of the senate, and 
after 1892 in the archives of the inspector of navigation (sjöfartsinspektör), 
ser. Eb. 
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controlled by the local "seamen's house". This was thus a 
storehouse of knowledge about which ships were actually sailing, 
and the lists show that track could even be kept of ships (and their 
crew) which were far from their home-waters. Of course the 
information was not fully comprehensive — obviously in most 
cases inquiries were made of the owners — but any errors caused 
by delayed messages about wrecking are of no real importance. 
Only once was a significant defect found in a ship-list: five big 
ships were missing from the 1913 Vårdö (eastern Aland) data.22 
This was probably because their owner actually lived in 
Mariehamn, and the curator of the "seamen's house" may have 
thought that they were registered there. 
These lists have one substantial drawback, however. Neither the 
navigtion-dues nor crew-control applied to ships which only 
sailed in domestic coastal waters. True, most "houses" had 
information about such vessels as well, but it may not have been as 
up-to-date as it should have been. Bothnian coastal vessels were 
not included in the lists at all, but the fleet in question was small. 
Fortunately, the far larger fleets of small vessels from Aland 
(which mainly sailed to Stockholm), the Turku Archipelago, the 
Nyland coast and the Carelian Isthmus (which sailed to St. 
Petersburg) were all on the books of their respective "seamen's 
houses". One other problematic area is Saimaa, where not all 
towns had a "seamen's house" and magistrates took care of their 
functions. In general, it may be said that the extent of the problems 
and uncertainties with this source material can be narrowed down 
to ships of less than 100 tons, and the whole inland fleet. Data can, 
of course, be checked and completed by the judicious use of 
shipping statistics and published ship-lists. In a study mainly 
concerning foreign shipping proper, these problems are, anyway, 
of secondary importance. 
22 	 The archives of sjöfartsinspektören, ser Eb (Vårdö); Kåhre op.cit., ship-list. A 
couple of years later the error was, however, corrected. 
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The calculation of tonnage — methods and definitions 
In principle, the use of the ship lists from the "seamen's houses" is 
quite straightforward. They usually contain details of each ship — 
name, type or rig, tonnage, year of building, owner, number of 
crew — enabling them to be classified by type and size, and 
respective total numbers and tonnage can be calculated by simple 
addition. As the material is fairly extensive and requires a lot of 
checking for coverage and consistency, as well as additions from 
other sources, it was, however, deemed not reasonable to do this 
for every single year during the period in question. Six sample 
years were chosen instead, 1865, 1875, 1885, 1895, 1905 and 1913. 
This gives two boom years at the beginning, but as the time in 
between was generally good for shipping, this is by no means a 
drawback. According to what the published statistics reveal about 
the development of Finnish merchant tonnage, 1865 falls in the 
middle of a steady rise and 1875 represents the culmination of 
growth. Again, 1885 and 1895 represent years of depression in 
freight markets, and shipping statistics suggest that 1895 was quite 
close to the transition from a long decline to a new rise. This new 
rise, however, ended around 1900 and was followed by an 
unstable period. There were some really bad years around 1905, 
and only after 1910 did better times with higher freight and some 
increase in tonnage follow.23 The year 1913 is a logical end to the 
series as the last year before World War I; it was also typical of the 
pre-war boom. However, 1905 is not ideal because it was definitely 
worse than the top of the preceding boom, about 1900, on the one 
hand, but slighly better than 1902-04 and 1908-09, on the other. 
An attractive alternative would have been to break out from the 
symmetrical ten-year periods and take 1900 and 1908 instead of 
1905, but, unfortunately, there are some serious gaps between 1897 
and 1904 in the source-material, and, in practice, there was not 
much to choose between them. To be realistic, it is not a big 
problem if only one sample year out of six happens to be less than 
ideal. 
The merchant fleet was defined to include only proper cargo- 
23 For business cycles in shipping, see table 4:5 (freight rate indices) and 
Nikula, Åbo sjöfarts historia, p. 6-19;  Rinman — Brodefors, Sjöfartens 
historia, p. 60-61, 74, 79. 
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carrying vessels with their own source of motive power, sails or 
engine, and intended for and capable of other than river, inlake or 
harbour services. Therefore, lighters, barges, tugs, salvage vessels 
and icebreakers were not regarded as merchant vessels. All this is 
quite well in accordance with current Scandinavian statistical 
convention. Neither were vessels under 19 register tons observed. 
This may sound rather a low limit nowadays, but it must be 
remembered that, at the end of the 19th century, small vessels were 
still viable in certain trades. 
In practice, these limits are not always so easy to observe. All 
vessels from Lake Ladoga were, with good reason, regarded as 
inland water vessels, but those from the lake system of Saimaa 
were more difficult to categorize. The "seamen's house" of Joensuu 
usually put ships intended for use outside the Saimaa canal under 
a special heading, but the magistrates of other towns did not pay 
any attention to the use to which the ships would be put.24 In the 
case of passenger ships, however, it was often known if they went 
beyond Wiborg,25 but if no such data was available, a formal 
division was made. Only steamships of 100 tons and over and 
similar-sized sailing vessels which were not barges were regarded 
as seagoing ships and included in the merchant tonnage proper. 
Tugs were called tugs on many ship-lists, otherwise small 
vessels with high-powered engines were excluded. A complicating 
factor is that no less than three different horse-power 
measurements were used simultaneously,26 therefore information 
about ownership was often needed. If the owner was a sawmill or a 
stevedor, the vessel in question was classified as a tug. 
One further problem was the conversion of lästs to tons, as has 
been mentioned. A proper tonnage figure was sought for every 
steamship observed in 1865 and 1875, but if this was not found, 
24 See sources in note 21. 
25 Such data can be found in e.g. Karttunen, Saimaan vesistön höyrylaiva-
liikenteen 100-vuotishistoria; Ahonen, Joensuun kaupunki 1848-1920: 
 
Vehviläinen, Savonlinnan kaupungin historia III. 
26 Up to the 1880s, nominal ("Watt's") horsepower was used almost 
exclusively, but subsequently, indicated horsepower became the most 
common. Even brake horsepower was sometimes used. The problem is that 
most sources do not specify which horsepower was in question — e.g.  
Finlands Skeppskalender could give data in different types of horsepower in 
the same volume. 
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the läst-figure was multiplied by 2.8 (in the case of paddle-
wheelers even this may have been too low, but a further 
elaboration in such a small population would have been 
meaningless). For sailing-ships, the läst-figures were simply 
multiplied by 1.85. Even though this may have produced slightly 
erroneous tonnage in a few individual cases, the relationship holds 
very well on average, and that is what counts on the macro-level.27 
Before the development of tonnage is more closely examined, it 
may be of interest to compare the results of the calculations done 
for this study with the figures from the official shipping statistics. 
Analysis of the differences may provide additional information 
about the reliability or otherwise of both series. Comparable 
figures must be used, however, for if the differences arise from 
both errors and discrepancies in classification, the result is an 
equation with two unknowns. The inland water fleets were 
handled totally differently in this study than in the statistics and 
must be excluded; even coastal tonnage can only be analyzed for 
the years for which the tonnage of barges and lighters is known, or 
when it was negligible. In practice, this means that comparisons 
can be made for 1865, 1875, 1905 and 1913 (table 2:1). 
It is clear that the 1865 and 1875 data agree quite well. True, 
there are differences for coastal parishes in 1865, but this is 
because the statistics also included vessels of between 5 and 10  
lästs. The figures for steamships differ a lot for the simple reason 
that the "official" lost-figures were all too low under the old 
system of measurement. 
The differences are much greater for the years 1905 and 1913, 
especially as far as sailing-ships are concerned: the 1905 statistics 
show an excess of 16 % compared with the tonnage computed for 
this study, and the difference grows to no less than 23% for 1913. 
The figures for steamships are much closer, and the differences 
occurred mainly because tugs and other special vessels were 
included in the statistics but not in the merchant tonnage as 
defined in this study. 
The inconsistencies in the figures for the sailing fleet are so 
dramatic that they require closer scrutiny. First, it can be 
27 This was actually controlled for in the data which was collected from the 
record-books of The Finnish Maritime Insurance Association (see chapter 
III). 
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TABLE 2:1. Merchant tonnage of the Finnish sea-coasts from 
different sources. Net reg.tons. "Statistics" = official 
shipping statistics. 
Sailing-ships Steamships 
Year (excl. barges) 
Statistics This study Statistics This study 
1865 (towns only) 123,840 124,663 1,598 2,669 
1865 (coastal parishes) 63,999 60,364 — — 
1875 (towns only) 115,316 114,400 6,621 7,756 
1905 214,707 182,260 46,056 44,614 
1913 221,497 179,142 61,843 56,545 
NB: Vessels which transported sawn goods on the lake system of Saimaa 
have been excluded from the Wiborg figures. There are big gaps for 
coastal parishes in the 1875 statistics. 
Source: Finnish Official Statistics, ser. I and IB and appendix I. Data on 
the tonnage of barges can be found only for after 1904 in the text 
of the shipping statistics. 
mentioned that the statistics for the towns Rauma and 
Uusikaupunki, which, apart from Åland, had the greatest sailing 
fleets (and practically no barges) in 1905 and 1913, agree very well 
with the figures computed from the ship lists of "seamen's 
houses". The Åland figures are quite close for 1905, but the 
statistics show an "excess" of about 10% for 1913. On the other 
hand, the differences were very large in some coastal parishes in 
South-west Finland. 
One more comparison can be made for the total tonnages in the 
larger size-classes of sailing-ships (there were few barges larger 
than 500 tons). The figures (table 2:2) show that, even for 1913, the 
data on such vessels agree quite well, and there are no real 
differences in the two largest classes (the tonnage of a ship might 
vary a little according to the source). 
It seems that the problem narrows down both geographically 
and in size-classes. Geographically, the statistics seem to be 
exaggerated for areas where shipping was in decline. The same 
applies to the size-classes between 500 and 1000 tons (and very 
probably also 300 to 500 tons), and once again, this is connected 
with decline, because these classes mostly consisted of wood- 
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Table 2:2. Sailing ships in the larger size-classes, 1913. 
Size-class 	 Statistics 	 This study 
net tons 	 Ships 	 Net tons 	 Ships 	 Net tons 
500>700 23 13,043 18 10,413 
700>1000 22 18,571 15 12,859 
1000>1500 13 17,184 13 17,090 
1500— 32 59,078 32 59,114 
Source: As table 2:1. 
hulled ships built in the 1870s (in either Finland or North 
America), which were reaching the end of their natural life. Larger 
ships, on the other hand, were of iron or steel, and they were 
bought in localities where shipping was still holding its own. 
Accordingly, the differences between the official statistics and the 
figures computed in this study can probably be accounted for by 
the old laid-up ships which still remained on the register and 
therefore crept into the statistics, although they contributed 
nothing to the shipping services or shipping income of the 
country, nor to the accounts of the "seamen's houses". Of course, it 
is possible that some ships which were still in business were 
missed by "seamen's houses" other than Wårdö, but, compared 
with the total difference, or error, this is not significant. 
Whether laid-up ships which were still able to sail should be 
included in the merchant navy is a point worth considering. It may 
be logical to do so in principle, but it is impossible to follow in 
practice, since the actual condition of these vessels is not known. 
Moreover, for a study in which the focus is on the performance and 
income of the merchant navy, the tonnage which matters is the 
tonnage which actually sailed. This principle has been followed 
consistently in this study and even ships which are listed by a 
"seamen's house" but which are known not to have sailed during 
the year in question are excluded. Thus, all tonnage figures for the 
six sample years refer only to vessels which, as far as can be 
ascertained, were in existence at the end of the respective year, and 
had made at least one commercial voyage during the previous 12 
months. 
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The development of total tonnage 
The results of a long and complicated search for reliable data are 
presented in detail in tables I:1-6 in the appendix. The core of 
this information, the total development of the Finnish merchant 
marine, can, however, be summarised in a rather simple and short 
set of data. Table 2:3 presents the tonnages according to two 
different definitions. First, all ships of at least 19 net tons are 
recorded (table 2:3A). However, according to certain modern 
statistical conventions, only sailing vessels of 100 net tons and 
over, and steamships of 100 gross tons and over, are included in 
the merchant fleet, so this alternative was also calculated (table 
2:3B).28 Since the data consists of observations at ten-year periods, 
it can, of course, show only a general trend. Some idea of short-
term fluctuations can be found in the "raw" (or uncorrected) 
tonnage-series of shipping statistics, and in figure 2:1 both sets of 
data have been superimposed. 
It has already been mentioned that the earlier part of the period 
was the culmination of a "golden era" in Finnish shipping. Indeed, 
the merchant fleet of the most important seaports had increased 
steadily since the 1830s, and although the Crimean war caused a 
steep decline — mostly because owners sold ships in order to 
avoid the seemingly inevitable material losses — the pre-war level 
was regained at the end of the 1850s, and soon surpassed.Z9 In 
1865, the total fleet seems to have been some 50% larger than it 
was in 1853, just before the Crimean war. This rise continued up to 
the middle of the 1870s, but some signs of a change could already 
be detected at the end of the preceding decade: according to the 
official statistics, the growth in total tonnage halted in 1870-72 
(see figure 2:1). Growth from 1865 to 1875 was still in the order of 
30 %, or on average almost three per cent per annum. 
28 It must be pointed out that, as gross tonnages are not regularly found in the 
sources, the classification of many steamships is based on estimated gross 
tonnages. The relationship between gross and net tonnages was, however, 
calculated by decades, as the volume of engines and bunkers sunk with the 
advent of more efficient machinery. Moreover, this is a problem which only 
affects a rather limited amount of small ships. 
29 E.g. Kaukiainen, "Merenkulku", p. 461-465. 
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1860 	 1865 	 1870 	 1875 	 1880 	 1885 	 1890 	 1895 	 1900 	 1905 	 1910 
Fig. 2.1. The Development of the Finnish Merchant Tonnage, 
1860— 1914. 
1 = total sailing-vessel tonnage according to official statistics 
2 = sailing-vessels tonnage according to official statistics, 
excluding lighters, barges and inland fleets 
3 = total steamship tonnage according to official statistics 
4 = steamship tonnage according to official statistics, excluding 
tugs and inland fleet 
• = sailing-vessel tonnage according to this study 
• = steamship tonnage according to this study 









TABLE 2:3. Finnish merchant marine, 1865-1913. 
A. Ships 19 net tons and over. 
Tonnage, net register tons 
1865 1875 1885 1895 1905 1913 
Sailing vessels 185,030 237,670 208,070 181,360 182,260 179,140 
Steamships 2,670 8,200 12,120 21,950 44,610 56,550 
Total 187,700 245,870 220,190 203,310 226,870 235,690 
B. Sailing ships 100 net tons and over, steamships 100 gross tons 
and over. 
Tonnage, net register tons 
1865 1875 1885 1895 1905 1913 
Sailing vessels 151,590 208,640 181,560 151,630 145,490 138,560 
Steamships 2,220 7,740 11,540 20,510 43,030 53,750 
Total 153,810 216,380 193,100 172,140 188,520 192,310 
NB: Lighters, barges and non-cargo-carrying special vessels are not 
recorded. Of inland lake fleets, only vessels which are known to 
have sailed regularly at least to the Gulf of Finland are included. 
Source: Appendix I. 
After the late 1870s, there was a definite change of trend: if the 
official statistics are to be believed, the actual drop began in 1877 
(figure 2:1). This coincides with the beginning of the so-called 
"long depression", which was clearly felt in shipping.30 From 1875 
to 1885, the Finnish merchant fleet was reduced by about 10%, 
and a further 10% reduction was experienced during the following 
decade. Then the tide turned again, but this period of growth was 
interrupted by a new slump which lasted most of the first decade 
of this century. It was only around 1910 that the tonnage began to 
30 The well-known Isserlis' freight index ("Tramp shipping cargoes and 
freights", chart 2, p. 76) shows a decline after 1873. The Norwegian freight 
rate index calculated by Fischer and Nordvik ("Maritime transport and the 
integration of the North Atlantic economy", p. 537) peaks in 1873-74 and 
presents a more modest decline than the former. 
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grow again, but World War I ended this boom, and, after the 
autumn of 1914, the best part of the Finnish merchant marine was 
confined to the Baltic. 
This new and corrected series shows that in 1913, the total 
merchant tonnage of the country was actually smaller than it had 
been in the middle of the 1870s. Thus, developments after the 
1870s were still worse than the official statistics suggest. Of course, 
the counting of nominal register tons does not tell the whole story. 
As the proportion of steamships which were able to transport in a 
given time more goods per ton than sailing vessels increased, the 
actual carrying capacity of the Finnish merchant fleet did grow a 
little. Expressed in conventional "sail-tons" (1 steam-ton = 3 sail-








According to these figures, the carrying-capacity of the Finnish 
merchant fleet was one third higher in 1913 than in 1875. As the 
maritime carrying-capacity for the whole world had probably 
grown six-fold during the same period,31 this was rather a poor 
performance. 
Structural changes in the fleet 
The total tonnage figures can only give a very rough idea of what 
really happened. Even though the Finnish merchant navy was not 
very large in actual numbers, it was far from uniform and may be 
described as not one fleet but rather as a score of different fleets 
which also developed differently. First, as in any country, there 
were different fleets for coastal and long trades. Second, sail and 
steam fleets, of course, were very different at the time when steam 
31 	 See chapter I, note 3. 
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was still experiencing rapid technical development and was 
gradually beginning to establish itself in ocean trades. A third 
feature, which was peculiar to Finland, was the traditional 
difference between urban and rural shipowning, the latter being 
unusually important. Rural shipowners had somewhat restricted 
shipping rights before 1868 (see p. 27) and, at first, their fleets were 
different from those of the urban owners. Subsequently, these 
differences diminished, although in certain respects they never 
totally vanished. 
Because of this inherent heterogeneity, there is a need for 
careful consideration of the structural changes in the merchant 
fleet. The most important features can be satisfactorily described if 
the fleet is classified by means of propulsion, size-group and home 
port (or rather by provinces and urban/rural classification). This 
kind of statistical examination, combined with a description of the 
most important novelties or technical innovations, will give a 
rough idea of how the actual environment — economic as well as 
technical — affected the decision-making of the owners. As the 
structural features mentioned above overlap, it seems most 
practical to present the development chronologically, by observing 
what kind of changes actually took place between subsequent 
decadic sample years. 
The period of growth (the 1860s and 1870s) 
Up to and far beyond the end of the 1870s, the domination of sail 
was not far from total. Steam only had a 1.3 % share of tonnage in 
1865, about 3 % in 1875 and just exeeded 5 % during the first half 
of the 1880s (see table 2:3A). Most steamships were intended for 
passenger traffic on the coast or on the Baltic, and, accordingly, 
(counting vessels of at least 19 tons) their average size in 1865 was 
a little less than 100 net tons. In 1875, however, the average 
tonnage had increased to about 160. As total steam-tonnage had 
trebled, interest in modern shipping technology was obviously 
increasing. The transition from paddle wheels to propellors took 
place during the latter part of the 1860s: the first propellor steamer 
which could be called a ship was commissioned in 1864 and the 
last large paddle-wheeler started its working life in 1867.32 
32 	 Lindberg, Ångbåtssjöfart i Åbo, p. 178, 179; Finlands skeppskalender 1860- 
70. 
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Unfortunately, the contemporary ship lists and calendars give very 
few particulars about engines. However, according to a contem-
porary description, a ship which was delivered from a Swedish 
yard in 1864 had "double cylinders", which must mean a 
compound engine.33 Since 1870 at least, all newly built ships seem 
to have been furnished with such engines.34 
Steamships were ordered from British, Swedish and St. 
Petersburg yards, and so it was relatively easy to learn about new 
innovations. Even one Finnish yard in Turku began building iron 
steamers and engines.35 Yet, in 1875 there were still only a few 
steamers which were big enough to be used in long trade, and most 
of these were not proper steamships but wooden sailing ships with 
auxiliary steam-engines. This combination of traditional 
shipbuilding and new machine technology seemed quite attractive 
at first. The first three auxiliaries were built in 1865-66 in the 
lake-system of Saimaa, but this innovation had also spread to the 
sea-coast before the turn of the decade. At least 18 auxiliaries 
altogether — barques and barquentines — were built in Finland 
between 1865 and 1874, and they amounted to no less than about 
60 % of all new steam tonnage during that time.36 Almost all of 
them were engaged in foreign trade beyond the Baltic, but, by and 
large, they were not very successful. Indeed, the engines were 
removed from at least two of them, and at least one projected 
auxiliary was launched as an ordinary sailing vesse1.37 In 1875, 
there were only seven or eight38 such ships in Finland with a total 
tonnage of about 2,000. 
In the 1860s, the urban and rural fleets were still very different, 
almost mirror images of each other. The former included all the big 
vessels sailing on the oceans: excluding steamers, ships over 300 
tons comprised almost 80 % of their total tonnage, and the average 
was 312 tons. The coastal parish fleets, again, consisted mostly of 
33 Lindberg, Ångbåtsjöfart, p. 178. 
34 
	
	 Lindberg, Ångbåtsjöfart, p. 198; The Ships of our First Century, p. 15-21. 
Compound engine was also called "Wolff engine". Cf. Persson, Stimbåt. 
35 Lindberg, Ångbåtsjöfart, p. 198. 
36 Finlands Skeppskalender 1865-73. 
37 Nikula, Åbo sjöfarts historia, appendix ship-list; Building-accounts of 
Regina, archives of August Eklöf.  
38 In a few cases, it is difficult to say whether a vessel should be classed as a 
steamship or an auxiliary. 
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relatively small vessels: half of the total tonnage belonged to the 
class of coastal vessels (19-100 tons), there was just a single ship 
over 500 tons and the average was a rather modest 67 tons. 
There is no doubt that urban shipowners were the leading and 
really innovative group in Finnish shipping and carried on the true 
international shipping business. They also adopted new 
techniques, and in 1865 there were still no steamships in rural 
districts. This applies especially to the Ostrobothnian towns, 
which built the biggest ships and also had the largest fleets. The 
following table (2:4) shows the structure of urban shipping in 
different parts of Finland, as well as how it developed. The table 
shows that the period of expansion had already come to an end in 
the towns before 1875. From the official shipping statistics, it 
seems that the turning point was the short depression which began 
around 1867. Even though this was followed by a new 
shipbuilding boom, earlier levels were not attained. The decline in 
tonnage was rather universal. 
During this same period, however, the fleets were also being 
modernized. Domestic shipbuilding was still very strong, and 
when old vessels were sold or scrapped, the replacements were 
usually larger. This increase in size was especially conspicuous in 
the Ostrobothnian towns, where earlier long traders of 300-500 
tons were replaced by ships of over 600-700,39 sometimes even 
over 1,000 tons. Thus the proportion of ships of 500 tons or more 
rose from 47 % of the total urban tonnage in 1865 to 60% in 1875, 
and that of ships of at least 700 tons from 10 % to 22 %. In 1865 
there was only one ship over 1,000 tons in the whole country (the 
fullrigged ship Martin Luther from Wiborg); by 1875 there were 
five. Still more were built and in 1879 the ship Ägir (1,383 net 
tons) was launched in Turku.40 This, however, marked the end of 
an era: no sailing ship of over 1,000 tons was built in Finland after 
that date. 
Quite obviously, increases in size were dictated by economic 
considerations. The size of vessels in international traffic was also 
on the increase. The average of all British sailing vessels, for 
39 A special type were the large brigs of over 600 tons which were built in 
Raahe. They were economical to build as the rig was simpler than that of a 
barque, and they seem to have been practical bulk-carriers. 
40 	 Nikula, Åbo sjöfarts historia, p. 66. 
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TABLE 2:4. Merchant sailing fleets of towns in different parts of 
Finland, 1865 and 1875. 
1865 1875 
Area Total sail Average Total sail Average 
tonnage size tonnage size 
Ostrobothnia 66,870 372 60,280 507 
South-west Finland 41,220 312 38,600 336 
Gulf of Finland coast 15,830 188 15,080 256 
Inland towns 750 188 440 147 
All towns 124,660 312 114,400 386 
Source: Appendix I. 
example, rose from 136 tons to 197 tons between 1850 and 1870 
and American and Canadian yards produced softwood vessels of 
up to 2,000 tons.41 With their lower running costs per ton, the new, 
bigger ships could take over the best routes from older, small full-
riggers and barques. At the same time, requirements concerning 
the construction and equipping of ships were increased as 
it became common practice in many long trades that only 
classified ships were chartered (otherwise the cargo could not be 
insured). Building ships of over, say, 6-700 tons from traditional 
Finnish softwood presented certain problems, and plenty of iron 
and even imported oak had to be used for main structural 
members; diagonal strapping (iron bands inside the planking), for 
example, became common in vessels of over 500 tons in the early 
1870s. Wire was often used as standing rigging — the Ägir even 
had iron masts and yards — and copper, zinc or yellow metal 
sheathing and copper fastening became standard in ships intended 
for ocean trades. Drawings were ordered from Danish and 
Swedish, and sometimes even American, naval architects, and 
many major shipowners obviously tried to follow the latest trends 
in wooden shipbuilding. One owner even considered building a 
clipper, but since this kind of vessel was not very practical for 
transporting wood cargo, the idea was soon abandoned. Yet, many 
41 Mitchell, European Historical Statistics, p. 651; McGregor, Merchant Sailing 
Ships, p. 174-175. 
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big ships could be called "medium clippers", that is, they were 
sharper than was normal in the 1840s or 1850s.42 That no ship over 
1,500 tons was built was probably because a softwood ship of such 
capacity must have been much deeper than Finnish shipowners 
were willing to accept (on the Bothnian coast in particular, the 
shallowness of the sea lanes was a problem). Indeed, the largest 
ships built in Finland were no less in length and beam than 
American and Canadian ships of over 1,500 tons (e.g. the Ägir was 
clearly longer and broader than the Canadian Marco Polo, 1,625 
tons), but never had more than two decks, unlike North American 
big ships which regularly had three.43  
The rising standard of building specifications and of rigging and 
equipment inevitably incurred more costs, and some con-
temporary writers actually thought that the biggest ships were too 
expensive to be profitable.44 Whether the actual capital costs per 
ton did rise, will, however, be examined later. 
The fleet of the coastal parishes was, as indicated previously, 
quite different, and it also developed differently. Table 2:5 shows 
the geographical distribution. By far the most important "peasant" 
fleets were those of the southwestern coast and archipelago and 
Åland, traditionally oriented towards Stockholm, and of the 
easternmost coast of the Gulf of Finland, which carried on 
extensive coastal trade to St. Petersburg.45 Coastal trade was still 
very important in 1865: about half of the "peasant" tonnage 
consisted of vessels smaller than 100 tons (and quite a lot of 
the smallest are not included in the figures). On the other 
hand, shipping on the Baltic and to Britain was increasing. 
Yet, vessels over 300 tons were still rare — they were found 
mostly in Åland — and rather than fullrigged ships and barques, 
brigs and schooners were typical long-traders. 
42 E.g. Nikula, Åbo sjöfarts historia, p. 66-67;  Norrvik, Briggen Carl Gustaf, p. 
46-47, 50; Nikula, Malmska handelshuset, p. 277-299; Kopisto, "Laiva 
Toivo, Oulu". Collection of drawings of ships in the provincial archives of 
Öulu (mainly from the archives of the houses of Bergbohm, Snellman and 
Sovio). 
43 	 Cf. McGregor, Fast Sailing Ships, p. 186-187. 
44 Norrvik, Briggen Carl Gustaf, p. 25. 
45 	 See Kaukiainen, Suomen tal onpoikaispurjehdus. 
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Total sail 	 Average 
tonnage 	 size 
1875 
Total sail 	 Average 
tonnage 	 size 
Ostrobothnia 2,870 45 7,080 93 
Southwest Finland'  15,750 81 40,410 157 
Åland islands2 18,520 141 45,600 215 
South coast3 4,580 49 6,410 61 
Southeast coast' 18,650 45 23,540 62 
Inland 230 115 
Total 60,370 67 123,270 120 
1 The province of Turku and Pori excl.  Åland 
2 There was a town, Mariehamn (founded 1861), on the Åland islands, 
but at this time it had few ships. 
3 The province of Nyland. 
4 The coast of the province of Wiborg. 
Source: Appendix I. 
It can be seen from the table that the period 1865-75 was a time of 
impressive growth for this part of the Finnish merchant fleet. The 
total tonnage doubled and the increase was particularly big in 
areas where shipping was important before — the Aland islands in 
particular experienced a real shipping boom. 
The size structure changed, too. Coastal tonnage even decreased 
in actual numbers, comprising only a good fifth in 1875, while the 
tonnage of ships of 300 tons and over had grown to around 30%. 
Quite obviously, the shipowners of the coastal parishes still 
regarded investment in ships as profitable, and so scores of 
barques were built for them, although many city burghers were no 
longer increasing their fleets. Whether the different developments 
in urban and rural areas were a result of the competion between 
them remains to be seen, but in any case, the success of the rural 
fleet was enough to offset the small decline in the urban fleet and 
to result in a substantial increase in the total tonnage of the 
country. 
Yet, the "peasant" ships of 1875 were still of rather modest size 
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of sailing ships 
tons 
Finland 2.4 162 
Sweden 19.6 118 
Denmark 19.0 123 
Norway 3.2 172 
United Kingdom 46.3 198 
Germany 17.5 195 
France 24.9 55 
Italy 5.8 91 
Greece 10.6 50 
Atlantic Canada (1874) 7.8 169 
Source: Mitchell, European historical statistics; Matthews, "The shipping 
industry of Atlantic Canada." 
compared with their urban sisters, being only half the size in 
average tonnage and with only one ship of over 700 tons. Neither 
were they generally very well built or equipped: they usually had 
no metal sheathing on the bottom but rather relied on the old-
fashioned "sacrificial" wood lining, which of course gave some 
protection against teredo navalis, but meant that the bottoms were 
soon fouled up. Thus they were not great ocean traders. On the 
other hand, they were well suited to the humble trade in wood 
products from Finland to the North Sea ports. 
To put developments in Finland into perspective, the fleets of 
some important maritime nations are compared in table 2:6. The 
figures, again, refer to the "raw" statistics of registered ships and 
cannot, therefore, be taken as absolutely accurate.46 In any case, 
they should suffice to indicate the most significant differences. 
It is clear that the proportion of steamships in Finland was far 
46 Official Finnish statistics, for example, show that the proportion of steam 
tonnage was 2.4 %, while the figures in table 2:3 show 3.3 %. The difference 
arises because, among other things, steamship tonnage has been adjusted 
upwards in this study. 
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lower than most of the other countries, and only Norway was at 
roughly the same level. There were even other resemblances 
between the Finnish and Norwegian fleets. The average size of the 
Norwegian sailing vessels was a little higher, but the proportion of 
big ships of 500 tons and over was about the same (around 30 %).47 
This was higher than the average in other Scandinavian fleets, 
about the same as in Canada and far higher than in France or the 
Mediterranian countries. Finland had no famous clippers and did 
not build such huge wooden ships as were launched at the yards of 
the United States and Canada, nor had she begun to use iron for 
ships as English and Scottish shipbuilders did. Nevertheless, the 
sailing merchant fleet of the country was in general quite up to 
date and up to good, North Atlantic standards. 
The period of stagnation (the 1880s and early 1890s) 
During the period of stagnation and tonnage decrease, there was 
only one exception: the steam-propelled fleet grew all the time. 
Tonnage trebled in the two decades between 1875 and 1895 
although, being very modest to start with, it just exceeded 10% of 
the whole merchant tonnage in 1895. 
As table 2:7 shows, most of the steam fleet was based in three 
towns, Vaasa, Turku and Helsinki. Of these, only Helsinki really 
increased its tonnage during the depression and accounted for no 
less than 90% of the total growth. Thus, steam tonnage in the 
capital rose to 53% of the total. This increase was largely brought 
about by the development of a single enterprise, The Finnish 
Steamship Company (Finska Ånfartygs Aktiebolaget, usually 
abbreviated to FAA). It started in 1883 with two 700 net ton (1,100 
dwt) steamers operating regular services to the English East coast, 
and in 1895 it already owned ten ships of similar size.48 Apart from 
FÅA, there was just another company carrying regular traffic to the 
North Sea ports, the Wasa-Nordsjö Angbåts Ab. (which was set up 
in 1873 with a 250-ton steamer), but in 1895 it had only two North 
Sea steamers and three smaller ones.49 
In 1895 the Finnish steam fleet could be divided into three main 
47 Finnish Official Statistics I:6, p. 10. 
48 Suviranta, Suomen höyrylaiva osakeyhtiö, p. 22-39. 
49 Wasa-Norsjö ångbåts a.b., p. 19-43. 
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Ostrobothnia 4,830 254 4,220 281 
— Vaasa 3,020 275 3,020 302 
Southwest Finland 2,440 136 3,610 124 
— Turku 1,940 139 2,090 110 
Aland — 200 67 
Gulf of Finland coast 4,230 128 13,270 204 
— Helsinki 3,000 215 11,570 351 
Interior 620 103 650 108 
Total 12,120 159 21,950 186 
Source: Appendix I. 
categories. First, there were rather modern cargo steamers of over 
500 tons, such as the FAA boats, which occasionally even carried 
passengers. They were all newly built and ordered from British or 
German yards, and, after the late 1880s they were fitted with triple 
expansion engines.50 This top group accounted for no more than 
about 8,500 net tons, but it was still almost 40 % of total steam 
tonnage. The next group consisted of ships which either ran long 
coastal routes (e.g. North-Ostrobothnia — St.Petersburg or 
St.Petersburg — Stockholm) or sailed on the Baltic. They were 
usually 300-400 net tons and carried cargo as well as passengers. 
Most of these ships were newly built and ordered from Sweden in 
the 1870s or early 1880s, and thus they usually had compound 
engines.51 This category should include all steamers of over 200 
and under 500 tons, thus adding up to about 8,000 tons altogether. 
Finally, there were the coastal steamers which included some 
fairly old vessels and which accounted for more than 5,000 tons in 
all. 
Among the smallest steamers were a few wooden vessels, but 
iron and steel dominated the other groups totally. The popularity 
50 	 The Ships of our First Century, p. 10-14. 
51 See note 34. 
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of wood-hulled auxiliaries declined rapidly, and by 1895 they 
were non-existant. In 1895, all the larger ships were town-based 
and only some coastal steamers belonged to rural parishes. 
The sailing fleet developed in a totally different way, or rather, 
at first it did not develop at all. No big ships were built after 1879, 
and up to the end of the 1880s, long-trading tonnage mainly 
consisted of what was left from the preceding decade. Without any 
new construction the fleet slowly diminished as old vessels 
decayed and were removed from service. Some tolerably good 
ships were even sold abroad, to Norway in particular. 
Table 2:8 shows that the stagnant trend continued until the mid-
1890s, when the total sail-tonnage was only 76% of what it was 
two decades earlier, and was also below the level of the mid-1860s. 
The laying-up of old vessels was not the only change; indeed, 
closer examination of the fleet reveals two interesting trends. First, 
coastal shipping tonnage grew, and was actually higher in 1895 
than it had been in 1875. This suggests that some small ships had 
been built, particularly on the easternmost coast, where trade to 
St.Petersburg increased at almost the same rate as the city grew. 
There were even some Baltic and North Sea vessels of 200-300 
tons built around 1890, mostly on the southwestern coast, but 
these were not enough to counteract the continuous decline in the 
ranks of old vessels. 
The second point of interest is that the tonnage of ships over 
1,000 tons more than doubled since 1885 and quadrupled since 
1875. The trend towards greater ships thus continued. However, it 
was no longer manifest in new, domestic building, but in buying 
second-hand vessels from abroad. As the demand for sailing 
tonnage had dramatically reduced since the mid-1870s, prices 
dropped in proportion, and it was soon possible to acquire a ten-
year-old and perfectly sound, hardwood vessel for much less than 
it cost to built a new one from domestic softwood. Naturally, 
foreign ships had occasionally been bought before (for example, in 
1881 two hardwood ships, of 1,200 and 760 tons, were added to 
the fleet of the Ostrobothnian town of Oulu);52 however, it became 
really common after 1889, when ocean freight at last increased 
52 	 Snellman, Oulun laivoja ja laivureita, p. 140-141  (ship Gustaf Adolf  and 
barque Karl). 
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TABLE 2:8. Merchant sailing fleets in different parts of Finland in 
1885 and 1895. 
1885 










a) towns 44,510 495 22,760 517 
b) rural parishes 3,070 70 710 39 
South-west Finland 
a) towns 39,220 360 40,7802 340 
b) rural parishes 40,410 180 35,480 167  
Åland 43,850 244 50,390 260 
Gulf of Finland coast 
a) towns 11,660 253 9,1303 152 
b) rural parishes 24,470 53 21,570 49 
Interior 
a) towns 810 161 540 135 
b) rural parishes 170 58 — . 
All towns 97,220 386 75,210 330 
All rural parishes' 111,970 122 108,150 125 
Total 208,070 179 181,360 166 
1 All Åland included. 
2 The combined figure for Uusikaupunki and its surroundings is 
distributed according to the same percentages as in the official 
shipping statistics, according to which, 59% of tonnage was from the 
town. 
3 Six cases with a combined figure for a town and its surroundings are 
similarly divided into urban and rural. 
Source: Appendix I. 
somewhat. There were 19 sailing-ships of over 1,000 tons in the 
Finnish fleet in 1895 (see appendix I:4A), of which no less than 16 
were bought from abroad.53 Many second-hand vessels were also to 
be found in smaller size-classes, and between 1889 and 1895 the 
town of Turku, for example, acquired nine, with a combined 
53 	 Finlands Skeppskalender records where most of these were built. Only three 
were domestic-built ships from the 1870s. 
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tonnage of over 8,100 tons54 (in 1895, the town's total sailing 
tonnage amounted to 11,660 tons). Most of the second-hand 
vessels were European-built hardwood ships of 700-1,100 tons, 
but a few larger North American softwood vessels, the biggest 
being over 1,700 tons, were also found. As some indication of what 
was to come, there were also two iron or steel ships in the fleet. 
The first one had been bought just one year before, and the second, 
a four-masted barque of 2,150 tons, and only three years old, was 
purchased in June 1895; both were owned by the same company 
from the small town of Rauma.55 
Metal-hulled windjammers were being built in great numbers as 
early as in the late 1850s in Britain, and they had been able to 
compete successfully on the long ocean trades. Their hulls were 
strong and they retained their classification longer than wooden 
vessels.56 Nor did they need any expensive metal sheathing as 
protection against teredo navalis — new antifouling paints were 
being developed instead. Thus, it is no wonder that iron and steel 
sailing ships were still being built in great numbers decades after 
the last big wooden windjammers had been launched (France was 
a major customer for these in the 1890s), but as the demand for sail 
did not grow, second-hand prices began to fall. Iron and steel 
sailing vessels soon became common in the Finnish merchant 
fleet. 
Different local fleets also developed differently. A comparison 
of 1895 and 1875 tonnages appears below: 
	
54 	 Nikula, Åbo sjöfarts historia, appendix ship-list. 
	
55 	 Finnish official statistics I:14, p. 13; Ship lists of Rauma sjömanshus 1894- 
95; The ships of our First Century, p. 198 (the Fennia). As early as in 1892, 
according to Finlands skeppskalender, there was one iron-hulled barque 
(Pallas, 1. 251 nt.) in Vaasa. It was, however, still a kind of composite ship: 
the iron shell was covered by timber so that a traditional copper sheathing 
could be used without the risk of excessive corrosion. 
	
56 	 See e.g. Harley, "The Persistence of Old Techniques", p. 374; McGregor, Fast 
Sailing Ships, p. 130-135; McGregor, Merchant Sailing Ships, p. 16-17, 
113—. 
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Tonnage in 1895 as a per- 
Area 	 centage of tonnage in 1875 
Ostrobothnia 
a) towns 	 37 
b) coastal parishes 	 13 
South-west Finland 
a) towns 	 111 
b) coastal parishes 	 83  
Åland 	 111 
Gulf of Finland coast 
a) towns 	 61 
b) coastal parishes 	 72 
Inland 
a) towns 	 123 
b) coastal parishes 
All towns 	 66 
All coastal parishes' 	 86 
Total 	 76 
1 Including all Åland.  
Coastal parishes generally fared a little better than towns. There 
were, however, great differences among the towns, and those in 
Ostrobothnia, which once comprised the major shipping district, 
experienced a really steep decline. On the other hand, tonnage 
increased in the Southwest, but this was mainly due to just one 
small town, Rauma, where tonnage inreased almost threefold from 
1875, mostly due to the purchase of second-hand vessels. One 
other town which also had a relatively large second-hand fleet and 
a little tonnage increase on 1875 was Vaasa. This was a big 
exception among the Bothnian towns, and if it is excluded, total 
tonnage of the province was three quarters less than two decades 
earlier. 
A third town which fared better than the average, although there 
was no increase in sail tonnage, was Turku. As was mentioned 
before, foreign, second-hand vessels were common here too. 
Among the non-urban districts, again, only Aland was able to 
increase its fleet a little. Even here, a few foreign ships had been 
bought, but the Aland shipowners had also purchased many from 
the Bothnian towns. 
3 — Sailing into Twilight 
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Of all Finnish urban and rural districts, only two really 
advanced in shipping during these years of stagnation: the capital 
Helsinki built the first Finnish steamship fleet of any size for 
foreign trade, and the tiny Rauma experienced a rather surprising 
sailing ship boom. In general, Finnish shipping did not fare too 
well, neither compared with its previous performance nor with 
other maritime nations. True, there were a couple of regions where 
steam shipping increased almost as little, such as Norway (the 
proportion of steam tonnage was 20 % in 1895) and the North 
American seaboards (in Atlantic Canada steam represented 
17 % of tonnage in 1895). In most countries, however, both 
quantitative and technical developments were far better than in 
Finland, and thus it was definitely lagging behind in international 
competition. 
The period of fluctuation (the mid-1890s to World War I) 
Steamship tonnage grew very rapidly during the boom years of the 
late 1890s: it doubled between 1895 and 1905, and the best part of 
the increase was actually recorded before 1901. After the turn of 
the century, developments were rather unstable and fluctuating, 
and between 1905 and 1913, the average increase was actually 
slower than during the preceding two decades. In 1905, 
steamships represented almost 20 % of total tonnage, and no more 
than 24 % at the end of 1913. 
Tonnage in different size-categories developed quite differently, 
as the figures below show: 
Size-class 1895 1905 1913 
20>200 net tons 5,500 6,830 8,480 
200>500 net tons 7,930 8,580 8,870 
500 — 	 net tons 8,520 29,230 39,050 
It is clear that the growth of ocean-going steam-tonnage (for ships 
larger than 500 net tons) was massive between 1895 and 1905, but 
then diminished. Technically the ships did not change so much. 
Indeed, the most revolutionary development since the turn of the 
century seems to have been a two-fold increase on the earlier 
optimum size of cargo-carrier, about 1100 dwt, on some of the 
busiest routes. The demands of increasing emigrant traffic were 
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Ostrobothnia 6,480 381 6,100 244 
— Vaasa 4,400 400 5,640 376 
Southwest Finland 5,990 200 8,210 164 
— Turku 3,510 153 7,320 198 
Aland 70 34 170 87 
Gulf of Finland coast 31,510 303 41,340 350 
— Helsinki 28,440 605 38,580 654 
Interior 570 113 730 122 
Total 44,610 282 56,550 281 
Source: Appendix I. 
taken care of by building combined cargo and passenger steamers 
which could carry 300 (Arcturus and Polaris, 1899), and later more 
than 700 (Titania, 1908) passengers.57 
Medium-sized tonnage growth was slower, almost zero during 
the last decade of the period. Many of the older coastal liners were 
sold abroad, and, since trains were now a faster means of transport 
between South-Finland and St.Petersburg or North-Ostrobothnia, 
no new ships were built to replace them. Short coastal routes, 
especially in the Turku Archipelago, expanded, however, and 
coastal tonnage grew at a steady pace. 
Geographically, the pattern remained almost unaltered (see 
table 2:9); indeed, the domination of the three most important 
towns increased further. At the end of 1913, the steam fleets of 
Helsinki, Turku and Vaasa constituted no less than 92 % of the 
Finnish total. Helsinki was constantly in a class of its own, and its 
share rose from 61 % in 1895 to 68 % in 1913; accordingly, the 
development of the country's steam shipping was largely dictated 
by what happened in the capital. Helsinki was also dominated by 
the Finnish Steamship Company (FAA); in 1895, 85 % of the local 
steam-tonnage belonged to it, but this figure dropped to about one 
half (or a third of the whole country's steam-tonnage) when a 
57 	 The Ships of our First Century, p. 30-31, 40. 
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couple of new steamship companies were established. 
Steam shipping also remained an urban business. In 1913 there 
were barely a dozen, small steam vessels in the coastal parishes58 
and they totalled about one per cent of the national tonnage. 
The boom of the late 1890s brought to a halt the downward 
trend in sail, and the total tonnage began to grow for the first time 
in twenty years. Even though this boom was followed by a further 
period of decline, sailing tonnage was still about as big in 1905 as it 
had been in 1865. It did peak, however, at the turn of the century, 
and during the lean years which lasted until 1909-10, many old 
ships were laid up. Although a new boom began after 1910, total 
sailing tonnage was somewhat less in 1913 than it had been at the 
lowest period of decline in 1895. 
The decline was not universal. Indeed, the trend which was 
already visible in the 1890s, growth at both ends of the scale and 
decline in the middle, still continued. The following figures for the 
different size-classes show this polarization very clearly: 
Size-class 1895 1905 1913 
20>100 29,720 37,960 40,470 
100>700 108,700 75,020 49,800 
700>1500 39,060 57,500 29,950 
1500— 3,880 13,800 59,110 
The size of long-trade sailing ships increased substantially after 
the 1890s. All the ships in this category were bought from abroad, 
but they were increasingly of iron or steel, and by 1913, practically 
all which were larger than 1,000 tons had metal hulls. Both in the 
late 1890s and early 1910s, when freights were quite good, these 
ships were brought to Finland in great numbers. In the 1910s 
boom, even towns such as Helsinki and Turku, which had 
relatively large steamship fleets, were affected. At the same time, 
most of the earlier hardwood ships and "Novascotiamen" were 
sold or laid up. 
The small town of Rauma was at the forefront of the second-
hand windjammer business until around 1905. It was closely 
followed by Aland, whose long-trade fleet still included more 
58 The official statistics claim that there were about 60, excluding inland 
districts, but in reality most of them were tugs owned by sawmills and other 
industrial companies. 
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1905 	 1913 
Average 	 Total 
size 	 tonnage 
Average 
size 
Ostrobothnia 5,360 109 4,120 111 
South-west Finland 79,840 222 66,740 243  
Åland 59,350 280 61,510 303 
Gulf of Finland coast 37,710 68 46,770 73 
Interior — — 
Total 182,260 155 179,140 155 
Source: Appendix I. 
wooden than metal-hulled vessels in the first decade of this 
century (they continued to buy wooden ships from Finnish towns, 
where shipowners had begun to go over to iron and steel).59 Here, 
the real transition to the "second generation" of second-hand 
vessels took place only after 1910, but it was rapid. In 1913, over 
40 % of the country's big iron or steel sailing-ships were based in 
Åland. The small town of Uusikaupunki also experienced a similar 
boom, and in 1913, no less than 80% of all Finnish ships over 700 
tons were found in Åland, Uusikaupunki and Rauma (table 2:11). 
These were also the places in which some medium-sized Baltic 
and North Sea sailing ships were still to be found: they even 
accounted for 80% of the tonnage in the medium size-classes 
(200-700 tons). 
Coastal tonnage (see table 2:12), on the other hand, was centred 
mainly in the neighbourhood of Wiborg, and, as mentioned earlier, 
was employed in trade to St.Petersburg. Both firewood and stone 
and sand (for building purposes) were transported there in 
growing quantities, thus the local coaster fleet prospered and 
grew.60 On a minor scale, similar developments were taking place 
on the coast of Nyland, near Helsinki. The traditional trade to 
Stockholm seems also to have expanded up to the turn of the 
century, but the coastal fleets of Åland and the Turku archipelago 
stopped growing after 1905. 
59 	 See the ship list in Kåhre, Den åländska segelsjöfartens historia.  
60 E.g. Kaukiainen, Koiviston merenkulun historia, p. 221-229. 
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TABLE 2:11. The geographic distribution of larger (700 tons and 
over) sailing ships, 1895-1913. Net tons. 
Area 1895 1905 1913 
Ostrobothnian towns: Vaasa 7,366 1,446 1,446 
Others  9,085 1,789 751 
Åland 6,001 31,103 39,837 
South-west Finland: Rauma 8,107 14,483 7,310 
Uusikaupunki 2,412 11,373 23,940 
Turku 6,710 2,949 5,839 
Other towns 968 
Coastal parishes 780 3,147 709 
South coast: Helsinki 717 1,618 6,811 
Other towns 792 3,393 2,420 
Total 42,938 71,301 89,063 
Source: Appendix I. 
TABLE 2:12. The geographic distribution of the coastal sailing 
fleet (vessels under 100 net tons), 1895-1913. Net 
tons. 
Area 1895 1905 1913 
Ostrobothnia 1,540 1,870 1,620 
South-west Finland 4,520 7,630 6,570 
Aland 2,550 4,040 4,090 
South coast: Nyland 5,130 6,080 7,140 
South coast: county of Wiborg 15,980 18,340 21,060 
Total 29,720 36,960 40,470 
Source: Appendix I. 
The period from 1895 until the first world war was thus, as far as 
sailing ships were concerned, a period of both decline and growth. 
Growth, however, was confined to rather narrow geographical 
areas in the south-west and south-east, and it was in contrast to an 
almost universal decline elsewhere. In total tonnage, it was a 
period of slow decline, but for many parts of the country it was 
nothing less than the final act in the long history of merchant 
sailing vessels. 
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TABLE 2:13. Average size of steamships in selected merchant 
fleets, 1913. Net tons. 










Atlantic Canada (1910) 217 
NB: In all cases, except Denmark and Norway, the figures also include 
motor-vessels. As these were at this time mostly quite small, often 
auxiliary sailers, this tends to deflate the rates somewhat. 
Source: See table I. 
Almost everywhere in Europe and around the North Atlantic, this 
final act had already been played by the turn of the century. In 
1913, steam tonnage was overwhelmingly dominant in all 
maritime countries except Finland, the USA and in the Atlantic 
provinces of Canada. Although the revised figures presented above 
give Finland a slighly bigger share of steam tonnage than the 
official statistics — 23.9 % at the end of 1913 rather than 18.2 % — 
this difference does not really count. Even compared with the USA 
and Atlantic Canada, Finland was very far behind. In actual 
figures, the Finnish steam-fleet was almost negligible. It was only 
10% of the Swedish, 3% of the German and less than one per cent 
of British steam tonnages' 
Even structurally, the Finnish steam-fleet was relatively weak. 
Table 2:13 presents the average size of steamships in some typical 
merchant fleets at the end of the period. The Finnish and Canadian 
61 Irrespective of its exceptionally high percentage share, Finnish sailing 
tonnage was not unusually large in actual figures. True, it was somewhat 
larger than e.g. the Swedish or the Greek, but only 20-35 % of the German, 
French, Norwegian and British fleets, and even compared with the 
population it was easily second to Norway. 
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figures were clearly below average for that time. This, at least in 
Finland, was because of the large proportion of coastal vessels in 
the tonnage. The ocean-going vessels were also of moderate size. 
Ship sizes had increased considerably after the beginning of the 
20th century, and bulk-carriers of around 5,000 gross tons became 
common in long trades.62 Even in liner services between Britain 
and the most important Scandinavian ports, the average size had 
increased to over 2,000 tons gross by 1914.63 It could be said, of 
course, that the "handy size" for Finnish timber ports was smaller 
than that, but even in the Baltic timber trade the Finnish ships 
were on the small side. The average size of British steamers 
visiting Finnish ports in 1913 was 1,260 net tons (or about 2,100-
2,200 tons gross). At that time there were only five steamships over 
1,500 net tons in Finland, and Finnish steamers which took 
cargoes beyond the Baltic were on average only about 880 net 
tons.64 To put it in a nutshell, the crucial question seems to be why 
the transition to big steamships was so slow in Finland. 
62 See e.g. Graigh, The Ship. 
63 Pearsall. "Steam enters the North Sea", p. 213. 
64 
	
	 Finnish official statistics IB:33. The number and tonnage of British ships can 
be found directly in table 5, but the figures for Finnish ships sailing beyond 
the Baltic must be computed from table 9, which specifies clearings by 
customs house, nationality and destination. 
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2. Investment cycles and capital formation 
The development of the Finnish merchant fleet was clearly not 
without some quite abrupt changes in new building and other 
investment activities. Even though these cycles were not identical 
in all regions, the highest peaks were found in the 1860s, early 
1870s and the 1890s, and troughs in the 1880s and between 1900 
and 1907. Coastal and Baltic fleets, however, developed more 
evenly and fluctuated somewhat differently. 
In order to compare the different cycles of investment it is 
necessary to establish how much tonnage was built in Finland and 
bought from abroad. It is also necessary to know the prices of these 
ships in order to calculate how much money was "sunk" in 
shipping at different times. Because there was always some 
"outflow" of ships (sold, wrecked, worn out), the amount of gross 
investment may not have developed in line with total tonnage. 
Conventional tonnage, however, is not an adequate measurement 
of capital accumulation either, at least not in a period when sailing 
vessels and steamships represented very different capital values. It 
is therefore essential to ascertain the actual monetary value of the 
fleet at different times in order to see whether and how much the 
capital stock grew or decreased. Last but not least, a very important 
aspect is the difference between these two series, gross 
investments and net capital formation, a difference which, in the 
macro economic sense, represents depreciation of capital stock 
and which, in an industry such as shipping, could be considerable. 
Needless to say, all these data are much more difficult to collect 
than tonnage figures, but at least reasonable estimations are 
possible. 
Prices of new ships 
Data on building costs are not difficult to collect. There is not an 
abundance of information, but many examples are to be found in 
both owners' and shipbuilding-companies' archives. There is just 
one notable "blank spot": the prices of small coastal vessels are 
practically unknown. True, there are a few cases in which 
building-costs are mentioned, but the vessels in question were 
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mostly built by owners using timber from their own forest and 
even labour from their own family (although a special shipwright, 
at least, was normally hired), and only costs paid in money were 
usually recorded.' 
Even for larger sailing vessels, the prices mentioned in the 
source material are not necessarily unambigious. Normally, new 
ships built in Finland were sent on their first voyage far from fully 
equipped. The outfit was then completed in a British harbour and 
items such as anchors, chain, windlass, instruments etc. bought; 
usually the ship was then also fitted with copper or zinc sheathing. 
These were no small expenses: additional fitting out might have 
cost up to £1 (25 Finnish marks) per ton, and coppering in a dry 
dock totalled from £1.8 to £2 (35-50 marks) per ton (big ships 
with less wetted area per ton cost less).2 Only one major Finnish 
yard, Turku shipyard, seems to have regularly delivered ships with 
copper or zinc sheathing; however, their charge for metal seems to 
have been about 20% higher than in British yards.3 Finally, it must 
also be borne in mind that building costs varied a lot depending on 
local labour costs, on whether the ship was iron- or copper-
fastened and how many iron structural members were used. 
Examples of building costs for sailing-ships are given in table 
2:14. They apply to the 1860s and 1870s, when domestic 
shipbuilding was still actively going on. Most of the data is derived 
from owners' accounts, and if all expenses for outfit, coppering etc. 
were found in the accounts of the first voyage, they were included 
in the initial building costs. Unfortunately, in most cases it is not 
clear exactly what was included in the price. 
1 	 E.g. Börman, Aboländsk byggdeseglation, p. 222-223. 
2 Ships' accounts (see appendix IV:1). Data which clearly specify coppering-
costs have been found for the following vessels: Martin Luther (1864-65), 
Vesta (1866), Freden (1857), Toivo (1871), Matts August (1874), Amur (1869). 
See also Norrvik, Briggen Carl Gustaf, p. 66-69. Most of the accounts 
mentioned above also contain different fitting-out items. British yards seem 
to have charged an additional price of close to £1 per ton for copper-
sheathing of new vessels (which, of course, includes no charge for dry-
docking), and the total cost of a long-trader's outfit (so-called East India 
outfit) amounted to about £2 per ton (MacGregor, Fast Sailing Ships, p. 143). 
3 	 Engström, Åbo sjöfarts historia, p. 42-45; the accounts of Amur (1869). 
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TABLE 2:14. Costs of building new sailing-ships in the 1860s and 




Cases net tons 
Building-prices per net ton 
Lowest 	 Highest 	 Average 
A. 1860s 
>300 1 246 111 (£4.2) 
300>500 3 427 163 (£6.2) 349 (£13.3) 238 (£9.1) 
500>700 13 604 132 (£5.0) 291 (£11.1) 182 (£6.9) 
700— 3 970 149 (£5.7) 293 (£11.2) 216 (£8.2) 
B. 1870s 
>300 5 264 146 (£5.6) 195 (£ 7.4) 162 (£6.2) 
300>500 5 357 174 (£6.6) 240 (£ 9.2) 192 (£7.3) 
500>700 5 592 145 (£5.5) 311 (£11.9) 230 (£8.8) 
700- 3 941 166 (£6.3) 326 (£12.4) 242 (£9.2) 
NB: Although the actual exchange rates varied a little, the average value 
of one pound sterling, 26.2 Finnish marks, is used here. 
Source: Shipowners' accounts (see appendix IV:1); Nikula, Åbo sjöfarts 
historia p.60-62; Börman, Aboländsk bygdeseglation p. 224,  
Kaukiainen, Koiviston merenkulun historia p.250. 
The price variations seem bewildering at first sight. They usually 
occurred, however, because of differences in outfit and building 
specifications. The maximum prices recorded above refer to fully-
fitted ships with copper sheathing, while the minumum figures 
obviously apply to cases where the price included only the hull, 
the rigging and the basic sails. There were also notable local 
variations. For one thing, it seems that ships were cheaper on the 
Bothnian coast, and in particular the northern part, than on the 
southern coast, in Turku, Helsinki and Wiborg. The huge brigs of  
Raahe were a special case: most of them, measuring around 600 net 
tons, were fitted out for their first voyage at a total cost of only 
140-150 marks (£5.3-5.7) per ton. Obviously they were not built 
to a very high standard, but even copper-fastened barks and ships 
from Raahe and the neighbouring Oulu were built, fitted out for 
ocean voyages and even coppered, for a total of 230-250 marks 
(£8.8-9.5) per ton. In Turku and other southern ports, as the 
75 
maximum figures show, the corresponding price was around 300 
marks (£11.5). Prices also, of course, varied a lot with the business 
cycles: ships built during the booms of the mid-1860s or early 
1870s seem to have been more expensive than those launched in 
the late 1860s. 
If a ship was sheathed with zinc rather than copper, the total 
price tag could have been about 5 % lower, and if it had no 
sheathing or just wood-lining, and was fitted for Baltic voyages, 
the price may well have dropped to 200 marks or below. This was 
the case with schooners, brigs and barks built in the rural coastal 
ditricts. Humble coastal traders, despite their small size, which in 
theory should have meant rather high prices per ton, were cheaper 
still. The few available building accounts suggest that two-masted 
galeases were built for less than 100 marks (£4) per ton, but as 
similar second-hand vessels were sold for 120 marks or even more 
per ton,4 the actual building costs must have been at least 150 
marks per ton. On the other hand, smaller, undecked vessels may 
have been much cheaper.5  
After the 1870s, the building of larger sailing vessels practically 
ceased, and only coastal and Baltic fleets were subsequently 
replenished with domestically built new ships. Information about 
prices also becomes more scanty, but no fundamental changes in 
price level seem to have taken place before the first world war. 
Finnish prices were very low compared with those paid in 
Western Europe. During the 1860s and early 1870s, £15-19 per 
ton was a perfectly normal price charged by a British yard for an 
iron or composite windjammer of about 1,000 register tons.6 Thus, 
even the most expensive Finnish sailing ships cost only 2/3 of the 
price of British vessels, and the simple "peasant" barques sailing to 
the North Sea could be built for less than half of that. The 
differences in price, of course, also reflected differences in quality. 
An iron ship could be given an initial 15-year classification by 
Lloyd's or Veritas in their highest class, but for no Finnish 
softwood ship did they ever go beyond 8 years.' Moreover, 
compared with the big, North American softwood ships, the 
4 	 Börman, Åboländsk bygdeseglation, p. 227. 
5 	 See Börman, Åboländsk bygdeseglation, p. 226. 
6 	 Harley, "On the Persistence of Old Techniques", p. 377; McGregor, Merchant 
Sailing ships, p. 60-63, 113, 136. 
7 	 Classification was recorded in Finland skeppskalender.  
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Finnish first-class windjammers were not so cheap; £10 per ton 
seems to be the traditional estimate of Canadian prices for newly 
built ships, and even lower averages have been suggested.8 In the 
United States, on the other hand, shipbuilding-prices rose 
substantially after the civil war, and quotations of £14-15 per ton 
seem to have been normal.9 
The relatively cheap prices gave a substantial advantage to the 
Finnish ships. However, this only affected traditional sailing 
vessels; as soon as the new steam technology was applied to 
shipping, there was an abrupt rise in costs. This was already 
clearly visible when wood-hulled auxiliaries were being built in 
the late 1860s and early 1870s. Steam engines, boilers and 
propellers could increase total costs by about 25 %, and as they 
and the coal bunkers also decreased cargo space by at least a 
quarter, the resulting price per net ton, as far as can be seen from 
the insurance values of these auxialiaries, rose to no less than 
450-550 marks (£17-21).10 
Full-powered iron steamships were still more expensive. The 
prices of the first two iron propeller steamers in Turku (1864 and 
1873) were about 790 and 880 marks (£30 and £34) per net ton.11  
Even more expensive was the first real ocean-going steamer, which 
the Wasa—Nordsjö company built in Port Glasgow 1873-74: the 
total cost of this vessel (which was only 251 net tons) was 9,850 
pounds sterling, or almost 39 pounds (990 marks) per net ton.12 
Later on, the prices of standard bulk-carriers seem to have 
fallen. This happened not only because engines and iron hulls 
became cheaper, especially as the vessels grew bigger, but also 
because machinery and bunkers required less room and thus there 
was a definite gain in net tons. The Finnish Steamship Company 
(FAA) paid about 680 marks (£27) per net ton for their first two 
ships (built in Germany, 1883). Later they had two ships built in 
Britain, in 1889, for 546, and again in 1895, two ships for no more 
8 Fischer — Sager — Omner, "The shipping industry and regional economic 
development", p. 37. Unfortunately, the authors do not state whether the 
ships in question were coppered and fully fitted out. 
9 Harley, "On the Persistence, of old Techniques" p. 379 (subnote 9); 
McGregor, Merchant Sailing Ships, p. 176, fig. 229. 
10 	 Record-books of Sjöassuransföreningen i Finland. 
11 	 Lindberg, Ångbåtssjöfart i Åbo, p. 178, 198. 
12 	 Wasa-Nordjö Ångbåts Ab., p. 23. 
77 
than 500 marks (about £20) per net ton (the last order was, indeed, 
a bargain).13 Special winter-boats with shells reinforced against 
ice, and powerful engines were, however, more expensive. FAA 
paid 885 marks per net ton for two such vessels in 1891, and in 
1902 another company paid about 930 marks per net ton for three 
vessels.14 All these ships could also carry passengers, but special 
passenger ships commanded still higher prices: at the turn of the 
century, they ranged from 1,240 to 1,560 marks (£49-62) per net 
ton.15 Small coastal passenger boats were equally expensive; 
although they were more modestly fitted out, their small size led to 
relatively high prices per ton.16 
It is clear that even the prices of steamships varied a lot. What is 
important, however, is that they were much higher than for 
Finnish-built sailing vessels. In the 1870s, an ocean-going steamer 
was up to three or four times more expensive than a first-class 
barque, and in the 1890s the difference between the few domestic-
built barques or barquentines and the cheapest steam-propelled 
bulk-carriers was still large. For the period after the early 1880s, 
however, price comparisons of newly built sail and steam ships 
have little relevance as Finland obtained most of its sailing ships, 
apart from coastal vessels, on second-hand markets. 
Second-hand prices 
Finnish shipowners, of course, were buying second-hand ships in 
the 1860s and 1870s, very few of which were foreign. Thus, 
second-hand markets were quite an insignificant source of tonnage 
on a national scale. As already mentioned, in the 1880s the trend 
was totally reversed, and practically all sailing vessels over 500 net 
tons entered in the Finnish register were bought from abroad. 
Second-hand prices then became an important determinant of 
shipping investments. 
13 
 Suomen Höyrylaiva Osakeyhtiö 1883-1933, p. 15, 19, 34. 
14 Suomen Höyrylaiva Osakeyhtiö 1883-1933, p. 27; Lindberg, Ångbåtssjöfart 
i Åbo, p. 268. 
15 The ledgers of Finska Ånfartygs Ab. 1899 (new steamers Arcturus and 
Polaris); Lindberg, Ångbåtssjöfart, p. 244, 253. 
16 Lindberg,  Ångbåtssjöfart, p. 305, 321-322, 331-332. 
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TABLE 2:15. Purchase prices of second-hand sailing vessels, 500 
net tons and over, 1880-1913. Finnish marks 
(pounds and decimals). 
Period Number of 	 Purchase prices per net ton 
cases 	 Lowest 	 Highest 	 Average 
A: Wood vessels 
1880-90 9 43 (£1.7) 119 (£4.7) 69 (£2.7) 
1891-1900 7 26 (£1.0) 48 (£1.9) 37 (£1.5) 
1901-13 13 21 (£0.8) 104 (£4.1) 53 (£2.1)  
B: Iron and steel vessels 
1895-1900 5 88 (£3.5) 171 (£6.8) 110 (£4.3) 
1901-10 4 60 (£2.4) 126 (£5.0) 95 (£3.7) 
1911-13 6 43 (£1.7) 100 (£3.9) 75 (£3.0) 
NB: Marks converted to pounds at the average exchange rate (Bank of 
Finland, avista) of each period. 
Source: Shipowners' accounts (appendix IV:1); Kåhre, Den åländska 
segelsjöfartens historia, p. 359-361, 446-447; Börman, 
Aboländsk bygdeseglation, p. 229-230. 
Second-hand prices, however, are difficult to describe 
systematically. The vessels differed not only according to building 
specification (e.g. hardwood vessels were much more expensive 
than softwood ones), they were also of widely varying ages, and 
age was probably the most important single determinant of a ship's 
current value. As actual prices are known only for less than 50 
large (500 net tons or over) sailing vessels bought after 1880 (table 
2:15), there is not enough data to cover such a variance. 
Fortunately, values and tonnages of ships imported after 1895 are 
to be found in the foreign trade statistics. Even though these values 
are not necessarily in all cases true purchase prices, but rather the 
normal values of comparative vessels, they should suffice to give a 
rough idea of what was paid for second-hand vessels imported to 
Finland." 
17 Finnish official statistics, ser.I and IA. The values of different commodities 
were not verified from invoices or other trading documents but they were 
determined by the Board of Customs after hearing a group of experts. See 
Pihkala, Suomen ulkomaankauppa, p. 17. 
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TABLE 2:16. Values of sailing vessels imported to Finland 1895-
1913. Finnish marks (pounds and decimals). 




2 	 3 
Iron and steel vessels 
1 	 2 	 3 
1895-1900 53 633 59 (£2.3) 27 1,207 115 (£4.5) 
1901-05 40 538 56 (£2.2) 5 1,357 84 (£3.3) 
1906-10 33 542 34 (£1.3) 15 1,692 72 (£2.8) 
1911-13 41 249 59 (£2.3) 30 1,573 68 (£2.7) 
NB: The pre-1912 figures do not include imports from Russia. 
Conversions as in table 2:15. 
Source: Finnish official statistics I and IA (foreign trade), table 2a. 
Data on individual purchases and import statistics correlate so 
well that the values registered by the latter must have been 
realistic. The only serious defect in the material is that hardwood 
and softwood vessels were not separated. In general, fluctuations 
from one year to another were fairly large. This was partly because 
of variations in the quality of imported tonnage,18 but mostly 
because prices fluctuated with freight cycles. The trend, however, 
was clearly downwards, although wooden vessels seemed to 
experience a reverse development at the end of the period. The 
reason for this was probably that the data for 1911-13 includes 
smaller and probably newer ships than before.19 
Norwegian import tonnage statistics present a similar picture. 
Average prices per net ton (in pounds and decimals) developed as 
follows:2° 
18 E.g. in 1895, the only three-year old four masted barque Goodrich (renamed 
Fennia) was bought to Finland for an exeptionally high price of over 170 
marks per ton. Of this purchase see Senate, Finansexpeditionen, KD 9/21 
1897 (the buyers received a loan from the state). 
19 	 This is mainly because imports from Russia, which were not observed earlier, 
cannot be separated for 1912-13. They consisted mainly of small, Estonian-
built vessels. 




iron and steel 
vessels 
1892/95 £2.5 £5.3 
1896/1900 £2.6 £3.3 
1901/05 £2.4 £3.5 
1906/10 £2.3 £2.9 
1911/13 £2.1 £2.3 
Differences from Finnish import prices are not great. Perhaps the 
most pronounced one is that wooden vessels imported to Norway 
were slightly more expensive than those in the Finnish statistics 
(the difference was especially conspicious in 1906-10), but this 
was probably because the former were on average relatively small 
and possibly included more hardwood vessels. As the Norwegian 
data is more extensive than the Finnish (between 1895 and 1910, 
the Norwegians seem to have been the leading buyers of second-
hand sailing vessels of iron or steel), the development is more 
steady, but basically both data describe the same worldwide, 
second-hand markets. This relative uniformity is understandable 
bearing in mind that the great majority of large, wooden vessels 
still afloat were built in the late 1860s and 1870s. Even most iron 
and steel windjammers were built before the mid-1890s. Thus, the 
age-structure of those sold after that date seems to have changed 
primarily with the passing of time. The figures presented above 
support this by showing a general downward trend of 2.5-3 % a 
year in prices. 
Prices of both hardwood and iron sailing ships clearly fell in the 
1890s, in spite of the boom in the freight market. Obviously, the 
supply of second-hand vessels increased when the transition from 
sail to steam gained momentum, and as the best quality wooden, 
not to mention iron, hulls from the 1860s and 1870s were very 
durable, this good supply continued for years. By the mid-1890s, a 
good hardwood vessel could be bought for an eighth of what it 
would have cost to build a good ocean-going barque in Finland; at 
the turn of the century, a good iron fullrigger (such as the famous 
clipper Mermerus which was bought by Turku in 1898 and three 
years later sold to Aland),21 
 cost only half as much per ton as a 
21 	 Nikula, Åbo sjöfarts historia, appendix ship-list. 
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TABLE 2:17. Average prices of steamships imported to Finland 




Price per net ton 
Finland Norway 
1896/1900 654 (£25.8) 343 (£13.5) 
1901/05 655 (£25.8) 401 (£15.8) 
1906/10 526 (£20.7)1  369 (£14.5) 
1911/13 340 (£13.4) 327 (£12.9) 
1 1906/09; data for 1910 is obviously faulty. 
NB: 1 No. crown = 1.4 Fi. mark. 
Source: Finnish official statistics ser.I and IA; Gjölberg, Ökonomi,  
teknologi og historie, table 12. 
new, domestically built, softwood barquentine. Around 1910, 
prices were still lower, although building costs had not dropped at 
all. 
The question of second-hand prices for steamships is in one 
respect more difficult but, at the same time, less important. This is 
simply because most steamships acquired in Finland before the 
turn of the century were new. This can be seen clearly from a 
comparison of ton-prices for steamships in the Finnish and 
Norwegian import statistics. As table 2:17 shows, they were quite 
different. 
Up until 1905, the Finnish figures are very close to the prices of 
new ships and second-hand steamers more than, say, five years old 
must have been quite rare. The opposite was the case in Norway: 
prices seem to be only a shade higher than the average second-
hand prices of the same period. It is known from the Finnish data 
that older steamers could be bought for around 300 marks per ton 
in the 1890s,22 and this was roughly the level in the early 1910s, 
too, when only second-hand steamers were imported. Compared 
22 	 A good example is s/s Sicilia, 1,210 net tons, which was bought in 1898, then 
nine years old, and cost 310 marks per net ton. Senate, economy department 
AD 1521/398 1898. 
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with the corresponding prices of new ships, second-hand prices 
for steamers were by no means unduly high. Indeed, if a ten-year 
old ship could be bought for 50-60 % of the original price, as the 
figures suggest, its value had fallen by an (arithmetical) average of 
4-5 % a year. In any case, they were still more expensive than 
new, domestically built "second-class" (uncoppered, iron-
fastened) barques, and far more expensive than iron-hulled, 
second-hand sailing-ships. 
Investment cycles 
Supplementing the price data presented above with tolerably 
reliable quantity data of new and second-hand tonnage produces 
the total amounts of investment. This presents no problems from 
1895 onwards, when shipping statistics began to include data on 
tonnage additions, and reliable figures of tonnage bought from 
abroad are obtainable from the import statistics. Sources are much 
less reliable, however, for the earlier years. Data on new ships can 
be found in published statistics from 1866 to 1880,23 although this 
material is far from complete; however, no such figures for the 
whole country seem to be available for after 1880. Thus there is a 
total blank for the period 1881-1894, which is unfortunate, since 
these years cover what was supposedly the very trough of the 
depression which began after 1875. 
Moreover, the 1866-1880 data on new building has many 
obvious gaps. Figures are either not available for all geographic 
areas, or they just give an estimate of the number of ships with no 
reference to tonnage. Of course some short chronological gaps can 
be easily bridged, and even geographical ones can be filled by 
relating the new building activity to the level of existing tonnage. 
However, the best means of controlling and completing this data is 
by referring to the tables concerning the age-structure of the 
merchant fleet: these were first published for the end of 1875 and 
23 Finnish official statistics, ser. I:2-5 (shipping and foreign trade). This data 
was collected by local länsmän for their 5-year reports, which were 
subsequently summed up in the reports of the governors, and published in 
the Finnish official statistics, ser. II (the economic conditions of Finland). 
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later for 1882 and 1885.24 Since only steamships were normally 
bought from abroad, these data at least give the absolute minimum 
number of sailing vessels built at different times.25 By comparing 
the age data for different years and the tonnage data, it is also 
possible to estimate the average amount of the annual "outflow" 
(whether caused by wrecking, selling or laying up) of tonnage. 
Both in the 1870s, and between 1875 and 1885, this seems to have 
been at around 6 per cent a year, which means that one age-class of 
ships was decimated to half of its original strength in about twelve 
years.26 This percentage ratio may be used to reconstruct the 
"cohorts" of new building after 1860 and up to 1885. The resulting 
figures must naturally be regarded only as an estimate with a 
substantial margin of error, but since ships with no age-data 
(almost 20 % of all in 1875) have been excluded, there should still 
be a satisfactory safety-margin. 
With all their errors, the figures suffice to stress two things. 
First, the peak of new building activity was reached during the 
decade between 1865 and 1875. In 1874, which was probably the 
turning-point, no less than 33,000 tons of sailing vessels were 
built, but this record was followed by quite a dramatic drop. In the 
24 Finnish official statistics I:3, p. 9, I:6, p. 14 (only ships belonging to urban 
owners), I:7, p. 15. 
25 The data also shows that the official new building statistics were very 
defective. According to them, 86 sailing vessels were built in Finland 1866-
70, but in 1875 there were still no less than 307 sailing vessels built during 
those years in the Finnish merchant marine. Many of those built 1866-70 
had already been sold or wrecked and, moreover, the date of building was 
known only for a good 80 % of ships. As sailing vessels were only seldom 
imported, practically all of the difference results from faults in the shipping 
statistics. 
26 In 1870, there were 658 sailing vessels altogether in all Finnish towns; in 
1875 the number of urban ships built in 1870 or before was 399. It was 
assumed that the proportion of ships with no age data was constant at 19 %., 
and so the average outflow in 1871-75 was 6.0 %. A similar comparison was 
made between 1875 tonnage and ships built in 1875 or before and in use in 
1885 (now a reduction was made in the former because in 1885, only vessels 
of 50 tons and over were included in the age-statistics), and the result was an 
average reduction of 5.9 % a year. In 1882, there were 60 ships over 50 tons 
built 1871-75 in Finnish towns; in 1875, the corresponding figure (with a 20 
% reduction for vessels under 20 lästs) was 95: the average reduction was 
almost 7 %. 
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TABLE 2:18. Estimate of new sailing tonnage in Finland 1861- 
1880. Net tons.27 
Period 	 1861-65 1866-70 1871-75 1876-80 1881-85 
Total built 	 82,000 110,000 120,000 55,000 28,000 
Average per year 	 16,400 22,000 24,000 11,000 5,600 
Of this built for towns 12,700 12,800 8,400 1,900 800 
— for rural shipowners 3,700 9,200 15,600 9,100 4,800 
Source: See note 23. 
1880s, only Baltic and coastal sailing ships were still being built, 
and at the bottom of the depression, in 1885, only 18 vessels over 
50 tons were launched; their estimated net tonnage was only about 
3,000, and not a single new ship was over 400 tons. 
The other obvious change was that the proportion of ships built 
for rural owners rose and accordingly, investments by urban 
shipowners dropped by more than the average. Indeed, 
shipbuilding activities of the latter peaked in the 1860s, and this 
level was not reached again during the next boom period in the 
1870s. At the beginning of the 1880s, new building for urban 
owners was almost non-existent. As the best ocean-going ships had 
always come from coastal towns, this structural change had a 
substantial bearing on the total value of new vessels. It may be 
27 The figures were computed as follows: 1861-75 are based on the 1875 age-
data, which also records tonnages (lästs), by assuming that each "cohort" 
diminished on average 6 % a year. Thus the tonnages for each "cohort" were 
multiplied by 1.06`, where t = 1875 — (the middle year of the age-class in 
question). The ratio towns/rural areas is the same as that in the actual age-
classes remaining in 1875, but as urban tonnage also included steamships, 
steam-tonnage was first subtracted from urban tonnage. The 1876-85 figures 
are based on 1885 age-data by assuming the same outflow (6 %) as before. As 
the later data only record the number of ships in different size-categories, the 
tonnages were computed assuming that the average tonnage in each size-
class equalled the class median. As the data makes no distinction between 
urban and rural vessels, the ratio towns/rural areas was computed for 1876-
80 using 1882 age-data, which only contains urban vessels. For 1881-85, it 
was assumed that the proportion of urban vessels was 15 % of total new 
building (in 1876-80 it was 17 %). In 1875, age was known for 81 % of 
tonnage, in 1885 for 96 % of ships. 
85 
TABLE 2:19. Estimate of urban and rural investments in sailing 
tonnage, 1861-1885. Million marks per year. 
urban rural total 
1861/65 3.3 0.7 4.0 
1866/70 3.3 1.8 5.1 
1871/75 2.2 3.0 5.2 
1876/80 0.5 1.7 2.2 
1881/85 0.15 0.75 0.9 
Source: Table 2:18. Estimated average values of new building per net ton 
were: 1861-80 urban 260 marks, rural 190 marks; 1881-85 
urban 200 marks, rural 160 marks. 
supposed that 60 % of new urban ships were copper or zinc 
sheathed (this at least was the percentage for 1865-75 urban 
tonnage),28 and that the average value of new tonnage was thus 
about 260 marks (£10) per net ton. After 1880, this value probably 
dropped as no large ships were built. The value of new rural ships, 
supposing that no more than 25% of them were coastal tonnage, 
can be estimated at an average of about 190 marks per ton, 
although even here, the average value must have fallen after 1880. 
According to these figures, the value of new building was as 
follows (table 2:19). 
These figures do not include second-hand acquisitions from 
abroad, but these were very few and this defect is of no real 
importance. It is more than probable that an underestimation of 
new building, which cannot be avoided in the calculations, 
accounts for more tonnage. 
The figures do not include steamships either. These were 
expensive and, despite low tonnages, incurred total investments 
well worth estimating. It is not difficult to obtain reliable enough 
figures for steamship acquisitions, irrespective of whether they 
were built in Finland or bought from abroad. Since practically all 
ships imported from abroad were newly built, the year of building 
(found in published ship-lists), usually also indicates when the 
28 Finlands skeppskalender, 1865, 1975-76. In 1875-76 only 3 % of rural 
ships, by tonnage, were copper- or zinc-sheathed. 
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TABLE 2:20. Estimated Finnish steamship investments, 1861- 
1885. 
Period 1861-651866-70 1871-75 1876-801881-85 
New steamships, built 
and imported, net ton 1,200 2,400 4,400 2,800 3,550 
Do, average per year 240 480 880 560 710 
Thereof auxiliaries 80 330 490 — — 
Est. av. price per ton, 
Fi. marks —auxiliaries 500 500 500 
—others 800 800 800 750 600 
Total investment per year, 
million marks 0.15 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.4 
Source:  Finlands skeppskalender and sources for table 2:18 above. 
investment in question was made. The age-statistics mentioned 
above can also be used for the same purpose. The only problem is 
with the tonnage figures: since the old läst-numbers of steamships 
are not fully comparable with later register tonnage, the 
relationship between prices and tonnage is also far from 
systematic, at least up to the mid-1870s. Therefore the estimate 
(table 2:20), particularly the first part, should be used with caution. 
In spite of the margin of error, it is possible to state safely that 
the figures were quite modest, especially since the proportion of 
auxiliaries (that is, of cheaper tonnage) was quite high before 1875. 
Thus, the figures do not basically change the general picture. If 
investments in sail and steam are summed up, the following 
averages for different five-year periods are obtained: 
1861/65 	 4.2 mill. marks a year 
1866/70 	 5.4 mill. marks a year 
1871/75 
	 5.8 mill. marks a year 
1876/80 	 2.6 mill. marks a year 
1881/85 	 1.4 mill. marks a year 
The almost catastrophic decline in investments after 1875 remains 
beyond any doubt. 
After the late 1880s, as imports of second-hand tonnage 
increased, age-data can no longer be used to determine investment 
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cycles. This leaves a gap in the data of almost 10 years. However, 
there are fairly clear indications that the depression in investments 
continued to the latter half of the 1880s. From 1887 onwards, there 
is proper data on tonnage imports, and they indicate that, just 
before the turn of the decade, a small boom was experienced. The 
average annual value of imported tonnage was still very modest in 
1887 and 1888, less than 0.3 million marks (of which only a tenth 
consisted of sailing vessels). However, during the next two years, 
1889-90, it grew to 4.4 million marks a year (sail 1.25 and steam 
3.2 millions), and was still over two millions in 1891.29 Domestic 
building of wooden sailing vessels was also temporarily revived in 
those years.30 During the three or four years after 1891, when 
freights again declined, imports also decreased. 
As mentioned earlier, official data for new tonnage acquisitions 
began in 1895: since that date, both domestic new building and 
imports have been fully recorded. However, data on new building 
contain some tonnage which has not been included in the 
merchant marine for this study. First, new barges were classified as 
sailing vessels and tugs were included in the figures for 
steamships. The statistics also comprise new building for the 
inland fleet, but the proportion is not specified. To compensate for 
these "excesses", the following reductions have been made: 
— the increase in the total tonnage of barges (which can be 
found in shipping statistics) has been deducted from new sail 
tonnage 
— as compensation for tugs, an arbitrary 25 % has been 
deducted from domestic new building of steam tonnage 
— the proportion of inland tonnage of total sail and steam 
tonnage has been deducted (in the case of sail this was quite a 
steady 20%, in steam it fluctuated between 13 and 19 per cent) 
The resulting figures for tonnage acquisitions are presented in 
table 2:21. The simplest way to translate the tonnages to monetary 
values is to use the values of imports found in the trade statistics. 
For domestic new building, however, such real values cannot be 
found, and arbitrary ton-prices have therefore been used, as before. 
29 Finnish official statistics, ser. I; import statistics. 
30 This is clearly seen in the published ship-lists (Finlands skeppskalender)  
which register many ships built around 1890. 
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TABLE 2:21. Tonnage acquisitions from different sources, 1895-
1913. Averages per year, 1,000 net tons. 
1895/1900 1901/05 1906/10 1911/13 
Sailing ships 
- domestic new building 5.1 5.2 3.45 4.3 
- imports 11.0 5.7 8.65 19.1 
Total, sail 16.1 10.9 12.1 23.4 
Steamships 
- domestic new building 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.8 
- imports 4.6 2.1 3.2 2.7 
Total, steam 5.3 2.7 3.8 3.5 
Grand total 21.4 13.6 15.9 26.9 
NB: For imports, the first period is 1895/1900, for new building 1896/ 
1900. 
Source: Finnish official statistics, ser I, IA and IB (shipping and trade, 
foreign trade). 
The new building-price for sailing ships has been set at 150 marks 
(about £6) per ton (most of these were simple coastal vessels), and 
for steamships at 1,000 marks (about £40) per ton (as they were 
usually small passenger vessels, the ton-price must have been 
much higher than that of standard bulk-carriers). This produces 
the following estimates of total shipping investments (table 2:22). 
It is clear that investments in steam were always the dominating 
element, and any variations thus significantly affected the total. As 
the level was quite low in 1911/13, the total investments do not 
show the kind of "peak" that the increase in tonnage figures 
suggest. 
All prices quoted here and previously were, of course, current 
prices. This presents no great problems of comparison, for, as is 
well known, prices were quite stable during the whole period. It 
can of course be said that, as prices in general (as for example the 
well-used Rousseaux index shows) were some 65-70 % higher in 
the 1860s than in the 1890s, the investment boom of the late 1890s 
represents a somewhat higher real value than the last boom of the 
sailing-ship era. Such a comparison, however, fails to take account 
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TABLE 2:22. Finnish shipping investments 1896-1913. Million 
marks per year. 
1896/1900 1901/05 1906/10 1911/13 
Sailing ships 
- domestic new building 0.8 0.8 0.5 0.65 
-  imports 1.0 0.4 0.5 1.25 
Total, sail 1.8 1.2 1.0 1.9 
Steamships 
- domestic new building 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.8 
-  imports 3.0 1.3 1.7 0.9 
Total, steam 3.7 1.9 2.3 1.7 
Grand total 5.5 3.1 3.3 3.6 
Source: See table 2:21. 
of the fact that, during the later period, Finnish tonnage 
acquisitions were purchased mostly at international prices, 
whereas before the 1880s, most new tonnage was built clearly 
more cheaply. On the other hand, the investments could be 
evaluated by relating them to the carrying capacity of the tonnage 
- for example by multiplying steam-tonnage by three - but this 
comparison, again, fails in that the tonnages involved in 
international shipping were quite different in the 1910s and in the 
1860s. Indeed, the only sensible way to rate the actual monetary 
values of investments during different periods is to show how high 
were the opportunity costs involved, that is, what other 
opprtunities were lost by "sinking" these amounts of money in 
shipping. This can be done by using the Finnish general wholesale 
price index as a deflator. As Finnish domestic (as well as export) 
prices were much lower in the 1860s and 1870s than in the 1910s, 
compared with the international (or Finnish import) prices, this 
estimation also gives more weight to earlier sailing-ship 
investments than would the Rousseaux' index, for example.31 At 
1913 prices, the following series emerges (yearly averages of total 
shipping investments in millions of marks): 
31 The indices in question can be found in Suomen taloushistoria 3 (Historical 











Thus, in terms of domestic opportunity costs, shipping 
investments ranked somewhat higher in 1896/1900 than in 1866/ 
70 or 1871/75; the earlier boom, however, lasted much longer. It 
actually began after the Crimean war, when tonnage losses were 
compensated by massive new building. On the other hand, the 
"high" which was observed in tonnage growth in 1911/13 totally 
melted away. 
Compared with investment volume in general, the pre-1875 
boom stands out even more. According to a preliminary 
estimation, total Finnish investments, excluding residential 
building and the clearing of new fields, was less than 20 million 
marks in 1860, and about 30 million in 1870, but rose to over 100 
million at the beginning of this century.32 Thus, in the 1860s and 
early 1870s, shipping investments had quite a prominent position, 
but from the turn of the century they began to sink to a rather 
trivial level. 
Capital "outflows" 
A large proportion, and sometimes the entire amount, of invested 
capital was used to replace worn out, lost or sold tonnage. In the 
"golden days" of the 1860s and 1870s, annual new building 
amounted to no less than 10 % of existing tonnage and, according 
to the estimations presented above, this amounted to almost 
240,000 net tons between 1865 and 1875. As the merchant marine 
grew by some 57,000 tons during the same period, a good three 
32 	 Hjerppe — Peltonen — Pihkala, Investoinnit ja niiden rahoitus Suomessa, p.  
2-5. 
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quarters of the new building was needed just to compensate for the 
continuous "outflow" of tonnage.33 
As mentioned earlier, in a macro economic sense, the entire 
difference between gross and net investments can be called 
depreciation. Part of this "outflow", however, consisted of sold 
ships, which were not direct losses, and should not be regarded as 
part of depreciation. Selling ships abroad, however, was not very 
common in Finland, which differed from countries such as British 
North America in this respect.34 According to Finnish foreign trade 
statistics, the export of ships to countries other than Russia was 
quite rare (and exports to Russia mostly consisted of new tonnage 
which never was registed in the Finnish merchant marine and was 
not included in the new building figures presented above).35 
This impression is further confirmed by the ship-lists of two 
important local fleets, those of Oulu and Turku. The data consists 
of about 100 ships which were registered in these towns between 
1855 and 1880, and whose fate is known well enough. Of these, 
half ended their career as shipwrecks, while 23 were sold abroad 
(16 before 1880 and 7 after that date). Almost as many, 22, were 
sold to other Finnish towns, and they did not represent "outflow" 
on a national scale.36 Typically, ships were sold having been rather 
well-used (in some cases after being damaged) and thus the former 
owners also had to accept a good deal of depreciation in their 
33 Earlier it was estimated that the "cohorts" of new ships diminished on 
average by 6 % a year, while according to figures presented above, the 
amount of "outflow" (new building minus tonnage increase) amounts to 7.5 
% of existing tonnage. The difference arises simply because cohort-specific 
and average tonnage-related percentages are not the same things in a 
situation of increasing tonnage. The latter case conserns new building during 
a period when the amount of tonnage was partly a result of much lower new 
building earlier. Therefore the percentage must be higher than in the former 
case. 
34 See e.g. Rice, "Measuring British dominance of shipbuilding in the 
'Maritimes' ". In the 18th century, large amounts of tonnage were still being 
built in Ostrobothnia for Stockholm shipowners, but this tradition declined 
after Finland was ceded to Russia. See Toivanen, "Suomalainen laivakauppa 
Tukholmaan".  
35 Pihkala, Suomen ulkomaankauppa 1860-1917, table 2. Of course not all 




Nikula, Åbo sjöfarts historia, appendix ship-list; Snellman, Oulun laivoja ja 
laivureita, p. 95-139. 
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prices. Such a high rate of direct loss by wrecking and indirect loss 
by depreciation made shipping rather an expensive business: a lot 
of capital was needed all the time just to maintain the existing 
level of tonnage (in other words, the difference between gross 
investments and net capital formation was very high). Between 
1865 and 1875, no less than 180,000 tons of new building was 
needed to compensate for the "outflow". If no ships had been sold 
abroad at that time — always supposing that the Oulu and Turku 
data are representative — at least 150,000 tons of new building, or 
on average over six per cent of the existing tonnage per year, would 
still have been necessary. 
How many ships were sold depended mostly on business 
cycles, and owners could sometimes earn more by well-timed 
selling than by normal freight business.37 Selling old tonnage 
could, on the other hand, also be motivated by a need to build new 
ships, but in all cases the figures fluctuated very much. In contrast, 
the amount of worn out or lost tonnage represents a more stable 
element, which basically depended not on business cycles but on 
the average life expectation of ships. This average life was dictated 
on the one hand by the inevitable wear, which set a limit on how 
long a vessel could be used without excessive maintenance costs, 
and on the other hand by the equally inevitable risks involved in 
shipping, which brought a premature end to the career of some 
fraction of the existing tonnage every year. This second element 
may seem quite unsystematic and unpredictable, but in the long 
run and in large fleets the variations are not too drastic, and seem 
to be systematically connected with the technical quality of 
tonnage. 
Normally, only the value losses caused by wear and tear are 
considered under the heading "depreciation". This is more a 
practical convention than a theoretical distinction. Of course, 
"risks" were connected with the active use of a ship, while 
depreciation, not least because of ageing, took place even when a 
37 E.g. A. Ahlström from Pori (Björneborg) bought a ship of 773 net tons for 
57,300 marks in June 1871 and sold it in May 1873 for £4,400 (if an agents 
provision of 1/2 % is subtracted it amounted then to 109,200 marks). Normal 
net income in those days for a large ship like this was around 20,000 marks a 
year. General ledgers, the Archives of A. Ahlström.  
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ship was snugly laid up in a cove.38 However, no one built a ship 
without the intention of using it in maritime transport, and in this 
sense the expenses caused by "risk" were an unavoidable item of 
capital "outflow". On the practical level, the difference is relevant, 
however, because many owners catered for "risk" by insuring their 
ships, and premiums paid were, and still are, understood as 
operational costs (although in principle they were merely 
redistributed risks). Therefore, it is useful to estimate these 
elements of capital loss separately. In the following, they will still 
be called "risk" and "depreciation". 
How high were the risks of shipping in the late 19th century? A 
rough indication of how contemporaries saw it is that normal 
insurance premiums were around six per cent of insurance value a 
year.39 This percentage, however, contained a safety margin; the 
first Finnish Mutual Maritime Insurance Association (Sjö-
assuransföreningen i Finland), for example, could return around 
20% of paid premiums to its members in 1850-1889 (and this 
period even included the Crimean war). The actual bill for sea-
damage in the 1860s, when practically no steamships were 
insured, amounted on average to slightly less than 5 % of the total 
value of the fleet. This figure, of course, includes total losses as 
well as minor damage through rigging failure, grounding or 
collision; total losses, again, amounted to 3-4 % of tonnage.40 As a 
rather large share of Finnish merchant tonnage belonged to the 
Association (see table 3:1), there is no reason to believe that the 
risks of other vessels were much different. 
The risks for steamships might appear to be lower. As far as total 
losses were concerned, this actually seems to have been the case: 
according to the Finnish shipping statistics, the average amount of 
tonnage lost in shipwrecks between 1893 and 1913 was around 
38 On the other hand, most of the actual wear which caused value losses also 
resulted from the active use of the ship. 
39 Record-books of Sjöassuransföreningen i Finland; Hoving, Finska sjöförsäk-
rings aktiebolaget, p. 28-32. 
40 Huldén, Suomen merivakuutusyhdistys, p. 12; Annual reports of the 
Association (Protokoll fördt vid allmän bolagsstämma ...). The statistics 
published in the reports only accounted for the number of lost ships, which 
probably represented a slightly higher proportion of ship numbers than of 
total tonnage. 
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2.5 % a year for sailing vessels and only 0.6 % for steamships.41  
Yet, the difference in overall risk seems to have been smaller. 
Steamships visiting more harbours and narrow passages in a year 
than windjammers obviously had more than their share of 
collisions and groundings and so were most often charged the 
general 6 % premium. Finnish Maritime Insurance Association 
statistics for 1907-1913 (when they gave different accounts for 
steam and sailing-ships) show, however, that the total bill for 
steamers amounted to 2.2 % and for sailing vessels to 3.7 % of the 
respective insurance values.42 Unfortunately, the statistics do not 
indicate whether iron-hulled windjammers fared better than 
wooden ones, but it seems that the general "risk" level of sailing 
ships decreased a little after the 1860s. 
In real life, the costs were a little higher, perhaps one percentage 
point, because owners who had insured their ships paid more: 
their premiums had to cover the costs of underwriters as well. It 
may be said, however, that the difference consisted of money paid 
for services (and perhaps even for a feeling of security), and not a 
capital cost caused by "risk". 
The rate of depreciation "proper" cannot be determined at a 
similar aggregated level. The whole idea of assessing the value 
losses of capital due to ageing and wear was strange to most 
shipowners. Assessments of depreciation can only be found in 
some accounts after the 1870s, and with one exception these were 
steamship companies. Thus, the only way to compute depreciation 
is to look at the new building or purchasing and selling prices of 
the ships for which all that data can be found. Even ships which 
were laid up or scrapped can be included (their end value is, of 
course, taken as nil), as can wrecked ships which were insured for 
their full value and for which the claim paid by the underwriters 
(which represented their end value) is known. 
From shipowners' accounts (see chapter IV) and other possible 
41 Finnish official statistics, ser. I and IB (shipping and trade, shipping). 
42 Ömsesidiga Sjöförsäkringsanstalten Sjöassuransföreningen i Finland, 
reports for 1907/1910 and 1911/1913. The accounts of two Finnish maritime 
insurance companies (which even used to charge premiums of around 6 %) 
show such a difference between premium income and settled claims that a 
general "realized" level of "risk" at the beginning of the 20th century seems 
to have been around 3 %. Finnish official statistics, ser. XXII (insurance). 
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sources, reasonable data for almost 40 sailing ships were found 
(table 2:23). The modern convention is to calculate the 
depreciation as a percentage fraction of the remaining or 
depreciated value (that is, the value of the ship diminishes as a 
geometrical series). In historical material, however, this system 
may result in some odd situations. If a vessel was laid up, its end 
value should be taken as zero, which means that its original value 
divided by its end value is infinity. An arbitrary very small end 
value would, of course, produce a rational result, but it would be 
very sensitive to how low this end value was set. A much simpler 
way, therefore, is to compute an arithmetic mean by dividing the 
total value loss by the number of years of operation and expressing 
it as a percentage of the new building (or purchasing) value. This 
method produces much lower percentages compared with 
exponential depreciation, but these are by no means less realistic. 
Indeed, the actual price data conform rather well to it. Obviously 
the shipowners of the time were used to adjusting the value of their 
vessels (e.g. when the insurance value was determined or the 
selling price negotiated) downwards by equal annual amounts, 
"flat rate depreciation".43 This method also has the advantage that 
undepreciated new building values (which, if not readily found, 
can be determined within reasonable margins of error) can be used 
in computing the actual value of depreciation — either for a whole 
fleet or a single ship — while the exponential method uses 
depreciated rest values, which are usually more difficult to 
determine. 
The results are presented for four different categories of ships, 
depending on the one hand on whether they were domestically 
built or second-hand, and on the other on when they were sold, 
lost or laid up. It was assumed that the prices of sailing ships 
dropped faster after the "long depression" began. Differences 
between Finnish-built ships were, however, quite small and those 
sold before 1875 depreciated by the same amount as those sold 
after that date. Nor was there any significant difference between 
sold and wrecked (insured) vessels, which seems to give some 
reliability to the insurance values. In general, it seems that ships 
43 Record-books of Sjöassuransföreningen i Finland. Norwegian shipowners 
also followed this custom, see Fischer and Nordvik, "From Broager to 
Bergen", p. 51-52. 
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TABLE 2:23. Rates of depreciation, sailing ships, 1860-1913. Per 
cent of new building-value. 
Number of 	 Average 
cases 	 tonnage 
Depreciation, % per year 
Max. 	 Min. 	 Aver. 
A. Ships built in Finland 1860-1875, sold etc. before 1876 
5 	 496 	 6.0 	 2.1 
B. Ships built in Finland before 1880, sold etc. 1876-1900 
3.7 
	
14 	 548 	 5.2 	 2.0 
C. Ships built in Finland, sold etc. after 1900 
	
5 	 312 	 4.0 	 2.4 
D. Second-hand ships 
	




NB: "Sold etc." also denotes laid up vessels and total losses for which 
full compensation, the value of which was known, was received 
from underwriters. 
Source: Accounting data, appendix W:1. 
which were used for a long time had lower rates of depreciation 
than average (see group C in the table). This was probably because 
they had undergone a massive rebuilding at some time. It seems 
that a realistic rate of depreciation for domestically built sailing 
ships was about 4 %; in other words, their typical "life-
expectation" discounting wrecking was about 25 years. 
Second-hand vessels clearly deviated from this relative 
uniformity. Their high percentages may at least partly result from 
the simple fact that depreciation here was compared with rather 
low purchase-prices (while contemporaries typically depreciated 
with equal decrements, these were not necessarily high compared 
with the new building prices). Another reason may be that many of 
them were bought during a boom period and sold when depression 
prevailed. There were also cases when an uninsured ship was sold 
after suffering serious damage, or a partly (or under-) insured one 
compensated by a rather small payment from underwriters. In any 
case, it seems that the balance of capital costs was slightly more 
unfavourable for sailing-ship owners during the last two decades 
of the period than it had been before. 
No compatible data on actual transactions can be found for 
Finnish steamships. There are, of course, occasional notices of 
4 — Sailing into Twilight 
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prices paid for old vessels, but they are far from representative. 
The account-books of the Finnish Steamship Company (FAA) 
contain complete data on capital values and annual depreciation 
for all their ships, but as the rates were arbitrary, they do not 
necessarily give a reliable picture of the development of current 
values. Indeed, when business was good, as around 1895, they 
depreciated no less than 6 % of the value of their fleet, while ten 
years later, when times were worse, they had to go down to 2-3 % 
(all percentages here are of depreciated rest values). For a longer 
run, ups and downs balanced each other and produced individual 
ship depreciation fluctuating around 2.5% of new building value. 
This rate seems to be quite near what was regarded as realistic 
by contemporaries. This can be confirmed by looking at how 
steamship insurance values developed. For 10 ships which were 
insured by the Maritime Insurance Association for at least 15 
years, and which did not experience substantial rebuilding, the 
insurance values dropped an average 2.4 % a year (max. 3.0 %, 
min. 1.7 %).44 This suggests that the normal "life expectancy" of a 
steamship (if built of iron or steel, as were all ships referred to 
above, and not accounting for wreckage) was about 40 years. 
It is quite obvious that steamship tonnage "outflow" was smaller 
than that of a fleet of sailing vessels. A difference in risks which 
was especially pronounced in regard to total losses has already 
been demonstrated, and the value of a steamship also depreciated 
more slowly than the value of a windjammer. It is not easy to 
combine the different items of capital "outflow" in a single 
parameter, not least because it is partly a question of imaginary 
expenses. In any case, if the "life-expectancy" of an iron- or steel-
hulled steamer was over 60 % longer than that of a softwood 
sailing vessel, and if the difference in terms of total losses was 
greater still, the average "outflow" in the former case must have 
been only half of what it was in the latter. Earlier, it was estimated 
that regular new building of over six per cent of existing tonnage 
was needed in the 1860s and 1870s just to compensate for the 
tonnage "outflow" (selling excluded). In steamship tonnage, the 
corresponding rate would have been in the neighbourhood of three 
44 Registers of Sjöassuransföreningen i Finland. The steamships in question 
were picked up from the sample which was collected in order to study the 
use of the tonnage (see next chapter). 
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per cent. Thus, the difference between gross investments and net 
capital formation was, in general, reduced because of the technical 
transition. This development, however, did not affect the Finnish 
merchant marine much because the proportion of steamships was 
so low until the end of this period. 
The real value of the fleet and capital accumulation 
As anyone who is familiar with national accounting knows, the 
real (or current) value of a capital stock is a rather ambiguous 
quantity. Ships, however, are not the worst possible item. They are 
continuously being bought and sold, which offers at least some 
reference data. During the period in question, both second-hand 
prices — although fluctuating from boom to depression — as well 
as the rates of depreciation showed such relative consistency that 
it seems meaningful to compute a series of the value of the capital 
stock in question. 
In theory, this could be done by starting with the prices of new 
ships and applying to them the rates of depreciation computed 
before. Fortunately, there is another much simpler and far more 
representative method: insurance values can be found for all ships 
insured by the Maritime Insurance Association of Finland. These 
data were collected for the same sample years, 1865, 1875, 1885, 
1895, 1905 and 1913, as the tonnage data, and it comprises values 
of over 700 vessels altogether.45 This material is very repre-
sentative of the larger size-classes (300 tons and over, see next 
chapter) and of ships which belonged to urban owners. Insurance 
values seemed to correlate quite well with actual prices, as was 
seen with steamships before. They probably did not follow the 
short-term fluctuations in every detail, but this is not necessarily a 
drawback in a description of long-term development. 
Average insurance values per ton were computed separately for 
each sample year and size-class. As it seemed very likely that ships 
included in this data were in general of higher quality and more 
valuable than those which were not insured, the figures were 
modified in two ways. For 1865, 1875 and 1885, a separate set of 
values, 10 % lower than the average, was calculated for rural- 
45 	 Registers of Sjöassuransföreningen i Finland. 
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owned vessels, and those below 100 tons were given an arbitrary 
value per ton of 100 marks (about £4). After 1895, non-urban 
vessels were not taken as a separate group, but all ton-values for 
sailing-ships in classes below 700 tons were lowered by 5 %, and 
all vessels under 100 tons were rated at 100 marks per ton. 
Furthermore, for 1905 and 1913, the insurance material was 
supplemented with the accounting-values of ships belonging to 
the Finnish Steamship Company (which were no longer insured by 
the Association), and the ton-values were counted separately for 
passenger-ships and ordinary bulk-carriers. Using these values per 
ton, the value of tonnage in each size-class and for the whole 
merchant fleet was easily calculated (table 2:24; values per ton can 
be found in appendix II). 
These figures are, again, a rather dramatic expression of the 
extent of the stagnation in shipping after 1875, and of the modest 
recovery after the mid-1890s. Even in 1913, the nominal value of 
steam tonnage was lower than the 1875 figure for sailing ships. It is 
not surprising that the value of windjammers was decreasing all 
the time as the average age of the fleet, with the sole exception of 
small coastal vessels, was steadily increasing. It is more startling 
that the rising curve of the capital value of steam-tonnage 
apparently crossed the falling curve for sail only just before the 
turn of the century. 
It is also significant that the nominal total value (as well as the 
real value if computed by domestic wholesale prices) was lower in 
1913 than it had been in 1875. Although this kind of comparison 
contains elements which cannot be directly compared (for 
example, no account is taken of the fact that the increasing sizes of 
ships decreased building-costs per ton so that higher tonnage 
could be produced for less money), the figures prove at least that 
there was no positive capital accumulation between the mid-1870s 
and the 1890s. When the new but short investment boom of the 
1890s came to an end, there followed a period when investments 
hardly exceeded the natural tonnage outflow and depreciation. 
Between 1905 and 1913, wholesale prices in Finland and abroad 
increased by around 20 %. The increase in the current value of 
steam tonnage was actually slightly below this rate, and for the 
whole fleet it was less than 6 %. Thus there was hardly any net 
capital formation in shipping after the turn of the century. 
It is remarkable, although not unexpected, that gross 
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TABLE 2:24. Estimated current value of Finnish merchant 
tonnage, 1865-1913. Mill. Finnish marks. 
Year Sailing ships 
size-classes 








1865 2.9 16.7 11.9 31.5 2.4 2.4 33.9 
1875 2.7 23.3 13.2 39.2 6.6 0.9 7.5 46.7 
1885 2.5 14.3 8.7 25.5 6.6 1.5 8.1 33.6 
1895 3.0 9.5 5.8 18.3 7.0 4.3 11.3 29.6 
1905 3.8 4.8 8.6 17.2 8.3 15.1 23.4 40.6 
1913 4.0 3.2 8.2 15.4 8.6 18.9 27.5 42.9 
Source: Appendices I and H. 
investments for a greater part of the period were smaller than 
tonnage outflow. One reason might be that shipping generated too 
little income to enable the existing capital stock to be maintained. 
On the other hand, it is equally probable that the lack of 
investment resulted not from inadequate income but from failure 
to reinvest, that capital flowed out to other industries. Which 
explanation is more plausible will be seen once a clear picture of 
the economic returns of shipping begins to emerge. 
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3. Labour 
As shipping was not labour-intensive, its quantitative re-
quirements in this respect were not great. Demand for certain skills 
was, however, quite high. In Finland, as in many European 
countries, there were already formal qualifications for masters and 
mates in foreign trades at the beginning of the period. These were 
specified by a law which presupposed both formal examinations 
and years of practice. The diffusion of steam added its own skilled 
labour requirements, and in Finland the qualifications of engineers 
on passenger vessels were stipulated by law in the 1850s, and their 
education and training was arranged in the technical schools.' 
In Finland, only a Finnish citizen could act as master or mate on 
a Finnish vessel and it was only in exceptional cases, such as if a 
ship lost one of its officers in a foreign port, that a foreigner could 
be hired.2 At least in theory, similar limitations also applied to 
ordinary seamen, because in Finland they had to be shipped 
through the local sjömanshus. In practice, however, ocean-going 
ships, especially those which made long voyages, had 
international crews. Cheap Finnish labour rather than the law kept 
the labour market for Finnish shipping relatively restricted. The 
price of labour, of course, also had some bearing on how demand 
developed in terms of man per ton. 
Sources of labour and wage information 
No comprehensive and reliable statistics on the quantitative 
development of labour in shipping exist for Finland before 1918. 
Only in 1863-70 did shipping statistics include data on the 
number of seamen,3 but these figures were inaccurate. They were 
collected from the ship-lists by the sjömanshus (towns) and 
länsmän (rural districts), which also gave the numbers of masters 
and seamen, the former in the form of a special roll of sailors.4 It is 
1 	 Finlands Författnings Samling 18.4.1859, 19.2.1879, 27.3.1890. 
2 	 Finlands Författnings Samling 21.8.1851, 31.1.1863, 15.4.1874. 
3 Finnish Official Statistics I:1-2. 
4 See chapter II:1, note 11. 
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possible that the figures collected by the länsmän missed a sailor 
or two, but the town rolls certainly contained too many sailors, 
because they included all members of the sjömanshus in question, 
including those who were too old to sail. 
It is not, however, too difficult to find more relevant data for 
seamen on urban vessels. Many of the ship-lists gave the number of 
sailors aboard along with other ship-specific data. Sometimes they 
only included their "own" men (that is, the members of the 
sjömanshus in question) but more often, fortunately, the total 
number of crew. This is enough to create a representative sample,5 
or rather a series of samples, which, like the ship-lists, cover the 
whole period. Moreover, for after the late 1870s, when "seamen's 
houses" were also established outside the towns, the material 
covers the whole country; before that it can, of course, be 
supplemented with the ship-lists of the länsmän. Many of the 
ships' accounts (see chapter III) also contain detailed data about 
the seamen aboard. 
Data on wages are to be found both in the archives of  
sjömanshus and in ships' accounts. The former very often contain 
special series of crew agreements (mönstringsrullor) and data on 
wages were noted on the rolls (matrikel). The ships' accounts, 
again, were often supplemented by special crews' accounts  
(folkbok), which divulge not only the initial monthly wages but 
also any increases and total earnings. Crew agreements provide 
very extensive and representative material, while the crews' 
accounts show more precisely what the actual labour costs were.6 
As the development of monthly wages is not of primary 
importance to this study, exhaustive data collection in the archives 
of various sjömanshus was not regarded necessary and accounting 
material was mostly used instead. The data for steamship crews 
was, however, very limited. Since the Finnish Steamship 
Company (FAA) accounts, which are by far the most important 
data on steamships used in this study, only supply the total wage 
5 That lists of certain "seamen's houses" do not contain full details of the 
number of seamen seems to have no systematic connection with any relevant 
features of shipping. 
6 Ships, and sailing ships in particular, were not fully manned all the time. 
After coming to a foreign port, men often jumped ship or left legally, and 
replacements normally only joined the ship just before it sailed. 
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bill and not individual wages, it was considered necessary to 
supplement them by collecting information about steamship 
wages from the archives of the Helsinki sjömanshus (as mentioned 
before, the town had a relatively large steam fleet from the 
beginning). Existing studies dealing with seamen's wages were, of 
course, examined.' 
Crew size 
The data on the number of seamen is a large sample of individual 
ships rather than a summary. It would therefore be logical first to 
determine typical manning levels, and only after that, and using 
these ratios, to estimate the total number of seamen. Average crew 
sizes are useful figures for other purposes, too: they provide a 
rather good parameter of labour productivity. 
Crew size is normally gauged by comparing the number of 
officers and crew with ship tonnage (typically expressed as men 
per 100 net tons). This is very convenient, but it does produce a 
few complications. First, as is widely known, man-ton ratios 
diminished substantially when ships grew larger, and a 1,000-ton 
ship or barque, for example, needed only 60 per cent more men 
than a 300-ton brig. The rates were also different for steamships 
and sailing vessels; apart from very obvious differences in jobs, 
this was also related to differences in tonnage: compared with 
length and beam, steamships always had lower net tonnage than 
windjammers. Thus, man-ton ratios must be expressed separately 
for different size-classes and for sail and steam.8 The man-ton 
ratios of sailing vessels are also often computed for different rigs, 
but the correlation of size and rig was, at least within one period, 
7 	 See sources for tables 2:27 and 2:28. 
8 Of course, an alternative would be to express the man-ton ratios as 
curvilinear regressions, separately for sail and steam. Apart from involving 
relatively complicated formulae, an additional draw-back is that the 
extrapolation of the data in order to estimate the total number of seamen 
would require the input of the individual tonnages of all ships, which is not 
feasible. 
104 
so high that it does not produce much new information.9 
Moreover, it should be remembered that seamen had many other 
tasks aboard than just trimming the sails, and the total amount of 
work depended mainly on the size of the ship. 
There is a group of steamship personnel which presents special 
difficulties: those who took care of restaurant services on 
passenger vessels. Before the turn of the century, these restaurants 
were not usually kept by shipping companies but by independent 
entrepreneurs, who also hired their own people (the FAA, for 
example, took over the restaurants aboard their ships in 1905). 
Therefore ships' accounts do not usually include them, neither did 
the "seamen's houses" mention them in their lists (however, they 
should be found in påmönstringsrullor, if the ship was sailing 
abroad).10 It is obvious that their number had no logical 
relationship with the size of the ship; it depended rather on the 
size and quality of its restaurant. For this reason, these people were 
not included in the crew when computing man-ton ratios. 
The development of manning levels is summed up in table 2:25. 
As the number of observations was relatively limited, the figures 
for steamships show some casual fluctuations. Therefore, the data 
are also presented in a more accurate form as curves of man-ton 
ratios by net tons (figure 2:2). 
The data shows that, in size-classes below 500 tons, steamships 
required 60-80 per cent larger crews per net ton than sailing 
vessels, but in larger classes the difference clearly diminished.11 In 
general, the ratios were remarkably stable; for steamships, 
especially, there was only a weak trend towards smaller crews. 
9 Eric W. Sager (Seafaring Labour, p. 208) presents a table which shows that 
there was no less than a 25-30 % difference in man-ton ratios between ships 
and barques. All the observations for the period 1863-1914, however, are 
summarized in this table which fails to indicate the gradual change from 
ships to barques which took place simultaneously with the general decline in 
man-ton ratios. Thus, the table somewhat exaggerates the actual differences 
between the two rigs. 
10 Sundqvist, "Kvinnor ombord," p. 499-503. Although, by law, the 
påmönstringrullor of sjömanshus, also listed restaurant personnel aboard 
ships sailing abroad, their wages were not recorded. 
11 As steamships normally had a net tonnage of about 60-65 % of gross 
tonnage, their manning ratios per gross ton were smaller than those for 
sailing vessels. 
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TABLE 2:25. Man-ton ratios in the Finnish merchant marine, 
1865-1913. Men per 100 net tons, masters included. 
Size-class 
Year 19<100 100<200 200<300 300<500 500<700 700<10001000- 
A. Sailing vessels 
1865 7.1 4.8 5.1 3.7 2.8 2.4 
1875 7.4 5.0 4.0 3.2 2.6 2.1 
1885 7.4 4.6 3.8 2.9 2.3 2.0 1.8 
1895 7.8 4.7 3.7 2.8 2.1 1.7 1.5 
1905 7.5 4.7 3.7 2.9 2.2 1.8 1.4 
1913 7.8 5.3 3.8 2.9 2.1 1.7 1.3  
B. Steamships (excl. restaurant personnel on passenger ships) 
1865 .. 8.2 7.0 
1875 (13.5)1  8.6 6.1 4.6 - 
1885 12.9 8.5 6.1 4.9 2.7 
1895 13.3 6.8 6.9 4.4 2.8 - 
1905 11.3 6.5 6.0 4.3 2.8 2.0 1.9 
1913 12.3 7.2 5.7 4.5 2.9 2.5 1.8 
1 Only three observations. 
Source: Ship-lists of sjömanshus and länsmän.  
Sailing vessels, on the other hand, seem to have experienced a 
trend towards more rational labour use in the 1860s and 1870s. 
With the exception of the two smallest size-classes, men per ton 
ratios dropped from 1865 to 1885 by 20-25 per cent. Most of this 
rationalization took place in the 1860s, and seems to have been 
connected with the general growth in ocean-going ships (see p. 55). 
A contributing factor may have been a direct shortage of 
experienced sailors at a time when tonnage was increasing 
rapidly.12 The man-ton ratios still fell a little in the highest size-
classes - but only in them - from 1885 to 1895, and after that 
there were hardly any changes. 
12 	 At least in Turku (Åbo), complaints about a shortage of seamen were voiced.  
Nikula, Åbo sjöfarts historia, p. 166. 
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In 1862, the board of the Finnish Marine Insurance Association 
expressed its opinion that Finnish ships had much larger crews 
than similar-sized foreign vessels.13 Unfortunately, there are little 
data on man-ton ratios in different countries, but at least compared 
with North American levels, the Finnish ratios were quite 
generous. According to some Canadian studies, in the 1860s, 
normal man-ton ratios were 2.6-2.7 in size-class 250-499 tons, 
and 2.0-2.4 in the 500-999-ton class. In Finland in 1865, there 
were still 3.6 men per 100 tons in the 300-499-ton size-class, and 
2.5 men in the 500-999-ton class, which means that there was a 
real difference of 10-30 per cent. This difference did not vanish 
when the Finnish crews diminished: quite on the contrary, the 
Canadian ratios fell equally fast and, what is more remarkable, 
continued to fall even after the 1880s. At the turn of the century, a 
Canadian ship of 500-999 tons had on average a 20-25 % 
smaller crew than a Finnish one of similar size.14  
Because of high labour costs, the North American man-ton ratios 
were probably the lowest in the world, and therefore the Finnish 
figures may not have been excessively high compared with some 
other nations. At least British man-ton ratios were systematically 
15-25 % higher: in the 1890s, for example, Finnish ships of 500-
999 tons had on average 1.9 men per 100 tons while the 
corresponding British figure was 2.2.15 This difference may partly 
have depended on the fact that British ships often carried boy 
apprentices, who were practically nonexistent in the Finnish fleet. 
On the other hand, Finnish owners had no strong motives to 
approach the American "under-manning" levels: ships engaged on 
ocean trades had to be prepared for long series of voyages, and as 
desertion was commonplace,16 it was prudent to carry more than 
minimum crews. As long as Finnish labour was cheaper than 
foreign labour, this was also profitable. 
13 	 Nikula, Åbo sjöfarts historia, p. 164. 
14 Sager, "Sources in productivity change in the Halifax ocean fleet", p. 104; 
Fischer, "The great mud hole fleet", p. 145; Sager, "Labour productivity in 
the shipping fleets of Halifax and Yarmouth", p. 162; Sager, Seafaring 
Labour, p. 202-204. 
15 Sager, Seafaring labour, p. 215. See also Williams, "Crew size in Trans-
Atlantic trades", p. 111. 
16 Hautala, Merimiesten karkaaminen suomalaisilta laivoilta.  
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Total labour development 
Once man-ton ratios have been computed, it is relatively 
straighforward to estimate the total number of seamen. If the 
extrapolation is done separately for sail and steam and for each 
size-class (and each sample year, of course) the resulting totals 
should reasonably accurately represent the total demand for 
labour. Because of a lack of data, the steamship figures for 1865 
and 1875 are not very reliable, but as they were relatively few in 
number, the totals are not affected much. 
Table 2:26 presents the development of the total number of 
seamen as well as of the different subgroups, even incorporating a 
rough estimation of restaurant personnel on passenger steamers. 
The figures show that the middle of the 1870s, not surprisingly, 
marked a turning-point in the growth of labour, exactly as it did in 
the growth of tonnage. The total figure of almost 10,000 men was 
never reached again; indeed, after the early 1880s, the level 
dropped below that of the mid-1860s for good. Even if there was a 
slight increase to well over 8,000 by the turn of the century, this 
was again followed by a slow decline." 
The total demand for labour fell somewhat faster than total 
tonnage. This was a result of two conflicting trends. The average 
ship size increased considerably and this meant, of course, that the 
demand for labour per ton declined. At the same time, however, 
the proportion of steamships rose, and as they required more men 
per net ton than sailing vessels, this change partly counteracted the 
effects of the increase in ship size. 
Traditional coastal shipping by small and simple sailing vessels 
represented a constant and very conservative element; man-ton 
ratios remained practically unchanged. These were high on small 
ships and the vessels therefore employed quite a substantial 
number of men, 2,300-2,900. If they are disregarded, the decline 
in the demand for labour was still more dramatic: from 1875 to the 
1910s it had fallen by no less than a third. 
The demand for formally competent masters and officers 
dropped even more. Excluding coastal sailers, whose masters were 
17 	 Kaukiainen, "Från jungman Jansson till Kalle Aaltonen", p. 354. In table 2:26, 
these figures are slightly modified as far as passenger steamers are concerned. 
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TABLE 2:26. Estimated numbers of crew and officers in the 
Finnish merchant marine, 1865-1913. 
1865 1875 1895 1913 
A. Coastal sailing vessels 
Masters 814 666 694 912 
Other crew 1,830 1,590 1,630 2,000 
Total 2,650 2,250 2,300 2,900 
B. Other sailing vessels 
Masters 481 655 398 248 
Mates (incl. konstaplar)  780 1070 540 360 
Crew 4,320 5,230 3,130 2,270 
Total 5,600 6,950 4,050 2,900 
C. Steamships 
Masters 26 46 117 203 
Mates 30 50 140 260 
Machine officers 35 75 160 280 
Crew 140 360 760 1,410 
Total 230 530 1,180 2,150 
D. Restaurant personnel on passenger steamers 
Total 40 80 140 250 
Grand total 8,500 9,800 7,700 8,200 
Source: The figures are based on Kaukiainen, "Från jungman Jansson till 
Kalle Aaltonen" (HTF 3/1988), table 3 and bilaga 3. The number 
of restaurant personnel has been estimated on the basis of 
påmönstringsrullor of Helsinki sjömanshus and the data of 
steamships officers and crews, 1914-15, in the archives of  
sjöfartsinspektören (Ba:1, Ec:1). 
not required to take an examination, the number of masters fell by 
36 per cent from 1875 to 1913 and of mates (including second 
mates and so-called konstaplar, that is unqualified acting watch 
officers) by no less than 45 per cent. Again, the decrease was 
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mainly due to the rise in average ship size, but it was also helped 
by the fact that the requirements for the number of deck officers 
were quite liberal in Finland.18 A decline in the number of the most 
expensive men, compared with the tonnage in business, was of 
course a boon to the owners, but it affected only those who had 
sailing vessels. Steamships also needed engineering officers, and 
this new category of qualified and well-paid personnel made up 
for most of the decrease in the number of deck officers.19 
The price of labour 
A typical feature of maritime labour was that the crew of a ship 
formed a hierarchical structure, where differences in position were 
also reflected in wages. Table 2:27 below shows that the highest 
wages were sometimes five to ten times more than the lowest ones. 
These figures do not include masters, whose earnings exceeded 
those of mates by even more, nor cabin boys, whose pay was 
perhaps a half of a jungman's wage. 
The table also shows one unsatisfactory feature of maritime 
wages. Although, in principle, a man's pay depended on how he 
was rated aboard, ranks of ordinary sailors such as matros (able-
bodied seaman), lättmatros (ordinary seaman) or jungman (boy, or 
junior ordinary seaman) were not in any way universally defined. 
Neither were they based on examinations or ability testing, but 
rather depended on the owner's or master's subjective ideas about 
how skillful a man was and to what extent these skills should be 
paid for. Thus it is no wonder that there was no uniform wage 
18 	 According to the act of 1874, which was effective until the end of the period 
in question, ships sailing on the Baltic or the North Sea required only one 
second mate (understyrman), while on the Atlantic they had to have one 
mate, and only if they sailed beyond the line from Cape Horn to the Cape of 
Good Hope should they have both first and second mates. Steamships 
carrying passengers had slightly higher requirements on the number and 
quality of officers. Kaukiainen, "Från jungman Jansson," p. 359. 
19 According to the regulations, a coastal steamer was required to have at least 
one qualified engineer and a "sea-going" ship, that is, one sailing day and 
night, at least two. In addition, ships often had engineering apprentices, who 
mostly acted as firemen but were paid somewhat more. Finlands författnigns 
samling 21.8.1851, 31.1.1863, 15.4.1874. The largest steamships usually had 
three engineers. 
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TABLE 2:27. Typical monthly wages for officers and sailors on 
foreign-going ships in Finland 1860s-1913. Finn. 
marks. 
1860s 	 1870s 1880s 1890s 1900-101910-13 
A: Foreign-going sailing vessels 
(First) mate 	 +-100 110-120100-125  95-125 90-115 110-150 
Carpenter 	 40-65 50-70 45-70  50-75 35-60 65-85 
AB (matros) 	 35-60 50-70  45-60 40-65 35-60 +-60 
OS (lättmatros) 30-50 40-50  30-50 30-45 30-40 45-55 
Boy (jungman) 15-30 20-30  15-30 15-35 22-30 25-45 
B: Steamships 
First mate 	 100-140 120-175150-200 200-250175-200 175-225 
First engineer150-200 130-200150-200 200-225200-225 225-250 
Carpenter 	 60-65 	 50-60 50-60 55-70 75-80 
AB (matros) 	 45-55 40-65 45-60 40-50 45-60 45-70 
Boy (jungman) 25-35 18-45 25-40 25-40 25-35 25-45 
Fireman 	 40-52 35-60 40-50 40-50 40-55 40-60 
Source: Ships' accounts (see appendix IV:1); Helsinki sjömanshus, 
namnrullor, afmönstringsrullor, Lybeck, "Sjöfolket i Raumo",  
p.550; Nikula, Åbo sjöfarts historia, p.166-167;  Papp,"Sjöfolk i 
Vårdö", p.587-588; Börman, Åboländsk byggdeseglation,  
p.249-250. 
scale. The various wage brackets (which may have been fewer than 
the three mentioned above) very often overlapped and a boy 
aboard one ship may well have had higher pay than an ordinary 
seaman on another. 
There were, however, certain systematic differences in wages, 
mainly depending on the nature of the trade in question. The most 
distinctive of these differences was that men on board sailing 
vessels in coastal and Baltic trades (whose wages were not 
recorded in table 2:27) were paid clearly less than sailors in long 
trades.20 Another systematic difference was found in the wages of 
20 This can be clearly seen e.g. in Börman's figures from Kimito; the averages 
were clearly lower than those presented in table 28, because a large 
proportion of the sailors in this case were recruited for coastal or Baltic 
vessels (Börman, Åboländsk byggdeseglation, p. 249-250). See also 
Ahlström, "Sjöman i Helsingfors," p. 524. 
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mates: they were paid a good deal more on steamships than on 
sailing vessels. This may have been because of the high wages of 
first engineers (which obviously reflected the limited supply of the 
necessary skills); "first officers" (who were responsible for the 
cargo) would not have earned very much less. Surprisingly, the 
less experienced deckhands (jungmän) also had better than 
average pay on steamships. This may have been affected by the 
wages of firemen: their work was so hard that pay equal to or better 
than that of an OS on a windjammer was well justified. Jungmän 
had to do similar heavy work quite often — especially when the 
ship was coaling — and experience of traditional seamanship 
counted for very little.21  
It is quite obvious that wages rose during the boom periods, both 
in the early 1870s and from 1911 to 1913. In both cases the 
increases were larger than the general increase in prices; thus, 
there was some real growth too. However, real growth was still 
better in the 1880s when prices fell and wages followed them only 
marginally. There was a special steamship boom, however, in the 
1890s, when tonnage increased at a faster rate than ever before. 
This undoubtedly resulted in a great demand for officers, and their 
wages rose distinctively (and as prices then were quite stable, this 
also meant real growth). When the prospects of shipping worsened 
after the turn of the century, mates' wages were frequently 
lowered, and other pay levels also dropped slightly. At the same 
time, prices were increasing and the first years of the 20th century 
brought a substantial decrease in real wages. 
Finally, a few words must be said about the man whose 
influence over the labour bill was decisive: the master. He was by 
21 Wages were probably also affected by the fact that there were more married 
men past their twenties on steamships than on sailing vessels. According to 
an unwritten but well-followed rule, such men were paid more than young, 
unmarried men, irrespective of actual working ability. It has been claimed 
that only in the era of steamships, could being a seaman become a career. It is 
possible, however, that differentiation between temporary and very young 
sailing-vessel seamen and more or less permanent steamship men developed 
only after, say, the 1860s. Obviously, life aboard steamers which regularly 
visited domestic ports was more "civilized" and therefore suited older, 
married men. It was perfectly normal that 2/3 to 3/4 of all men on sailing 
vessels were under 30 years of age. See e.g. Ahlström, "Sjöman i Helsingfors,"  
p. 521. 
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far the best paid individual aboard, and even though it is open to 
question whether he was a manager or an entrepreneur (many, 
indeed, had shares in the ships they sailed), and whether he 
represented business know-how rather than labour, his earnings 
were a cost to be met by the owner. In Finland, most masters, like 
their colleagues in Western Europe, received their pay partly as a 
monthly wage, and partly as a percentage of freight income, so-
called kaplake (dutch kapplake).22 The former, typically, was the 
same or somewhat lower than the mate's wage, up to 100 marks 
(£4) a month.23 Kaplake, again, was almost invariably five per cent 
of gross freight until the end of the 1880s,24 and this, of course, was 
much more money than the monthly wage. Later, when shipping 
profitability declined, many sailing ship owners dropped the 
percentage to four, and in some cases (usually when a new and 
inexperienced master was hired) even down to three. Some others 
tried to fix the commission to net income or profit.25 In steamships, 
however, the trend was quite the opposite. A steamship master 
was required to pass a short examination in the principles of steam 
engines, and this obviously also brought them higher wages. A 
fixed wage became the norm during the boom of the 1890s, and the 
wages were good: depending on the size of the ship, they 
fluctuated between 3,000 and 10,000 marks per year. This 
development resulted in a clear differentiation of masters' wages 
in steam and sail. A slight levelling off took place at the end of the 
period. The increase in sailing ship size resulted in higher incomes 
for their masters, while the wages of steamship masters, on the 
other hand, were lowered somewhat during the depression of 
1906-08; in fact, the trend followed that already found in the 
wages of steamship officers (see table 2:27). 
The development of wages in the different categories does not, 
22 	 Many shippers and shipping agents even used to pay master a small gratuity, 
but in Finland it was usually agreed between the master and the owner that 
this gratuity was wholly or largely paid to the owner. 
23 Included in the master's wage are certain supplements (e.g. so-called "cabin 
provisioning money") which were paid on a monthly basis, but not money 
which was paid as compensation for expenses (e.g. so-called "land-going 
money"). 
24 On rural ships, however, a greater variety of percentages was used. See 
Börman, Åboländsk bygdeseglation, p. 256. 
25 Ships' accounts (see appendix W:1). 
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however, give an adequate view of the development of manning 
costs. The actual wage bill of a ship depended just as much on the 
structure of the crew and the combination of high and low skills as 
on the general level of wages. In sailing ships, in particular, the 
substitution of jungmän for some of the AB:s or OS:s made quite a 
difference to the total labour costs, and in this respect, crew 
composition varied a lot. Steamships, on the other hand, were 
always obliged to carry both deck and engineering officers, which 
substantially increased the payroll and made the wages of 
deckhands a lower proportion. Therefore, a better idea of the 
actual level of labour costs may be formed by looking at the average 
monthly wages of all crew members, including mates and 
cabinboys. This figure measures both the general level of maritime 
wages and the average levels of different ranks and skills among 
the crews at the same time. In principle, an even more simple 
method would be directly to calculate labour costs per net ton, but 
this figure should be obtained separately not only by decade but 
also by size-class (it would be affected, of course, by man-ton 
ratios). However, the wage data is drawn mainly from the 
accounting material, which is far too restricted to allow such a 
split. Moreover, an important element of the total labour bill, the 
wage of the master, was only remotely connected with tonnage. 
The average wages of crewmen and masters are presented in 
table 2:28. Since the source material mainly covers relatively large 
vessels, the figures are not fully applicable to all kinds of ships. As 
the table shows, the average tonnages in the sample are always 
clearly above the national average: it may be said that the data 
represents sailing ships which sailed mainly outside the Baltic, 
and steam ships which ran on long coastal routes to Sweden, 
Estonia and Russia or further afield. It is also obvious that the 
average tonnages were somewhat different at different times, but 
fortunately, they developed in much the same way as the averages 
for the whole merchant marine (coastal vessels excluded). 
Moreover, the differences in tonnage affected average wages 
surprisingly little: there was practically no correlation between 
these variables for sailing vessels, and for steam, the averages 
began to fall noticeably only when the size exceeded 600-700 
tons. Thus, in both groups, labour costs per ton developed in 
roughly the same way as man-ton ratios. 
Table 2:28 shows that the average wages for crew members 
115 
TABLE 2:28. Averages of monthly wages of crew members 
(masters excluded, officers included) and of total 
earnings per month of masters in samples of Finnish 
foreign-going ships 1860-1913. Finn. marks and 
pounds and decimals. 
1860s 1870s 1880s 1890s 1900-10 1910-13 
A: Medium-sized and large sailing vessels  
Av. tonnage, net tons 	 446 	 547 	 608 704 	 737 	 1,181 
Crew Marks 
	
39.3 45.7 45.4 45.3 45.7 	 60.8 
Pounds 	 1.5 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.4 
Masters Marks 	 363 	 353 	 299 275 	 273 	 398 
Pounds 	 13.6 13.4 11.8 10.9 10.8 	 15.7 
B: Medium-sized and large steamships (excl. auxiliaries)  




251 	 293 317 	 630 
	 620 
Crew Marks 	 60.5 71.9 68.1 77.6 74.3 	 78.6 
Pounds 	 2.3 2.7 2.7 3.1 2.9 	 3.1 
Masters Marks 	 c.350 	 560 	 490 
Pounds 	 c.13.3 	 22.0 	 19.3 
NB: Marks converted to pounds according to the average exchange rates 
of the four middle years of a decade. 
Source: Ships' accounts (see appendix IV:1); Helsinki sjömanshus, 
namnrullor, afmönstringsrullor. 
were, as expected, very different in sail and steam: with the 
exception of the last ten years or so, the former fell within the wage 
brackets of ordinary seamen (lättmatroser), while the latter could 
be compared with the wages of carpenters or bosuns. Since 
steamships also required more men per net ton than sailing 
vessels, they were relatively expensive to man. Using the man-ton 
ratios computed before, the total wage bill (master included) of a 
normal (250 tons) steamer in the 1870s turns out to be about 5.4 
Finnish marks per month and ton, while the corresponding cost 
figure for a normal (500 tons) sailing vessel hardly exceeded two 
marks. In the 1910s, again, the average, foreign-going steamer 
(around 550 tons) could be manned for about 3.4 marks, but the 
average sailing vessel trading outside the Baltic (around 750 tons) 
required only 1.6 marks per month and ton. If steam and sailing 
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ships of similar net tonnage are compared, the wage bill of the 
former was typically 50 % higher than that of the latter. 
Indirect labour costs: food provisions 
In addition to monetary wages, practically all sailors were fed and 
lodged aboard their ships.26 With the exception of officers, lodging 
at the beginning of the 20th century was still of such a modest 
quality that it is very difficult to attach a cash value of any 
importance to it. Since it was also unthinkable to sail a deep-water 
vessel without having the crew permanently aboard, it seems 
impossible, even in principle, to make a distinction between costs 
of lodging and fixed costs in general. Food provisions, on the other 
hand, were a special item of running expenses, and even though 
the quality of food was often, and on long-traders especially, quite 
poor, it was in any case a typical natural benefit paid by the 
employer.27 
The costs of food provisions are normally identifiable in the 
ships' accounts, if they are detailed enough. Unfortunately, many 
masters did not trouble to specify all cost items according to their 
final use but rather presented a ships chandler's bill containing 
both food and bosun's stores as a single lump sum. The value of 
provisions which were loaded at home before sailing abroad were 
not always specified either. All this means that sufficient data on 
food costs can be found only in a minority of accounts. 
Fortunately, the variation in figures seems to be moderate,28 and 
26 On a few passenger steamers, men were not fed by the ship but they could 
have their meals in the restaurant. In such cases, the men were paid about 
20-30 marks more per month. 
27 
	
	 According to the modern system of national accounting, "wages and salaries" 
include all the remuneration an employee receives for his work, either in 
cash or in kind, including e.g. net costs for housing and food which the 
employer offers. As sailors usually paid nothing for these, total food costs 
must be included. 
28 Food costs were computed from 44 sailing vessels' accounts (1858-1914) 
and for 34 FAA steamships in 1905 and 1913. In the former group, the overall 
standard deviation was 4.8 (average = 32.8), in the latter 11.4 (aver = 65.2). 
The deviation in the latter case was larger probably because on some (but not 
all) ships which occasionally carried passengers, the food costs of passengers 
were included in the normal food bill. 
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TABLE 2:29. The average value of food provisions per man and 
month in the Finnish merchant marine, 1860-1913. 





















1.43 65.2 2.57 
NB: Conversions as in table 2:28. 
Source: Ships' accounts (see appendix N:1). 
therefore reasonable representativeness can be achieved from 
relatively few observations. 
Table 2:29 shows that, at least on sailing ships, the food bill per 
man was quite stable; variations in it reflect price fluctuations 
rather than any real changes. 
Even in this respect, steamships seem to have been more 
expensive. The data is, of course, quite limited and represents only 
one company, the FAA, at the very end of the period. It is, 
however, quite possible that the quality of food was somewhat 
better on steamships. One reason is that, before the 1880s, most of 
them (auxiliaries excluded) carried passengers, and there was 
usually a restaurant aboard for them; the restaurant kitchen was 
also used to prepare food for the crew. It must also be remembered 
that the personnel on steamships included a lot of officers who 
normally dined better than common seamen (in a few cases even 
some passengers' consumption may not have been itemized 
separately from the crew's bill). Finally, a fraction of the difference 
arose because the value of food provisions aboard sailing vessels 
did not always include cabin provisions: the master often had to 
buy at least some of his food and drink himself, and he was paid a 
special allowance for this.29 
29 This practice was common on e.g. ships from Turku (Åbo). The allowance 
(kajutfourneringspengar) typically amounted to 20 marks a month. See note 
23. 
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TABLE 2:30. Average wages for able-bodied seamen (matroser) in 
Finland and some other countries. Pounds sterling 
per month. 
1860s 1870s 1880s 1890s 1900-10 1911-13 
Finland 1.7 2.3 2.2 2.2 1.9 2.4 
Norway' 1.8 1.9 2.3 2.8 3.0 3.4 
England 3.1 3.2 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.1 
British N-America 6.0 5.4 5.2 4.7 
Europe, average 2.8 3.1 2.9 3.0 
1 Averages of one-year (1860, 1870, 1880 etc.) values. 
Source: Fischer — Nordvik, "From Namsos to Halden", table 1; Fischer, 
International Maritime Labour, 1863-1900, tables 2-3; Fischer, 
"A Dereliction of Duty," p. 66. 
Despite the low quality of food, which was so often vividly 
described in memoires and other narrative sources,30 its value was 
obviously not so trifling. Indeed, in the 1860s, the average value of 
provisions on sailing vessels almost equalled the average wages, 
and even later it represented some two thirds of them. 
Finnish labour costs compared 
It has been a common belief that the wages of Finnish sailors were 
quite low by international standards. This study has not produced 
anything to challenge this: all the monthly wages presented above 
were low compared with those on British and North American 
ships. The following comparison (table 2:30), which only takes 
into account one group of seamen, the AB:s or matroser, shows this 
very clearly. 
Because the differences between the different ranks of common 
seamen were rather fluid, the comparison cannot be totally 
accurate. Neither can it be used to indicate differences in overall 
manning costs, because AB wages did not necessarily represent 
30 See e.g. Kaukiainen, "Laiva Toivo, Oulu," esp. notes 32-35. 
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average crew wages. Both on British and Canadian vessels, the 
majority of ordinary sailors were rated as ABs, while they 
represented the elite of the forecastle on Finnish windjammers. 
Accordingly, average actual crew wages (master excluded, officers 
included) for Canadian vessels were slightly higher than AB 
wages31 but in Finland they were 10-15 % lower (see table 2:28). 
The rates on British ships, with their boy apprentices, probably fell 
between these two. On the other hand, Canadian vessels were 
often able to hire crew abroad for lower wages than those paid in 
their home ports; according to Eric W. Sager, the average crew 
wages in the Windsor fleet fluctuated around £4 in 1863-1905.32 
By observing the differences in both man-ton ratios and wage 
levels, it is possible to present a very rough estimation of relative 
wage costs in these three fleets. If Finnish average crew costs 
(master excluded, officers included) on a long-trading, 500-999-
ton sailing vessel are given the value 100, comparative British and 
Canadian costs are rated as follows:33 
about 1865, British 240, Canadian 205 
about 1875, British 200, Canadian 160 
about 1885, British 180, Canadian 145 
about 1895, British 185, Canadian 150 
It must be admitted that the data on the average wages of crew 
members, or wages per ton, is far from precise; moreover, indirect 
labour costs (the value of food provisions) should also be taken 
into account. The estimation, however, shows very wide national 
variations which must mainly represent real differences in 
manning costs. In the 1860s, in particular, Finnish shipowners 
were enjoying a massive comparative advantage; it certainly 
diminished after that, but it was still of importance at the turn of 
the century. It is a real pity that fully comparable data for Germany 
and France was not available; however, the average European wage 
31 	 Sager, Seafaring labour, p. 217 (graph 14). 
32 Ibid.  
33 Man-ton ratios for sailing vessels of 500-999 tons according to table 2:25 
(Finland) and Sager, Seafaring labour, p. 215 (Canada and Britain); average 
wages according to tables 2:28 and 2:30 (Finland and England, in the latter 
case AB wages reduced in all cases by £0.1) and Sager, Seafaring labour. p. 
217 (graph 14, Windsor fleet representing Atlantic Canada). 
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was very close to the English level. It seems probable that 
Norwegian manning standards were roughly equal to the Finnish, 
and that the differences in labour costs between the two countries 
were fairly small. It was only after the turn of the century that 
Norwegian wages clearly rose above Finnish levels. 
Many Finnish owners and masters found out that foreign sailors 
were used to better wages when they were obliged to recruit new 
men in big international ports. As indicated previously, it is quite 
possible that this wage differential also kept Finnish crews slighly 
larger than the lowest levels in Atlantic merchant marines: having 
an ample crew when sailing from a home port could postpone the 
day when the master had to take on an expensive foreign sailor. 
Basically, the low wages of Finnish sailors reflect the general 
level of workers' wages in the country, as well as the standard of 
living. In Finland, able-bodied seamen were paid comparable 
wages to railway and urban consruction workers, and although 
AB:s represented the higher end of the maritime wage scale, it 
must be remembered that the other wages mentioned included no 
food. Ordinary farm-hands who were fed by their employer, on the 
other hand, earned about the same as, or slightly less than a 
jungman.34  
At the beginning of the period covered by this study, in fact, 
Finnish maritime wages were quite good compared with those on 
land. There were two major reasons for this. First, as long as 
shipping was expanding, the demand for labour was high; and 
second, the high level of foreign wages compelled owners to pay 
better wages for ocean-going seamen than was necessary for 
domestic labour, so as to keep desertion rates tolerable. Later, 
however, the development of maritime wages was less favourable. 
The following figures (table 2:31) present indices of real wages for 
seamen and some typical land-based jobs.35 
Over the whole period, both agricultural and industrial wages 
increased more than maritime wages. Since the demand for 
maritime labour had decreased during the shipping depression, 
34 Wage data on non-maritime professions from: Heikkinen — Kortteinen — 
Soikkanen — Soininen, Palkat, toimeentulo ja sosiaalinen rakenne 
Suomessa, appendix tables 4,9. 
35 
	
	 Heikkinen et al., Palkat ... , appendix tables 6, 10. All wages deflated by cost 
of living index (op. cit., app.table I).  
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TABLE 2:31. Finnish real wages, 1865-1913. Indices, 1913 = 100. 
Real wage index 
Time Matros,  
average 
Aver. crew 





wage sailing ship hand industry 
C. 1865 86 73 .. 52 
C. 1875 106 78 64 63 
C. 1885 120 99 69 91 
C. 1895 124 98 72 100 
C. 1905 93 88 87 97 
C. 1913 100 100 100 100 
especially in the 1880s and 1901-08, this is not surprising. It is 
also a fact that desertion rates in the Finnish merchant marine 
diminished after the 1880s.36 Accordingly, the factors which had 
earlier caused the raising of maritime wages to a somewhat higher 
level than that demanded by the situation on the domestic labour 
market were removed. It seems that the labour costs in Finnish 
shipping actually fell after the turn of the century, both compared 
with other industries at home and, as the case of Norway seems to 
indicate, with certain other merchant marines. 
36 Hautala, "Suomalaisten merimiesten karkaaminen". 
122 
4. Capital, labour and know-how 
During the last "golden" era of sail, Finland enjoyed comparative 
advantages in terms of both capital and labour costs. Because 
international data on building prices and seamen's wages is still 
rather limited, it is not possible to measure these advantages on a 
one-dimensional scale. It is, however, indicative that the building 
of sailing ships was roughly as cheap in Finland as in North 
America, and that the manning costs on long traders were roughly 
at the same level as in Scandinavia up to the turn of the century. 
Thus, it is appropriate to say that Finnish shipping represented a 
low-cost mode of production. 
In the 1860s and early 1870s, wages were already rising, largely 
because there was a high demand for labour. The prices of the best 
tonnage also rose steadily. This was a result both of the technical 
difficulties of building large wooden hulls and of the growing 
proportion of imported material and equipment (sailcloth, paint, 
wire, metal structures, steering-gear etc.). The final blow for cheap 
ships came with the transition from sail to steam. Practically all 
Finnish steamships plying the Baltic and beyond were bought 
from abroad, and for prices of no comparative advantage. 
During the depression which began in the late 1870s, the 
demand for labour declined, but as nominal wages fell less than 
prices (probably because of the undeveloped labour market), real 
labour costs rose. Accordingly, the advantage of cheap labour also 
seems to have diminished a little. 
A new investment boom in the 1890s did not produce quite as 
rapid an increase in tonnage as that of the 1860s and early 1870s. It 
was, however, dominated by steamship acquisitions, and as most 
of them were new, and even included special winter and passenger 
ships, total expenditure was high. From a later perspective, it may 
seem odd that a low-cost country mainly bought new and 
expensive tonnage, but it must be remembered, that there were still 
relatively few steamships. Well-used (and by now mostly second-
hand) sailing vessels had a clear tonnage majority, and thus low-
cost shipping was still very prevalent. 
In any event, the boom seemed to indicate that, even in Finland, 
the final transition from sail to steam was in evidence. However, 
just at this point, for some reason or other, developments deviated 
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from the path which led to the rapid substitution of steam for sail 
in Norway 1900-13, for example. It seems that the years of 
depression in the first decade of the 20th century were crucial in 
this respect. They also seem to have produced a change in the 
development of capital and labour costs. Wages were lowered in 
relation to domestic wages in general and to foreign maritime 
wages. At the same time, there was also a transition in steamship 
investment from new ships to second-hand tonnage. It seems, 
therefore, that Finnish shipping took one step back on the ladder of 
production costs. This may have improved competitiveness (if that 
was the problem) but it unfortunately made little difference during 
the great pre-war boom, and little fruit could be gathered before the 
World War brought normal development to an end. 
Finally, a few words must be said about a factor which has so far 
been totally neglected: know-how and entrepreneurship. 
According to Joseph Schumpeter, these were the decisive 
ingredients in economic development, and today a kind of neo-
schumpeterianism is well in evidence.1 These views stress a very 
important point; even modern econometric analyses seem to 
indicate that economic growth depends at least as much, if not 
more, on certain qualitative characteristics (often dubbed "total 
productivity") of the factors of production as on quantitative 
increments of capital or labour.2 Unfortunately, features such as 
know-how, or entrepreneurship, are very difficult to measure. 
To say that the skill and know-how of shipowners and masters 
were important to the success of shipping is pure common sense. 
That some were better than others is self-evident, and thus also 
uninteresting, and only accounts for the inevitable unsystematic 
variations evident in the profit-and-loss accounts. What is 
interesting for an historian is whether there were any systematic, 
such as geographic, differences or changes over the period. Such 
variations can sometimes explain differences in the productivity of 
capital and labour. 
Low-cost production is not uncommonly associated with a 
1 A well-known advocate of this line of thought in Scandinavia is Erik 
Dahmén; see e.g. "Kan den företagshistoriska forskningen bidra till den 
ekonomiska teoriens utveckling?"  
2 For one Finnish example see Hirvonen — Hjerppe, "Taloudellinen kasvu 
Suomessa 1880-1980" p. 172. 
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relatively low share of highly skilled labour, or a lower-than-
average level of skills in general. What is known of the formal 
education of masters and mates3 in Finland, however, does not 
indicate that the level was exceptionally low. The first three 
navigation schools (in Turku, Helsinki and Vaasa) were founded in 
1812, almost four decades before formal examinations for masters 
and mates were required in Britain, and there were six of them by 
1870.4 The quality of these schools seems to have reached the 
normal Scandinavian level, and there was a steady improvement. 
At least in one critical area, knowledge of foreign languages, the 
standard was not very good in the middle of the 19th century: 
according to the 1851 act, the navigation schools only taught 
rudimentary German, French and English.5 After 1863, only 
English was taught, but this was done more thoroughly: future 
masters were even trained in English correspondence. Better 
training was also given in economic geography and the general 
know-how of business conditions. Inclusion in the master's 
examination of great circle navigation after 1863 and the basics of 
climate, winds and currents after 1874 also brought about 
improvements in the ability to navigate the shortest and fastest 
routes.6 Even though the board of the Maritime Insurance 
Association sometimes criticized the standard of Finnish ships' 
3 Since 1765, Swedish (and Finnish) masters sailing in long trades were 
required to pass an examination. During the period it was possible to pass 
three different examinations in the Finnish navigation-schools; in 
hierarchical order they were:  östersjöskeppare or coopevardie (kofferdi) 
skeppare, mate (styrman) and master (sjökapten) examinations. Before 1863, 
the mate's examination was the lowest one. Östersjöskeppare could act as 
master on the Baltic and the North Seas, but not further. On coastal sailing 
vessels, and also on the Baltic before 1863, no formal qualifications were 
required of masters. 
4 
	
	 Finlands författnings samling, 3.4.1812; Olin, Åbo sjöfarts historia I, p. 206; 
Sager, Seafaring labour, p. 94-96;  Bidrag till Finlands officiela statistik 11:2 
(1866-70), p. 33-34. 
5 Finlands författnings samling 21.8.1851. See also Nikula, Åbo sjöfarts 
historia, p. 147; Ahlström, "Sjöman in Helsingfors", p. 529. 
6 Finlands författnings samling 21.1.1863, 15.4.1874. An interesting point is 
that even Finnish masters contributed to the fundamental oceanographic 
work of M. F. Maury by sending him their observations of winds and 
currents. Accordingly, Maury's Sailing Directions soon became known in 
Finland. Nikula, Åbo sjöfarts historia, p. 146. 
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masters, it was quite high, at least after the improvements 
mentioned above. In fact, they and other Nordic masters received 
praise from abroad.' 
An especially interesting feature of the know-how of that time 
was, of course, the competence of engineering officers. This was an 
area in which Finland almost totally lacked traditions, but in her 
semi-modern society of the middle of the 19th century, it was not 
difficult to organize the education of engineers, in particular since 
the common use of the Swedish language on the coasts made it 
very easy to find relatively up-to-date literature. There is nothing 
to prove that Finnish steamships experienced any troubles because 
of incompetent machine-room personnel, not at least from the 
1860s onwards. On the contrary, Finnish engineers and steamship 
masters were found in some numbers on the river-boats of St 
Petersburg and even on the Caspian Sea.8 
The case of entrepreneurs (shipowners) is more complex. Their 
abilities cannot, of course, be measured by any formal 
examinations. Obviously the owners present a very wide 
assortment of people, from the peasant who could just read and 
write to a trading-house owner who had served his years of 
apprenticeship in large continental firms, knew several languages 
and had wide foreign business contacts. Needless to say, the latter 
was immensely better equipped to deploy his ships in 
international freight markets. On the other hand, the former 
usually had the advantage in coastal trade and local markets, 
which required knowledge of local conditions above all else. 
No comprehensive analysis of shipowners for the period in 
question exists9 and therefore only some general observations can 
be made. Around the middle of the 19th century, the 
unquestionable top class of shipowners consisted of urban trading 
7 See e.g. Nikula, Åbo sjöfarts historia, p. 147-148;  Norrvik, Briggen Carl 
Gustaf, p. 20 (subnote). 
8 See e.g. Engman, "Sjöman från Finland i Ryssland."  
9 
	
	 Most sources used in this study, such as published and manuscript ship-lists, 
only mention the managing owner (correspondent redare) and the existence 
of other shareholders usually remains unknown. The insurance registers (see 
chapter III) record the precise shares of shareholders who insured their 
holdings in the ship. Only the ships' accounts (see chapter IV) record all 
owners and their respective shares, but this data exists only for a small 
minority of vessels. 
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houses, which also represented the highest level of business know-
how in Finland. In 1859, twenty such firms or merchants owned 
roughly a third of Finnish tonnage, and much more of the biggest, 
ocean-going ships.10 However, when the freight markets stagnated, 
the biggest trading houses were among the first to give up 
shipping. This trend was already evident in Wiborg and Helsinki 
in the 1860s,11 and in the Bothnian towns after the early 1880s (see 
appendix I). Many of these firms began to concentrate their 
business on the sawmill and other industries, and reduced their 
foreign activities. They often also bought shares in new steamship 
companies, most of which only carried coastal traffic. The net 
result was a distinct change in the structure of shipowners: the 
proportion of owners, especially of sailing vessels, with limited or 
nil experience in foreign trading and with insignificant business 
contacts abroad, obviously rose. Of course, many "self-made" 
businessmen were just as smart as well-established members of the 
urban bourgeoisie. It does seem probable, however, that a negative 
development was taking place even in the imaginary stock of 
know-how. 
Whether such potential impoverishment had any significant 
implications is difficult to say. In everyday business it was 
probably not felt much, because masters, with the exception of 
regular lines services, still had a remarkable role in decision 
making, and their qualifications, as well as the availability and 
standard of the services of shipping agents, were improving. The 
effects were probably felt above all in long-term decision-making, 
in investments and the choice of future strategies. This may be one 
explanation of the traditional attitudes (e.g. adherance to sail). 
All this does not imply that shipping totally lacked innovative 
elements or high-level business management at the end of the 19th 
century. The few big steamship companies were undoubtedly 
examples of up-to-date organization, but they were small in 
number and concentrated in a few towns, mostly in the capital. It 
is interesting that members or descendants of former important 
trading house families were quite well represented among their 
10 	 Mauranen, "Kauppa ja liikenne," p. 437; Finnish published ship-lists. 
 
11 Tigerstedt, Kauppahuone Hackman II, p. 133-148; Kovero, "Helsinki 
liikennekeskuksena," p. 302. 
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shareholders.72 In general, joint-stock companies did not became 
popular in shipping, and at the end of the period, the over-
whelming majority of sailing vessels were still owned by 
individual owners or traditional one-ship companies. At a time 
when technical modernization required more capital than before, 
this kind of organization was not an efficient tool: the traditional 
companies could neither collect investment funds nor attract 
much capital outside the established core of shareholders. The 
slow acceptance of new company forms is just one aspect of long-
term decision-making, which, as noted above, probably suffered 
from a lack of up-to-date know-how. 
The change in the structure of ship owning could, of course, be 
just a reflection of the declining opportunities offered by shipping 
and of the fact that those with a better-than-average understanding 
of business economics were the first to draw such conclusions. 
There is, however, at least a shadow of doubt that the change in 
entrepreneurship was also the cause of or, at least a contributing 
factor to, the worsening fortunes of shipping. However, it is 
impossible to provide a definite answer without more information 
about the actual behaviour of Finnish shipowners. 
12 See e.g. Suviranta, Suomen Höyrylaiva Osakeyhtiö, p. 20-23;  Wasa-Nordsjö 
Ångbåts Ab., p. 16-17. 
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III. Production 
1. General problems of data and methods 
The size and type of a ship always has some connection with the 
trade in which it is used and, therefore, the structural changes 
which were observed in the Finnish merchant marine give some 
indication of the structural changes in the deployment of the fleet. 
This connection is particularly logical in the case of small sailing 
vessels: most of them were so basic that they could only be used in 
coastal trade which, for geographical reasons, meant nothing more 
than trade to Sweden, Russia and domestic ports. As far as larger 
ships are concerned (which, in the middle of the 19th century, 
covered anything from a 200-ton schooner upwards) the picture is, 
however, much more complicated. This was especially true in the 
days when most sailing vessels were general-purpose bulk-
carriers, which might sail almost anywhere. Accordingly, no 
meaningful picture of what shipping really was and how it 
developed can be painted without the background of a reasonable 
overview of the actual trades in which it was engaged. 
The data 
Finnish shipping statistics are not very helpful for collecting data 
on how and in which trades the ships were used. True, after 1856, 
they registered the traffic in Finnish ports (that is, the total tonnage 
of entered and cleared vessels), but the tables were published in a 
rather summary manner. Only from 1883 is it possible to find 
figures which specifically give the number and tonnage of Finnish 
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sailing and steam ships entered from or cleared for different 
countries.' Even then, the data is practically unusable as far as 
steamships are concerned; very many of them were engaged in 
regular line traffic which involved visiting a number of Finnish 
ports before sailing abroad, or after returning to home waters. 
Since they were included in the statistics of each port of call (and 
the tonnage was always register tonnage, not the tonnage of cargo 
loaded or unloaded), the figures were inflated far above the actual 
volume of traffic.2 Only from 1892 onwards was distinction made 
in the shipping statistics between "direct" foreign shipping and 
"combined" domestic and foreign shipping, which meant that a 
passenger liner, for example, was registered only once per voyage 
(or twice per turnround) in the former category. Thus, it is only 
after that date that comprehensive and reliable data on all shipping 
by Finnish tonnage between Finland and foreign countries became 
available.' 
Most sailing vessel traffic was "direct" shipping. Accordingly, it 
was normally registered only once each voyage,4 and the export 
and import cargo figures are realistic even before 1892. For 
1 Finnish Official Statistics, ser. I. The original tables which the customs-
houses compiled contained a good many details, especially after 1867, when 
a special form was used for them (see Finnish Official Statistics I:2, p. 1-2). 
Unfortunately, such basic material could not be found in the archives of the 
Statistical Office or the Board of Customs or the Senate. The search yielded 
only one useful piece of data; a working table for the year 1872, which 
specified the arrivals and departures of Finnish ships by country of departure 
and destination. The special archives of the Central Statistical Office of 
Finland XXIV:1. 
2 See e.g. Finnish Official Statistics I:15 (1895), p. 15. 
3 Finnish Official statistics, series I. Unfortunately, the published statistics do 
not specify "direct" traffic by nationality and motive power (sail/steam) and 
loaded condition (loaded / in ballast) and the port of departure / destination, 
all of which are required for the extraction of figures for the export and 
import cargoes of Finnish steamships and sailing vessels. The original 
working tables, however, have been preserved and they provide detailed 




	 In 1895, e.g. only about 4 % of all entered and cleared loaded sailing vessels 
(irrespective of nationality) were registered in combined foreign and 
domestic shipping (and the bulk of these were in domestic traffic — the 
corresponding proportion of foreign traffic was only about 1 %), while the 
corresponding rate for steamships was 56 %. 
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"peasant" vessels, voyage data can be found even for the 1860s and 
1870s: the ship-lists of the länsmän (see p. 39) contain information 
about their voyages.5 However, three wide gaps in the data still 
remain: there is no information for urban ships before 1883, nor for 
all steamships before 1892. Most importantly, with the exception 
of some sporadic data from the late 1860s,6 there are no real 
statistics on cargoes transported by Finnish ships between foreign 
countries. As this kind of "cross-trading" was a very important part 
of the shipping industry in those times, the deficiency is rather 
critical. 
Fortunately, there are private archives which contain abundant 
information on the voyages of Finnish ships. By far the best are 
those of the Finnish Mutual Marine Insurance Association (Sjöas-
suransföreningen i Finland). This association was established in 
1850,' and it grew so popular that the overwhelming majority of 
major urban shipowners were members in the 1860s and 1870s.8 
Thus, it also represented a rather large proportion of Finnish 
merchant tonnage. Most significantly, its register-books were 
carefully kept, and contained basic data of the hull, outfit and 
5 See chapter II, note 14. Unfortunately, after 1876-77, the lists were made 
only in Ostbothnia. For the best part of the 1860s there are only summary 
tables. Lists have, however, been found in the archives of the länsmän — see 
e.g. Börman, Åboländsk bygdeseglation, p. 8-9 — and copies of those of the 
Province of Wiborg, 1853-1864, are still in Wiborg (Leningradskogo 





As early as in the 1860s, the shortcomings of the statistics were recognized by 
the Finnish Statistical Bureau, as it began to collect data on how much freight 
Finnish ships carried between foreign ports. This effort, which mainly relied 
on information received from a number of shipowners in different towns, 
produced rather extensive statistics for 1868, but subsequently the material 
thinned out and became unrepresentative; after 1877 it was no longer 
collected. No consistent statistics can be reconstructed using these data. 
Finnish official Statistics I:2-3. Original material can be found in the 
Special archives of the Central Statistical Office of Finland, ser XXIV. 
7 Activities began formally in 1850 as two distinct associations, West Finnish 
and South Finnish, but these were merged in 1859. Huldén, Suomen 
merivakuutusyhdistys, p. 8. 
8 Only one really big shipowner, C. G. Wolff from Vaasa, did not join the 
association, but neither did he insure his ships with any other company. 
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classification, plus the voyages, sometimes even the cargoes of 
each single vessel.9 
The manager of the Association (in Turku) received information 
from the company's own agents (who were in the biggest Finnish 
seaports), directly from owners and from published ship-lists such 
as the Lloyd's List.10 All this resulted in very complete and reliable 
data on voyages; in typical cases, exact dates of arrival and 
departure are noted. A significant amount of this data can also be 
cross-checked as detailed account-books (see chapter IV) were 
found for a good number of the ships. When the information in the 
register-books was compared with the masters' accounts of 
voyages (and in some cases with log-books), which are primary 
and very reliable sources, no single substantial difference was 
found. There were a few instances when the register-books omitted 
a port call, but this was virtually never a port of loading or 
discharge. Thus, the Association's register-books seem very 
reliable. Moreover, they are very easy to use because all the data for 
each ship covering three consecutive years is to be found in one or 
two places in a single volume. 
These register-books were examined for the same sample years 
(1865, 1875, 1885, 1895, 1905, 1913) as those for which total 
tonnage was checked. Data was collected not only on the voyages 
but also on insurance values (which were used in chapter II to 
determine the actual value of the merchant fleet) and some other 
characteristics of the vessels. In order to improve the 
representativeness of the data and to smooth out the effect of 
exceptional fluctuations, the samples were stretched beyond 
single calendar years. Each ship was followed for a minimum 
amount of time or number of voyages: in most cases, which 
concerned vessels used in long trading all the year round, this was 
either two years or eight voyages (cargo or ballast), whichever limit 
was reached first. If the voyages were unusually long, the time- 
	
9 	 Sjöassuransföreningen i Finland, register-books. The charter ("octroi") of the 
association was originally for three years, and subsequently it was always 
renewed for similar periods. The register-books also cover similar three-year 
periods, beginning August 1. 
	
10 	 Great numbers of agents' and owners' letters can be found in the archives of 
the association. In a few cases, the register specifically mentions that 
information has been drawn from a published ship-list. 
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limit was exceeded, but there were also instances (e.g. wrecked 
and sold ships) when it was not reached.11  Ships which returned 
home for the winter were normally observed over one year (most 
often spring to spring, thus including laying-up time), but if two 
consecutive sailing seasons were very different, both were used. In 
practice, all this resulted in an average observation period of one-
and-a-half years per ship. When the sailings of individual ships 
were summed up the figures were, of course, divided by the time 
in question so as to represent performance over one year (see 
appendix III:2). 
In some respects, however, the register-books are not entirely 
satisfactory. For instance, they often lack detailed data about the 
voyages of steamships which sailed on regular coastal or Baltic 
lines and only indicate the line in question. Information on cargoes 
— and this refers to all ships — is also rather unsystematic and 
defective: in the majority of cases, there was no record of whether 
the voyage was made loaded or in ballast. Of course, with some 
knowledge of the general conditions of maritime trade, it is often 
possible to make an informed guess. Fortunately, there is also a 
parallel source. The Association did not underwrite cargo risks, 
but as there was demand for such activity, a subsidiary company, 
the Second Marine Insurance Association, was formed in 1860 
(later, in 1907, they were merged).12 In practice, it was run by the 
same people as the "First" Association and thus also has excellent 
register-books. They contain cargo data on all ships having at least 
one insured cargo (in addition, the Second Association also 
underwrote casco (hull) risks which exceeded the maximum limit 
set by the First Association).13 Practically all ships which were 
insured with the Second Association had their primary casco 
insurance with the "First", and thus the parallel use of both 
register-books substantially supplements the cargo data. The 
11 If a wrecked or sold ship was followed for less than a year, the time was 
always recorded as a full year. This is because such ships were included in 
the tonnage figures, and their lower-than-average production must be 
accounted for, otherwise the totals would be inflated. 
12 
	
	 Huldén, Suomen merivakuutusyhdistys, p. 22; Hoving, Finska sjöförsäkrings 
aktiebolaget, p. 11. 
13 Archives of Sjöassuransföreningen i Finland, record-books of Andra 
sjöassuransföreningen i Finland. 
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account-books of individual ships (see appendix IV:1) also often 
yield similar information." 
Another, much smaller problem is that the orthography of the 
names of distant ports is sometimes so faulty that it is very difficult 
to identify the precise location. However, if the preceeding and 
subsequent ports, and the times required for passages were 
considered, it was usually possible to guess the port of call with 
reasonable accuracy.15 
The representativeness of the data is a complex problem. It is 
obvious that the Association insured a large share of the Finnish 
merchant marine, more than half of all urban tonnage in the 
middle of the 1860s and, ten years later, almost three quarters. 
Different types, sizes and local fleets, however, were quite 
differently represented in its books. From the very beginning, the 
rules of the Association stated that only sailing vessels over 40 
lästs (about 75 reg.tons), fitted out for trading outside the Baltic 
and owned by burghers in the Finnish staple towns, could be 
insured. This ruled out the coastal and Baltic fleets as well as 
vessels belonging to rural owners, and also steamships — 
obviously steam was still regarded as an unknown quantity. It was 
only in 1872 that the rules were amended so as to allow steamship 
insurance.16 Southwest Finnish "peasant" shipowners, on the 
other hand, formed an insurance association of their own, Åbo  
läns privata sjöförsäkringsförening (The Private Marine Insurance 
14 	 The percentages of ships with precise cargo information were as follows for 
the different sample years (N = percentage according to numbers, NTO = 
percentage according to net tonnage): 
N NTO 
1865 4 4 
1875 36 36 
1885 43 41 
1895 32 35 
1905 17 16 
1913 16 20 
15 Another difficulty is that many ports, especially in colonies which later 
became independent, have changed their name. A good source for finding old 
names was Philips' Mercantile Marine Atlas (1905). Reed's Tables of 
Distances was also useful. 
16 Huldén, Suomen merivakuutusyhdistys, p. 8, 16. 
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Association of Turku Province), in 1865, and in 1874, a separate 
association was also set up in Åland.17 
The representativeness of the register-books also depended on 
business cycles and the development of the insurance business in 
particular. During the depression of the 1880s, the number of 
vessels belonging to the Association dropped much faster than 
actual tonnage (see table 3:1), and in the 1890s, there was 
practically no recovery, thanks to the appearance of new 
competitors in marine insurance. In 1889, a company called Triton 
was established in Turku, and the Finnish Marine Insurance 
Company Ltd. (Finska Sjöförsäkrings Aktiebolaget) began its 
activities in 1898; it was after this date that the biggest steamship 
company in the country (Finska Ångfartygs Aktiebolaget), left the 
Association.18 On the other hand, the small associations which had 
insured peasant-owned vessels fared still worse, and their 
members began to join the "First" Association. 
In order to arrive at a more balanced sample, it was therefore 
deemed necessary to supplement the register-books with some 
additional source material. The voyage data of rural ship-lists was, 
of course, exploited as long as it was available;19 unfortunately 
these lists were no longer compiled in the 1880s, and "peasant" 
vessels were seldom insured by the Association. Although the 
archives of the "Private" Association of Åbo Province have also 
been preserved, their register-books contain little or no data on 
voyages. However, for the mid-1880s they do record voyages 
which were made after October and before May (they charged extra 
high premiums).20 This material may seem rather scanty, but at 
least it indicates how common it was to keep ships sailing all the 
year round. 
Additional data on ships sailing mainly on the Baltic were 
17 Hoving, Finska sjöförsäkrings aktiebolaget, p. 11. 
18 Register-books of Sjöassuransföreningen i Finland, Hoving, Finska 
sjöförsäkrings aktiebolaget, p. 11-14. The director of the FAA was very 
active in the founding of Finska sjöförsäkrings aktiebolaget, and therefore it 
was natural that his company left the Association. 
19 Since this data was of a rather different nature, it was not included in the 
voyage sample. Anyway, there is almost 100 per cent coverage for 1875, and 
even for 1865, voyage data for almost half of the peasant tonnage can be 
found. 
20 	 The archives of Åbo läns privata sjöförsäkringsförening, register-books. 
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TABLE 3:1. The representativeness of the sample collected from 
the register-books of the Finnish Marine Insurance 
Association (incl. some additional material) by size 
class. 
A. Sailing vessels. 
1 = Sample tonnage (net tons) percentage of total urban tonnage 








1 	 2 
1895 





20>100 11 10 11 1 1 0 0 0 
100>200 39 16 14 5 9 5 2 2 
200>300 67 61 44 9 32 9 4 9 
300>500 60 76 58 24 32 12 12 11 
500>700 56 95 68 51 68 35 19 39 
700>1000 58 89 91 82 108 85 45 48 
1000>1500 1001  40 87 87 82 71 75 69 
1500>3000 . 100 100 100 69 
Total 56 78 66 30 59 28 30 37 
N of sample 179 172 119 74 59 54 
Of these 
— peasant vessels 
(excl. 'land) 
0 2 1 3 8 0 
— Aland vessels 0 0 0 1 18 19 
1 N=1. 
extracted from log-books, of which there are large collections in 
the archives of most "seamen's houses" as well as in the Maritime 
Archives of Åbo Akademi. The systematic collection of data from 
such comprehensive material was not possible, however, and 
therefore an arbitrary sample was taken from the ships of two West 
Finnish towns, Uusikaupunki and Rauma, where Baltic sailing 
was very common (as mentioned earlier, after the turn of the 
century, they had the only important Baltic sailing fleets apart 
from Aland). The sjömanshus archives contained hundreds of 
volumes of log-books, and the ones chosen were of sixteen 
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B. Steamships and auxiliaries. 
Sample percentage of total Finnish steam tonnage 
1 = Including all steamships in the sample 
2 = Including only steamships with detailed voyage data 
Size-class 18 751  1885 1895 1905 1913 
(net tons) 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
20>100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
100>200 36 0 44 0 11 4 4 0 13 0 
200>500 93 51 68 11 64 7 83 29 74 0 
500>1000 . 100 100 84 84 79 52 80 50 
1000>3000 . 39 39 50 43 
Total 63 29 59 25 57 36 54 35 56 32 
N of sample 20 9 21 6 28 14 42 22 50 20 
1 Excluding an auxiliary from which the engine was removed in 1875. 
Source: Appendix I and III:1. 
schooners, brigs and barquentines, many of which covered long 
periods of time.21  
Finally, the steamship data was augmented with material from 
the archives of the FAA. These contain series of special accounts 
and positon lists, and it is possible to follow the voyages of the 
company's steamers even after they had left the Insurance 
Association.22 In addition, the accounting material (see appendix 
IV:1) yielded new data on a few steamships and sailing vessels 
which were not found in the register-books of the Association. 
These additions help to correct the worst anomalies in the 
sample, but it still remains skewed. As table 3:1 shows, the larger 
size-classes were always very well covered, while the data on the 
smallest vessels, sail and steam alike, was scanty at the outset and 
gradually thinned out to nothing. Although more "peasant" ships, 
21 	 Archives of the sjömanshus of Uusikaupunki and Rauma. One log-book from 
the sjömanshus of Kustavi was also used. 
22 The archives of Finska Angfartygs Aktiebolag, special voyage accounts of 
ships (usually in two volumes called "Oceanbåtar" and "Östersjöbåtar").  
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particularly from Åland, were insured with the "First" Association 
after the turn of the century, coverage remains modest. 
Thus, for the entire period in question, the sample offers a 
somewhat top-heavy collection of the best tonnage.23 The 
skewness in tonnage also affects the voyage patterns: it is clear that 
the proportion of long trades (which involved large ships) is 
much higher in the sample than it was in reality. A good 
illustration of this is that, although the sample figures for around 
1885 (see appendix III:2) are about 31,000 net tons of clearances 
a year from Finland for Southern Europe (the Iberian Peninsula 
and the Mediterranian) and only about 11,000 for the North Sea 
ports (including the whole of Britain), the shipping statistics 
record about 40,000 tons for the former and about 77,000 tons for 
the latter.24 This means that coverage for tonnage sailing for 
Southern Europe was almost 80 per cent, but it was only around 
15 per cent for North Sea trade. No such problems exist with 
the largest size-classes, however; it may be safely assumed that 
most sailing vessels over 700 tons were fitted out for and used in 
ocean trades. It was only at the very end of the period that many 
older wooden vessels in this size-class became unusable in 
anything other than North Sea trade. However, it can said that the 
sample gives a relatively good picture of freight business between 
foreign ports, and since there are statistics on traffic to and from 
Finland from 1883 onwards, its weaknesses in the latter respect (as 
far as sailing tonnage is concerned) are not an insurmountable 
problem. 
There is a similar skewness in the sample regarding steamships. 
An additional difficulty arises because the number of observations, 
especially containing detailed voyage data, is usually rather small. 
In general, steam tonnage venturing outside the Sound (or later the 
Kiel Canal) was sufficiently documented, although there is one 
poorly covered area: there are only a few examples of ships which 
were occupied on irregular tramp freight business. The scantiness 
of voyage data for ships sailing within the Baltic before 1891 is also 
23 	 For example, in size-classes 300 to 700 tons, sailing ships with copper or zinc 
sheathing and fitted out for ocean-voyages were in a clear majority, while in 
the actual Finnish merchant tonnage (rural tonnage included) they probably 
amounted to a third or less. 
24 Finnish Official Statistics I:7, table 7a, I:8, table 14. 
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a problem, because it cannot be supplemented with shipping 
statistics (see p. 130, above). Fortunately, there are good statistics 
of liner services for 1894 (and for that year only) which give, 
among other things, the number of voyages actually sailed on 
different regular routes.25 With due care and in combination with 
the time-tables of different lines,26 this information can be used as 
"bench mark" data to indicate normal traffic frequency on these 
routes. Indirectly, it also indicates how many steamships were 
engaged in other kinds of traffic, in other words, tramping. Finally, 
in autumn 1914, when war broke out, detailed data on all Finnish 
foreign-going steamships was collected, including information on 
the kind of traffic they were used for. This material also makes it 
possible to give an overview of the proportion of tramp freight 
traffic.27 
How to measure sailing and production 
An industry in which production consists of a great number of 
very different kinds of transport using very different vessels 
inevitably is difficult to represent with a simple and straight-
forward set of figures. Irrespective of whether the goal is to 
summarize total production or to describe the percentages of 
different trades, there is no perfect and all-encompassing unit of 
measurement. The structure and distribution of sea-transport is 
often studied by counting the number of entrances and/or 
clearances in different ports, either by simple frequencies or by 
using shipping tonnage as a unit of measurement.28 From the 
perspective of the port, it would be logical to count the volume of 
cargo (usually measured in tons), and this does, indeed, describe 
an important and tangible aspect of shipping. Its value to the 
25 Finnish Official Statistics I:14, table 10. 
26 Timetables can be found in the daily papers and also e.g. between the leaves 
of the account-books of the FAA. 
27 Lists of steamships 1914, Archives of Sjöfartsinspektören (inspector of 
navigation), Ba 1, Ec 1. 
28 See e.g. Alexander, "Output and productivity in Yarmouth ocean fleet"; 
Sager, "Sources of productivity change in Halifax ocean fleet"; Fischer, "The 
great mud hole fleet". 
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economy as a whole was relative to the amount of goods it was able 
to move from one place to another. 
From the perspective of the ship, however, the essence of 
maritime transport is in the voyages, of which the ton is not a 
perfect measure. The time and effort a ship commits to 
transporting cargo was also a function of the distance covered, 
which could be anything from a short coastal trip to a haul to the 
other side of the globe. The ton, or any measurement of weight or 
volume which does not take distance into account, actually puts 
disproportionate weight on short transport. Therefore, it has 
become customary to gauge transport using measuments which 
combine both the amount of goods transported and the length of 
distance covered, such as ton-miles or ton-kilometers. This 
method produces a better comparison of transport on different 
routes. 
However, even a sophisticated unit such as the ton-mile fails to 
measure correctly all the important elements in the production of 
seaborne transport. Moving a cargo from point A to point B is just 
one part of the total effort; the cargo must also be stowed in a ship 
and then unloaded. If the costs, time and labour involved are 
calculated, these harbour activities take up a substantial 
proportion of total production.29 Moreover, they were not related 
to the length of the voyage but to the volume of the cargo. 
In the big European and North American ports, however, 
loading and unloading were performed by specialized stevedores, 
and were not therefore produced by the ship and its crew (their job 
was to clean the holds and prepare the ship for its cargo). In coastal 
trade, in small Baltic harbours and in many Southern European 
and Far East ports, on the other hand, it was common practice for 
seamen to do the loading and unloading, possibly aided by a few 
local casual labourers. This whole problem, of course, could be 
avoided by considering loading and unloading apart from shipping 
production proper and categorizing them as "auxiliary activities of 
shipping". However, since the costs of these activities were 
incorporated into the freight, and either paid for by the ship or 
carried out by the crew, this is not the perfect solution. It would, 
however, be too complicated to try more sophisticated physical 
measurements. Moreover, the shortcomings of physical 
29 Harley, "Issues on the Demand for Shipping Services", p. 68. 
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measurements are at least partly compensated by a third, very 
common measurement of production: monetary income and 
expenses (which will be introduced in chapter IV). However, 
money also has obvious limitations as a unit of measurement, and 
physical measurements should not be discarded altogether. It is 
obvious that a balanced picture of maritime transport requires the 
use of both. 
On a practical level, there are some difficulties in measuring the 
physical volume of transport. Above all, the precise weight or 
cubic volume of goods carried in a ship are only seldom known. 
This information can sometimes be found in accounting material, 
but the data is far too scanty to enable total figures to be computed. 
On the other hand, a ship's measured tonnage can always be 
found. Although, in principle, it indicates the volume of available 
cargo space rather than of actual cargo, in practice, it is a good 
substitute for the latter. Practically all Finnish ships left domestic 
ports fully loaded and, in foreign tramping, the carrying capacity 
of most ships was utilized to the full. There were undoubtedly 
great differences in the stowage rates of individual ships, for 
example depending on whether they were loaded with light, high 
volume, or heavy goods, but in general the cargo weight or volume 
correlate with ships' tonnage well enough to enable the latter to be 
used as a measure of actual cargo carried. As far as passenger ships 
are concerned, this is a particularly attractive solution since it 
avoids all the problems of converting the number of passengers 
into some physical measurement.30 For comparative purposes, 
register tons may also be converted to dead weight tons with 
reasonable accuracy.31 Net ton, moreover, has the advantage of 
being the same unit used in Finnish shipping statistics to measure 
traffic to and from Finland. 
In certain circumstances, however, tonnage is not accurately 
related to the volume of cargo. Sailing ships, for example, 
sometimes carried small, paying cargo instead of ballast, but were 
30 	 Harley, "Issues on the Demand," p. 82. 
31 	 In general, the ratio between gross ton and dw-ton was a rather steady 1:1.5-
1.6, irrespective of whether it was a steamship or not, but since only net ton 
was normally used in the 19th century, this does not help much. For sailing 
vessels, the ratio of net tons to dw-tons was normally around 1:1.85, and for 
steamships 1:2.3-1:2.6, but as the latter dw-tonnage also includes bunkers, 
the ratio of net tons to cargo tons may have been 1:2-1:2.3. 
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nowhere near fully loaded. Steamships on regular lines also often 
had to count on much less than a full cargo — or a full complement 
of passengers — on certain legs of their routes. In both cases, there 
is no way of knowing the actual amount of cargo. A small error in 
the total figures therefore has to be accepted. 
Establishing the distance between different ports is not too 
complicated. The idea is not to record how many miles a vessel 
sailed through the water, but rather to observe normal waterborne 
distance between any two points on the globe,32 and standard 
tables of distances and similar sources are perfectly adequate.33 Of 
course, sailing vessel routes in the 19th century were sometimes 
different from modern sea lanes,34 and there were also some 
significant changes during the period in question. This happened 
because of the opening of new canals, such as the Suez Canal 
(1869), the North Sea Canal (Ijmuiden—Amsterdam, 1876) and the 
Kiel (Kaiser Wilhelm) Canal (1895). The Suez Canal had no direct 
bearing on Finnish shipping since very few steamships sailed to 
the Far East and sailing vessels regularly doubled the Cape. The 
other two, however, were frequently used (the Kiel Canal mainly 
by steamships) and must therefore be taken into account in 
establishing distances.35 
32 Attention is drawn to what the well-known master mariner J. C. B. 
("Bracewinch") Jarvis said about sailing ship trade: "It wasn't the miles that 
counted in deep-water voyages: it was making best use of the ocean winds." 




For this work I used Reed's Tables of Distances (10th ed., 1920), a modern 
Brown's Nautical Almanac and Philips' Mercantile Marine Atlas (1905). In 
very few cases, distances had to be measured on a modern geographic atlas. 
34 E.g. the lane round South America nowadays passes through the Straits of 
Magellan instead of doubling the Horn, which was the standard passage for 
windjammers. On a voyage from California or Chile to Europe, this means 
difference of around 400 nautical miles, and from Australia to Europe, the 
difference is around 200 naut. miles. Needless to say, the actual mileage 
through the water was on average longer going westwards, against the 
prevailing winds, than eastwards. 
35 It was assumed that from 1876 onwards, all vessels went to Amsterdam by 
the North Sea Canal instead of the Zuidersee. For sailing vessels, all distances 
were measured round Skagen, even after 1895, except in a few cases, when it 
is specifically mentioned in the sources that a port (always at the mouth of 
the Elbe) was reached by the Canal. The route of FAA steamships was usually 
known. If this information was not available, it was assumed that steamships 
passed through the Canal. The Panama Canal was opened in August 1914 and 
therefore had no bearing on this study. 
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Accurate distances can only be determined from the data 
collected from the register-books of the Insurance Association or 
similar sources (the insurance sample). Shipping statistics merely 
give a breakdown of shipping by country of departure or 
destination and, similarly, the ship-lists of "peasant" vessels from 
the 1860s and 1870s usually mention the country to or from which 
the voyages were made. In these cases, the insurance sample data 
was consulted as far as possible, to find out the actual destinations 
and average distances covered by ships sailing to, for example, 
Germany or Spain. Failing this, the distance to the nearest, well-
frequented port of the country in question was measured.36 
As was mentioned above, many ships cited in the insurance 
records were followed for up to two years, and the period was 
extended on either side of the sample year in question. Thus, when 
cumulated transport performance is then divided by time so as to 
arrive at the figure for one year, the result does not, strictly 
speaking, represent the calendar year in question. This difference, 
however, is of no practical significance. 
By far, the most complicated issue is how to compute the ton 
and ton-mile totals. Since only traffic from and to Finland around 
1895, 1905 and 1913, plus corresponding sailing ship traffic 
around 1885, plus the voyages of rural vessels around 1875, can be 
scanned with practically 100 per cent coverage, a substantial part 
of the total must be derived by extrapolation from the insurance 
sample. The "unknowns" consist partly of certain shipping 
categories (steamships) and partly of certain trades (foreign 
tramping), and the only logical method is to perform the 
extrapolation using the same categories. Accordingly, the 
production of sailing vessels and steamships was computed 
separately, and both totals were estimated from the totals of their 
different trades. For 1865 and 1875 (and, to double-check, 1885, 
too) the former were divided into two groups, urban and rural 
tonnage. 
36 	 E.g. for peasant vessels sailing to England the distance was computed to Hull, 
which was probably their most important export destination. Incidentally, 
the distance from any Finnish port to Hull differs only slightly from the 
distance to many other English or Scottish East coast ports. 
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Sailing vessels represented a far wider variety of different trades 
than steamships and, therefore, are more complex to deal with. As 
already mentioned, the insurance sample had an obvious bias 
towards longer trades and traffic to the North Sea ports, for 
example, was not well covered. It is quite clear that there was a 
division of labour between different vessels, and the choice of 
trade was related primarily to size, but also to quality (e.g. copper-
sheathing was required in ocean trades). Quality is difficult to 
assess but, fortunately, there was a rather strong correlation 
between size and quality, at least after the late 1860s, when small, 
ocean-going schooners disappeared. Thus, the basic assumption 
may be made that the representativeness of the figures for different 
trades depended on the average size of ships engaged, just as the 
representativeness of the whole sample varied according to size. 
This principle was directly followed for long, Atlantic and World, 
trades: for each year, the average vessel size was computed and the 
sample coverage was assumed to be the same as that for the size-
class within which this average tonnage fell. 
For shorter trading, a few amendments were necessary, 
however. Baltic trades were so thinly represented in the insurance 
sample that, before the mid-1880s, as far as urban vessels were 
concerned (for rural vessels there was data in the ship lists), the 
traffic could only be estimated on the basis of potential Baltic 
tonnage. As suggested previously (see p.138), there was also a huge 
difference between the coverage rates of North Sea and South 
European trades. It is quite clear that mainly urban vessels with 
copper sheathing sailed to Spain and the Mediterranean, and they 
were better represented in the sample than their average size 
would suggest. This presents no problem for the years after 1883, 
as the total figures for the respective export and import trades can 
be obtained directly from the statistics (the sample should also 
reveal, in roughly the right proportions, the occurrence of 
tramping compared with export and import transport in those 
waters). For the 1860s and 1870s, again, only urban tonnage is 
affected, as the voyages of rural vessels are covered relatively well 
by the respective ship-lists. A comparison of the sample and the 
statistics for 1885 indicated that coverage for South European and 
Mediterranean trades was just as good as for Atlantic business, 
while coverage for urban vessels carrying goods to North Sea ports 
was about as poor as the sample percentage of ships in the size- 
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class 300-500 tons.37 These guidelines, then, were followed in 
estimating the traffic to the North Sea and Southern Europe by 
urban vessels in 1865 and 1875. 
For steamships, the procedure was more simple. Since both the 
total extent of line services in 1894 and the tonnages engaged in 
different lines and tramping trades in 1914 were known, the 
extrapolation of the sample data between those dates was not 
complicated. Starting from these "bench mark" years, statistics of 
steamship traffic from and to Finland can also be used to show 
fluctuations in individual traffic routes and areas, in spite of the 
multiple recording mentioned above. For earlier years, again, the 
numbers are low enough to make it practicable to follow the few 
boats sailing to the Southern Baltic and to the North Sea 
individually. 
Coastal trade to Russia and Sweden in the 1880s and earlier 
presents a similar problem to that encountered with sailing ship 
cross-trade; this was also solved by analogy, supposing that the 
insurance sample represented the same proportion of traffic as of 
tonnage in the relevant size-classes. The estimate was, further-
more, cross-checked by ascertaining that it developed in a roughly 
similar manner to the "gross" figures (including multiple 
registration) found in the shipping statistics.38 
Finally, a practical definition of "different trades" needs to be 
arrived at. For a master or ships' agent, "trades" were quite specific 
things, transport of certain goods from a port (or a group of ports) of 
origin to a common destination; so they could speak of the Baltic 
wood trade (often divided into the Gulf of Finland and the Gulf of 
Bothnia sectors), or the Black Sea grain trade, or pitch-pine trade, 
or Far East rice and teak trades. In a statistical description, such 
detailed identification, apart from often being impossible because 
of lack of detail in the data, is, however, quite unreasonable. If the 
analysis is to go any way towards presenting an overall view, the 
perplexing variety of ports and trades must be condensed into a 
manageable number of classes. 
A substantial part of the data, shipping statistics, already 
37 The total coverage for North Sea trade in 1885 was as low as 15 %, largely 
because the insurance sample for that year only includes one rural vessel, 
while the majority of the traffic in question was carried by these ships. 
38 The extrapolation procedure is reported more fully in appendix III:2. 
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presents figures for entered and cleared tonnage according to 
countries of departure and destination. The principle of a pure 
geographical classification is quite acceptable, provided a 
distinction is made between export, import (in relation to Finland) 
and cross-trade cargoes. It is not necessary to identify all the 
different countries, however; it is more practical to define the 
natural areas of navigation. The competence requirements for 
masters and mates, the "trade" categories in the classification 
system of Bureau Veritas and, accordingly, the voyages made by a 
vessel — before 1868 even the "lawful" revires of "peasant" ships 
— were defined according to similar natural boundaries. 
These principles, applied to the realities of late 19th-century 
shipping, resulted in six natural areas of navigation. Starting from 
the "core", Finland's own coasts, they were: 
1. Coastal waters, or the Gulfs of Finland and Bothnia and the 
Northern Baltic. As domestic transport is not included, in 
practice, this means trade with Russia and Sweden. 
2. The Baltic, in practice trade to Denmark and the Baltic coast of 
Germany. 
3. The North Sea, including all British and Irish ports, the South 
of Norway and the French Channel ports. 
4. Other European waters, north of Stavanger and south of 
Ouessant, including the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. 
5. The Atlantic, down to the line from Cape Horn to the Cape of 
Good Hope (and, of course, excluding the European coasts). 
6. The rest of the World ("World trades"). 
According to this system, each voyage was classified by the most 
distant port of loading or discharge, even when most of the sailing 
took place nearer to home. The division is not very different from 
that applied in the shipping statistics: although the boundaries 
sometimes do not coincide with national ones, the deviations are 
not significant.39 Only in one case, the French ports, was there 
conflict between different sources, since Finnish shipping 
statistics do not make any distinction between the Channel and 
39 	 From 1892, Finnish shipping statistics distinguish between the Baltic and the 
west coasts of Sweden, as well as between the Baltic and the North Sea coasts 
of Germany. 
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Biscayan ports.40 It might also have been useful to distinguish 
between North and South Atlantic trades, but there were usually 
so few cases of the latter in the periodic samples that separating 
them would have involved a significant risk in extrapolation. 
Simply measuring ton-miles, however, does not produce the full 
picture of the trends and structures of shipping. Although it is 
possible to present a breakdown of total figures by different trades, 
the tons and ton-miles do not give answers to all the relevant 
questions. The overall development of the freight market, and 
factors affecting it, dictated the real options for steamships and 
sailing vessels. At different times, there were different 
combinations of outward and home cargoes which experience had 
shown to be profitable, and there were also different optimal 
cargoes for different types and sizes of vessel. All these are things 
which can only partly be expressed within quantitative 
dimensions. Different combinations of voyages may, of course, be 
picked up from the data but, because of the great number of 
different ports of loading and discharge involved, a statistical 
analysis is bound to be very complicated. Needless to say, the same 
applies to connections between the economic environment and the 
behaviour of Finnish shipowners and masters. Obviously, a 
traditional, historical narrative will be a necessary and useful 
additional tool. 
40 Since 1892 there has been a distinction between Mediterranean and other 
French ports. A good number of small sailing vessels usually visited French 
Channel ports, while steamship lines more often touched Bordeaux. By 
consulting other sources, a fair estimation of the relative importance of 
Channel and Biscayan ports can be made. 
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2. The development of trade 
In principle, a Finnish ship engaged in foreign trade either sailed 
between Finland and other countries carrying export and import 
cargo, or "tramped" between foreign ports in so-called "cross-
trade". In the first half of the 19th century, these activities differed 
in one respect: practically all shipping to and from Finland was 
protected by produktplakatet and special customs dues for foreign 
ships, while in international trade, Finnish ships were naturally 
not similarly favoured. However, by the end of the 18th century, 
Finnish "blue-water" shipping had already stepped outside the 
protected circles of the country's own export and import business: 
in addition to the normal "shuttle" trade to Spanish and other salt-
loading ports (spaniefart), ocean-going ships began to carry freight 
on the Mediterranean and other southern waters during the 
winter.' This cross-trade increased substantially in the second 
quarter of the 19th century and, as mentioned earlier (seep. 22), by 
the 1860s, the great majority of ships belonging to urban owners 
passed the winter outside the Baltic. The increasing popularity of 
freight-carrying in foreign waters at that time was quite 
understandable. Not only was it possible to carry on sailing when 
the Northern waters were ice-bound, but foreign tramp freight also 
helped to compensate for the permanent lack of import cargo. At 
least before the 1870s, international trade in general increased 
faster than Finnish foreign trade; moreover, the volume of goods 
carried on west European or Mediterranean routes, for example, 
was so large compared with what was exported from Finland, that 
there seemed to be room for an almost limitless growth in trade for 
the small northern fleet. Accordingly, carrying foreign goods was 
not limited to when the northern Baltic was covered with ice, and 
even became the full-time business of some ships. 
The growth of tramp-freight, of course, meant that an increasing 
proportion of Finnish shipping was subjected to free international 
competition. This trend was further strengthened by the de facto 
abolition of produktplakatet and other special rights of domestic 
1  See e.g. Olin, Åbo sjöfarts historia I, p. 176-177, 185-186; Alanen, Der 
Aussenhandel und die Schiffahrt Finnlands, p. 379-382 (and sources 
mentioned in loc.cit.).  
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ships (see p. 27). As tonnage still continued to grow after the 
liberalization of navigation legislation, Finnish shipping was 
clearly competitive and had succeeded in taking a tolerable market 
share of international maritime transport. Of course, in an 
expanding market this was not too difficult for a relatively small 
fleet, which was also favoured by the comparative advantages of 
cheap tonnage and cheap labour. The situation changed after the 
1870s, however, at least in one fundamental respect. There was 
always some division of labour between the transport of valuable, 
light goods and cheap bulk products,2 but with the advent of steam 
the distinction grew sharper than ever. In many of the best trades, 
steamships became market-leaders; this actually created a market 
division in which the "second-class" freight was left for sailing 
vessels. Soon the demand for sailing tonnage stopped growing, and 
gradually began to shrink. 
Because of this development, it seems practical to examine the 
freight markets of sailing vessels and steamships separately. 
However, there was also a third category of shipping in Finland: 
traditional coastal trade by sail was a special, non-competitive 
sector, at least in the sense that it was tied to local resources and 
other factors of production which were not accessible to 
foreigners.3 Many of the coastal passenger steamers should, in fact, 
be counted in the same category, although, in that their traffic was 
confined to domestic waters, they fall mainly outside the scope of 
this study. Humble sailing trade to Sweden and Russia is also 
peripheral in this respect, but there is one aspect which should be 
noted here. For certain owners of foreign-going sailing vessels, in 
rural districts in particular, coastal trade always counted as an 
alternative opportunity, especially if international freight 
declined. Rather than giving up the business altogether, affected 
owners could return to traditional small-scale shipping. 
2 	 See e.g. Unger, The Ship in the Mediaval Economy, p. 28, 34-35. 
3 Apart from requiring lots of local knowledge, engaging in coastal trade (so-
called cabotage) was difficult for foreigners because they were not allowed to 
carry freight between Finnish ports. 
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Sailing ship trades 
Different ships for different trades 
During the latter half of the 19th century, there were practically no 
legal requirements in Finland covering the seaworthiness of 
sailing ships. In theory, any vessel could sail as far as the 
competence of its master permitted. In practice, however, not only 
common sense but also the activities of classification societies, 
such as Lloyd's Register and Bureau Veritas, created a division of 
labour based on the quality and outfit of ships. In the "golden 
decades", the 1860s and 1870s, it was becoming increasingly 
difficult to charter an unclassified vessel in Atlantic or longer 
trades.4 
Economies of scale also meant that longer trade required larger 
ships. Table 3:2 below shows that ship size correlated strongly 
with the trade for which it was used. Coastal vessels were very 
modest in size and the bulk of Baltic traders were under 200 net 
tons. The strong correlation, however, does not mean that ships 
within one size-bracket always sailed in one and the same trade. 
With the exception of small coastal sailers, most ships normally 
carried goods on pure "tramping" principles where (within the 
confines of what their classification or the quality of outfit 
permitted) it seemed to be most profitable. Thus, different ships 
usually had rather wide "bands" of sailing waters and a vessel 
normally trading within the Baltic, for example, now and then 
carried a cargo to the North Sea ports, and many long-traders 
carried wood cargo either to British ports or to Spain as the first leg 
of their cross-trading adventure. 
In a few cases, the economics of shipping disturbed the 
correlation pattern between long trade and big ships. Surprisingly, 
ships crossing the Atlantic were, on average, slightly smaller than 
those sailing in the Mediterranean and other European waters. 
4 See e.g. Norrvik, Briggen carl Gustaf, p. 47. Bureau Veritas, which was more 
popular in Finland than Lloyds, made a distiction between ships which were 
allowed to sail on the Atlantic (class "A") and on "long trades" (class "L"), 
depending i.a. on how high they were sheathed with metal. Ships with no 
metal sheathing could be classified for "great coasting trade", including the 
Mediterranean. See "Regulations for the Classification of Wooden Vessels", 
art. 3, Veritas. Registre International de Classification des Navires. 
150 
TABLE 3:2. Average sizes of Finnish sailing vessels in different 
trades, 1865 and 1875. Net tons. 
Trade 1865 1875 
Coastal trade to Russian ports' 29 25 
Coastal trade to Swedish ports2 53 66 
Exports to other ports on the Baltic 125 150 
Exports to the North Sea ports c.3503 325 
Exports to other European ports 347 390 
Exports to other continents' 189 340 
Cross-trade in European waters (excl. 
the North Sea and the Baltic) 415 419 
Atlantic cross-trade 385 586 
World cross-trade 646 775 
1 Average size of vessels cleared in the coastal customs check-points in 
the Province of Wiborg (excl. Ladoga coast). 
2 Average size of vessels cleared in the Aland customs-houses of Eckerö 
and Degerby. 
3 Estimation based on the insurance sample and the preserved ship-lists 
of coastal parishes. 
4 Only three cases in each year. 
Source: The register-books of the Finnish Marine Insurance Association; 
ships-lists of coastal parishes; data on clearances in Finnish 
customs-houses, Finnish Official Statistics I:2, the special 
archives of the Central Statistical office of Finland XXIV:1. 
This was simply because in certain Trans-Atlantic trades, such as 
carrying sugar or rum from the West Indies or coffee from Brazil, 
the "handy size" was still quite modest. Indeed, the low average of 
export trade from Finland to other continents mostly reflected the 
fact that coffee was imported in small schooners, which often first 
took a cargo of sawn goods to Brazil. 
Later, such small-scale traders gradually disappeared and the 
general increase in ship size further strengthened the correlation 
between tonnage and trade. As table 3:3 shows, average tonnage 
grew on practically all the major routes. Only in a couple of 
traditional areas, coastal trade to Sweden and Mediterranean trade 
(including cross-trade to and from these waters), was the opposite 
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TABLE 3:3. Average sizes of Finnish sailing vessels in different 
trades 1884/86, 1894/96, 1904/06 and 1912/13. Net 
tons. 
Trade 1884/86 1894/96 1904/06 1912/13 
Coastal to Russian ports 36 46 51 61 
Coastal to Swedish ports 63 69 58 57 
Exports to ports on the Baltic 204 233 285 290 
Exports to the North Sea ports 328 358 410 462 
Exports to other European ports 446 526 442 452 
European cross-trade (excl. 
the North Sea and the Baltic) 499 626 608 .. 
Atlantic cross-trade 685 854 949 1,031 
World cross-trade 947 1,142 1,432 1,795 
Source: The register-books of the Finnish Marine Insurance Association; 
data on clearances in Finnish customs-houses, Finnish Official 
Statistics ser. I. 
the case, but both were losing importance in relation to other 
alternatives. Since small schooners and brigs had also practically 
disappeared, the correlation between size and trade grew all the 
stronger. The difference between ocean-going vessels and those 
sailing on the North Sea and other European coastal waters grew 
substantially, and at the end of the period, the former mostly 
consisted of iron and steel ships of over 1,000 tons. 
The most interesting dividing line between different trades is 
that which separates cross-traders from vessels which only 
transported goods to and from Finland. In practice, this division 
was the same as that between ships sailing only on the Baltic and 
the North Sea and those going further afield; it also separated ships 
sailing only seasonally from those which were employed 
throughout the year. However, like all other dividing lines 
between different trades, this one was frequently crossed by 
individual ships: ships engaged in any cross-trading activity 
varied from those which only occasionally carried a cargo on the 
Mediterranean to the equally extreme case of a ship which left 
Finland in ballast and returned home for a hasty refit after five 
years or more, also unloaded; and among ships which kept sailing 
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during the northern winter were always some which only went to 
Spain with wood from Finland and returned home next spring 
with a cargo of salt, thus carrying on the traditions of old 
spaniefart in its simplest forms (see p. 177). So, by all definitions, 
there was a rather large "grey area". 
Although the distinction between long trade and "full-time" 
sailing on the one hand and summer-time North Sea and Baltic 
trade on the other was quite diffuse, it is still tempting to try to 
measure, however roughly, the proportion of tonnage normally 
engaged in either one. For statistical purposes, the most practical 
distinction is whether ships were laid up for the winter or not; for 
analytical purposes, it is more relevant to know which ships sailed 
"full-time" than to ascertain which carried, say, at least one cargo 
between any two foreign ports. The insurance registers also furnish 
reliable data about the actual sailing period: since ristorno 
(refunding of insurance premiums) was granted for the laying-up 
period, it was also carefully noted. 
The source material for the 1870s is full enough for very reliable 
exrapolation to be made; not only does the 1875 insurance sample 
cover almost 80 per cent of all urban tonnage, but there is also an 
almost complete series of rural ship-lists. This material quite 
convincingly shows that very few urban vessels under 200 tons 
sailed on long trades or during the winter, but that in the size-class 
300 to 500 tons, they were in the clear majority and among larger 
vessels, any winter lay-up was highly unusual. The material is not 
quite as comprehensive for the preceding decade, but it is very 
clear that, as with ocean-trading schooners, there were more long-
traders in the small size-classes, and in the 300- to 500- ton class, 
only five percent of insured tonnage returned home for the winter.5 
The above only refers to urban tonnage. As already noted, 
"peasant" ships were in general more modestly equipped: for 
example, they normally lacked any kind of metal sheathing. This 
quite effectively ruled them out of long trading in southern waters, 
and they were mainly engaged in seasonal North Sea or Baltic 
trades. They also carried freight between foreign ports, but only 
seldom extended their voyages to waters which were navigable 
during the northern winter. Indeed, around 1875, less than ten of 
5 	 The register-books of Finska sjöassuransföreningen.  
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all the thousand or so peasant vessels were engaged in long trades 
during the winter, and in the middle of the 1880s, the number was 
probably even smaller.s In the middle of the 1860s, there must 
have been very few "peasant" long traders indeed. 
Later the insurance sample gradually became less representative 
for small and medium-sized vessels, and thus it is more difficult to 
estimate how many might have been engaged in long trade. At the 
same time, however, the minimum size of ships sailing in cross-
trades also increased, as was indicated above. This development 
was further strengthened by the ageing of wooden ships built in 
the 1870s: during their later years, many of them could no longer 
be used for ocean trades and were deployed in the North Sea 
instead. Moreover, since the medium size-classes were also 
thinning out, cross-trading more than ever before became the 
business of really big windjammers, and the difference between 
them and other sailing tonnage became less diffuse than in the 
1870s. This development, fortunately, makes extrapolations from 
the insurance sample much easier; in practice, no vessels under 
300 tons can be expected to have sailed during the winter. It is, 
therefore, possible to present realistic estimates of total Finnish 
cross-trading' sailing tonnage (table 3:4).8 
6 Rural ship-lists, 1875; the register-books of Åbo läns privata 
sjöförsäkringsförening, 1884-85. 
7 Although the figures in table 35 explicitly refer to ships which did not come 
home for the winter, similar tonnages are arrived at by counting the vessels 
which carried at least one cargo between West European and Mediterranean 
ports or father afield. This can be estimated at around 93,000 net tons in 1875 
and around 100,000 tons in 1865. 
8 The number of ships which were not laid up for any significant period was 
first extracted from the insurance samples (for 1885, additional data for 
"peasant" ships was collected from the register-book of Åbo läns privata 
sjöförsäkringsförening and for 1875 from the rural ship-list). The insurance 
data was extrapolated in the following way: in size-classes below 300 tons, 
only vessels which were found in the sample and did not return home for the 
winter were included; in size-classes 300>500 and 500>700 tons, the 
percentage of tonnage not laid-up was applied to all tonnage; in size-classes 
from 700 tons upward, all tonnage except vessels which the sample showed 
to have been laid up were included. After 1895, however, size-class 300>500 
tons was extrapolated in the same way as ships below 300 tons before, and 
size-class 700>1000 tons as size-classes 300>500 and 500>700 tons before. In 
addition, it was assumed that only 50 % of "peasant" vessels in size-class 
500>700 tons was not laid up for winter. 
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TABLE 3:4. Estimated tonnage in year-round occupation, 1865-











% of total 
Finnish 
tonnage 
1865 102,600 82 103,000 56 
1875 92,300 81 95,900 40 
1885 60,400 63 64,300 31 
1895 62,100 72 74,700 41 
1905 78,100 42 
1913 91,100 51 
Source: Register-books of the Finnish Marine Insurance Association and 
of the Marine Insurance Association for the Turku Province 
(1884-85); ship-lists of rural parishes 1865 and 1875. For 
methods of estimation see note 8. 
The figures clearly suggest that long-trading tonnage was already 
diminishing somewhat during the depression at the end of the 
1860s. Since total urban tonnage was also dropping and never fully 
regained its earlier level, this coincidence emphasises the 
importance of cross-trade for urban tonnage. It is perhaps not so 
surprising that tonnage decreased still more before the mid-1880s, 
as the new depression which grasped international freight markets 
during the late 1870s intensified. In the next decade, when 
prospects were brighter, a distinct upswing is noticeable, and at 
the end of the period, Finland's fleet of cross-trading windjammers 
was almost as big as it was in the 1870s. At that time, about half of 
her entire sailing tonnage was mainly engaged in long trading 
outside the Baltic and the North Sea. 
The changing structure of transport 
However interesting tonnage figures for different trades may be, 
they are nevertheless a poor measure of the different types of cargo 
carried and of how effectively the ships were run. A more accurate 
picture may be obtained by calculating the voyages in tons and 
ton-miles. 
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TABLE 3:5. Estimated transport by Finnish sailing vessels in 
different trades. Loaded voyages, net tons (nt) and 
(net)ton-(nautical)miles (ntm), annual averages, 
1865-1913. 
c. 1865 	 c. 1875 	 1884/86 
Trade 	 1000 Mill. 1000 Mill. 1000 Mill. 
nt ntm nt ntm nt ntm 
Total 
Trade 
215 19 238 21 285 26 
225 364 224 313 222 329 
255 847 277 978 208 632 
695 1,230 739 1,312 715 987 
1894/96 	 1904/06 	 1912/13 
1000 Mill. 1000 Mill. 1000 Mill. 
nt ntm nt ntm nt ntm 
Coastal trade, 
exp. and imp. 




exp. and imp. 




280 24 263 22 316 30 
210 266 163 175 148 142 
188 589 158 967 202 1,475 
678 879 584 1,164 666 1,647 
NB: Beginning 1884/86, the figures for all export and import trades are 
three-year averages; before that they are based on either one-year 
figures drawn from the ship-lists of rural parishes, or the insurance 
sample, which on average covered 1.5 years; all figures for cross-
trades as well as for export and import before 1884 are based on the 
insurance sample, in which the larger ships were observed on 
average for two years. 
Source: Appendix III:2. 
Table 3:5 presents the broad outlines of development. As far as the 
two first sample periods are concerned, the figures are not very 
accurate, because coastal trade data is rather poor; long trading, on 
the other hand, can be estimated fairly well. The table shows a 
dramatic difference between tons and ton-miles. Coastal sailers 
always carried quite large amounts of goods, from a third to almost 
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TABLE 3:6. Percentages of different trades of the estimated total 
of ton-miles produced by Finnish sailing vessels, 
1865-1913. 
c.1865 c.1875 1884/86 1894/96 1905/06 1912/13 
Coastal trade, 
exp. and imp. 
Other exp. and 
imp. trades 
Cross-trade 
1.5 1.6 2.6 2.7 1.9 1.8 
30 24 33 30 15 8.6 
69 75 64 67 83 90 
Source: See table 3:5. 
half of the total, but the distances covered were so low that the 
resulting ton-miles only made up a small fraction of total transport 
production. Cross-trading, in contrast, only accounted for larger 
quantities of cargo than coastal trade in the 1860s and 1870s, but 
because of the long distances involved they always represented a 
clear majority (from 63 to 90 per cent, see table 3:6) of all sail-based 
transport expressed in ton-miles. 
Coastal trade and other export and import shipping was rather 
stable up to the 1890s: fluctuations in percentages mainly reflected 
changes in the volume of cross-trade. In general, transport 
production fluctuated in a similar way to the development of 
sailing tonnage. Structural changes, however, meant that there was 
quite a difference in magnitude. The following set of indices shows 




nt 	 ntm 
1865 100 100 100 
1875 128 106 107 
1885 112 103 80 
1895 98 98 71 
1905 100 84 95 
1913 97 96 134 
The index of ton-miles shows by far the greatest fluctuations. This, 
of course, mainly reflects the changing cycles of cross-trade. It is 
interesting to note that there was a relatively steep rise from the 
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low point at the beginning of the 1890s, and just before the world 
war, the record of the previous "golden era" was clearly surpassed. 
Transport in tons, on the other hand, never repeated the maximum 
achieved in the 1870s. It also developed more steadily, which 
obviously reflects the great impact of coastal and other short 
transport on these figures. Thus, the fluctuations in ton-miles 
resulted from fluctuations in the average length of voyage (that is, 
mainly of long-trade voyages). In this respect, the period clearly 
falls into three stages: from the relatively stable situation of "the 
golden decades", the average fell to roughly three quarters, and 
rose again in the last two decades, finally surpassing the level of 
the 1870s. 
The indices also show that, on both scales, production in the 
1860s, compared with tonnage, reached its highest ever levels, 
with the exception of 1913. This means nothing less than a 
subsequent reduction in the productivity of the merchant marine. 
This is rather surprising, since the ships seem to have been 
developing rapidly, at least in pure technical terms, at that time 
(see p. 55-56). The voyage data, however, offer a straightforward 
explanation for the decline: ballasted voyages increased radically 
after the late 1860s. In the insurance sample, their percentage share 
of total mileage developed as follows (since data was often lacking, 
the percentages are given in round figures):9 
1865 	 9-10 % 
1875 	 23-26 % 
1885 	 23-25 % 
1895 	 32-37 % 
1905 	 24-26 % 
1913 	 c. 25 % 
9 See appendix III:2. The exact percentages were as follows ("A" = percentage 
of ships for which complete cargo data was found; "All" = the whole sample): 
Sample 	 "A" 	 All 
1865 	 8.5 	 10.2 
1875 	 26.1 	 22.4 
1885 	 23.3 	 24.7 
1895 	 36.9 	 32.2 
1905 	 25.5 	 23.6 
1913 	 25.0 	 24.0 
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There was a further increase in the prevalence of ballasted voyages 
in the 1890s, after which time, and probably as early as the latter 
half of the decade, the levels stabilized again at around 25 per cent. 
These figures, once more, have a very strong bias towards long 
trades. Finnish shipping statistics reveal that the share of ballasted 
voyages did not change much in coastal or Baltic trades,10 and, 
moreover, they represented a modest share of total ton-miles. It 
may be said, then, that production was clearly affected by the 
availability of cross-trade, paying cargoes. 
These changes resulted, of course, from the general 
development of the international freight market, from the changing 
balance between the demand for and the availability of tonnage, 
and from the changing division of labour between sail and steam. 
As already mentioned, these factors may have had quite different 
influences on different trades, which therefore should be 
examined separately. 
The development of cross-trade 
Cross-trade, or long trade, was not only the largest category of 
Finnish sailing vessel activity, but also the first to be affected by 
ups and downs in freight business cycles. It is thus a logical 
starting point for a closer analysis of development. Table 3:7 shows 
how the contribution of Finnish sailing vessels to international 
cross-trading changed over the period. It does not exclusively 
cover true long trade. There was also cross-trading within the 
Baltic (e.g. wood cargo from Northern Sweden to Germany, which 
"peasant" vessels, in particular, used to carry), and coal freight 
from Britain to Denmark, Sweden and St. Petersburg were equally 
common. This kind of cross-freight was mostly carried by vessels 
which never ventured to the oceans nor sailed during the winter. 
Compared with the grand total, however, they were a minor 
element. They will be dealt with in connection with other Baltic 
and North Sea trade, further on. 
In the middle of the 1860s, cross-trading mainly consisted of 
three roughly equal elements, at least in terms of ton-miles. The 
first, trade between West and South Europe and in the 
10 	 Finnish Official Statistics, ser. I and IA (tables of shipping by destination and 
origin). 
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TABLE 3:7. Estimated transport by Finnish sailing vessels in 
foreign cross-trade. Loaded voyages, net tons (nt) and 
(net)ton-(nautical)miles (ntm), annual averages, 
1865-1913. 
c. 1865 
Cross-trade 	 1000 	 Mill. 
	
nt 	 ntm 
c. 1875 
	
1000 	 Mill. 
	
nt 	 ntm 
1884/86 
	
1000 	 Mill. 
	
nt 	 ntm 
Baltic 6 4 11 7 7 5 
North Sea 32 36 95 105 83 87 
Mediterranean 
and other European 127 310 32 80 12 27 
Atlantic 58 248 108 422 92 375 
World 31 249 33 361 14 139 
Total 255 847 277 978 208 632 
1894/96 1904/06 1912/13 
Cross-trade 1000 Mill. 1000 Mill. 1000 Mill. 
nt ntm nt ntm nt ntm 
Baltic 7 5 7 5 6 4 
North Sea 77 80 51 51 32 32 
Mediterranean 
and other European 5 12 1 3 2 3 
Atlantic 85 354 35 201 35 189 
World 13 138 64 707 126 1,248 
Total 188 589 158 967 202 1,475 
Source: See table 3:5. 
Mediterranean, which also recorded by far the greatest number of 
voyages and tonnage, was dominated by grain trade from the Black 
Sea. There was usually a consistent triangular voyage pattern: first, 
after delivering a Finnish wood cargo, a ship might load coal in a 
Bristol Channel port (Cardiff, Newport, Swansea) or in Newcastle 
(Shields), and take it to Alexandria or some other Mediterranean 
port. Sometimes a new cargo for Constantinople or the Black Sea 
was found, but very often the next leg was sailed in ballast. In 
Russian (Odessa, Nicolayev, Taganrog) and Roumanian" (Sulina, 
11 Roumania was an autonomous principality under the Ottoman Empire from 
1861, an independent kingdom after 1881. 
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Kustendje/Constanza) ports, ships loaded mostly wheat, and 
sometimes tallow, for Britain or France (mostly Marseille). From 
Britain the triangle could be commenced anew; from Marseille, 
again, some vessels took cargo to a British coal port while others 
returned in ballast to the Black Sea. In addition, there was other 
business to be found when the season was not favourable for grain, 
such as carrying ore and esparto from South Spain to Britain, or 
marble from Leghorn. After a few years' continuous sailing 
between West Europe and the Black Sea, the regular final leg 
consisted of salt cargo from Cadiz, Cagliari or some other 
Peninsular or West Mediterranean port to the Baltic, usually to the 
ship's home port.12 
For Finnish ships, the Black Sea trade was a business with 
traditions. It began in the late 1830s, and up to the middle of the 
century, in other words, before new trade agreements put most 
foreign ships on a par with domestic ones, the Finns obviously 
enjoyed some advantage of flying the Russian tricolor. More 
significant, however, was that the export of grain from the Black 
Sea to England and certain other parts of West Europe grew 
steadily and there was a brisk demand for shipping.13 There was 
the additional advantage that, according to the standards of Bureau 
Veritas, metal sheathing was not required of vessels trading in the 
Mediterranean.14 This, of course, saved a lot of expense for owners 
who did not worry about fouled bottoms and who were not 
interested in sailing the Atlantic. 
The second category, Atlantic trade, was far more heterogenous. 
In the middle of the 1860s its mainstay, as far as Finnish vessels 
were concerned, seems to have been the "shuttle" trade between 
Britain or continental ports and British possessions in the West 
Indies and Central America: of all Trans-Atlantic return (eastward) 
cargoes recorded in the sample, two thirds came from this area 
(including Bermuda). Shipping was required first and foremost to 
12 	 Unless otherwise stated, the descripitions of trades and cargoes are based on 
the voyage data in the "insurance sample". 
13 See e.g.  Nikula, Malmsko handelshuset, p. 123-124;  Engström, Åbo sjöfarts 
historia II:1, p. 118; Hautala, "From the Black Sea to the Atlantic, p. 13-16;  
Ahlström, "Hamnen i Odessa"; Attman, "The Russian Market in the World 
Trade"; Siegelbaum, "The Odessa Grain Trade"; Harlaftis, "The Role of the 
Greeks in the Black Sea Trade". 
14 See note 4. 
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import raw sugar, logwood and mahogany while the export of coal 
usually gave enough outward cargo. Many Finnish ships also 
sailed to Brazil (Rio, Bahia) for coffee, or to the Argentine to load 
hides and other cattle produce. Some of them brought wood cargo 
from Finland, but the outward cargo more often consisted of coal 
from Britain or salt from the Mediterranean. Imports were also 
brought directly to Finland from the West Indies and Brazil. A 
third trade of some importance was grain, cotton or petroleum 
from the United States to West Europe and the Baltic. The civil 
war, of course, limited U.S. exports to some degree. 
The last main category, "world trade", consisted mainly of 
imports from the East Indies to Europe: coffee and spices from the 
Dutch colonies or rice and teak from Burma. A few ships even 
sailed to Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines, or loaded 
nitrate or guano in Chile. Some also engaged in local coastal trade 
if the season was not right, for example, loading rice. Outward 
cargoes, again, consisted almost exclusively of coal. 
In most long trading, ships sailed in both directions with paying 
cargo. In Black Sea, Mediterranean and Atlantic trade, outward 
cargoes comprised about 45 per cent of the total (measured in net 
tons). In East Indian and other world trades the figure was clearly 
lower, but this was partly because a few voyages began with a 
paying cargo to Capetown or South America. In all cases there was 
one common denominator: as has already been mentioned more 
than once, the standard outward cargo was British coal.15 
By the middle of the 1870s the general cross-trade picture had 
changed substantially. Given that North Sea tramping had trebled 
(mainly as a result of the growth in "peasant" shipping), the total 
increase in long trade was, however, modest at some 7 per cent in 
terms of ton-miles — net tonnage had actually diminished by a 
fifth. More important, however, was the structural change, "from 
the Black Sea to the Atlantic", as Kustaa Hautala expressed it. 
Indeed, the former mainstay of Finnish cross-trading, grain cargo 
from the Black Sea, had almost disappeared: in the entire mid-
1870s sample there were only three cases. Other kinds of cargo 
15 	 For a good description of the coal trade see Palmer, "The British Coal Export 
Trade". 
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were still being carried in the Mediterranean, however, but 
Atlantic voyages had gained in importance, and also in "world 
trades", production in ton-miles reached a higher level than 
before. 
There were two reasons for the almost total disappearance of 
cargo from the Black Sea. First, within a short time after the 
opening of the Suez Canal, steamships gained supremacy in the 
best Mediterranean and related trades. By 1875, no less than 80 per 
cent of all tonnage cleared in Odessa was steam tonnage, and most 
sailing vessels still in business seem to have been rather small 
Greek or Turkish coasters.16 At the same time, grain imports from 
the United States increased (although they did not yet surpass 
Black Sea grain), thus offering an alternative opportunity for 
sailing ships displaced from Black Sea trade. 
The Atlantic trade, however, had also changed a great deal. The 
West Indies became less important for Finnish sailing ships — 
obviously because of an abrupt drop in sugar freight17 — and 
accounted for just 10 per cent of all return cargoes in the sample. 
No less than 80 per cent now came from the United States 
(including the Mexican Gulf ports) and even Canada recorded 
some 7 per cent. This left only one per cent for the South Atlantic 
ports,18 and it can be said that North America totally dominated the 
scene. As the economy of the United States was growing at a fast 
rate,19 this was not surprising. 
Finnish ships found their North American cargoes mainly in 
three different trades. First, they transported grain (wheat and 
indian corn) from New York, Philadelphia and Baltimore to 
Ireland and West British ports, sometimes also to the Continent. 
Probably equally important, although the lack of data about goods 
carried prevents the computation of any precise quantities, were 
cargoes of petroleum from the same area to all of West Europe and 
even to the Baltic. A third important cargo was wood, which fell 
16 	 The report of the Finnish trading agent in Odessa, the archives of the State 
Secretary, VSV 291:1876. 
17 	 Between 1865 and 1868 there was a fall of over 40 % in the freights of sugar 
and molasses from the West Indies to the US. Sager, Seafaring labour, p. 69. 
18 	 On the other hand, South American ports recorded a much higher percentage 
in outward cargo, but a substantial proportion of this was (as in the 1860s) 
carried by "world" traders destined for the East Indies. 
19 	 See e.g. Hacker, The Course of American Economic Growth, p. 172-175. 
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into two categories: pitch-pine from the Gulf ports (mainly 
Pensacola) and softwood from Canada. In the 1870s, the former 
was far more important. Some Finnish ships also took part in the 
phosphate trade from the Bull River area (South-Carolina).20 
The great drawback with Atlantic trade was that outward 
cargoes were difficult to find. Most American exports were bulk 
goods while imports mainly consisted of industrial products 
which required much less space; British coal, for example, was 
only in very limited demand in the United States. According to an 
estimate by C. Knick Harley, eastbound demand for cargo-space in 
the late 1870s was more than double westbound demand.21 Indeed, 
the sample shows that Finnish ships performed accordingly: the 
number of outward cargoes was only a third of all return 
(eastward) cargoes. Since no less than a third of outward cargo 
went to South America and other South Atlantic ports (being 
mainly carried by ships destined for the East Indies), no less than 
four fifths of the regular Atlantic traders arrived at Transatlantic 
ports in ballast.22 This development, indeed, was mainly 
responsible for the notable increase in ballasted voyages after the 
1860s. Moreover, excessive demand in one direction meant 
excessive supply in the other and freights were, accordingly, very 
low. 
As high ballast mileage and low outward freights inevitably 
lowered shipping profitability, one may wonder why so many 
Finnish ships were engaged in Atlantic trade. The simple answer 
seems to be that it offered the best opportunity to all "blue-water" 
vessels which were not suitable for "world" trade. Traditional 
West Indies trade did not grow at the same pace as that with North 
America, nor did it match the growth of deepwater tonnage 
in Atlantic countries. It must also be remembered that their 
most valuable product, raw sugar, did not require much cargo 
space. 
20 	 See also Nikula, Åbo sjöfarts historia, p. 108-109. 
21 	 Harley, "Issues on the Demand for Shipping Services", p. 82-85. 
22 Hautala ("From the Black Sea," p. 21) cites U.S. statistics which reveal that 
42% of Russian (of which the majority were Finnish) ships arrived with 
cargo. The difference between this figure and the proportion found in the 
sample may be explained by there being, in reality, more paying ballast cargo 
than the insurance records registered. It is also possible that there was some 
direct exporting by Russian vessels from Russia to the U.S. 
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"World" trade, of course, involved far fewer entries and much 
less tonnage than Atlantic trade, as far as Finnish ships were 
concerned, but, since distances were great, the resulting total of 
ton-miles was only 15 per cent lower. Although, with the opening 
of the Suez Canal, regular steamship traffic had affected Far East 
trades, and virtually brought to an end the story of tea clippers, 
traditional East Indian cargo was still to be found. This accounted 
for the bulk of Finnish "world" trader business and comprised 
about 80 per cent of all cargo to Europe in the sample. The rest 
consisted of occasional coastal trading in China and the Pacific 
(mainly coal from Newcastle, NSW), and even voyages from San 
Francisco to Britain. 
Thus, the general picture of "world" trade was very similar to 
what it was ten years earlier. There is one interesting difference, 
however: the proportion of outward cargo had increased to over 60 
per cent of return cargo (and cargo to South Atlantic ports is not 
included in this figure). As coal still dominated the former, this 
was probably a result of the increase in steamship traffic in the Far 
East, which needed coal of course. Paradoxically, sailing vessels 
had an important role in supplying the coaling stations. 
During the next two decades, cross-trading was in continuous 
decline, although the chronology of decline differed in different 
trades. During the first phase of the "long depression", long trade 
suffered most: both by tons and ton-miles, the output of Finnish 
ships dropped clearly below the level of the 1860s. From 1885 to 
1895, the decrease was not as dramatic and "world" trading 
remained roughly at the same level as in the mid-1880s. Shipping 
in Mediterranean and West European waters, however, followed 
yet a different pattern, steep and continuous decline. In the mid-
1890s, the volume was only a fifth of 1870s levels. This trade 
developed in conjunction with respective export and import 
shipping: indeed, most of what is here classified as cross-trading 
was nothing more than cargoes of wood from Sweden and salt to 
Baltic ports. Both the export of wood from Scandinavia to South 
Europe and the import of salt diminished markedly during this 
period, and it seems that steamships were already dominating 
Mediterranean trade to such an extent that there was little business 
to be found for sailing vessels. 
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Atlantic trade fared better than average during the depression. 
Both by tons and ton-miles, the decrease in the decade 1875-85 
was 10-15 per cent, and this new level was retained up to the 
mid-1890s. The structure of the trade also remained much as it was 
in the 1870s. In the samples from both the 1880s and the 1890s, 
over 90 per cent of eastward cargo carried by Finnish ships was 
loaded in the United States or Canada. Of the other ports of origin, 
the West Indies fared worse and South America better, but, on the 
whole, these changes were marginal. 
There was, however, one systematic trend in the American trade 
of the Finnish windjammers: wood cargo gradually increased until 
it was totally dominant. By around 1885, southern pitchpine and 
Canadian softwood accounted for two thirds of all return cargo 
registered in the sample, and close on 90 per cent by around 1895. 
This, of course, meant that other kinds of cargo, grain, petroleum 
and so on, diminished. At first sight, it might appear that this is an 
example of specialization: Finns, if anyone, must have been 
accustomed to carrying wood. This hypothesis, however, falls 
short of the truth: in reality, specialization was not voluntary. 
Steamships took over the best Atlantic bulk freight one by one, 
beginning with grain.23 In the 1880s sample, there were still a few 
clear entries concerning grain cargo from the United States, but ten 
years later there were none (the only exception being one instance 
of wheat shipped from Bahia, Brazil). Petroleum in barrels was still 
substantial business for Finnish ships in the mid-1880s, and taking 
back empty barrels also provided some outward cargo. However, 
by the mid-1890s, specially-built tankers had taken over most of 
the business, and the sample contains only four or five cases of 
petroleum cargo.24 Thus, pitchpine and softwood business became 
so popular simply because they were still available for 
windjammers. Returns were not very good and the ships were 
usually loaded in relatively primitive ports or on open roads, 
which meant that port-times were longer than steamships were 
willing to accept. Timber cargoes did not require first-class ships 
either, but could be carried tolerably safely even in old and "soft" 
wooden vessels. 
As the choice of return cargoes became more limited, outward 
23 See e.g. Harley, "The Shift from Sailing Ships to Steamships," p. 221-224. 
24 See also Hautala, "From the Black Sea", p. 19. 
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cargo also diminshed. In the 1885 sample, there were still three 
outgoing to every ten return cargoes (although these also included 
cargo to South America and South Africa carried by long-traders 
destined for the East Indies), but ten years later, outward cargo 
represented only 20 per cent of the latter. The increase in ballasted 
voyages was a direct result of the imbalance in Atlantic cargo. 
Paradoxically, this happened at the same time as the increase in 
emigrant traffic was turning the scales to make demand for 
westbound tonnage surpass that for eastbound.25 This, again, well 
illustrates the dual freight market: emigrant traffic belonged 
mainly to the domain of steamships. (Even before, when emigrants 
sailed in windjammers across the Atlantic, Finnish ships 
practically never carried westbound passengers, probably because 
the emigrant trade from British ports was quite tightly controlled.) 
Compared with the relative stability in Atlantic trade, "world" 
trade seems to have experienced a dramatic depression: there was 
already more than a 50 per-cent fall in cargo carried by Finnish 
sailing vessels during the late 1870s and early 1880s. Such a 
decline obviously resulted from market developments. Steamships 
gained definite supremacy in Indian trades, which both directly 
and indirectly affected the traditional East Indian freight markets. 
The demand for sailing tonnage in general dropped, and this 
marred the prospects of all but first class ships. By the early 1880s, 
there were already quite imposing fleets of iron or composite 
sailing vessels, not only in Britain but also in Germany and the 
Netherlands,26 and compared with them, Finnish wooden vessels 
were no great match. Moreover, during this decade, many of the 
latter reached the age at which they could no longer retain the 
highest class without extensive repairs; normally, a copper-
fastened ship might be expected to stay in the Veritas top class (3/ 
3) for 12-13 years.27 Indeed, many long-traders were sold before 
they were due to be reclassed, and some others reduced their outfit 
and copper sheathing so as to rate down from the "L" (long trade) 
to the "A" (Atlantic) category.28 Very few Finnish vessels were able 
25 Harley, "Issues on the Demand," p. 82-83. 
26 See e.g. Palmer, "The British Shipping Industry", table 4. 
27 	 Veritas, "Regulations for the Classification of Wooden Vessels", art. 11-13. 
28 	 Finlands Skeppskalender registered the classification of vessels (if any) after 
1892. 
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to continue making Far East voyages, and the whole tradition of 
"world" trading seemed to be fading away. 
Second-hand vessels which were bought in the 1890s did, 
however, revive the business beyond the two great capes. At the 
same time, they also manifested a definite change in trade, a 
change from the East Indies to Australia. In the 1880s sample, all 
Finnish "world" traders but one still loaded in the East Indies 
(including India and Hong-Kong) but by the next decade, only two 
East Indian cargoes were found and Australian and East African 
ports now dominated transport. The structure of the trade had 
changed in another sense too: the primacy of colonial return cargo 
was substituted for outward cargoes of wood, mainly 
Scandinavian and Canadian softwood. Even return cargoes quite 
often consisted of timber, kauri or yarrah from Tasmania and 
South-west Australia (it must be remembered that Australian grain 
exports were still in their prime in the 1890s), but one cargo of 
timber from Portland, Oregon was also recorded. All this meant 
that there was freight in both directions, which remarkably 
lowered the mileage of ballasted voyages. At around 1885, outward 
cargo destined beyond the Atlantic was only about 60 per cent of 
respective return cargo, but these figures evened out a decade later. 
In summary, it may be said that both the 1880s and 1890s 
represented a low point in Finnish sailing vessel trading beyond 
the Atlantic. The seeds of new development did, however, begin to 
sprout before the turn of the century. 
The omens of the 1890s were well realized during the decade 
before the war. The structure of tramp-trading, and particularly of 
long-trading, was totally transformed. The Atlantic lost most of its 
former importance to really long, "world" trade, which accounted 
for two-thirds of all Finnish loaded net tons in cross-trade and over 
four-fifths of all ton-miles in 1912-13. This development also 
meant such an increase in long voyages that the total number of 
ton-miles probably exceeded the level of the 1860s by the turn of 
the century, and the level of the 1870s was surpassed by a good 
margin before the War. Another side of story is, however, that the 
number of voyages was quite low, and in net tons, transport did 
not even exceed the level of the mid-1880s. 
The decline in Atlantic trade ended the "Pensacola era" in 
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Finnish deepwater shipping. Although almost a third of all return 
cargoes from America to Europe still came from pitch-pine in 
1904/06, the amount was only a fifth of what it had been ten years 
earlier, and there were just a couple of cases in the 1912-13 
sample. On the other hand, Finnish ships transported increasing 
amounts of pitch-pine to South America, often returning with 
freight from South America to Europe. This type of trade was 
already fairly common in the 1890s, and in 1904/06 almost two-
thirds of Finnish windjammer Atlantic freight was either destined 
to, or originated from, South Atlantic ports. At that time, however, 
the actual volume of Atlantic freight was only about a half of what 
it had been around 1885 and 1895, and subsequently even pitch-
pine cargo to Brazil and Argentine decreased. In the 1910s, the 
Southern Atlantic still accounted for about two-thirds of all 
Atlantic freight by Finnish sail, but about 60 % of it consisted of 
outward cargo (often carried by ships destined for "world" trade). 
Amazingly, West Indies trade gained importance again at the end 
of the period, but the total number of voyages in the sample is so 
low that it is very difficult to say whether this was anything more 
than just accidential fluctuation. In any case, there seemed to be 
one systematic change: the proportion of outward cargo rose a little 
and, accordingly, that of ballasted voyages fell. 
In "world" trade, the East Indies had totally lost its former 
importance: not a single Finnish vessel loaded or unloaded there. 
Apparently, Australia was the centre of this business, as she was in 
the 1890s. In the 1904-06 sample, no less than three-quarters of 
return cargo was loaded there. Much outward cargo, mainly timber 
from Scandinavia, however, went to South Africa. Later, South 
American guano and nitrate were more frequently loaded by 
Finnish ships and, in the 1912-13 sample, double the number of 
cargoes to Europe were loaded in Chile or Peru than in Australia. 
In addition to simple "shuttle" trade to Australia and South 
America, a third voyage pattern became common. After a shipload 
of (usually) timber hed been taken to Australia, coal was loaded in 
Newcastle, NSW, bound for the West coast of South America and 
the circle was completed with a cargo of nitrates or guano to 
Europe. Occasional timber freight from the North West coast of the 
United States was also recorded. 
The amount of outward and return cargo was consistently equal. 
Not only was there a need for timber from Scandinavia in Africa 
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and Australia, but coal from Europe was also in demand on the 
West coast of South America. Thus, few ships had to sail long 
passages in ballast, or carrying cheap (ballast) cargo. On the other 
hand, all this freight traffic to and from the Pacific was not the kind 
to attract steamer business: it consisted of relatively cheap and 
bulky goods loaded mainly in primitive ports, or in natural 
harbours, and transported over long ocean routes with few or no 
coaling stations. The demand for this kind of transport kept big 
sailing ships viable, while steam had made windjammers obsolete 
in medium-range shipping. 
Finnish exports and imports: North Sea and Baltic trades 
Practically all Finnish shipping to the Baltic, the North Sea ports 
and to South Europe, had one thing in common: the Baltic wood 
trade. This refers not only to export goods loaded in Finnish ports, 
but also to most cross-trade cargo carried on these waters. All the 
countries on the Northern seaboards of the Baltic experienced a 
boom in timber exports some time in the latter half of the 19th 
century, and sawn goods and other wood products filled most of 
the cargo-space of the ships leaving Finnish (see p. 25) as well as 
Northern Swedish ports, and St.Petersburg.29 In Finland, 
especially, tar was also an important export item, but production 
was already in decline in the 1860s.3° 
The export of tar and wood, of course, went back a long way in 
Finland. In the late 18th century, tar from Ostrobothnia and sawn 
goods from South Finland (from the surroundings of Wiborg, in 
particular) were being exported in great quantities to West Europe 
and certain Mediterranean ports.31 Timber exports to Northern 
Germany, west of the Oder, and Denmark (which were the only 
timber deficit areas within the Baltic) were also traditional. The 
production of sawn goods increased slowly during the earlier part 
of the 19th century, but a real breakthrough was made in the 1860s, 
when British customs-dues for non-empire wood products were 
lowered and steam technology was adopted in the Finnish sawmill 
29 Kaukiainen, "British Timber Imports and Finnish Shipping", p. 163. 
30 Se espec. Hautala, Suomen tervakauppa 1856-1913. 
31 Alanen, Der Aussenhandel, p. 109-129, 167-203; Åström, From Tar to 
Timber, ch. 
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industry.32 From 1860 to 1913, exports of sawn goods from Finland 
grew roughly ten-fold.33 
The most important import item, at least in terms of volume, 
was traditionally salt.34 In the latter half of the 19th century its role 
was definitely reduced as new, bulky imported goods such as coal 
gained ground. The import of grain also grew to impressive 
dimensions, but since it was mainly bought from Russia, this 
affected coastal shipping and railways more than anything else. In 
any case, as already noted (see p. 25), a permanent feature of 
Finnish foreign trade was that imports required much less cargo-
space than exports. 
These basic facts are relevant in the context of the development 
of export and import transportation by Finnish sailing ships (table 
3:8). The imbalance in the physical volume of trade is clearly 
reflected in the volumes of outward and return cargo: both in the 
1860s and 1910s, the latter amounted to only a third of the former 
(in net tons), but at other times it was lower still. The total amount 
of cargo was quite stable up to the 1890s, but a steady decline set in 
after the turn of the century. 
For the entire period, the bulk of export and import shipping 
could be classified as Baltic and North Sea trade. Apart from that, 
there was actually only one other of importance: the wood and salt 
trade to the Iberian peninsula and the Western Mediterranean. 
These trades, together with small-scale cross-trading in the same 
waters, developed quite differently and thus should be 
investigated separately. 
Baltic trade was surprisingly stable right through the period. 
During the first three decades, exports to Denmark and North 
Germany (mainly Schleswig-Holstein) required 50,000 net tons, or 
a little more, of shipping each year. In the 1890s, however, the 
figure rose to about 70,000 net tons and remained at that level until 
the War. The increase obviously resulted from an increase in the 
demand for timber products in Germany, where industrial growth 
was accelerating. As there were already several steamship lines 
32 Åström, From Tar to Timber, esp. appendix tables; Hoffman, Suomen 
sahateollisuuden kasvu, p. 39-57. 
33 Ahvenainen, Suomen sahateollisuuden historia, p. 285. 
34 	 Alanen, Der Aussenhandel, p. 244-276. 
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TABLE 3:8. Estimated Finnish export and import transport by 
Finnish sailing vessels (other than coastal traffic). 
Loaded voyages, net tons (nt) and (net)ton- 
(nautical)miles (ntm), annual averages, 1865-1913. 
c. 1865 
	 c. 1875 	 1884/86 
Trade 1000 Mill. 1000 Mill. 1000 Mill. 
nt ntm nt ntm nt ntm 
Exports: 
Baltic 57 36 52 32 50 30 
North Sea 71 94 113 148 74 92 
Other 40 114 16 45 40 104 
Total 169 245 181 225 164 226 
Imports: 
Baltic 16 11 9 6 9 5 
North Sea 11 14 12 14 22 26 
Other 29 94 22 67 26 72 
Total 56 119 43 88 58 104 
Grand total 225 364 224 313 222 329 
1894/96 1904/06 1912/13 
Trade 1000 Mill. 1000 Mill. 1000 Mill. 
nt ntm nt ntm nt ntm 
Exports: 
Baltic 70 42 69 42 72 44 
North Sea 73 91 55 69 36 43 
Other 21 56 7 17 5 14 
Total 164 186 131 127 113 102 
Imports: 
Baltic 5 3 6 3 13 8 
North Sea 22 26 18 22 17 20 
Other 19 53 9 23 5 12 
Total 46 82 32 48 35 40 
Grand total 210 268 163 175 148 142 
NB: Sums computed from unrounded figures. 
Source: See table 3:5. 
across the Baltic, at that time, it seems odd that Finnish sailing 
vessels were still able to increase their wood cargo. The 
explanation seems to be two-fold. On the one hand, timber was 
172 
still mostly unloaded in rather primitive, small ports (such as 
Lubeck inner port and Eckernförde) which did not attract 
steamers. On the other hand, a substantial amount of this wood 
consisted of pit-props, baulks and other timber which was not 
produced at large sawmills, but rather loaded in natural coastal 
harbours or roadsteads.35 Small and medium-sized sailing vessels 
with low day-costs were still suitable for this kind of business. 
There was, however, a shortage of return cargo, and the trend 
was distinctly downwards at the beginning of the period: import 
cargo in the mid-1860s was estimated at almost 30 per cent of 
export cargo (by tonnage), but at well below 20 per cent around 
1875. As this was a period of expansion in steamship lines across 
the Baltic, it seems very probable that such vessels managed to 
establish themselves as carriers of more valuable import goods. In 
the 1890s, the proportion of import cargo dropped further, to 
below 10 per cent of export cargo, and this also coincided with 
expansion into Baltic lines by Finnish steamships. At the very end 
of the period, however, sailing vessels were returning with more 
cargo, most of which consisted of cement, bricks and other 
construction materials for which there was an increasing demand 
in Finland. Accordingly, the proportion of return cargo again rose 
to almost 20 per cent, but it must be remembered that this was 
quite often only ballast cargo.3s 
It was mentioned earlier that Finnish sailing vessels also 
transported wood from Swedish sawmills to Germany and 
Denmark in addition to normal export cargo. This kind of trade 
began in the 1830s, and was practised by Aland and Southwest 
Finnish "peasant" shipowners in particular.37 Around 1875, for 
which period there is the best data, this was not, however, 
extensive and amounted to about a fifth of what was exported from 
Finland to Germany and Denmark. There is no comparative data 
for the latter part of the period, but Swedish shipping statistics 
35 This was typical, at least according to the logs of the Baltic traders from 
Rauma and Uusikaupunki. They also state very clearly how long loading and 
unloading could take. 
36 
	
	 Examples of ballast cargo were found in the log-books of Baltic sailing vessels  
(Rauma and Uusikaupunki sjömanshus).  
37 Kaukiainen, Suomen talonpoikaispurjehdus, p. 122-124; Bärman,  
Åboländsk bygdeseglation, p. 191 (figure 34); Papp. Åländsk all-
mogeseglation, p. 180-185. 
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clearly suggest that trade declined slowly. Just before the War, only 
about 60 % of the tonnage levels of the 1870s was recorded.38 (See 
table 3:7.) 
North sea trade was in many ways just an upgrading of Baltic trade, 
but it developed differently. At first, sailing vessels fully exploited 
the rapid growth of timber exports to Britain: by around 1865, 
North Sea exports accounted for more cargo space than Baltic 
exports, and the volume almost doubled in the next ten years. It 
seems that, at that time, wood freights beyond the Sound 
compared quite favourably with those within the Baltic, and many 
rural shipowners seemed to abandon the latter and to make North 
Sea trade their major business. Indeed, this became a dominant 
element in Finnish "peasant" shipping, and by about 1875, almost 
60 per cent of wood cargo on Finnish keels to North sea ports was 
carried by tonnage from rural parishes. In addition, many ships 
from Åland and Southwest Finland also carried wood from 
Swedish sawmills (precisely as they took their products to 
Germany or Denmark): in 1875, this kind of trade involved no less 
than 50,000 net tons of shipping, which, compared with the 
110,000 plus net tons of direct exports, was no small figure. 
Between 1865 and 1875, North Sea trade was the most rapidly 
expanding sector of Finnish shipping. While the estimated total 
cargo of sailing vessels during that time increased by some 66,000 
net tons, the respective increase in wood cargo to the North Sea, 
including that from Sweden, was 75,000 net tons. This was 
obviously to the detriment of other trade. Indeed, there seems to 
have been some movement from Mediterranean to North Sea 
38 Bidrag till Sveriges Officiella Statistik: Utrikes handel och sjöfart: Sjöfart.  
Only for the 1910s do the statistics record the tonnage of entered and cleared 
Finnish vessels by origin of departure and destination, so that vessels sailing 
on the Baltic can be separated from those going to the North Sea. Before that, 
the statistics record only the total tonnage of entered and cleared Finnish 
vessels in different customs districts. A rough picture of the combined 
development of Baltic and North Sea trade from Sweden can be formed by 
comparing the tonnage of Finnish vessels cleared from Swedish Bothnian 
ports. From the working tables of the shipping statistics of the Tullstyrelsen,  
the development of wood trade from Sweden can be followed roughly from 
the number of ships which were cleared empty for Northern Sweden. This 
tonnage decreased quite drastically from the mid-1890s until 1912/13. See 
also appendix III:2. 
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timber shipment but, since practically all of the increase was in 
rural tonnage, the changes simply reflect the fact that shipping by 
"peasant" owners was still expanding while urban shipping began 
to stagnate. 
One advantage of North Sea trading for rural shipowners was 
that it was easier to find return cargo in England than in Germany 
or Denmark. Coal was already in some demand in Copenhagen, 
Stockholm and St. Petersburg, and it could be loaded in the East 
coast ports, Hull and Newcastle, where most timber was unloaded. 
Although Newcastle coal was not comparable with the hard Welsh 
"steam-coal", and obviously did not pay very high freights, it 
suited the low-cost, rural vessels quite well. Accordingly, around 
1875, nearly 40 per cent of all Finnish "peasant" vessels taking 
wood from Finland, Sweden or Russia to the North Sea obtained 
some kind of return cargo. It is true that this figure was not very 
high, but it was clearly better than Baltic trading could offer. Urban 
ships, on the other hand, carried relatively little return cargo from 
North Sea ports, only a tenth of similar outward cargoes. However, 
many of them did return home (or to other Baltic ports) with salt 
from South Europe. 
The attraction of North Sea freight for Finnish sailing vessels 
seems to have declined quite suddenly during the first decade of 
the "long depression": there was a reduction of about a third 
between 1875 and 1885. During the following decade, however, 
the figures remained virtually constant. The decline was not 
universal either: North Sea cargo on urban ships dropped by 
almost two thirds, while rural vessels continued trading almost 
unaffected up to the 1890s. By the turn of the century, a new and 
universal decline did set in. Even "peasant" sailers began to suffer, 
and before the world war, North Sea exports by Finnish 
windjammers were down to less than a third of 1870s levels. On 
the other hand, import cargo did not diminish at all at first; on the 
contrary, its tonnage increased in the 1880s and the 1890s, and 
declined only slowly after that. The reason for this surprising 
development was that Finnish imports of coal grew considerably 
during the period. It was not, however, enough to reverse the 
general downward trend in North Sea trading by Finnish 
windjammers. 
Wood cargo from Sweden also seems to have followed a 
downward trend. Unfortunately, only a very crude estimation is 
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possible, but all the data suggest that the decline was slow at first 
and gathered momentum only after the 1890s. Just before the War, 
the figure was only a third of what it was in the 1870s (including 
return cargo; see table 3:7).39 
The general decline in North Sea trades was accentuated by the 
fact that sailing vessels were gradually demoted to transporting 
second-class timber products, such as splitwood or firewood, 
plank-ends (which were still used to pave streets) and raw timber. 
The decline seems to have been first and foremost the consequence 
of steamships taking over the transportation of sawn goods. In the 
1890s, steamships enjoyed an above-average share of export 
transport (excluding shipments to Sweden and Russia) in six major 
timber ports (about 71 % of all loaded tonnage in 1894/95, for 
example, while the figure for the whole country was about 66 %). 
The proportion of sailing tonnage in these ports also dropped quite 
dramatically from 1895 until the War, from almost 30 per cent to 
less than a tenth.4° 
The overwhelming popularity of steamships for transporting 
bulky and cheap timber products is not exactly what could be 
expected. Of course, the engines made a great difference in the 
variable summer and autumn winds of the Baltic, and the cranes 
were a distinct advantage when loading at the roadstead, as 
happened in most timber ports. The biggest advantage, however, 
was probably that the steamer's capacity to carry wood cargo had 
gradually increased ton for ton beyond that of a sailing vessel. 
Since wood is relatively light, a full load also implies deck cargo, 
which was restricted on sailing vessels for reasons of stability and 
rigging. Early steamers with large open decks, on the other hand, 
could carry more than a third of their cargo on deck and, net ton for 
net ton, could accommodate close to 50 per cent more than a 
typical wooden sailing vesse1.41 This substantially increased the 
39 See note 38. 
40 Finnish Official Statistics, ser. I and IB.  
41 The difference was clearly verified by the Finnish ship-list (Suomen 
kauppalaivasto) of 1930, which in many cases record a vessel's capacity to 
carry wood cargo (in standards). For steamships built before 1914, the 
average was 0.85 standards per net ton, for sailing vessels 0.5-0.6 standards. 
The difference arose not only because of differences in deck-cargoes; iron 
vessels (as all steamers were) had fewer structural members (pillars, orlop 
beams) in their holds and could therefore utilize the space better when 
loading bulky wood products. 
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steamer's edge over a sailing vessel in transport performance. 
Mediterranean trade, which was in fact the start of deepwater 
shipping in Finland (see p. 148), was a third important category of 
export and import shipping. As already metioned, outward 
voyages taking timber to South Europe and return trips with salt 
were often only the beginning and end of a long-trader's voyage 
pattern. There were, however, quite a few vessels which really 
specialized in this trade, carrying on what almost amounted to 
liner traffic between Finland and certain Mediterranean ports. 
This was especially typical of the South coast towns of Helsinki,  
Porvoo (Borgå) and Loviisa (Lovisa).  
The stable element in this trade was the import of salt, for which 
there were not many alternatives; for the export of wood products, 
on the other hand, Spanish, Portuguese and other Mediterranean 
ports were some of many possible destinations. This basic 
difference can be seen quite well in table 3:8. Fluctuations in 
export cargo, whether expressed in tons or ton-miles, were far 
greater than in imports. 
According to the figures, there was a big drop in export tonnage 
destined for Southern Europe in the beginning of the period, from 
the mid-1860s to the mid-1870s. As this was a decade during 
which timber exports from Finland to Britain expanded rapidly, it 
seems that market development disfavoured South European 
ports. In the following decade, when depression affected prices in 
England, and Atlantic freight rates had declined, timber exports to 
the Mediterranean again reached the level of the 1860s. In the 
1890s, increasing economic activity in Western Europe made 
North Sea (including French) markets attractive again, and exports 
to the Iberian Peninsula and beyond, declined. 
Salt imports from Southern Europe remained relatively stable 
during all these fluctuations. There was only a 20 per cent drop in 
the 1870s — which probably meant that there was more salt 
coming from Liverpool — but former levels were subsequently 
almost regained. It was only in the 1890s that a systematic fall 
began and just before the War, salt-importing sailing tonnage was 
less than a fifth of what it was half a century earlier. This final 
decline was probably a natural consequence of the development of 
sailing tonnage. Old, medium-sized wooden vessels were being 
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replaced by big iron and steel ships which were not economical in 
traditional small-scale Mediterranean trade. One significant 
contributing factor was that the Finnish Steamship Company 
opened a line to the Mediterranean in 1889, and these ships could 
now import salt to Finland. Thus, even this traditional trade 
seemed to reflect the displacement of sail by steam on increasingly 
long transport routes. 
Coastal trade 
Although coastal trade is not the subject of this study, it sometimes 
offered an alternative opportunity to certain other types of 
shipping. A "peasant" shipowner, in particular, who had taken 
firewood to Stockholm or St. Petersburg before building a North 
Sea -going brig or barque, might well return to his former business 
if wood and coal transport between Britain and Scandinavia 
became less profitable. Therefore it seems reasonable to look at the 
general development of coastal trade in order to see whether 
fluctuations occurred in the opposite direction to those in the 
Baltic and North Sea business. 
The problem with coastal trade is that the data is far from 
perfect, particularly for the early part of the period. It is true that 
local ship-lists are reliable on the number of coastal vessels, but 
they often give only a summary record of the number of voyages. 
Neither do pre-1883 shipping statistics present figures for all ships 
sailing to Sweden or Russia.42 This means, of course, that the 
estimates in table 3:9, particularly as far as the 1860s and 1870s are 
concerned, must be used with greater caution than the earlier 
estimates of longer-range shipping. 
Table 3:9 contains at least one example of coastal shipping 
development as the antithesis of North Sea and longer trades. After 
42 The best proxy for such figures before 1883, after which time destination / 
origin-specific figures for Finnish ships are available, is the number and 
tonnage of ships cleared from Degerby and Koivisto (Björkö, for which figures 
can be found only from 1867 onwards). They were by far the most important 
customs stations for coastal vessels sailing to Stockholm and St.Petersburg, 
but the figures also comprised vessels sailing further afield. On the other 
hand, their traffic was just a part, albeit a major part, of the total trades in 
question. Accordingly, the figures can only be used, together with statistics 
on the export of firewood, as indicators of general trends. 
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TABLE 3:9. Estimated coastal transport by Finnish sailing 
vessels. Loaded voyages, net tons (nt) and (net)ton-
(nautical) miles (ntm), annual averages, 1865-1913. 
c. 1865 c. 1875 1884/86 
Trade 1000 Mill. 1000 Mill. 1000 Mill. 
nt ntm nt ntm nt ntm 
Exports: 
Sweden 24 4 27 4 37 6 
Russia 102 7 113 8 126 9 
Total 126 11 140 12 163 15 
Imports: 
Sweden 12 2 14 3 24 5 
Russia 77 6 85 6 99 7 
Total 89 8 98 9 122 12 




1000 	 Mill. 
	
nt 	 ntm 
1904/06 
	
1000 	 Mill. 
	
nt 	 ntm 
1912/13 
	
1000 	 Mill. 
	
nt 	 ntm 
Exports: 
Sweden 29 5 30 5 31 5 
Russia 136 10 127 8 206 14 
Total 165 14 157 13 237 19 
Imports: 
Sweden 14 3 13 3 16 3 
Russia 102 7 93 7 63 8 
Total 115 10 106 9 79 11 
Grand total 280 24 263 22 316 30 
NB: Excluding coastal transport within Finland and transport over the 
Ladoga. Sums computed from unrounded figures. 
Source: See table 3:5 and note 42. 
a rather stable phase of slow increase, there was rapid growth 
between 1875 and 1885, when long trading became less attractive. 
As far as Russian exports were concerned, this trend continued to 
the 1890s. Trade to Stockholm, on the other hand, declined after 
the mid-1880s, but at the same time, Baltic shipping increased 
considerably. This seems to be a case of contrary development, of 
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coastal trade suffering from the growth of another freight business. 
It would, however, be unrealistic to suggest that changes in 
coastal trade were mainly a result of tonnage supply, that 
shipowners could have transferred their activities at will. They 
could have done so only if demand for coastal transport was much 
larger than supply, or if it was continuously increasing. As 
mentioned earlier, coastal trade consisted mainly of firewood 
transport to Stockholm, Reval (Tallinn) and St. Petersburg. 
St.Petersburg was, at least in quantitative terms, by far the most 
important, and exports to Stockholm normally exceeded those to 
Reval. There was, in addition, substantial business in fish to both 
Sweden and Russia. Small boats were normally used for this, 
however, all of which were not included in the shipping statistics, 
and the impact on ton-figures was small. Table 3:9 indicates that 
import cargo was also important, particularly with Russian trade. 
The overwhelming bulk of imports consisted of grain, for which 
there was an increasing demand in Finland. 
Factors of demand explain why costal trade to Sweden did not 
expand any more after the 1890s. Although the city of Stockholm 
doubled in population during the period, the demand for firewood 
was adversely affected by the increasing use of coal (from 1861 to 
1907, coal imports to Sweden grew 14-fold).43 The same 
phenomenon also affected the demand for firewood in 
St.Petersburg;44 it is worth noting that tonnage sailing from Finland 
to Russia had decreased by the turn of the century. There were, 
however, a couple of other export products in increasing demand 
in the Russian capital: stones and sand to construct ports, quays, 
houses and fortifications. In the 1910s in particular, the 
fortification works in and around Chronstadt created a real boom 
in East Finnish coastal trade.45 On the other hand, import transport 
from Russia stopped growing in the mid-1880s. It is probable that 
more and more grain was being imported by rail. Moreover, at the 
end of the period, Russia was losing ground to Germany in grain 
exports to Finland.46 
Demand from St.Peterburg was substantial and growing more 
43 	 Historisk statistik för Sverige 3, table 3.1. 
44 Pihkala, Suomen Venäjän-kauppa p. 70. 
45 Ibid., p.102-103;  Kaukiainen, Koiviston merenkulun historia, p. 224-228. 
46 Pihkala, Suomen Venäjän-kauppa, p. 148-149. 
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than demand from Stockholm. Coastal trade, therefore, seemed to 
offer better long-term opportunities along the Southeast coast of 
Finland than in the Southwestern archipelago. This is in 
accordance with observations concerning the development of 
tonnage: big ships almost disappeared from coastal parishes close 
to Wiborg during the early 1880s, and North Sea trade was never 
resumed again. At the same time, many Southwestern or Åland 
"peasant" owners stuck to their big ships, almost as long as they 
were still afloat. It is true that, even in these regions, there was 
some increase in the total tonnage of coastal vessels around the 
turn of the century,47 but this was probably more to do with 
domestic coastal transport than the rather stagnant trade to 
Sweden. 
Coastal shipping offered urban shipowners no real alternative to 
their traditional long trading. Resources such as forest for fire-
wood, which were important as far as Stockholm and St.Petersburg 
were concerned, were lacking, as was the necessary know-how. It 
was also impossible for owners of large vessels to switch straight 
from foreign cross-trading to coasting, for which their existing 
tonnage was unsuitable. Transition could, therefore, only be a 
long-term objective, as large, old vessels were replaced with new, 
much smaller ones. This rarely happened with urban owners, at 
least as far as sailing tonnage was concerned. However, there was 
some transition to coastal trading in another sense. Many urban 
owners invested money in small steamships, which sailed on 
domestic coastal routes. 
Steamer trade 
From coastal passenger/cargo vessels to specialized steamships 
As tonnage development indicates, the growth of steam in Finland 
followed a well-trodden path. At first, it was dependent on coastal 
line services between Finnish towns and to Sweden and Russia. 
Thus, at the outset, there was no real competition with sailing 
vessels; steam created a market for a new type of service, namely 
regular and reliable transport for passengers.48 It was only during 
47 	 See appendix table I and Börman, Åboländsk bygdeseglation p. 120-123. 
48 See e.g. Palmer, "The British Shipping Industry 1850-1914", p. 94. 
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the early 1870s that steamships began to make headway with 
traditional bulk cargo, but even then, it mainly involved wood-
hulled auxiliaries. As far as Finnish merchant tonnage was 
concerned, steam really entered the common bulk-carrying market 
and began to compete with sailing vessels only in the late 1880s. 
The development of steam tonnage was covered in some detail 
in chapter II and it is not necessary to repeat it here. Steamship 
quality was directly related to the traffic in which it was engaged: 
up to the 1890s, only a small minority of Finnish steamers ever 
sailed beyond the Sound. During the two or three first decades of 
the period covered by this study, when the number of cargo 
steamships was extremely low, there was hardly any demand for 
passenger traffic to Western Europe. There was hardly any local 
supply of suitable tonnage, either. While it was perfectly safe to 
cross the Baltic on vessels similar to those which sailed to Sweden, 
it was not thought advisable to expose them to the conditions of 
the North Sea. North Sea trade not only required stronger vessels 
(longer waves mean that more longidutinal rigidity is needed) but 
the "handy size" was also larger. In the middle of the 1880s, there 
was hardly any difference in the average tonnage of steamers 
sailing to Sweden, Russia and Germany. On the other hand, apart 
from wooden auxiliaries, hardly any Finnish steamer under 500 
net tons ever sailed beyond the Baltic.49 All this also meant that, 
before the 1890s, few steamers were able to sail all the year round. 
They simply were not able to reach ice-free waters in winter. 
Both the technical limitations of the early Finnish steamers and 
the small amount of steam tonnage make it relatively easy to assess 
the birth and growth of steamer traffic beyond the Sound (table 
3:10).5° Even in the mid-1880s, no less than three quarters of all 
Finnish steam-propelled tonnage was sailing within the Baltic 
and, accordingly, laid up for four to six months every year. There 
was quite a sudden "take-off", however, between 1895 and 1905 




The tonnage in question was estimated as follows: all ships over 500 net tons 
were included unless they sailed a regular line within the Baltic (only one 
case, s/s Wellamo, 613 nt, was actually found). Of smaller vessels, those 
which are known to have sailed to the North Sea were included. Data on their 
sailings was drawn from the insurance registers, ship-lists of local 
sjömanshus and from the lists of Finnish steamships in 1914 (archives of  
sjöfartsinspektören, Bat, Ecl). 
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TABLE 3:10. Estimated tonnage sailing outside the Baltic, 1865-
1913. Steamships, incl. auxiliaries. 
Time Net tons 
% of Finnish 
steam tonnage 
1865 — 0 
1875 2210 27 
1885 2820 23 
1895 8520 39 
1905 28570 64 
1913 38860 69 
Source: See note 50. 
(or, rather, at the turn of the century) when the proportion of 
"ocean-going" steamers increased by 25 percentage points. This 
new level did not change much before the World War. 
Up to the early 1890s, it was only North Sea tonnage which 
sailed all the year round. However, winter-traffic between Hangö 
and Stockholm (or Oxelösund) by small steamer started in 1878, 
and after the Finnish government acquired its first icebreaker, the 
Murtaja, in 1890, a slowly increasing number of reinforced 
passenger vessels also sailed during the winter-months.51  
The slow escalation from coastal services to longer trading 
stands out equally clearly from estimations of the extent of 
shipping services provided by Finnish steamships in different 
trades (table 3:11). These estimates, however, are not very precise 
due to the previously mentioned, inherent weaknesses in the data. 
For one thing, steamers sailing on regular routes — that is, most 
Finnish steamers at that time — were assumed to be fully loaded 
on all legs of their normal services, irrespective of how few goods 
there actually were in their holds (see p. 142). One possible 
consequence of this is that the statistics may exaggerate steamer 
transport production. It is also possible that they present too 
balanced a picture of outward and inward cargo; as mentioned 
earlier, Finnish exports required much more shipping space than 
her imports. Yet, there are strong reasons to believe that steamers 
51 	 See e.g. Ramsay, I kamp med östersjöns isar; Pohjanpalo, 100 vuotta Suomen 
talvimerenkulkua.  
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carried return cargo to Finland more often than sailing vessels; 
many steamers' accounts reveal that freight income was quite 
evenly distributed between outward and inward voyages; this was 
typical within the Baltic in particular.52 Fortuitously, this also 
means that the suspected excess in the figures for total production 
cannot have been very large. There was, however, one important 
exception, namely the emigrant business, which was 
predominantly one-way traffic. Although returning emigrants 
were estimated to total one fourth of those leaving, they could not 
fill the third-class bunks on return voyages, especially since there 
was a notable time-lag between leaving and returning. For this 
reason, it seemed reasonable to introduce a small correction into 
the estimates by subtracting 15% (representing an average 30% 
unused capacity on return voyages) from the total tons and 
tonmiles of emigrant vessels.53 
It has been mentioned already that pre-1883 data concerning 
traffic on coastal lines to Sweden and Russia is very scanty, as is 
also data on ships mainly engaged in irregular foreign "tramping" 
(see p. 138). Thus, the figures for coastal trade should be used with 
some caution as far as the two earliest sample years are concerned. 
The latter problem only applies after the 1890s (before that, 
practically all steamers sailed in regular service), and even then, 
because of the rather small volume of cross-trading, its bearing on 
the total figures is not substantial. 
52 	 The ledgers of the FAA and other steamship companies used in this study. 
E.g. the accounts of the s/s Lloyd from Wiborg show that the ship normally 
earned more on inward cargo from Lübeck than on export cargo. Such data 
cannot be found for the FAA ships, but a rough idea can be formed by looking 
at the loading expenses, which were recorded in the special voyage accounts. 
It must also be remembered that less than full cargo was also common on 
outward legs, e.g. when a steamer collected sawn goods at various Finnish 
South Coast ports. 
53 Only in one case, the Titania (1997 nt) was the reduction increased to 20 %. 
All these percentages may sound low, but emigrant ships also carried cargo, 
and after the turn of the century, their income from cargo fluctuated between 
40 and 25 per cent of total income. They carried a relatively high number of 
emigrants, when full, one passenger per 2.5-2.7 net tons (the corresponding 
rate in Atlantic traffic was about five; see Harley, "Issues on the Demand for 
Shipping Services", p. 82). Obviously, the third-class accommodation was 
very modest and the emigrant decks were probably used for general cargo on 
the return voyage. 
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TABLE 3:11. Estimation of transport by Finnish steamships in 
different trades. Loaded voyages, net tons (nt) and 
Trade 
	
(net)ton-(nautical)miles 	 (ntm), 	 annual 	 averages, 
1865-1913. 
	
c. 	 1865 	 c. 	 1875 	 1884/86 
	
1000 	 Mill. 	 1000 	 Mill. 	 1000 	 Mill. 
	
nt 	 ntm 	 nt 	 ntm 	 nt 	 ntm 
Coastal trade, 
exp. and imp. 35 15 120 38 160 60 
Other exp. and 
imp. trades 15 9 28 21 60 57 
Cross-trade 8 15 11 16 
Total 50 24 156 74 231 133 














exp. and imp. 319 117 465 137 729 164 
Other exp. and 
imp. trades 214 258 488 540 709 774 
Cross-trade 24 47 52 133 47 178 
Total 558 424 1,006 810 1,485 1,117 
NB: Totals were computed from unrounded figures. Beginning with 
1884, the figures for all export and import trade are three-year 
averages; for earlier years they are based on one-year figures drawn 
from the shipping statistics or the insurance sample. 
Source: Appendix III:2. 
That the overwhelming majority of steamship transport in the 
1860s was coastal traffic is no surprise. Table 3:11 does not include 
any domestic coastal services which, however, did employ a 
notable number of steamers of 200 net tons and less. On the other 
hand, ships sailing beyond the Sound, which were used most of 
the year, were more productive per ton than those confined to the 
Baltic, and thus the proportion of long trade transport was 
somewhat higher than the corresponding proportion of tonnage. 
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Measured in ton-miles, the percentage of traffic sailing beyond the 
Baltic grew as follows: 
c.1865 	 0 % 
c.1875 	 30 % 
1884/86 	 38 % 
1894/96 	 58 % 
1904/06 	 70 % 
1912/13 	 72 % 
These figures illustrate an earlier and less pronouced transition 
than the tonnage figures in table 3:10: the change seems to have 
been most rapid between the mid-1880s and mid-1890s. The 
difference may have arisen partly because of the element of error in 
the estimates. On the other hand, tonnage sailing beyond the 
Sound in the 1870s consisted almost solely of auxiliaries. They 
sailed long distances without using their small engines, and 
therefore their transport capacity was not much greater than that of 
pure sailing vessels. By comparison, the new cargo steamers of the 
FAA and Wasa—Nordsjö company were a great improvement, and 
it is therefore logical that, between 1875 and 1885, steamer 
transport in long-trading grew in excess of long-trading steam 
tonnage. On the other hand, after the 1890s, transport to the North 
Sea and beyond developed quite well in line with tonnage 
development. During the last decade of the period, the structural 
change in Finnish steam shipping was by all standards quite slow. 
This deceleration was not totally unexpected, since European and 
North Atlantic freight markets experienced a series of depressions 
in 1903-04 and 1907-08. The Russo-Japanese war in 1904 
caused additional difficulties for Finnish shipping. 
The slowing down of the transition did not, of course, mean that 
the growth of steamship transport had stopped. As table 3:11 
shows, up to the War, the quantitative increase was quite 
impressive ton for ton and ton-mile for ton-mile: transportation 
grew about 40-fold in half a century. Yet, as the following indices 
indicate, even in total production, the most rapid increase 
(excluding the 1860s) took place in the late 1880s and the 1890s 
(table 3:12; in order not to overemphasize the importance of the 
very small steam tonnage of the 1860s, the figures for 1912/13 have 
been given the value of 100). 
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TABLE 3:12. Finnish steamship transport indices (1912/13 = 
100). 
nt ntm 
c. 1865 3 2 
c. 1875 11 7 
1884/86 16 12 
1894/96 37 38 
1904/06 68 73 
1912/13 100 100 
Source: Table 3:11. 
To sum up, steamship transport data, like tonnage data earlier, 
tells of a slow and incomplete transition. During the first half of the 
period, up to the mid-1880s or early 1890s, steamships were still 
mainly being used in a rather narrow sector, basically in the same 
way as during the introduction of the new technology in the 1830s 
and the 1840s. The breakthrough of cargo steamers started a new, 
dynamic development, but this slowed down at the beginning of 
the 20th century. Neither in tonnage nor traffic figures, nor in 
comparison with what happened abroad, did this breakthrough in 
Finland ever really fulfil its potential during the period in 
question. 
Coastal trade 
Since steam shipping began by carrying coastal passenger traffic, it 
seems logical to begin a closer look at the trades with them. 
Compared with the coastal trade of sailing vessels, however, this 
was a different business. Not only did most coastal steamers 
represent far larger capital, and sail on much longer routes than the 
small galeasses carrying fire-wood to Stockholm or St.Petersburg, 
but many of them could equally well travel to the southern Baltic. 
Thus there was no clear-cut difference between coastal and Baltic 
trade in steam shipping. 
Coastal trade was totally dominated by lines to Stockholm and 
St.Petersburg. For example, in 1894 (a year for which there is 
complete data on all regular lines to and from Finland),54 Finnish 
54 Finnish Official Statistics I:14, p II:86-87. 
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steamers sailed a total of 493 two-way trips engaged in coastal 
trade. Of these, 216 were between Finnish ports and the Russian 
capital (112 to and from the Saimaa area), 115 between 
St.Petersburg and Stockholm and 76 between Stockholm and 
Finland, which adds up to over 80 % of the tours in question. In 
addition, 58 trips were made between Finland and Reval (Tallin)  
and 28 between Kaskö and Sundsvall. 
As well as regular liner services, there was also some "tramp" 
cargo shipping between Sweden and Finland and Russia and 
Finland. This was, however, quite modest in comparison, only 13 
per cent of all traffic to and from Sweden in 1894. In Russian trade, 
the corresponding figure was larger, about 35 per cent, but 
"tramping" was still of minor importance.55 
Table 3:14 shows the estimated development of coastal trade. 
Although, as already pointed out, the first third of the time series is 
less than totally reliable, there is no doubt of a remarkable 
increase. The number of tours and the tonnage of ships engaged 
increased to such an extent that, in terms of net tons, the traffic 
grew 20-fold. Measured in ton-miles, however, the ratio was more 
modest at about 1,000 %. This indicates some qualitative changes 
in trade apart from pure growth. Above all, the average length of 
route decreased by over 50 per cent from 400-500 to 225 nautical 
miles. At the same time, there were fundamental changes in lines. 
At least from the 1870s, and up to the 1890s, St.Petersburg was a 
far more popular destination than Stockholm. Of special 
importance were long routes from the upper Gulf of Bothnia 
which, at the same time, made connections between Finnish 
coastal towns. Such lines were in special demand in Bothnian 
shipping towns, regularly carrying Russian hemp and canvas for 
sailing vessels.56 Since the early 1870s, however, the steamer-lines 
from South-Finland to the imperial capital had been in 
competition with the railway from Helsinki to St.Petersburg, and 
when the Bothnian railway reached Oulu in the middle of the 
1880s, the long coastal lines also began to suffer. After the 1890s, 
55 	 The volume of "tramping" was estimated by subtracting the traffic on regular 
lines (according to FOS I:14, p. II:86-87) from total traffic volumes (Finnish 
steamships cleared for and entered from Russia and Sweden). 
56 This is evidenced both by the accounts of s/s Oulu and many building 
accounts. See also Norrvik, Briggen Carl Gustaf, p. 43. 
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TABLE 3:13. Estimated coastal transport by Finnish steamships. 
Loaded voyages (cargo and/or passengers), net tons 
(nt) and (net)ton-(nautical) miles (ntm), annual 
averages, 1865-1913. 
c. 1865 	 c. 1875 1884/86 
Trade 1000 Mill. 1000 Mill. 1000 Mill. 
nt ntm nt ntm nt ntm 
Exports: 
Sweden 8 3 23 7 28 10 
Russia 9 5 37 12 52 20 
Total 18 8 60 19 80 30 
Imports: 
Sweden 8 3 23 7 28 10 
Russia 9 5 37 12 52 20 
Total 18 8 60 19 80 30 
Grand total 35 15 120 38 160 60 
1894/96 1904/06 1912/13 
Trade 1000 Mill. 1000 Mill. 1000 Mill. 
nt ntm nt ntm nt ntm 
Exports: 
Sweden 60 18 120 30 248 60 
Russia 100 41 88 31 124 25 
Total 160 59 208 61 372 84 
Imports: 
Sweden 61 18 139 35 245 59 
Russia 98 40 118 41 106 21 
Total 159 59 256 76 357 80 
Grand total 319 117 465 137 729 164 
NB: Excluding coastal transport within Finland and transport over 
Ladoga. Sums computed from unrounded figures. 
Source: See table 3:11. 
189 
total ton-miles sailed between Finland and Russia decreased 
systematically.57 
This trend was further reinforced by the fact that the exchange 
of goods between Russia and Finland grew quite slowly after the 
mid-1880s, and actually declined from 40-50 % to about 30 % of 
Finland's foreign trade. It is obvious, however, that the decline in 
shipping was not only caused by market factors: Russia was 
building its own steam fleet and, therefore, wanted to restrict the 
competition from Finnish lines (see p. 299). The constitutional 
crisis between Russia and Finland (the so-called Russian 
oppression) also made Russian connections less popular. 
At the same time, traffic between Sweden and Finland increased 
rapidly. Since the volume of trade between the countries was not 
enough to sustain more than modest cargo shipping, this may have 
been simply a result of the general increase in travelling (including 
emigration).58 While the increasing numbers of visitors to 
St.Petersburg were effectively catered for by the railways,59 
travellers going over to Stockholm (including those from 
northwest Russia) had no alternative but to sail. The expansion in 
winter traffic meant substantial increases in the yearly number of 
tours to Sweden, but sailing east of Hangö (or in mild winters, 
Helsinki) was not possible in midwinter. There was only one factor 
which was contrary to this trend: in the 1890s, after the FAA had 
bought their first passenger vessels, emigrants began, in increasing 
57 There was only one minor development which was contrary to this trend: 
shipping by small (c. 100 nt) tramp steamers, mostly wood-hulled and 
carrying firewood, increased. They used to load at different small ports on 
Lake Saimaa and their size was dictated by the size of the locks of the Saimaa 
Canal. Thus they represented the beginning of the transition to steam in 
traditional coastal trade. 
58 Unfortunately, there are no precise figures on the volume of liner services 
after 1894, but the shipping statistics (FOS, ser. I and IB) show that, e.g. in 
1913, no les than c. 213,500 net tons of Finnish steamshipping to Sweden 
was cleared at the customs house of Degerby, Åland, which was then a 
checkpoint for most regular lines. This tonnage was about 82 % of all Finnish 
steamshipping to Sweden. In addition, there were Finnish lines which, at 
least in wintertime, sailed directly from Helsinki or Hangö to Sandhamn (at 
the mouth of the south-eastern passage to Stockholm). 
59 That the number of passengers on the Helsinki — St.Petersburg railway 
increased substantially is clearly shown in contemporary railway statistics.  
Finska statsjärnvägarne 1862-1912, p. 333. 
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numbers, to use direct lines to England instead of first going over 
to Sweden. After the turn of the century, however, when 
competition on the Finland — Stockholm lines increased and 
ticket-prices fell, the trend was reversed for a few years.60 During 
the last decade before the War, the capital of Sweden clearly 
surpassed St.Petersburg as a destination for coastal liners. 
It is interesting that traffic both to Russia and Sweden was 
firmly in the hands of Finnish companies; Russian and Swedish 
ships were found only on a few secondary routes. This is a rather 
typical example of the adage that contacts with large centres are 
usually established by those living in smaller centres or 
"outports"; but this, of course, does not offer a real causal 
explanation. Winter-traffic probably gave an additional boost to 
Finnish companies by allowing the most modern Baltic tonnage to 
be used all the year round. There was massive wear and tear on 
ships in the ice, however, and business was profitable only 
because the state subsidized wintertime traffic.61  
In any case, coastal traffic seemed to offer Finnish steamship 
owners a nice niche, in which international competition was 
hardly felt at all. However, it was a niche with limited 
opportunities for growth. This message was brought home the hard 
way during the first decade of this century when two Finnish 
companies, FAA and Bore from Turku, engaged in tough 
competition on their Stockholm lines; tariff wars (which lowered 
the income of both) were fought from 1903 to 1905 and again from 
1909 to 1911, until the companies agreed on a division of traffic.62 
Undoubtedly, the competition was intensified by the fact that, at 
that time, there was a good supply of tonnage since traffic on 
Ostrobothnian coastal lines had decreased because of the new 
railway. Railway development was, indeed, one more factor which 
limited growth opportunities, and thus it is no wonder that the 
proportion of coastal traffic in the total transport output of Finnish 
steamships constantly declined. 
60 Suviranta, Suomen Höyrylaiva Osakeyhtiö, p. 35; Kero, Migration from 
Finland to North America, p. 36. 




	 Suviranta, op. cit., p. 45-46;  Törngren, Ångfartygs Aktiebolag Bore, p. 62- 
65. 
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Steamers in North Sea and Baltic trade 
As was mentioned before, steamships trafficking on the Baltic 
were very similar to those sailing from Finland to Sweden and 
Russia. Thus, Baltic steamer trade was in many respects just a 
logical extension of coastal trade. Indeed, many vessels combined 
both, or sailed occasional voyages on the Southern Baltic in late 
autumn, when normal services on more northern routes were 
difficult to maintain.63 
Passing the Sound was a technical threshold for steamships, but 
it did not prevent vessels built for the North Sea from carrying 
goods within the Baltic. For example, the first real cargo steamer in 
Finland, the Fennia from Vaasa, sailed a route between Finland 
and the East coast of England, but in practice it carried more cargo 
within the Baltic than beyond.fi4 Many ships sailing the North Sea 
later must also have had some involvement in Baltic freight 
business. Although Finnish exports to Great Britain were 
constantly on the increase (in the middle of the 1890s they 
exceeded exports to Russia and took over the number one 
position), import volumes were much smaller and lagged far 
behind those from Germany.65 
The clear dominance of regular liner services in early Finnish 
steamer business was also clearly visible in the Baltic and North 
Sea trades. In 1894, only 22 % of Baltic cargo and 9 % of all North 
Sea cargo loaded onto Finnish steamers represented irregular 
"tramp" trading.66 On the other hand, passengers were of much 
less importance compared with coastal trade. True, most steamers 
sailing on the Baltic regularly carried passengers, but, before the 
63 In the registers of Sjöassuransföreningen i Finland a frequent entry for such 
vessels was that they made östersjöturer (Baltic voyages) in November-
December. Unfortunately, these entries do not normally specify the voyages 
in more detail, neither do they prove that they were actually made, but at 
least the owners wanted the insurance policy of their vessels to allow this 
kind of Baltic voyage. 
	
64 	 The registers of Sjöassuransföreningen i Finland 1874-76. 
65 Pihkala, Suomen ulkomaankauppa 1860-1917, p. 53-54. At that time, the 
statistics specified the geographical distribution of foreign trade according to 
the origin and destination of transport. Thus, British export means goods 
loaded for a British port and German import, goods loaded in a German port. 
	
66 	 The volume of cargo on regular lines was computed from FOS I: 14, p. II:86- 
87. 
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TABLE 3:14. Estimated Finnish export and import transport by 
Finnish steamships (other than coastal traffic). 
Loaded voyages (cargo and/or passengers), net tons 
(nt) and (net)ton-(nautical) miles (ntm), annual 
averages, 1865-1913. 
c. 1865 	 c. 1875 1884/86 
Trade 1000 Mill. 1000 Mill. 1000 Mill. 
nt ntm nt ntm nt ntm 
Exports: 
Baltic 8 5 12 7 17 11 
North Sea — — 3 4 11 14 
Other — — 0 1 1 2 
Total 8 5 15 12 29 27 
Imports: 
Baltic 8 5 12 7 18 11 
North Sea — — 1 1 13 15 
Other — — 0 1 1 4 
Total 8 5 13 9 31 31 
Grand total 15 9 28 21 60 57 
1894/96 1904/06 1912/13 
Trade 1000 Mill. 1000 Mill. 1000 Mill. 
nt ntm nt ntm nt ntm 
Exports: 
Baltic 37 28 78 51 106 69 
North Sea 66 78 166 195 236 278 
Other 8 23 15 41 17 45 
Total 112 129 259 287 359 392 
Imports: 
Baltic 39 29 79 51 113 73 
North Sea 51 60 136 161 220 264 
Other 13 40 15 41 17 45 
Total 103 129 229 253 350 382 
Grand total 214 258 488 540 709 774 
NB: Sums computed from unrounded figures. 
Source: See table 3:11. 
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FAA steamers Urania and Astraea were built in 1891, North Sea 
vessels had accommodation for just a few.67 It was only when 
emigration grew to large proportions that passenger traffic became 
an important part of North Sea trade. Beginning in 1891, the FAA 
built several ships which could carry large numbers of third-class 
(emigrant) passengers. 
Table 3:14 shows that export and import transportation by 
Finnish steamers increased substantially after the 1880s. By far the 
most significant feature in the table is the growth of North Sea 
trade. In the middle of the 1880s, it was still a minor element, on a 
par with Baltic traffic, accounting for much less in tons and ton-
miles than coastal transport; at the end of the period, just before 
the First World War, it was worth no less than about a half of all 
Finnish steamship transport. Regular lines to the east coast of 
England accounted for most of this growth, but the FAA deep sea 
fleet also visited the big continental ports, from Hamburg to 
Bordeaux, and Copenhagen on the Baltic. From 1891, the line 
Helsinki (or Hangö) — Copenhagen — Hull was also open through 
the winter. 
Finnish lines were not equally successful on the Baltic. Even 
though there was continuous growth, the volume of traffic (in ton-
miles) in the 1910s was only a quarter of Finnish North Sea 
steamer transport. One of the reasons must have been that a greater 
volume of Finnish exports, especially wood products which 
required a lot of cargo space, went beyond the Sound than to 
Germany or Denmark. On the other hand, Finnish liners sailing to 
England and other North Sea ports could easily carry many 
imports from Germany on their homeward voyages; an increasing 
number of them were coming from Bremen and Hamburg rather 
than Liibeck.68  Another, even more important reason was that 
German and Danish shipping companies also operated liner 
services to Finland — in 1894, they had more tonnage and made a 
greater number of voyages than Finnish-owned Baltic lines.69 
67 	 The Ships of our First Century, p. 9-45; the ledgers of the FAA (the ships had 
distinct passenger and freight accounts, which makes it possible to ascertain 
how much income they earned from passenger traffic). 
68 See e.g. Suomen Höyrylaiva Osakeyhtiö 1883-1933, p. 46-47. 
69 Finnish Official Statistics I:14, p. II:86-87. 
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Accordingly, the Finns faced great difficulties in expanding their 
market share. 
From the very beginning, FAA ships carried freight between 
West European and Mediterranean ports during the winter. Thus it 
was not totally unexpected (although a grant and cheap loan from 
the state seem to have been the decisive factors) that the company 
started a Mediterranean line as early as 1889.7° At first, ships sailed 
between Barcelona and St.Petersburg, via South Finland, and they 
accounted for practically all Finnish steamer traffic beyond the 
North Sea. However, it never developed into very good business,71  
and, as table 3:14 clearly shows, cargo volume remained modest. 
This was not surprising: regular liner services always needed a 
firm background of export and import business and, with the 
dwindling role of salt imports, Finland's trade with the 
Mediterranean area was losing its former importance. Neither were 
the expectations of carrying imports to St.Petersburg fulfilled, as 
Russia began to develop her own steam shipping. Indeed, it seems 
that the most important achievement of the FAA Mediterranean 
line was to deal a final blow to sailing vessels' traditional 
spaniefart. 
Even the indirect effects of North Sea steam trade were far more 
significant. The coincidence of rapid growth and the decline of 
sailing vessel cargo to British and Northern French ports, together 
with the general fall in medium-sized sailing tonnage, implies very 
strongly that windjammers were pushed out of this trade by the 
expanding steamer services. On the other hand, the situation on 
the Baltic was quite the opposite. It seems obvious that the modest 
development of Finnish lines there left more room for less up-to-
date means of transport and provides some explanation for the 
tenacity of sail east of the Sound. 
In general, the growth opportunities of steamer trade between 
Finland and the big West European ports were relatively good. Not 
only were Finnish exports and imports expanding rapidly, but, as 
sailing vessels were being pushed aside, the growth of steam was 
potentially even more rapid. As far as regular lines were 
concerned, the services could never aim to cover the majority of 
exports, however. Since imports required less than a half of the 
70 Suomen Höyrylaiva Osakeyhtiö, p. 19-20. 
71  Ibid., p. 34, 46. 
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cargo space of exports, a realistic target would have been at a much 
lower level, if cargo on homeward legs was to be secured as well. 
Until the turn of the century, services to West Europe grew quite 
freely. This was mainly because, after the 1880s, big British 
shipping companies were not interested in establishing lines to 
Finland; in 1894, for example, there were none to be found.72 The 
FAA and Wasa—Nordsjö had already agreed upon co-operation 
and the division of traffic in 1884, and, in 1888, FAA made an 
agreement on traffic between Finland and Copenhagen with the 
Danish Det Forenede Dampskibs-Selskab.73 Thus, the situation on 
these routes was much the same as on many great sea-lanes where 
the traffic was regulated by shipping conferences (agreements on 
tariffs and traffic). In this case, the two Finnish companies had, in 
practice, a divided monopoly on regular services between Finland 
and Britain (this was further aided by the state subsidies to the 
FAA granted to maintain the traffic in wintertime). Only at the 
beginning of the 20th century was the peace disturbed. In 1902, a 
new shipping company called Nord was formed in Helsinki 
(although at least half of the major shareholders were from Turku). 
The aim was to open a regular, year-round service between South 
Finland and the East coast of England. By superseding the FAA, it 
also succeeded in obtaining state subsidies for maintaining winter 
traffic on this route. Since the route was vital to the FAA, they did 
not give up willingly, and after a violent, two-year tariff war, the 
new company had to surrender. The FAA bought the three Nord 
steamers, but, having no use for them, soon sold them abroad at a 
substantial loss. In addition to this, both companies suffered big 
losses because the tariffs had been too low to cover costs; total 
losses were estimated at three million Finnish marks at the time.74 
Although the FAA had succesfully defended its supremacy in 
North Sea liner trade, competition between domestic companies 
had come to stay. In 1905, a new company, Angfartygsaktiebolaget 
Transito, was established in Turku. Its first route was to Lubeck, 
but in 1909 it also started shipments to England.75 The tariff war on 
72 Finnish Official Statistics I:14, p. II:86. 
 
73 Suomen Höyrylaiva Osakeyhtiö, p. 16, 18-19. 
74 Kaukiainen, "The Transition," p. 181-182;  Suomen Höyrylaiva Osakeyhtiö,  
p. 43-45; Lindberg, Ångbåtssjöfart i Åbo, p. 265-276. 
75 Lindberg, Ångbåtssjöfart, p. 342-346. 
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the Stockholm route had also disturbed the lucrative emigrant 
business of the FAA as low prices induced emigrants to travel via 
Sweden. Thus, the last decade of the period was a time of 
uncertainty, at least for the leading steamship company in the 
country. In principle, of course, so-called healthy competition 
within an industry should not be harmful. In this case, however, it 
did disturb the normal development of income and may also have 
led to a decline in investments and retarded the growth of liner 
services. It is also possible that foreign trampers were competing 
more and more with liners in the transport of export goods such as 
wood and pulp. 
Cross-trade 
It has already been shown that cargo from one foreign port to 
another played a very modest role in the Finnish steamship 
business. Although the auxiliaries of the 1870s and FAA steamers 
used to sail on the Mediterranian and other ice-free waters during 
the winter, there were hardly any steamers which were mainly 
engaged in tramp-trading at large before the 1890s. Only by the 
turn of the century did it become more common to invest in big 
(and usually old) ships which were then deployed in so-called 
"wild trade".76 In 1913, there were still only nine or ten of these 
tramp steamers, with a total net tonnage of about 14,000.77 
Table 3:15 presents the estimated development of steamer cross-
trade. As has been mentioned, the data must be used with caution, 
and this specifically applies to the two last sample years. Up to the 
76 The first big tramp-steamer in Finland was Heros, 894 nt, bought from 
England in 1893 by a company in Kristinestad. In 1899 they changed over to a 
larger, new ship, and subsequently bought two more steamers. In 1913 the 
company moved its office to Helsinki. (Norrvik, Briggen Carl Gustaf, p. 287-
289.) A Helsinki businessman, Viktor Ek, who was director of a liner-
company (Helsingfors Angfartygs AB), started tramping-business in the 
1890s, and owned two tramp-steamers in 1913. The son of the founder of 
FAA, Ernst Krogius (or rather the firm Lars Krogius & co) founded Finska 
Lloyd in 1896, a company which also built new ships (in 1913 they owned 
five vessels) and deployed them in various tramp-trades. Two ships were 
sold to FAA in early 1914. 
77 The archives of sjöfartsinspektören, Ba:1 and Ec:1 (the lists of Finnish 
foreign-going steamers, made in autumn 1914, which also register the trade 
in which they were used). 
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TABLE 3:15. Estimated transport by Finnish steamships in 
foreign cross-trade. Loaded voyages (cargo and/ 
or passengers), net tons (nt) and (net)ton(nautical)-
miles (ntm), annual averages, 1875-1905. 
c. 1875 	 1884/86 
Cross-trade 	 1000 	 Mill. 	 1000 	 Mill. 
nt 	 ntm 	 nt 	 ntm 
Baltic 	 1 	 1 	 1 	 1 
North Sea 	 2 	 1 	 7 	 7 
Mediterranean and other European 4 
	 8 	 3 	 5 
Atlantic 	 1 	 5 	 1 	 4 
Total 	 8 	 15 	 11 	 16 
1894/96 	 1904/06 	 1912/13 
Cross-trade 	 1000 	 Mill. 	 1000 	 Mill. 	 1000 	 Mill. 
nt ntm nt ntm nt ntm 
Baltic 	 — — (—) (—) (—) (—) 
North Sea 	 1 0 (9) (11) (18) (14) 
Mediterranean 
and other European 22 44 (35) (91) (12) (18) 
Atlantic 	 1 3 (7) (31) (17) (116) 
Total 	 24 47 52 133 47 178 
NB: Sums computed from unrounded figures. 
Source: See table 3:11. 
mid-1890s, voyage data covered all the ships which, in practice, 
could carry freight on more distant waters, and therefore gave an 
almost complete picture of cross-trading. After that, however, the 
information was much more scanty: for both 1904/06 and 1912/13, 
only about 45 per cent of ocean-going tonnage is included, and the 
percentage of "full-time" tramp-steamers is lower still. Although 
the percentages do not seem small, the actual number of ships and 
voyages was very low. Therefore, extrapolation involves rather a 
large margin of error. The geographical distribution of cross-
trading, in particular, maybe far different in the sample than it was 
in reality (therefore the figures for the two last sample years are 
given in parenthesis). 
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Because of the error involved, the estimates are very 
conservative. Indeed, there is one further "unknown" which might 
increase the figures. Liners sailing between Finland and Western 
Europe could, at least in theory, carry substantial amounts of cargo 
between their foreign ports-of-call, but no records of this type of 
transaction have been found. However, since most regular 
shipping in European waters after the late 1880s was governed by 
shipping conferences involving the big continental and British 
companies, it is not likely that Finnish liners were able to exploit 
West European freight markets to any great degree. This, indeed, 
also somewhat limited the growth of tramp trading. 
Both the errors in the data and the relative unimportance of the 
trade make closer analysis unnecessary. One trend is worth 
pointing out, however: the volume and share of more distant 
transport increased systematically. On the other hand, after the 
turn of the century, total growth was modest. This is 
understandable with regard to the development of the tonnage in 
question. As mentioned, up to the late 1890s, the bulk of cross-
trading was a winter occupation of North Sea liners. These ships of 
about 600 net tons were quite handy in the Mediterranean, and 
they may occasionally also have been used in trade with West 
Africa and the Atlantic islands. The growth of Baltic winter-traffic 
meant that an increasing number of liner-steamers no longer 
needed to find other employment during the coldest months; 
accordingly, the frequency of cross-trading declined in the FAA 
fleet. Nor did "full-time" tramp-trader tonnage grow much after the 
turn of the century. There were, however, a few big ships, 1,500-
2,000 net tons, which were optimal on more distant voyages. 
Accordingly, South American trade became a common occupation 
for Finnish tramp steamers, although they hardly ever sailed the 
North Atlantic routes. 
The development of cross-trading may also have been hampered 
by the low level of tramp freights from 1902 to 1908. Finnish ships, 
in particular, faced difficulties in finding freight during the Russo-
Japanese war.78 In the 1910s, on the other hand, big sailing vessels 
78 	 Even the FAA tried to exploit the tramp freight market by buying two ships of 
almost 1,300 nt each in 1902. Since tramp freights were still sinking, 
however, they were mostly used on regular services. 
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obviously attracted the interest of speculation-minded shipowners 
far more than tramp steamships. 
Although the volume of steamship traffic still increased during 
the last decade before the War, it is tempting to say that, in a 
qualitative sense, the expansion had almost stopped. For some 
reason or other, Finnish shipowners were not able to deploy 
steamships successfully in the truly international shipping sector, 
foreign tramp trade. This is in sharp contrast to what happened in 
Norway during the same decade; Norwegian owners made massive 
purchases of second-hand steamships, tramp-steamers, thus 
effectively bringing about the transition from sail to steam in that 
country. In Sweden too, the transition must have been largely the 
result of a massive exploitation of the international tramp freight 
market.79 
79 	 This can be deduced, above all, from the fact that the average freight income 
of Swedish steamers (as will be seen later) was much lower than was typical 
in liner traffic. 
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3. Total production and productivity 
Total production of shipping services: growth and 
change 
Sail tonnage and steam tonnage underwent very different patterns 
of development. Although the growth of sailing-ship business had 
already culminated around 1875, it never fell into as steep a 
decline as in many other countries. There was even a modest 
renaissance after 1895 and, measured in ton-miles, 1912/13 output 
clearly exceeded the peak levels of the 1870s. Steam shipping, on 
the other hand, increased continuously and relatively rapidly, but, 
up to the late 1880s, the volume was so small that the total 
transport output of Finnish shipping closely followed the cycles of 
windjammers. Only by the late 1890s did steam gain a position to 
reverse trends in Finnish shipping production, pushing it past 
earlier peaks and doubling it during the next 15 years or so (see 
figure 3:1 and table 3:16). Just before the First World War, Finnish 
vessels carried almost three times as much cargo (in net tons) as in 
the mid-1860s, and produced over twice as many ton-miles. 
This kind of increase may seem impressive and, indeed, looked 
at in isolation, there was significant growth in the two last decades, 
averaging over four per cent per annum in terms of ton-miles. Over 
the whole period, however, the picture is far less rosy. Most other 
seafaring nations managed to achieve far greater growth in output 
since the carrying capacity of their merchant navies, if computed 
in "sail tons",1 grew four-fold, or even more. Thus, what was said 
about the rather stagnant development of Finnish merchant 
tonnage also holds good in the light of the production estimates. 
The crucial and most interesting feature was, of course, the 
transition from sail to steam. Transport estimations are 
particularly effective in showing how slow the transition actually 
was, and how it proceeded. Although sailing vessel and steamship 
1 	 Steam tonnage is usually multiplied by 3 and added to sail tonnage. The sail- 
ton was commonly used in the late 19th century to evaluate the actual 
carrying capacity of a merchant navy containing both sail and steam, and the 
ratio 1:3 was believed to represent the difference in efficiency between 

















Fig. 3:1. Sailing Vessel and Steamship Transport, 1865-1913. 
1 = sailing vessels, net-ton-nautical miles 
2 = sailing vessels, net tons 
3 = steamships, net-ton-nautical miles 
4 = steamships, net-tons 
Source: Tables 3:5, 3:11 
trade was analysed separately, some important interactions are 
already in evidence. Table 3:17 sums up the change by presenting 
the proportion of steamship transportation in various trade 
categories as well as in the total output. 
The table shows once more very clearly how the success story of 
steam shipping began on coastal lines and rather slowly moved up 
to longer trades. Steamers on routes to Sweden and Russia already 
accounted for more ton-miles than coastal sailing-vessels in the 
1870s (although in terms of net tons, they gained superiority only 
during the early 1890s). In longer export and import 
transportation, steam passed sail only two decades later, in the 
middle of the 1890s. 
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TABLE 3:16. Estimated total production of Finnish shipping 
(transport by Finnish steamships and sailing vessels) 
in different trades. Loaded voyages, net tons (nt) and 
(net)ton-(nautical)miles (ntm), annual averages, 
1865-1913. 
c. 1865 	 c. 1875 	 1884/86 
Trade 	 1000 	 Mill. 	 1000 	 Mill. 	 1000 	 Mill. 
nt 	 ntm 	 nt 	 ntm 	 nt 	 ntm 
Coastal trade, 
exp. and imp. 	 250 	 34 	 354 	 59 	 445 	 86 
Other exp. and 
imp. trades 	 240 	 373 	 252 	 334 	 282 	 386 
Cross-trade 	 255 	 847 	 285 	 993 	 219 	 648 
Total 	 745 1,254 891 1,386 946 1,120 
1894/96 	 1904/06 	 1912/13 
Trade 	 1000 	 Mill. 	 1000 	 Mill. 	 1000 	 Mill. 
nt ntm nt ntm nt ntm 
Coastal trade, 
exp. and imp. 	 599 	 141 	 728 	 159 	 1,045 	 194 
Other exp. and 
imp. trades 	 424 	 524 	 651 	 715 	 857 	 916 
Cross-trade 212 636 210 1,100 249 1,653 
Total 	 1,236 1,302 1,590 1,974 2,151 2,764 
NB: Totals have been computed from unrounded figures. As in all 
previous calculations, they do not take into account shipping 
between domestic ports, whether on the interior lakes or along the 
coasts, unless it was a part of a line going abroad. 
Source: Tables 3:5 and 3:11. 
Steam gave rise to services which did not exist before (coastal 
passenger lines) and with which sailing ships did not compete; 
thus, traffic could grow irrespective of sail. Real competition in 
economic terms began when steamships entered the bulk-carrying 
market, although, even then, freight rates were not the only 
important consideration. For steamers, regular services were one 
asset which could not be measured directly in money. In Finnish 
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TABLE 3:17. The proportion of steamships in the total production 
of Finnish shipping in different trades. Per cent. 
Trade 	 c. 1865 	 c. 1875 	 1884/86 
nt ntm nt ntm nt ntm 
Coastal trade, 	 14 	 44 	 34 	 64 	 36 	 70 
Other exp. and 
imp. trades 	 6 	 2 	 11 	 6 	 21 	 15 
Cross-trade 	 0 	 0 	 3 	 2 	 5 	 2 
All trade 	 7 	 2 	 13 	 5 	 21 	 11 
1894/96 	 1904/06 	 1912/13 
nt ntm nt ntm nt ntm 
Coastal trade 	 53 	 83 	 64 	 86 	 70 	 85 
Other exp. and 
imp. trades 	 50 	 49 	 75 	 76 	 83 	 84 
Cross-trade 	 11 	 7 	 25 	 12 	 19 	 11 
All trade 	 45 	 33 	 63 	 41 	 69 	 40 
Source: Tables 3:5 and 3:11. 
shipping, this second phase began around the middle of the 1880s, 
since which time windjammers were constantly in retreat.2 It may 
be said that the transition had already proceeded quite far by 1913, 
when steamers had a 70-per cent share of all cargo in Finnish ships 
(in net tons). Of course, competition was not restricted to Finnish 
steamers and Finnish sailing vessels; however, it seems 
appropriate to conclude that, as far as import and export transport 
2 This retreat is demonstrated by the following percentages which exclude 








c. 1875 7 % 3% 
1884 / 86 14 % 7 % 
1894 / 96 38 % 27 % 
1904 / 06 65 % 39 % 
1912 / 13 70 % 38% 
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was concerned, the success of Finnish steamers was a major factor 
in pushing Finnish windjammers out of business. 
However, in one category, long cross-trade, Finnish steamers 
hardly affected the development of Finnish sail at all. It was, above 
all, British and other Western European steamships, which made 
things difficult for them as well as for any sailing vessels. The 
changes observed in the long-trading patterns of Finnish sailing 
ships provided a perfect illustration of how sail was displaced 
from an increasing amount of business. This happened first in the 
Black Sea grain trade, and the Atlantic grain trade followed suit in 
the late 1870s. Gradually petrol cargoes were also taken over by 
steamers, and in the 1890s, big North American ports offered very 
few opportunities for sailing vessels. After the turn of the century, 
even traditional wood cargo from the Gulf area to Europe declined, 
and Finnish vessels, at least, moved one more step towards the 
shipping periphery, transporting pitchpine to South America. It 
was only in the longest ocean bulk transport, in which price 
mattered more than time, that competition between sail and steam 
had hardly begun. The effect in this one sector was rather drastic: 
in the 1910s, Finnish sailing vessels still accounted for more ton-
miles than Finnish steamers.3 
The transition from sail to steam also brought about other 
structural changes. If sea transport is divided into two sectors, one 
serving the country's foreign trade (and communications) and the 
other consisting of international cross-trading, it can be seen that 
the former grew systematically after the 1870s while the latter 
fluctuated in the same way as sailing vessel output. Expressed in 
indices (ton-miles in 1865 = 100) the picture is as follows: 
exp/imp. cross-tr. 
c. 1865 100 100 
c. 1875 97 117 
1884/86 116 77 
1894/96 163 75 
1904/06 215 130 
1912/13 272 195 
3 E.g. in the Norwegian merchant marine, according to Gjölberg's estimates, 
steamships passed sailing vessels in output of tonmiles around the middle of 
the 1890s. Gjölberg, "The Substitution of Steam for Sail in Norwegian Ocean 
Shipping," diagram 1. 
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This development is not surprising considering the division of 
labour between sail and steam: big sailing ships traditionally 
specialized in international tramp trade and steamers operated on 
regular liner services between Finland and its most important 
trading partners. Increases in both steam shipping and foreign 
trade thus inevitably supported the development of export and 
import shipping. Yet, with the high percentage of sail, cross trade 
still accounted for over half of the total output of ton-miles by 
Finnish shipping in the 1910s (see table 3:16). 
Technical transition and productivity 
Needless to say, productivity changes are very central to the 
development of any industry. They merit special interest when a 
technical transition is taking place, such as the substitution of 
steam for sail. 
Productivity, if understood as the relationship between actual 
output and existing factors of production (labour and capital), does 
not, however, directly measure the technical efficiency of ships or 
any other production system. The amount produced in a given 
year depends largely on market factors, fluctuations of demand 
and business cycles in general. Moreover, the correct measurement 
of production factors and output is not always easy, especially 
where an industry producing intangibles, like transport, is 
concerned. 
For shipping, the most meaningful parameter of productivity is 
the ratio of tonnage to transport production. This ratio is usually 
produced simply by dividing the number of loaded ton-miles 
sailed by the tonnage in question.4 The figures computed for the 
Finnish merchant marine are presented in table 3:18. They do not 
include coastal sailing tonnage, because it still included vessels 
which were not occupied for the full summer season. 
The figures seem to indicate a significant increase in 
productivity. Steamship production per ton more than doubled 
and, moreover, growth was continuous. Even sailing vessel 
productivity seems to have increased at the end of the period, 
4 	 See e.g. Gjölberg, "The Substitution of Steam for Sail," p. 140 (Diagram 2). 
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TABLE 3:18. Production and productivity indices for Finnish 
shipping 1865-1913 (1912/13 = 100).  
S/V = sailing vessels, excl. coastal transport,  
S/S = steamships. 
Time 
Index of ntm 
S/V 	 S/S 	 Total 
Index of tonnage 
S/V 	 S/S 	 Total 
Index of  
productivity 
S/V 	 S/S 	 Total 
c. 1865 75 2 45 109 5 79 69 42 57 
c. 1875 80 7 50 150 15 111 53 46 45 
1885/86 60 12 40 131 21 99 46 57 40 
1894/96 53 38 47 109 39 89 59 97 53 
1904/06 71 73 71 105 79 98 68 93 72 
1912/13 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
NB: Sailing vessels of 100 net ton or less were regarded as coastal vessels. 
Source: Tables 2:3, 3:5 and 3:11. 
although it declined at first, obviously as a response to the 
depression in the 1880s. 
On the other hand, the productivity indices do not substantiate 
the empirical data on performance which was collected from the 
insurance registers. Table 3:19 presents actual mileages sailed in 
one year by sailing vessels and steamships in the size-classes 
which were not laid up for the winter. In order to eliminate the 
effect of business cycles, all the years represent boom periods 
(exept 1885 for steamships, which was chosen simply because it 
was the first year with any number of steamers sailing beyond the 
Sound). It is apparent that there was hardly any increase in annual 
mileage. Indeed, the only systematic trend was that sailing vessel 
mileage grew in line with the increase in size.5 Thus, only the 
5 	 This is, of course, to be expected, since the speed potential (hull speed) of a 
vessel increases by the square root of its waterline length. This effect is, 
however, not very strong. E.g. a 1,000-ton ship is only c. 20 % longer than a 
500-ton ship and the difference in hull speed is only c. 10 %. In reality, the 
speed of a sailing vessel depended on sail area and wetted area as much as on 
length. During the last quarter of the 19th century, economies were made in 
rigs by abolishing sky-sails, studding-sails and other "flying kites", and by 
razing frigates to barques and barques to barquentines, which must have 
negatively affected their speed in light weather. 
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TABLE 3:19. Average annual total mileages (with cargo and in 












500>700 700>1000 1000>1500 1500— 
13800 17880 21090 . 
12250 17160 15020 19380 
11220 15090 19390 22040 
21310 
26710 23210 
22330 18190 21130 31830 
Source: Data collected from the insurance records of Sjöassuransföre-
ningen i Finland. 
transition to larger ships could have produced some increase in 
technical efficiency. 
The discrepancy between the empirical data and the 
productivity indices arose simply because the changes in the latter 
were brought about mostly for reasons other than technical 
development. Not only were the actual ton-mileages affected by 
business cycles (e.g. increases in ballasted voyages lowered the 
total of loaded ton-miles) but they also reflected how effectively 
the tonnage was deployed, above all how large a share of it was not 
laid up for the winter. Finally, as has already been noted, the ton-
mile is not a perfect gauge of shipping output, since no account is 
taken of the time in port and port activities (see p. 140). Two 
similar ships could produce widely different results, depending on 
the length of their voyages. This is quite dramatically illustrated in 
figure 3:2, which shows how the average annual mileage sailed by 
Finnish sailing vessels compared with the number of cargoes 
carried. It also contains an implicit comparison of mileage and 
ship size, since a low number of cargoes per year was typical of 
large vessels engaged in long trade (these vessels also sailed on 
more favourable winds than vessels on the Northern Atlantic or 
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Fig. 3:2. The Relationship of Loaded Voyages and Total Mileage 
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Source: Data file of vessels insured with Sjöassuransföreningen i Finland. 
the Mediterranean, for example). There was a logical (obviously 
curvilinear) difference in favour of long trade, and an increase of 
one cargo (or rather, a corresponding shortening of the average 
voyage) could decrease mileage by 4,000 to 5,000. Unfortunately, 
the material on steamships is not varied enough for comparison: 
most of the ones for which there is good voyage data sailed similar 
routes. 
The importance of time in port was also reflected in the freight 
rates. Examination of the rates and the distances involved shows 
that more was paid per mile on a short haul than on a long haul; 
the rate seemed to consist on the one hand of a fixed price per ton 
(depending largely on the stevedoring costs of the goods involved), 
and on the other of a fare set according to transport length. In the 
1860s and 1870s, according to freights paid to Finnish sailing 
vessels, the "fixed part" corresponded to a distance of about 2,100 
and 1,400 nautical miles respectively. In the following decade, the 
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figure was over 6,000 miles and in the 1890s about 1,700 miles.6 
International freight rates from 1909-13 indicate that port 
activities could be compared with 1,300 miles of plain sailing in 
the grain trade and about 2,800 miles in the coal trade.' Obviously 
the changes had very little to do with the development of port 
efficiency, they rather reflected market changes: the prices of long 
hauls may have increased more than short ones (and vice versa). 
In order to assess whether technological development affected 
productivity at all, some of the above parameters need to be 
revised. First, to eliminate the effect of the changing number of 
ships limited to summer sailing, tonnage should be expressed in 
terms of "year-round-occupied tonnage". In other words, tonnage 
laid up for the winter is multiplied by a figure of less than one; in 
this case a realistic multiplier seemed to be 0.6.8 Second, to 
eliminate the effect of changes in the average length of voyage and 
time in port, ton-mile figures need to be manipulated by adding 
something to represent port activities. The addition of 2,000 
nautical miles to each loaded voyages seemed realistic for all ships 
except coastal steamers; because they mainly transported 
passengers, which are quick to "load" or "unload", only 1,000 
miles was added. However, it must be pointed out that any mileage 
figure is arbitrary and does not account for the possibility that the 
6 The data was collected from the ships' accounts (see appendix 4:1). In each 
case, a regression line was plotted comparing the length of the haul with 
freight per ton (and the relationship was often remarkably linear). The 
regression lines were as follows: 
1864/66 	 y = 20.9 + 0.01x 
1874/76 	 y = 13.4 + 0.01x 
1884/86 	 y = 21.2 + 0.0033x 
1894 / 96 	 y = 9.4 + 0.0054x 
1904 / 06 	 y = 11.6 + 0.0027x 
1912 / 14 	 y = 20.9 + 0.0027x 
7 	 The estimates were based on freight data published in Harley, "Issues on the 
Demand for Shipping Services, 1870-1913", p. 72. 
8 Typical laying-up times were four to six months, or 0.3-0.5 years. Tonnage 
occupied for 12 months a year according to tables 3:4 and 3:10. 
9 This was done using the classified data in tables 3:5 and 3:11; the average 
length in each trade category was first computed by dividing the ntm by nt, 
this was then increased by 2,000 and the result multiplied by the nt in 
question. 
210 
TABLE 3:20. Revised production and productivity indices for 
Finnish shipping 1865-1913 (1912/13 = 100). 
 
S/V = sailing vessels, excl. coastal transport, S/S = 
steamships, a = productivity based on the index of 
actual ntm, b = productivity based on the index of 
revised ntm (rntm). 
Index of  
Index of rntm tonnage use 
Index of  
productivity 
Time S/V S/S Total S/V S/S Total S/V S/S Total 
ab a b a b 
c. 1865 94 3 39 110 3 78 68 85 62 82 58 51 
c. 1875 99 8 45 137 11 99 61 81 60 71 50 45 
1885/86 79 13 40 112 17 84 54 76 66 76 48 48 
1894/96 71 36 51 101 34 81 54 78 112 107 58 62 
1904/06 77 71 73 99 77 92 71 82 95 91 78 79 
1912/13 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
NB: Index of tonnage use results from: (tonnage in year-round 
occupation) + 0.6 x (tonnage laid up for the winter). Index of 
r(evised)ntm results from: nt x (nm + 2000), for coastal steamers nt x 
(nm + 1000), computed from classified data and unrounded figures. 
Source: Tables 2:3, 3:5 and 3:11. 
actual time in port depended a great deal on the cargo in question 
and, moreover, that the average length of time probably 
decreased.10 
The revised productivity indices, while still requiring due 
caution, show quite clearly that changes were brought about more 
as a result of inconsistency in efficient tonnage use and the 
prevalence of long trading than by technical development. There 
was hardly any improvement for sailing vessels, apart from the 
very end of the period; on the other hand, the decline in the 1880s 
and 1890s seems to have been caused by trade structure and other 
market-induced factors (such as increase in ballasted voyages) 
rather than, for example, by the deterioration of tonnage with age. 
10 An additional problem was that port times differed between chartered 
vessels and liners, because the latter often only handled minor amounts of 
cargo in intermediary ports. On the other hand, if there were many such 
ports, the total time spent could be quite high. 
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Real technical improvements in steamers seem to have taken place 
between the 1870s and 1890s (although the paucity of the material, 
especially for the 1860s, may cause some distortion in the results). 
For the last two decades, however, there is no indication of any 
change which could have been measured by an increase in ton-
miles. 
According to revised and unrevised figures, however, there was 
a total productivity growth in the order of 50 per cent. This simply 
resulted from the increase in steam tonnage. Since steamers greatly 
outperformed sailing vessels, this was enough to improve overall 
productivity even if steam and sail, on their own, maintained the 
same level all the time. As was mentioned before, it was felt at the 
time that steamships could carry three times as much cargo as 
sailing vessels within a given period. The empirical material used 
in table 3:19 suggests a much smaller difference, and a similar 
result is obtained if sailing vessel and steamship actual ton-miles 
are divided by respective total tonnages. Once again, however, it 
must be remembered that the trades in question were so different 
that comparison is rather misleading. On the other hand, if the 
revised ton-miles (as computed above) are divided by the revised 
(year-round-occupied) tonnage, clearly higher ratios are obtained 
(three boom periods): 
c. 1875 
	
3.5 : 1 
1894/96 	 5.4 : 1 
1912/13 	 3.7 : 1 
The wide variety in the results is a good illustration of how 
difficult "pure" comparison of technical performance is in reality. 
Finally, a few thoughts must be given to labour productivity. Since 
man-ton ratios declined significantly during the entire period (see 
p. 106), labour productivity must have improved more than 
production per ton. The calculations which are presented in table 
3:21 show that growth was quite impressive; labour productivity 
on sailing vessels at least doubled and on steamships it grew four-
fold. For sailing vessels the real gains originated in the last decade 
of the period, and for steamships mainly after the 1880s. 
Productivity development was thus quite good because it 
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TABLE 3:21. Labour productivity in the Finnish merchant marine, 
1865-1913.  
S/V = sailing vessels, excl. coastal transport, S/S = 
steamships, excluding restaurant personnel 
a = productivity based on the index of actual ntm, 
b = productivity based on the index of revised ntm 
(rntm). 
Index of total Index of labour 
Time labour productivity'  
S/V S/S Total S/V S/S Total 
a b a b a 	 b 
c. 1865 193 11 115 39 49 18 24 39 	 34 
c. 1875 240 26 149 33 41 23 24 34 	 30 
1894/96 140 55 104 38 51 69 65 45 	 49 
1912/13 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 	 100 
1 Index of ntm or rntm divided by the index of total labour. 
Source: Tables 2:26 and 3:20. 
improved compared with both capitalll and labour. This was by no 
means the rule during a period of technical transition. For 
example, the Finnish sawmill industry experienced substantial 
growth in labour productivity in the period 1860-1900, when the 
use of steam power became common, but the productivity of 
capital declined at the same time.12 Thus, Finnish shipping was 
not as badly off in all respects as its slow total growth might 
suggest. 
11 	 The productivity of capital did not improve only as a ratio of production to 
net tons. Since the current value of the tonnage, or the average value per ton, 
did not rise in the long run (see p. 100), production also grew compared with 
the capital value of the fleet. 
12 Hoffman, Suomen sahateollisuuden kasvu, p. 100-101. 
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Finnish shipping and the transport demands of 
Finnish foreign trade 
When the performance of a national fleet has to be put into a wider 
context, one traditional method is to compare it with all the 
maritime transportation of the country in question. For the 1860s 
and 1870s, after the abolition of various national navigation acts, 
when competition on the international freight market was very free 
and ship-owners usually earned a similar amount irrespective of 
the origin of goods transported, this kind of comparison would not 
be fully relevant. Later, however, after the introduction of the 
conference system13 in international liner services and the rebirth 
of shipping subsidies in many countries, "the freedom of the seas" 
was markedly reduced. Accordingly, the transportation of the 
country's foreign trade again became a natural source of 
employment for the national merchant fleet. 
The growth in Finnish foreign trade during the period 1860-
1913 was much greater than the increase in sea transport by 
Finnish vessels. As was shown previously (see p. 26), the demand 
for cargo-space for Finnish exports grew about six-fold in four 
decades (1870/72-1910/12), and official shipping statistics 
registered a five-fold increase in loaded arrivals and departures 
during the same period.14 Both ratios indicate that foreign trade 
outgrew Finnish shipping by a wide margin. 
The same development is also to be seen in the traditional 
statistical variable, the proportion of domestic vessels in maritime 
traffic. According to Finnish official statistics, this was in 
continuous decline in from 1860 to 1913. In the late 1860s, Finnish 
vessels still accounted for about 70 per cent of all loaded entries 
and departures, but this dropped as low as 44-48 per cent during 
the last decade of the period.15 
Unfortunately, the pre-1892 statistics contain some serious 
13 	 A useful overview of the development of the conference system can be found 
in Cameron and Faradon, Lloyd's List (Development of the Liner System and 
Shipping Conferences), p. 169-177. 
14 Finnish official statistics, ser. I and IB.  
15 Kaukiainen, "Merenkulku", p. 474 (figure 18); Kaukiainen, "The Transition 
from Sail to Steam," p. 173. 
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errors, mainly because of double registering (see p. 130).16 
Therefore, it is not possible to follow the decline in domestic 
tonnage over the whole period. Nor would it be as useful as it 
might appear; one single percentage series can disguise some very 
significant variations. Above all, the percentage of Finnish tonnage 
differed largely in different kinds of transportation. As mentioned 
before, most ships operating regular services between Finland and 
Sweden and Finland and Russia were Finnish, as were the coastal 
sailing vessels. Accordingly, domestic ships had the lion's share of 
maritime business to and from these countries. However, this also 
implies that, in the Baltic and the North Sea, the performance of 
Finnish ships was well below the overall figure. Moreover, there 
were significant differences between export and import shipping. 
Table 3:22 presents some recalculated figures for the last three 
sample periods of this study. It is very clear that, with the 
exception of trade with Sweden and Russia, Finnish shipping had 
a very small slice of the maritime transport cake, especially in 
exports (clearances). Since, at the end of the period, a great deal, 
probably half, of the shipping activity between Finland and her 
neighbouring countries was passenger traffic, the residual group, 
other countries, actually represents the real bulk of Finland's 
foreign trade, at least as far as cargo space is concerned. 
The reasons why Finnish vessels had such a small share of 
business to the Southern Baltic and beyond are two-fold. First, it is 
obvious that there was a plentiful supply of tonnage in these 
waters during the decades in question. A national share of about 50 
per cent in such market conditions is, according to more recent 
experiences, not low at all," and Finnish tonnage was indeed able 
to sustain such a level in import trade. The huge surplus volume of 
exports over imports, however, made it difficult to attain similar 
success with exports. This would have required a high proportion 
of ships to return to Finland in ballast, and this was not an 
attractive alternative for steamers, which had fuel costs 
16 Double registering mainly concerned Finnish steamship traffic (before 1892, 
domestic traffic was also included in shipping statistics), and therefore 
resulted in an inflated figure for domestic vessels, which, moreover, grew 
with the growth of steam shipping. Only for the early 1860s, when steam 
shipping was still modest, must the figures have been quite realistic. 
17 
	
	 E.g. the proportion of domestic tonnage in Norwegian maritime transport was 
a little more than 40 % in the 1970s. 
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TABLE 3:22. The percentage of domestic vessels in different 
sectors of Finland's maritime transport (net tonnage 








1894/96 Entrances 77.3 47.0 62.6 
Clearances 93.2 25.0 41.6 
Total 85.1 30.2 48.4 
1904/06 Entrances 75.7 54.6 64.7 
Clearances 88.0 22.6 35.3 
Total 81.4 30.0 44.7 
1912/13 Entrances 74.4 42.8 54.7 
Clearances 91.4 22.3 38.8 
Total 83.5 28.6 44.4 
Source: Finnish Official Statistics, ser. I and IB (recalculated from figures 
on shipping in Finnish ports). 
irrespective of their loaded condition. It seems, therefore, that the 
big increase in regular steamer services in Finnish foreign shipping 
almost automatically led to a decline in the share of domestic 
vessels in export shipping. 
This conclusion, however, is only acceptable with reservations. 
First, it seems that the high proportion of foreign vessels in 
Finland's export transportation was not a new phenomenon. 
Although early shipping statistics do not directly yield such 
information, it is possible to estimate that, as early as at the end of 
the 1860s, Finnish vessels were below the 50-per-cent level in 
loaded departures to countries other than Russia and Sweden; by 
the middle of 1870s the figure had further declined to below 40 per 
cent.18 Developments can be gauged more precisely by looking at 
export shipping from the biggest timber ports (Kemi, Oulu/ 
Uleåborg, Pori/Björneborg, Kotka, Hamina/Fredrikshamn and 
Viipuri/Wiborg), which handled 60-70 % of Finland's exports of 
18 Cf.  Kaukiainen, "British Timber Imports and Finnish Shipping", p. 165. The 
estimates were calculated by subtracting the tonnage of vessels sailing to 
Finnish and Russian ports from the tonnage of all cleared Finnish tonnage 
and the total of cleared tonnage, and by comparing the Finnish residue 
tonnage with the total residue tonnage. 
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sawn goods.19 Since very few goods were shipped to Sweden and 
Russia from these ports, the figures in practice represent shipping 
to "other countries". The percentage share of Finnish ships in 
these ports was even lower than in all export shipping:20 
1866/67 	 35 % 
1874/75 	 29 % 
1894/95 
	 16 % 
1904/05 	 13 % 
Although the percentages chart a definite decline, it is just as 
evident that, even in the "golden" days of windjammers, Finnish 
shipowners were not very eager to carry domestic wood products. 
In the light of what was said about the development of sailing ship 
trade, an obvious conclusion is that owners of large ships, at least, 
regarded foreign cross-trade as a much better proposition than 
shipping wood from Finland. Whether this was true during the 
whole period in question remains to be seen, but it can be said that 
wood was not a favourite cargo for line steamers. It was rather 
carried by cheap tramp ships, of which there was no great 
abundance in the pre-war Finnish merchant marine. 
In one respect, however, the situation had changed 
fundamentally. In the 1860s and 1870s, Finland had more tonnage 
than she needed to transport her own export and import cargo. 
After that, the growth of foreign trade surpassed the development 
of shipping to such a degree that, at the beginning of the 20th 
century, the tonnage was not sufficient even in theory to carry all 
the goods involved in Finnish foreign trade. This is clearly visible 
from a comparison of the transport output of the Finnish merchant 
marine with the demand for cargo space for export and import 
goods. 
Since traffic to Sweden and Russia mostly involved passengers 
and goods transported by coastal sailing vessels, and since some of 
the trade with Russia was carried out by rai1,21 it seems best to 
19 From the beginning, Finnish shipping statistics specify traffic by port. The 
figures cannot be calculated for before 1866, since it was only then that 
statistics began to separate loaded and ballasted departures. 
20 	 Kaukiainen, "British Timber Imports," p. 166. 
21 	 Moreover, data on coastal traffic to Russia is incomplete for the 1860s. 
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TABLE 3:23. The demand for shipping in Finnish foreign trade 
(excl. Russia and Sweden) and the transport output 
of Finnish vessels (excl. coastal traffic), 1865-1913. 
Time 
	










c. 18651  198 300 495 1220 2.5 4.1 
c. 18752 400 520 538 1327 1.3 2.6 
1884/86 988 1300 500 1034 0.5 0.8 
1894/95 1417 1750 637 1161 0.4 0.7 
1904/06 2241 2450 862 1815 0.4 0.7 
1912/13 3079 3300 1106 2570 0.4 0.8 
1 Demand for shipping 1867/68. 
2 Demand for shipping 1874/76. 
NB: The demand for shipping in ton-miles was estimated by multiplying 
tonnage by the average transport mileage of Finnish vessels in export 
and import trades (excl. coastal traffic). 
Source: Finnish Official Statistics, ser. I and IB; table 3:16. 
leave them out of the calculations and focus the comparison on 
trade with other countries. The results are shown in table 3:23, in 
which the actual tonnage, entered and cleared (to and from 
countries other than Sweden and Russia), is used as a proxy for 
tonnage demand. The figures agree quite well with earlier 
estimations of the demand for cargo space for the most important 
export items (table 1:3). 
The table shows that, in the 1860s and 1870s, both by net tons 
and ton-miles, Finland had (as expected) clearly more tonnage 
than she needed to carry her foreign trade; after that there is an 
equally systematic deficiency. However, caution must be used in 
comparing these ratios. As was pointed out before (p. 139-140), 
neither tons nor ton-miles are perfect indicators of transport 
performance, or of the transport potential of a merchant fleet. 
Thus, the ratios (C/A and D/B) computed in table 3:22 can only 
present minimum and maximum levels of surplus and deficit. A 
more accurate calculation of the transport potential would require 
218 
some allowance in ton-miles to be made for time in port. The 
productivity calculations incorporated a 2,000-nautical-mile 
allowance for each cargo. Incidentally, this revision of ton-miles 





1884/86 	 0.6 
1894/96 	 0.55 
1904/06 	 0.5 
1912/13 
	 0.5 
To sum up, the comparison suggests that, in the 1860s, Finland 
had three times more tonnage (other than coastal) than was 
necessary to transport her normal export and import cargo to the 
other side of the Baltic and beyond. In the mid-1870s, there was 
still an excess of almost 100 per cent (or slightly less, because the 
tonnage could not be used for a full 12 months a year on export and 
import transport). Thus, it was no wonder that international cross-
trading represented such a large share of the total occupation of 
ships. Rapid growth in foreign trade and a simultaneous decline in 
tonnage in the 1880s, however, meant that Finnish shipping could, 
in theory, only carry about 60 per cent of export and import cargo. 
During the last two decades of the period, domestic tonnage 
represented a rather constant 50 per cent of the total shipping 
capacity needed in the country's foreign trade. It must be 
remembered, however, that this is a totally theoretical comparison; 
in reality, Finland was left with an increasing amount of tonnage, 
large sailing vessels, which could not be used economically in 
Baltic or North Sea transport. Irrespective of the rates of return 
enjoyed by their owners, the ships offered no opportunity to those 
who wanted to carry goods to or from Finland. 
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IV. Income and profitability 
1. Problems of data 
It is a well-known fact that, during the last quarter of the 19th 
century, the general trend in maritime freights was downwards. 
Anyone in the business could see for themselves by reading 
Lloyd's List, for example, and the development was also depicted 
in statistical publications long before L. Isserlis brought out his 
often-cited study of tramp freights from 1869 to 1935.1 Although 
the representativeness of traditional freight indices has been 
questioned lately,2 it cannot be denied that the shipping industry 
was facing quite dramatic economic challenges during the period 
of technical transition. 
The decline of freight rates could, of course, have had very 
different implications in different sections of the economy. For 
manufacturers and merchants it meant a welcome decrease in 
transport costs, but for a ship-owner it could have signified a 
decline in income, unless he was able to increase the efficiency of 
his ships enough to compensate. The existence of such a trend also 
suggests that the current value of maritime transport was possibly 
developing along more diverse lines than the ton-mile ratings 
would imply. It is even less likely that output volume was directly 
related to shipping profitability. 
1 See e.g.  Sundbärg, Apercue statistiques internationaux, table 264; Isserlis, 
"Tramp Shipping Cargoes, and Freights". 
2 
	
	 Fischer and Nordvik, "Maritime Transport and the Integration of the North 
Atlantic Economy, 1850-1914"; Harley, "North Atlantic Shipping in the 
Late Nineteenth Century". 
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Historical studies on shipping, however, contain relatively little 
on the economic returns of the trade. This is not altogether 
surprising, since there is one overwhelming problem which makes 
progress rather slow in this field: the lack of data. Unlike technical 
details about new vessels and their speed records, the economic 
returns of shipping normally remained the private knowledge of 
the owners, and early shipping statistics only seldom touched on 
income or profits.3 Thus, there is not a wealth of data on the actual 
economic basis of shipping. This shortage has forced a number of 
maritime historians to employ different surrogates or "proxies" in 
place of hard evidence. For example, gross freight has been 
estimated by using some well-known indices of freight rates, and 
the value added by shipping calculated assuming that it amounted 
to some round percentage of gross freight. Even the best of the 
indirect methodologies, inevitably, depend on certain presump-
tions, which have not been established empirically, such as 
estimates of the average number of voyages per year, the amount of 
cargo that could be stowed per register ton and the frequency of 
ballasted voyages.4 
Shipping acounts 
The simplest and at the same time the most reliable way to study 
shipping income and profitability is to exploit the original profit-
and-loss accounts of the shipowners. The only drawback of this 
strategy is that such accounts have not been preserved in any great 
quantity — just the opposite. This means that problems of 
representativeness are always present, and this may impose 
certain limitations on the validity of the results. 
In Finland, lots of late 19th-century archives from private 
enterprises have been preserved both in public and private 
collections.5 Shipping, however, is rather poorly represented; 
3 Only Swedish and Norwegian shipping statistics present a continuous series 
of freight income from the late 1860s. 
4 See, for example, the use of such assumptions in Lewis R. Fischer, Eric W. 
Sager and Rosemary E. Ommer, "The Shipping Industry and Regional 
Economic Development in Atlantic Canada," p. 33-53. 
5 There is an extremely good general directory of Finnish business archives,  
Suomen yritysarkistot I—II. 
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obviously, manufacturing and other industries with permanent 
buildings were in a better position to preserve their papers than 
owners of perishable wooden ships, especially since shipping 
companies were often dissolved when the ship was sold or 
wrecked. The number of existing shipping archives is limited and 
almost all of them which contained any real ships' accounts from 
the period in question were used for this study. Thus, the material 
is not a sample. Its extent and distribution — geographic and other 
— were determined simply by what had been preserved and not by 
any considerations of representativeness. 
The backbone of the material comes from nine archives of 
trading-houses and ship-owners, which are both extensive and 
very well preserved. All these contained accounts of ships 
covering rather long periods. In addition, the "Maritime Archives" 
of Åbo Akademi contain a large number of detached ships' 
accounts, which have been collected from different private 
sources. Finally, data from a few existing studies were also 
appended to the material.s 
These archives and collections yielded data for about 180 
different ships,' of which 60 were steamers. The material was in 
the form of annual accounts or voyage accounts which usually 
spanned several years; all told they covered more than 1600 vessel 
working years.8 Although there were a few accounts which yielded 
ambiguous data on income or profit, the total amount of material is 
sufficient to give at least an idea of normal income and profit 
expectations. Unfortunately, the material is not equally 
representative of all kinds of vessels. The total number of working 
years falls into the following main categories:9 
Sailing vessels, long trading 
Sailing vessels, sailing on the 
North Sea and the Baltic 
Steamships 
810 years (48.4 %) 
249 years (14.9 %) 
615 years (36.7 %) 
   
6 See appendix IV:1. 
7 Five of these appeared in two different archives, as they were sold to other 
Finnish owners. 
8 See appendix IV:1. 
9 Data files collected from accounts presented in appendix IV:1. Unless 
otherwise stated, all the following numerical descriptions are based on the 
same data file. 
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There is plenty of data on long-trading sailing vessels, at least 
compared with what is available on the smaller windjammers 
sailing on the Baltic and the North Sea (the number of long-traders 
over the entire period 1860-1913 was previously estimated at 
slightly less than 50 per cent of total sailing tonnage), and there are 
just a couple of examples of coastal sailers. The number of 
steamship accounts clearly exceeds their total share of tonnage 
during the period (at the beginning of the 1890s they had a 10% 
share of total merchant tonnage), but an overwhelming majority of 
them date from the latter half of the period. The number of 
observations from before the 1880s is, indeed, so low that random 
variations may excessively affect the results. Moreover, the 
material from after 1885 is not quite as good as the number of ships 
and working years might suggest. Data from the ships of the biggest 
steamship-company, Finska Ångfartygs Aktiebolaget (FAA) was 
not processed with equal thoroughness for each year. The 
company ledgers contained a large number of different accounts — 
there were normally eight to ten for each ship — and the system 
became more complex with the growth of the business. Moreover, 
although the company did compute depreciation, the accounts did 
not separate balance and profit-and-loss statements systematically 
(for example, the accounts for coal and oil open with the value of 
existing coal and oil stocks). Many individual accounts also 
contained transfers from other accounts and certain expenses were 
accounted differently at different times.10 It was therefore 
necessary to make minor corrections to the different ships' 
accounts. In addition, company overhead costs had to be 
distributed between the ships in order to arrive at realistic 
results.11  It would have been too time-consuming to do all this for 
each single year, so a sample was collected instead: corrected 
10 E.g. wages which sailors were due to receive but which were not paid were 
not included in expenses before the turn of the century. Insurance costs were 
first included in the ships' accounts (although when the company took part 
of the risk and set up an insurance fund, sums paid to it were not deducted 
from ships' profit-and-loss accounts) but at the end of the period they were 
excluded. 
11 This was done by tonnage, which may slightly underestimate the overhead 
costs of big passenger (emigrant) vessels. The company overheads, however, 
were very small and did not greatly affect the profitability of individual 
vessels. 
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TABLE 4:1. The distribution of ships in the accounting material, 
by province. 
Number of cases 
Province 	 sail 	 steam 
North Ostrobothnia 	 21 	 1 
South Ostrobothnia 	 8 	 4 
West coast of Turku and Pori 





Turku 	 17 	 10 
Turku archipelago ("peasant" ships) 	 26 	 - 
Helsinki and Porvoo 	 5 	 44 
Viipuri 	 5 	 1  
Viipuri province ("peasant" ships) 
	
2 	 - 
Total 
	 124 	 60 
NB: Ships which were sold from one province to another were counted 
in both. 
Source: Data file collected from the accounting material described above. 
figures for individual ships were computed only for every tenth 
year (1885, 1895, 1905 and 1913). However, "raw" data on gross 
revenue (totals from the credit sides of the ships' freight and 
passenger accounts) and traffic result (the balance of the ships' 
profit-and-loss accounts, excluding overhead costs) were collected 
for each year. As far as gross revenue is concerned the error is 
negligible; traffic results, on the other hand, sometimes exceeded 
real net result by a considerable margin. Although this difference 
must be accounted for when profitability is estimated, the figures 
in general are accurate enough to give a true picture of profit 
fluctuations across the whole fleet. 
As table 4:1 shows, the most important shipping provinces are 
quite well represented in the material. With the exception of South 
Ostrobothnia, which is underrepresented compared with the 
northern part of the province, the geographic skewness of these 
distributions is roughly in line with the shipping activity in 
different provinces and towns. 
Chronologically, the material is not very evenly distributed. As 
far as sailing vessels are concerned, there are far more accounts for 
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TABLE 4:2. The chronological distribution of accounting material 
(Sailing time). 
Period Total 
number of 	 coverage 
accounts 	 in years 
Average 
ship-size, 	 total tonnage 
net tons 	 in the sample' 
A: All sailing vessels 
1860-69 81 175 442 7,740 
1870-79 142 249 471 11,730 
1880-89 120 230 479 11,020 
1890-99 95 151 522 7,880 
1900-09 89 144 870 12,530 
1910-14 43 67 1253 16,790 
Total 570 1,016  600 
B: Cross-trading sailing vessels 
1860-69 71 164 455 7,460 
1870-79 102 207 557 11,530 
1880-89 74 163 603 9,830 
1890-99 55 102 681 6,950 
1900-09 58 114 1076 12,270 
1910-14 37 59 1352 15,950 
Total 397 809 714 
C: Steamships 
1860-69 4 4 195 78 
1870-79 13 15 213 320 
1880-89 31 40 493 1,972 
1890-99 189 189 578 10,924 
1900-09 254 254 651 16,535 
1910-13 113 113 676 19,097 
Total 604 615 612 
1 Average size multiplied by coverage in years divided by ten (1910-14 
divided by five, steamships 1910-13 by four). 
NB: Ships which mainly carried other than Finnish export or import 
cargoes, and normally did not return home for the winter are 
included in the "cross-traders" category. Individual accounts were 
included in the period within which their middle years fell. Each 
annual account for an FAA vessel has been regarded as an individual 
account. 
Source: Data file collected from the accounting material described above. 
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the earlier half of the period than for the latter half (table 4:2): over 
60 per cent of them cover the first three decades. This imbalance, 
however, is somewhat illusionary. As the average size of vessels 
grew, their numbers decreased and, therefore, there is no reason to 
expect an equal number of accounts for each decade. Indeed, the 
tonnage covered by the accounts did not decline at the same rate; 
on the contrary, the highest figures occur after the turn of the 
century. The tonnages are also high enough to represent a 
significant share of total tonnage, at least in the larger size-classes. 
The long traders (cross-traders) in the accounting material can be 
estimated as percentages of all Finnish long-trading tonnage as 
follows: 
1860-69 	 7.1 % 
1870-79 	 11.8 % 
1880-89 	 15.2 % 
1890-99 	 9.5 % 
1900-09 	 16.0 % 
1910-14 	 17.6 % 
If the small flaws in the FAA data are overlooked, the 
representativeness of steamship accounts is even better: from 5 per 
cent (of ships over 100 tons) in the 1870s, the figure rose to about 
50 per cent in the mid-1890s and remained at about 35 per cent 
after that. The great drawback is that the steamship accounts do 
not represent all shipping categories: the data does not include a 
single tramp steamer. Neither does it cover small tonnage to any 
reasonable degree. Percentages, of course, do not indicate the true 
representativeness of material; this depends not only on the 
number of observations but also on the amount of variance found 
in different variables. 
In one respect, shipping accounts are a rather difficult source 
material: they are quite frequently incomplete. This problem 
results from the nature of the trade in the days of sail: economic 
transactions and decisions normally occurred in at least two 
different localities. The owner, of course, made the most important 
decisions and also paid the expenses of the ship and its crew as 
long as they were in the home port or nearby. However, when the 
ship had sailed, communications which were then available did 
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not allow the owner much participation in day-to-day business 
aboard and he had to leave most of it in the hands of the master. 
The latter, then, paid practically all running expenses, signed the 
charter-parties and collected freight revenues, only now and then 
sending surplus money home (or sometimes drawing a bill of 
exchange on the owner). This bifurcation of responsibilities also 
meant that each single ship normally had two different sets of 
accounts, those of the master, which recorded the ship's running 
expenses and income, and those of the owner. In addition, there 
was normally a third account, that of the crew (usually an 
appendix to the master's account); since wages were paid both by 
the owner and the master, the men's total earnings had to be 
calculated when they were paid out.12 
Not surprisingly, it frequently happens that only one of these 
accounts is preserved, and this inevitably means that some part of 
the ship's economy remains unknown. The quality of individual 
accounts also varies and some yield much more information than 
others. For example, different masters specified various cost items 
in foreign ports very differently. In some cases it is easy to 
distinguish between food expenses and bosun's stores, while in 
others, different ships chandlers' bills are merely recorded as lump 
sums. 
A general feature of the material is that the owners' accounts, 
which show the net result ("profit and loss"), are much better 
preserved than the masters' accounts. To illustrate the differences 
in data availability, the frequencies of four important variables are 
tabulated in table 4:3. 
The differences in the numbers of usable observations may seem 
disturbing. The pattern, however, is very fortunate as it 
corresponds with the quantitative needs for different kinds of data. 
The variables presented above differ widely in terms of variance: 
in the material concerning sailing vessels, the standard deviation 
for profit (expressed per year and net ton) was about 110 per cent 
of its arithmetic average, while the corresponding figures for the 
three others ranged between 30 and 39 per cent; for steamships the 
12 See Yrjö Kaukiainen, "From Days and Knots to Pounds and Dollars", p. 62-
63. 
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TABLE 4:3. The frequency of selected economic variables in the 
accounting data. 
1= number of accounts, 2= coverage in years, 3= 
average tonnage 
Sailing vessels 
1 	 2 	 3 
Steamships 
1 	 2 	 3 
Owners' accounts 
with data on net result 356 734 699 102 113 538 
Masters' accounts 
with data on gross income 191 385 683 103 114 524 
Crew accounts 
with data on crew wages 154 313 625 54 53 641 
Owners' and masters' accounts 
with data on food expenses' 82 195 702 48 48 695 
1 This item also requires the owner's accounts for the initial provisioning 
costs. 
Source: Data file of accounts specified in appendix IV:1. 
deviations varied in a similar manner.13 It is quite clear that, in the 
first case, many observations are needed in order to avoid 
excessive error in the estimate. On the other hand, for gross 
income, wages and food expenses, a much smaller number of cases 
still produces a rather low standard error.14 
In general, the accounting material is abundant enough to 
enable reasonably trustworthy conclusions to be drawn about the 
entire Finnish deepwater fleet, whether sail or steam. With an 
13 Because the levels of income and profit were quite different, the data for 
steamships and sailing vessels should not be merged. 
14 For example, for the previously-mentioned variables, the standard errors of 
estimate compared with the arithmetic averages in the cross-trading sailing 
fleet were as follows: 
net result per year and net ton 	 6.4 % 
gross income per year and net ton 	 2.5 % 
wages per year and net ton 	 2.6 % 
food expenses per year and net ton 	 3.2 % 
The figures are based on the standard deviation for the whole period and do 
not take account of possible systematic changes within it. 
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average of over fifteen observations a year on profit and nine on 
gross income, it is possible to produce a realistic analysis of 
general trends. The main drawback is that data on smaller vessels 
is scanty, and this inevitably introduces an element of error into all 
estimations covering the whole merchant fleet. 
Methods of calculation 
In this study, the ships' accounts were used in two ways. They 
helped to illuminate changes which were important on the 
business-level, such as fluctuations in income or profit and general 
cost development. They were also exploited in producing macro-
level parameters of economic performance, the gross income of the 
whole merchant fleet, as well as the net result, or profit, and the 
contribution of shipping to the gross national product. This means 
that the calculations were made in two logical stages; first, the data 
had to be converted into time-series of income and profit, which 
were then extrapolated to produce macro-level variables for all 
Finnish shipping. 
As data on both gross income and net result were drawn directly 
from empirical source material, it was not necessary to make 
complicated calculations at the first stage. Only two simple 
amendments to the actual monetary values found in the accounts 
were needed for the purpose of commensurability. First, since the 
accounts cover very different periods, the figures had to be 
expressed as annual averages and, secondly, as the ships were of 
different sizes — which directly affected gross income — they had 
to be divided by the net tonnage of the vessel in question.15 Thus, 
both income and profit are always expressed as average figures per 
year16 and ton. 
15 For a discussion of net ton as a scaling device see Kaukiainen, "From Days 
and Knots," p. 70-71. 
16 The basic calculations of gross income and net result did include various 
periods of inactivity (total accounting period). For long-traders, effective 
sailing time, in other words, time at sea and in port excluding lay-up for 
repairs and fitting out, was also computed (it was assumed that, because this 
occurred at irregular intervals, it would have increased the standard 
deviation). It turned out that sailing periods were, on average, only 4 % 
shorter than the total accounting periods and the difference in deviation was 
hardly noticeable. 
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A few things must be borne in mind, however, in using the old 
shipping accounts. First, although the master's accounts invariably 
present calculations of the ship's income, they do not always 
record a sum identical to gross freight. The master may have 
deducted agents' fees or freight advances, thus presenting only 
what he actually received at the port of discharge. In such cases, 
the accounts must be adjusted and the missing elements of gross 
freight added; only compensation for damaged or late cargo can be 
counted as "legal" deduction. On the other hand, all other income, 
such as net profit from sold cargo owned by the ship (for example 
when salt was imported to Finland)," as well as minor items such 
as demurrage, dock dues paid by the shipper and income from sold 
stowage material, also need to be added. 
It must be said, too, that the "profit" shown in the owner's 
accounts is not identical to what is now understood as net result, 
or operating surplus (which is the item used in national 
accounting); the accounting conventions of the late 19th century 
differed from today's in several respects. First, no real distinction 
was made between investments or capital costs and running 
expenses. It was common practice to regard the price of a new ship 
— just like the price of stock in a shop — as a cost which opened 
the debit side of the account. Income and expenses were noted 
normally, but only when the net profits accumulated to a sum 
exceeding the initial value of the ship did the account show 
"profit".18 Moreover, capital repairs and additional investments 
such as copper sheathing or the basic fitting out of the ship were 
also recorded as ordinary running costs. Normally, depreciation 
was not accounted for but, on the other hand, interest of 6 % on the 
owner's capital (that is, on the balance of the account) was usually 
debited as a cost. It was only in the 1880s that a few steamship 
companies began to separate investments and costs and to 
17 Net rather than gross income is used here because the issue is transport, not 
income from import trade. The difference between the purchase price and the 
selling price of salt, for example (the former also including customs dues and 
possible provisions), can be seen in terms of value added through 




However, if a ship was owned by a company, the shareholders paid for it at 
the beginning and its value was no longer accounted for, but separate 
accounts were made for each voyage or series of voyages. 
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depreciate the value of their assets, and sailing ship owners were 
still slower to adopt the new system.19 
All this means that several corrections to the owners' accounts 
need to be made in order to arrive at the equivalent of today's 
operating surplus. The initial value of the ship has to be removed 
from the opening debit, and expenses which either involved 
investments or capital repairs disregarded. Finally, only rents 
actually paid, but not interest on capital, can be included as costs. 
This only involves some straightforward subtractions and 
practically all owners' accounts yield the data needed to make 
them. 
Operating surplus is the income which not only gave the owner 
his final profit, or return on investment, but also paid for 
depreciation and, if the ship was uninsured, even for the risks of 
shipping. During the period in question, most big ships were 
already insured so that risks were, in fact, converted to operating 
costs in the form of insurance premiums. Depreciation, on the 
other hand, can be determined directly from the accounts only in a 
few cases. The data on prices and insurance values, which was 
used to determine capital costs (see p. 96-97), should, however, 
suffice to show what were realistic levels of depreciation. 
The corrected figures for gross income and net result were 
converted to time series separately for sailing vessels and 
steamships. The data was not divided according to size-classes, 
because this would have created too small clusters of observations; 
moreover, since freight income was paid typically per ton, no 
substantial differences can be expected between big and small 
vessels (apart from differences in trade). Thus, sailing vessels were 
divided into two classes only, ships engaged in international long-
distance trade and those sailing mainly in the Baltic and the North 
Sea, and laid up for the winter. The time-series were not presented 
on an annual basis either, because this too had resulted in 
unreasonably small numbers of observations.20 Instead, the figures 
found in the accounts were projected as moving averages: for each 




It may have proved difficult in some cases to split a voyage account covering 
several years. There were many expenses paid and much income received 
which covered rather long periods, or which were settled much later than 
they were incurred. 
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decade, four observations were computed so that neighbouring 
periods always overlapped by two years. Each single account was 
given a chronological fix according to its middle year and was, 
accordingly, classified in period(s) within the time-brackets of 
which this middle year fell. As accounts were of different 
duration, a weighted average (the chronological span of the 
accounts acting as the weight) was chosen as the primary 
parameter. 
In practice, this procedure produced so many observations 
within each period that standard errors of estimates could be kept 
tolerably low. Like any system of moving averages, of course, it 
also has a levelling effect: short-term fluctuations are moderated 
and trends stand out more clearly. On the other hand, the method 
is more sensitive than those based on linear or simple curvilinear 
regressions and, therefore, gives a better description of an industry 
such as shipping, with rather strong fluctuations spanning several 
years. 
As previously mentioned, steamship data was much more 
scanty. Moreover, it consisted of two rather different files. Data 
from diverse accounts found in various archives and in literature 
spanned a random choice of years, just as for sailing vessels, but 
there were only three examples from after the end of the 1880s. 
Accordingly, less sophisticated methods had to be employed here: 
common arithmetical averages, either spanning one decade or a 
half (depending on the number of observations) were computed as 
the main parameter. On the other hand, the ledgers of the Finnish 
Steamship Company (FAA) produced rich data which could be 
processed in the same manner as the data on sailing vessels. 
However, because the "crude" annual series included certain 
minor distortions, they could only be used in combination with 
the more detailed data from the four sample years. 
Steamships were difficult to study in other respects, too. First, 
there was a purely technical problem: the change in measurement, 
which meant that the last-figures of the 1870s — even though 
converted to net tons by an empirically derived multiplier — were 
not a very good parameter of steamship carrying capacity. 
Secondly, there were different types of steamship. While 
practically all sailing vessels were intended to carry bulk cargo, a 
significant number of steamships carried passengers, and such 
ships differed markedly from bulk-carriers: instead of upper holds 
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they had cabins and saloons and carried only limited amounts of 
general cargo. Compared with their net tonnage, passenger ships, 
or passerger/cargo ships, and bulk-carriers could generate very 
different gross income as well as net profit. For example, in 1895, 
the gross revenue of the two "emigrant" ships (which sailed to Hull 
and also carried some cargo) of the Finnish Steamship Company 
(FAA) earned three times as much as similar-sized cargo-ships; 
and the difference in net result was greater still.21 Accordingly, to 
make comparisons meaningful, different profit series need to be 
calculated for cargo and passenger (or passenger/cargo) vessels. 
The next step involved a similar process of extrapolation as 
used for the estimation of total traffic volumes in different trades. 
The most obvious, and also the simplest way of doing this was to 
start with the time series of average income and net result in 
different shipping categories and multiply the figures by the 
tonnage in question. As far as sailing vessels were concerned, this 
presented no major problem, since it was possible to present 
tolerable estimations of the tonnage categories according to which 
the data on income and profit were classified (long-traders, North 
Sea and Baltic tonnage, coastal vessels);22 the only difficulty was 
the scantiness of data on coastal vessels. 
In the case of steamships, the distinction between cargo and 
passenger ships was not always easy; although passenger ships 
were required to undergo a special safety survey,23 neither 
published nor manuscript ship-lists registered which steamers had 
been approved and registered as passenger-carriers. Before the 
1880s, however, and not counting auxiliaries, there were relatively 
few special cargo-steamers in the Finnish merchant fleet; 
moreover, the differentiation was still so weak that all steamers 
could be called passenger/cargo ships. Subsequently, at least in 
larger size-classes (or ships sailing to the North Sea), this 
specialization led to distinct cargo and passenger ship types, 
which were usually easy to identify. Only smaller vessels, below 
300 net tons or so, may still pose some problems simply because 
21 	 Ledgers of the FAA, 1895. 
22 Estimations of tonnage sailing all the year round (= long traders) were 
presented in table 3:4. All vessels of less than 100 net tons were regarded as 
coastal sailers, and the residue represented Baltic and North Sea tonnage. 
23 	 Finlands Författnings Samling 14.10.1874, 18.4.1859, no. 6/1879, 27.3.1890. 
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they often lacked technical data. On the other hand, from the late 
1890s, the cargo ships should be divided into two classes: liners 
and tramps. Unfortunately, data on tramp tonnage is limited. 
Apart from leaving some blank or dubious areas (costal vessels, 
tramp steamers), the estimation method has one additional weak 
point: it permits only a very rough division of shipping income 
into different trades. Fortunately, income can also be estimated 
independently by computing how much on average was paid for 
typical hauls in different carrying trades.24 Such data is readily 
found in ships' accounts; the only difficulty is that these sources 
contain information on a very great variety of freights. It would be 
pointless, for example, to look up how much was paid per ton for 
grain from Baltimore to Cork; such detailed data could not be 
related in a meaningful way to the macro-level estimates of 
tonnage or traffic output. A far better method is to relate income 
per ton to the length of haul and to compute a regression showing 
how income grew, on average, with distance (see p. 210). Of 
course, there were notable deviations from the average, such as 
outward (westward) cargoes over the Atlantic, but this kind of 
difference was normal in most trades, and the low-paying freights 
affected the regression according to frequency. Only in a few cases, 
when the focus was on trades consisting of one-way hauls such as 
Finnish import shipping, was it considered relevant to compute 
averages for a special group of freights.25 Accordingly, this material 
could be used to produce satisfactory estimations of the amount of 
income generated by the different trades. This second estimate can 
be used not only to cross-check the first, but also to fill in some of 
24 Similar data was also available from another source, the freight insurance 
registers of Sjöassuransföreningen i Finland. The latter material must be used 
with some caution, because all ship-owners did not insure their freight in 
full: it was very common that the freight advance (which could amount to a 
third of the estimated total) was, as required by the shipping agent, insured 
with a British company. Freight earnings recorded in the accounts are, 
therefore, a safer choice. 
25 The average freight for e.g. salt importation from South Europe was 
computed from the insurance freight registers of Sjöassuransföreningen i 
Finland (see note 22), since this data is more plentiful and, accordingly, 
produces better estimations. The resulting figures were corrected by 
comparing them with the freights in the accounting material in order to 
compensate for the fact that cargo was not always insured in full. 
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the blank areas mentioned above. Unfortunately, it does not throw 
any additional light on coastal trade, and reveals little even for 
Baltic freights. It has no relevance to regular liner services, either. 
By analogy the net result for all Finnish shipping can be 
extrapolated from the time series of profit per year and ton. In this 
case, only one method is possible: the average profit for each 
shipping category was multiplied by the total tonnage in question. 
The sum of wages paid (including masters' "kaplake") and food 
expenses must still be added to the total net result in order to 
arrive at the contribution of shipping to the gross national product. 
The basic data for these items was already presented in the chapter 
on labour. 
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2. The development of gross income 
Average gross income per year was affected by factors which, at 
any given time, were relatively uniform. These were, above all, 
market factors such as freight rates and the balance between 
outward and homeward cargoes, which had a great bearing on the 
frequency of ballasted voyages. Even the length of inactive periods 
may have been influenced by market fluctuations: the accounting 
material shows, not unexpectedly, that laying up for reparations 
was far less common during a boom than during a depression.' On 
the other hand, the efficiency with which ships were used (e.g. 
whether laid up for the winter or not) as well as how effectively 
they were deployed in the existing freight market differed very 
much from one case to another. Accordingly, there was always 
some variance around the averages but, as mentioned before, it was 
moderate rather than large. Quite interestingly, the variation 
tended to be larger than average during boom periods. This 
probably indicates that up-to-date information on freight market 
changes did not reach all masters (or owners) to the same degree. 
Sailing vessels 
The average total earnings of Finnish sailing vessels are presented 
in figure 4:1 (detailed data can be found in appendix IV) and the 
development is summed up in table 4:4 in the form of indices. 
Since most short-term fluctuations have been eliminated, the 
figures show rather logical development in three or four different 
phases. 
As far as long-traders were concerned, the 1860s represent a real 
"golden era". In the middle of the decade, the average annual net 
ton earnings clearly exceeded £5 (140 Finnish marks). On the other 
hand, as indicated by the standard deviation values (partly a result 
of the low number of observations; see appendix IV:2), there were 
1 	 Cf. appendix IV. Average long-trader income was computed both with regard 
to the total accounting period (incl. laying up) and to the sailing period (excl. 
laying up and reparations). In e.g. 1863-67 and 1871-74 there was a 
difference of only 4 % between these times, but in 1866-69 and 1876-79 it 
was around 8 %. 
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TABLE 4:4. The development of the average gross income of 
Finnish sailing vessels, per year (total accounting 
time) and net ton, 1858-1914. Indices based on 
income in Finnish marks; the average for long-trading 
vessels, 1868-72 = 100. 
	
A 	 = 	 Long-trading vessels over 400 net tons 
	
B 	 = 	 Vessels laid up for the winter 
	
C 	 = 	 100 x B:A 
Time 	 A 	 B 	 C 	 Time 	 A 	 B 	 C 
1858-62 103 1888-92 70 46 66 
1861-64 120 .. 1891-94 61 47 77 
1863-67 126 90 71 1893-97 62 40 65 
1866-69 93 81 87 1896-99 70 38 54 
1868-72 100 (96)' (96) 1898-1902 68 38 56 
1871-74 101 86 85 1901-04 54 37 69 
1873-77 95 81 85 1903-07 51 35 69 
1876-79 84 73 87 1906-09 52 33 63 
1878-82 80 61 76 1908-12 61 45 74 
1881-84 77 59 77 1911-14 71 61 86 
1883-87 69 49 71 1913-14 98 (61)1  (62) 
1886-89 71 41 58 
1 Only two observations. 
Source: Appendix IV:2. 
significant differences between individual ships; in the middle of 
the decade, the standard deviation was about 30 per cent of the 
average. 
It seems quite clear that such a high level of income was, both 
directly and indirectly, a consequence of the war in America; not 
only did it mean that a lot of tonnage normally sailing on the 
Atlantic was now out of action, but it also hindered grain imports 
from the U.S. to Europe and thus increased grain trade from the 
Black Sea, as well as freight rates.2 In addition, coal exports from 
2 	 It is interesting that a freight index constructed by Keith Matthews (as quoted 
in Sager, Seafaring Labour, p. 165), which only covered a selection of North 
Atlantic freight rates, presented a rapid growth culminating in 1862, and after 
that an equally rapid decline. It seems obvious that the decline was mainly a 
result of the decline in U.S. exports. Black Sea grain freights, which were 
more important for Finnish vessels, reached top values later. 
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Fig. 4:1. Gross Income and Net Result, Sailing Vessels. 
1 = Long traders, gross income 
2 = Baltic and North Sea traders, gross income 
3 = Long traders, net result 













Source: Appendix IV2. 
England to the Mediterranian gave a good number of outward 
cargoes, even though the price per ton was only about half that of 
grain freight.3 
The boom ended quite abruptly in 1867-68, giving way to a 
short but deep depression. This was clearly reflected in income. 
Although freight rates rose again during the earlier part of the 
1870s, the annual earnings of Finnish deepwater merchantmen no 
longer exceeded £5 per ton. The mid-1870s marked the beginning 
3 Normal freight for grain from the Black Sea to West Europe was around £2.3 
(FIM 60) per ton while coal from Wales to e.g. Alexandria fetched about £1.2 
(FIM 30) per ton. 
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of the well-known "long depression" and, indeed, the downward 
trend continued, with just one break (1885-1890), until the 
middle of the 1890s. By the end, average annual earnings had 
already declined to below £3 per ton. This decline was universal, 
as evidenced by the fact that differences between individual ships 
levelled out after the 1860s; by the 1870s, the standard deviation 
had already fallen below 20 per cent of the average, and remained 
at or below that level until the middle of the 1890s. 
Around the middle of the 1890s, a modest rise began, and the 
average income level recovered to that of the early 1880s. The 
boom was, however, rather short-lived, and a new decline set in 
after the turn of the century. This bottomed out around 1907-08, 
with average annual earnings falling down to less than £2.5 per 
ton. After that, deepwater sailing vessels again experienced 
slightly better times, and average income rose steadily until the 
War. 1913 was a particularly good year when an annual income of 
close to £4.5 per ton — the level of the mid-1870s — was perfectly 
normal. 
It must be remembered, of course, that the ships in the sample 
were very different at different times. In the 1860s and 1870s they 
were, typically, newly built softwood vessels of 400-900 net tons, 
while at the end of the period they consisted almost exclusively of 
second-hand iron and steel ships of over 1,000 net tons (see table 
4:2). On the other hand, there never seem to have been any 
systematic differences in income level by ship size;4 the only 
notable exception was in the 1860s, when small vessels sailing to 
South America and the West Indies clearly earned more than larger 
bulk-carriers, but this is understandable in view of their valuable 
colonial cargoes (since they were under 400 tons, they were not 
included in the indices in table 4:4). That different sized ships 
earned about the same per ton is exactly what can be expected, as 
ships were paid freight by cargo weight or volume. As no real 
differences by size were apparent, it could be said that, as far as 
income levels were concerned, the ships represented a rather 
typical bunch of cargo-carriers, whose owners tried to optimize 
4 	 This was tested by comparing the income levels of ships over 700 tons (after 
the turn of the century over 1,000 tons), with the average. No substantial 
deviation could be discerned for any decade. 
239 
their business according to the changing opportunities of the 
times. 
The income development of vessels sailing mainly on the Baltic 
and the North Sea followed roughly the same trends as that for 
long-traders. Comparison is rather difficult for the 1860s and the 
beginning of the next decade, however, since income data is either 
non-existent or very scanty. In fact, masters' accounts for these 
smaller vessels are not plentiful for the whole periods and 
therefore, at certain times, the margin of error in these figures may 
be considerable. 
There are also some interesting differences between the two 
income series. It seems possible that the depression of the late 
1860s was relatively mild for North Sea and Baltic vessels; on the 
other hand, the average income fell far more steeply from the mid-
1870s to the late 1880s (about 50 %) than that of long-traders 
(about 25 %). There was then a temporary rise, but this was 
followed in the mid-1890s by a new period of stagnation, as long-
traders again began to earn more. Smaller sailing tonnage income 
fell systematically up to the 1910s, when even it caught up with 
the pre-war boom. 
The average income of the Baltic and North Sea fleets was 
considerably lower than that of long-traders. At best, in the 1860s 
and the 1870s, the annual average was close to £4 (100 Finnish 
marks) per ton and fell to no less than £1.5 (less than 40 Finnish 
marks) during the first decade of the 20th century. This difference 
is not at all surprising, since the vessels in question were regularly 
laid up for the winter. The actual duration of lay-up varied a lot 
depending on the latitude of the home port but, since the bulk of 
the tonnage in question came from the Southwestern coast and 
'Aland, the average sailing season amounted to 7.5 or 8 months. 
Thus, it might be expected that, if such vessels earned the same per 
ton of freight, they would bring in (per net ton) 63-67 per cent of 
what a ship sailing all the year round was able to accumulate. 
Column C in table 4:4 indicates that the average income of Baltic 
5 This may have been because, as vessels frequently returned home at the end 
of the sailing season, the need for elaborate master's accounts was not very 
great. It is also possible that, since many Baltic and North Sea windjammers 
had peasant-born masters (often without formal education at navigation 
schools), and were owned by peasants, accounting skills were rather limited. 
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and North Sea tonnage actually exceeded this percentage in certain 
periods. In the late 1860s and for most of the following decade, the 
percentage was 85 or more, and up to the late 1880s it was 
constantly higher than two thirds of the long-traders' average 
income. This very strongly suggests that freights from the Baltic to 
Central and Western Europe were at a rather high level during the 
last "golden" days of windjammers. This is quite logical: since it 
was also a period of very rapid growth in the sawmill industries of 
both Sweden and Finland, the demand for shipping increased 
rapidly too. On the other hand, it must be remembered that the 
voyages in question were shorter and involved more port work 
than those of long-traders. Accordingly, freight income must have 
been slightly higher per ton than for ocean hauls. 
The rapid decline in average income per ton of Baltic and North 
Sea tonnage obviously resulted from the increase in tonnage 
supply, which coincided with the breakthrough of steamshipping 
in the Baltic. Thus the level of Baltic freights sank and, around the 
turn of the century, they even seem to have fallen below the 
normal level of many other trades. Since the average income of 
Finnish Baltic and North Sea tonnage dropped to about 55 per cent 
of the average earnings of long-traders, they earned less per month 
of active sailing season. During the last decade before the War, the 
percentage rose a little again, and exceeded two-thirds in the early 
1910s. 
The income level of coastal vessels cannot be similarly 
estimated since there is very little data; obviously most of them 
never had any real accounts. A few scattered sources produced the 
following examples:6 
— 1860-63: a vessel of 74 nt earned on average FIM 7,461 a 
year, or FIM 101 per ton 
— 1864-66: the same vessel earned FIM 7,769 a year, or FIM 
105 per ton 
— 1867-69: the same vessel earned FIM 8,376 a year, or FIM 
113 per ton 
— 1875: a vessel (jakt) of 41 nt earned FIM 1,214, or FIM 30 per 
ton 
6 Börman, Åboländsk bygdeseglation, p. 130, 132; id., Under västnyländska 
segel, p. 299-300; Kaukiainen, Koiviston merenkulun historia, p. 252;  
Krogius, "Sjöfart", p. 39:13. 
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— 1885: a vessel (jaala) of 45 nt was estimated to earn FIM 
2,100-2,700 a year, or FIM 47-60 per ton 
— 1908: a coastal sailer was estimated to earn FIM 0.25 per day 
per net ton on average, or FIM 45-50 a year 
— 1911: a vessel (galeas) of 75 nt earned FIM 3,761, or FIM 50 
per ton 
The first vessel on the list (accounting from 1860 to 1869) 
belonged to an iron mill and is not perhaps fully representative. In 
any case, the scanty income data shows some consistency with the 
income levels of Baltic and North Sea tonnage. However, the 
coastal fleet also included vessels which did not trade very 
intensively, but which were employed for a couple of voyages a 
year to transport farm produce or fish for sale; the jakt of which 
there was data for 1875 may be an example of this kind of 
occasional shipping. Therefore, it is probable that, at least by the 
1860s and 1870s, the average income across the whole coastal fleet 
was lower than the above examples would suggest. On the other 
hand, it is also probable that occasional shipping of farm produce 
gradually declined, with the result that an overwhelming majority 
of coastal tonnage was "professionally" employed at the end of the 
period. This should have produced smaller changes in the average 
income level in coastal trade than in other shipping categories. 
Sailing ship income and freight rates 
With the exception of the last five years or so, the period presented 
an almost constant decline in the average gross revenue of Finnish 
sailing vessels. The picture has, of course, much in common with 
some well-known freight rate indices, although no traditional 
index can ever present a complete picture of actual shipping 
income, since changes in the efficiency of ship use, or the 
productivity of shipping, could greatly modify the effects of freight 
fluctuations. 
A comparison of the development of the gross income of 
Finnish deepwater merchantmen with two freight rate indices, the 
well-known Isserlis and another which presents the earnings of 
Norwegian vessels in Atlantic trades, is presented in table 4:5. The 
Isserlis incorporates an increasing amount of typical steamship 
freight and therefore does not, in principle, describe the same trade 
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TABLE 4:5. Comparison of average gross income, freight rates and 
prices. Indices, 1868/72 = 100. 
Period 	 Isserlis Norwegian 
tramp 	 Atlantic' 
freight 	 freight 









Gross income of Finn. 
Long-trad. 	 Baltic & 
400 nt 	 North Sea 







1863-67 .. 104 (114) 122 107 
1866-69 91 101 97 96 97 
1868-72 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1871-74 106 121 107 107 101 103 
1873-77 102 112 106 106 95 97 
1876-79 92 96 99 106 85 88 
1878-82 85 89 95 100 83 74 
1881-84 75 84 92 87 78 71 
1883-87 64 72 81 75 70 59 
1886-89 68 73 75 68 70 49 
1888-92 65 76 77 61 70 55 
1891-94 58 66 74 52 62 56 
1893-97 56 65 68 51 64 48 
1896-99 60 .. 67 49 74 46 
1898-1902 62 71 48 73 45 
1901-04 50 72 54 57 44 
1903-07 50 74 61 52 41 
1906-09 48 77 65 51 40 
1908-12 54 80 62 54 
1911-14 67 85 68 73 
1913-14 68 87 95 
1 Average U.S. East Coast and Gulf of Mexico freight indices. 
2 Average Gefle — England and Luleå — England; 1863-67 Riga — 
England. 
Source: Isserlis, "Tramp Shipping Cargoes and Freights", p.122; Fischer 
and Nordvik, "Maritime Transport and the Interaction of the 
North Atlantic Economy", p.537; Fischer and Nordvik,  
"Shipping and the Baltic Wood Trade to Britain 1863-1908, p. 
176; Mitchell, European Historical Statistics (1980), p. 773-4. 
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as the gross income series. The Norwegian index, on the other 
hand, was computed from actual earnings and covers trade 
relatively long dominated by sailing ships; this makes comparison 
more relevant. In addition, the income development of Finnish 
Baltic and North Sea tonnage is compared with typical wood 
freights from the Northern Baltic to England. 
Not surprisingly, the income series for Finnish deepwater 
windjammers had more in common with the Norwegian than with 
the Isserlis index. The latter shows much lower values than the 
Finnish income index for the years after the early 1880s; the only 
exception is the depression of 1903-08, when both are at the same 
low level. The Norwegian index, on the other hand, is fairly close 
to the Finnish series, although it usually gives a more "optimistic" 
picture, especially for the mid-1870s. 
This last difference is probably largely due to differences in 
income for the base period (1868-72) and the fact that the 
Norwegian index, as used here, was narrower in scope (Atlantic 
freights, excluding Black Sea trade) than the Finnish income 
series. Accordingly, it may not have been affected by the structural 
change — including an increase in the proportion of ballasted 
voyages — which took place in Finnish deepwater trade. 
Baltic wood freights developed slightly differently. They 
remained relatively stable up to the beginning of the 1880s but 
then, right until the turn of the century, declined more steeply than 
Atlantic freights or tramp freights in general. The average income 
of Finnish Baltic and North Sea traders shows the same 
characteristics, although the decline began earlier than the freight 
index suggests. From the 1870s to the turn of the century, both 
indices tell a similar story and income development seems to have 
depended very much on the trend in freights. It is also obvious that 
Baltic freights in the 1870s (and probably also in the preceding 
decade) were at a relatively high level, which contradicts some 
well-established opinions.' The above comparisons revealed that it 
was only in the 1890s that the income level of Finnish sailing 
vessels engaged in Baltic wood trade was really poor. 
7 	 See e.g Fischer and Nordvik, "Shipping and Baltic Wood Trade to Britain", p. 
171. 
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TABLE 4:6 Average real gross income of Finnish sailing tonnage, 
1858-1914. Fixed price index (British wholesale 
prices), 1868/72 = 100. 
1=long-traders, 2=Baltic and North Sea traders 
1 2 1 2 
1858-62 96 1888-92 91 71 
1861-64 108 .. 1891-94 84 76 
1863-67 117 107 1893-97 94 71 
1866-69 95 96 1896-99 110 69 
1868-72 100 100 1898-1902 103 63 
1871-74 94 96 1901-04 79 61 
1873-77 90 92 1903-07 69 55 
1876-79 86 89 1906-09 66 52 
1878-82 87 78 1908-12 78 68 
1881-84 85 77 1911-14 80 86 
1883-87 86 72 1913-14 109 
1886-89 93 65 
Source: Table 4:5. 
What did the general fall in average income mean — was it real or 
did it partly result from monetary fluctuations? Table 4:6 presents 
a comparison of freight earnings and British wholesale prices. 
Since the pound sterling was by far the most common currency for 
settling freight bills, and since most of the expenses of Finnish 
deepwater sailers were also paid in pounds, most of the effects of 
currency fluctuations should thus be eliminated. The indices show 
that the development of gross income clearly deviated from that of 
wholesale prices in the 1860s, at least as far as long-traders were 
concerned. At first, average income increased much faster than 
prices, but from the mid-1860s to the mid-1870s, the real value 
declined by no less than one quarter. Then followed an amazingly 
stable period up to the late 1880s. There was a modest rise at the 
turn of the decade, a modest fall in the early 1890s and a boom in 
the latter part of the decade, with the real income level almost as 
high as in the middle of the 1860s. However, if the rise was 
remarkable, so was the slump following it, and between 1900 and 
1910 the real annual value of gross income per ton reached an all-
time low. The short pre-war boom, again, boosted the average 
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income level roughly to the same heights as during the two earlier 
peaks (the mid-1860s and the late 1890s). 
Baltic and North Sea fleets were even different in this respect. 
The decline in income between the late 1870s and the 1890s was 
constantly faster than the general fall in prices, and this trend only 
decreased, rather than stopped, during the boom of the 1890s. 
Even in this case, the real value of average income bottomed out in 
the middle of the first decade of the 20th century. 
The relative inflexibility in the real value of long-trade shipping 
income is somewhat surprising, given the general belief that sea 
transport became cheaper and more efficient during the period in 
question. This assumption implies, of course, that if ship income 
level were retained, it should have been possible for them either to 
transport more goods, or to sail more miles a year, or both. 
However, the productivity estimations showed that the Finnish 
windjammer fleet produced virtually no improvement in 
productivity before the turn of the century, in other words, before 
big metal-hulled ships became common. That long-trading sailing 
vessels were able to generate a fairly constant level of real income 
without a rise in average output may at first sight seem surprising, 
but it must be remembered that, from the 1880s, this trade only 
represented the periphery of maritime transport. Peripheral 
activities are not usually among the first to show increased 
efficiency. 
Steamships 
Although the accounting data for Finnish steamers is rather scanty 
for the earlier half of the period, one fact stands out very clearly. 
The normal annual gross income per net ton was far higher than for 
sailing vessels. In the middle of the 1860s, when Finnish cross-
trading windjammers earned an average of over 140 marks (over 
£5) per net ton, the few passenger/cargo steamers travelling along 
the coasts of the Northern Baltic (and sailing only about 7 months a 
year) recorded an annual average of no less than about 700 marks 
(£28) per net ton. Of course, the net ton is not a perfect gauge for 
comparing such different vessels; not only were there problems in 
the measuring method itself but, since a good proportion of coastal 
steamer income consisted of passenger fees, there was not the same 
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tonnage ratio as with bulk-cargoes. Yet, even later the cargo liners 
which carried hardly any passengers recorded an annual income 
per ton four to five times higher than sailing long-traders (see table 
4:7, columns B and D). 
It seems, however, that there was a declining trend in steamship 
income which continued to the middle of the 1880s: from the 
1860s to the end of the 1880s, the decrease amounted to over 50 %. 
Since the data for the 1860s, in particular, was very limited and the 
error of the estimate fairly high, the result is not conclusive. On the 
other hand, the trend is very similar to the development of sailing-
vessel income. 
The data for after 1885 is plentiful and does not present similar 
problems of representativeness. It is true that most of it deals with 
one single company, the FAA, but on the other hand, the figures for 
the cargo liners in particular show such small variation (see 
appendix IV:2B) that they must be typical of the trade. The 
company had such a large market share of Baltic passenger/cargo 
and "emigrant" shipping (in emigrant trade to England practically 
100 %) that these figures, too, cannot be very different from 
Finnish averages 
From 1885 to 1913, the average income of cargo liners fluctuated 
in roughly the same way as that of sailing long-traders (see figure 
4:2). There was some improvement in the latter half of the 1880s, a 
slow and relatively consistent fall until about 1910, and a 
conspicuous rise thereafter. However, there was no boom in liner 
freight at the turn of the century, when big windjammers were 
doing fairly well; on the other hand, 1905 was a better-than-
average year for cargo liners while the two preceding years, when a 
tariff war was being fought between FAA and Nord for the Hull-
route, were not as bad as might have been expected. Fluctuations 
were, however, quite modest; for example, from 1898/1902 to 
1906/09 the decline was only a quarter (that is, 5 %) compared 
with the fall in sailing long-trader income, and in the 1910s the 
increase was about a half of what big sailing vessels achieved. This 
kind of stability is exactly what could have been expected; carriage 
fees on regular lines always fluctuate less than tramp freights. 
The income development of Baltic passenger/cargo liners 
presents a different picture: from a low point at the beginning of 
the 1890s, there was a remarkable and continuous increase, which 
was particularly rapid around the middle of the 1890s and the 
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TABLE 4:7. The development of the average gross income of 
Finnish steamships, per year (total accounting time) 
and net ton, 1865-1913. Indices, based on income in 
Finnish marks; average, 1871-75 (FIM 419.8) = 100. 
A = Passenger/cargo ships sailing within the Baltic 
B = Cargo ships sailing regular lines outside the 
Baltic and occupied all the year round 
C = Passenger ships sailing outside the Baltic 
("emigrant ships") 
D = Annual income per net ton for long-trading 
sailing vessels over 400 net tons 









1876/80 85 —' — 22 
1881/85 92 — 21 
1886/89 77 86 — 19 1.12 . 4.53 
1891/94 68 91 250 16 1.34 3.68 5.69 
1896/99 110 82 373 19 0.75 3.39 4.32 
1901/04 108 73 397 14 0.68 3.68 5.21 
1906/09 127 75 525 14 0.59 4.13 5.36 
1911/13 172 99 367 19 0.58 2.13 5.21 
(1912/13 181 102 411 26 0.56 2.27 3.92) 
1 Although the first Finnish regular line to England was started in 1874, 
the ships in question did not sail all the year round. FAA was the first 
company to engage its ships in foreign cross-trading for the winter. 
Source: Appendix IV:2B. 
early 1910s. This is understandable, since passenger volumes, 
especially to Sweden, grew at that time, and it is obvious from the 
accounts that passenger income was a relatively high proportion of 
total revenue precisely during these two periods of growth (see 
appendix IV:2B). On the other hand, the development was far from 
smooth: average income fluctuated according to the intensity of 
the competition on the routes to Stockholm. 
Still more impressive was the growth in emigrant traffic to 
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Fig. 4:2. Steamship Gross Income. 
1 = North Sea passenger (emigrant) ships 
2 = Baltic passenger ships 








0 I I I 	 f I III  
1870 	 1880 	 1890 	 1900 	 1910 
Source: Appendix IV:2. 
England, which began on Finnish keels only in 1891. The upsurge 
of emigration8 meant a rapid increase in volume and in income per 
ton for the FAA emigrant ships; in 1907 they recorded the huge 
gross income of over 2,800 Finnish marks (over £110) per net ton. 
It was by far the the most lucrative trade in the entire Finnish 
shipping business. This growth, however, was not continuous: 
around 1900, and in 1903 and 1904, income declined temporarily, 
after 1907 it fell steeply and only partly recovered in 1913 (see 
figure 4:2). Some of this fluctuation occurred only because tonnage 
was increased in 1899 (two ships totalling 2,267 net tons) and 1908 
(one ship of 1,997 net tons). Such sudden increases in carrying 
8 	 Reino Kero, Migration from Finland to North America, p. 36. 
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Fig. 4:3. Emigrant Ship Income and Finnish Emigration, 1892-
1913. 
1 = Passenger income, 1,000 FIM 
2 = Cargo income, 1,000 FIM 
3 = Total Finnish emigration (number of persons/10) 
Source: Ledgers of the FAA; Kero, Migration from Finland, p. 28, 36. 
capacity naturally exceeded the growth in emigration, and income 
per ton was bound to fall. Total passenger income, on the other 
hand, showed a rising trend, although it fluctuated far more than 
income from cargo on emigrant vessels (see figure 4:3). These 
fluctuations follow those in the number of emigrants: 1908 and 
1911 were also very low points in Finnish emigration. It was only 
in 1904 that the market situation (the tariff war) made income fall 
more than the number of emigrants. 
Of special interest is, of course, the comparison of sailing vessel 
and steamship income, because it supplements the productivity 
estimations in the preceding chapter. For obvious reasons — 
sailing vessels never carried regular passengers — only year-round 
cargo-carrying trade is relevant here. Table 4:7 (column B/C) 
shows that Finnish cargo liners usually accumulated four to five 
times more income per net ton than long trading sailing vessels. At 
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least, as far as the middle of the 1890s and 1912/13 are concerned, 
the ratios are fairly close (slightly higher) to those which were 
computed from the revised ton-mileages of sailing vessels and 
steamships (see p. 212). In general, they clearly exceed the 
traditional 3:1 ratio. This was obviously because the steamers in 
question exclusively consisted of liners: not only did they 
command somewhat higher freight rates, at least during periods of 
depression, but, above all, they trafficked on shorter routes with 
more frequent port calls than big windjammers. Thus these ton-
miles were more expensive. A comparison with tramp steamers 
would probably have produced lower rates. 
Unfortunately, income data on tramp steamers is practically 
nonexistent. Since an overwhelming majority of Finnish steamers 
consisted of regular liners up to the 1890s, this lack is felt only for 
the end of the period. Fortunately, there is some scattered 
information which makes it possible to form at least a rough idea of 
the income which tramp steamers were able to generate. 
Since the insurance records contain voyage data on a few tramp 
steamers, it is possible to estimate their income if it is assumed that 
they earned a similar return per ton-mile (with due regard to the 
type of trade) as sailing vessels. This results in a consistently and 
substantially lower annual income per ton (between one and two 
thirds) than was recorded for liner steamers.9 It also illustrates that, 
after 1902, the two largest cargo ships of the FAA, which were 
engaged in semi-regular trade to the Mediterranean and were in 
construction typical "tramp-steamers", consistently generated an 
income per ton of 70 per cent of the average for the company's 
cargo steamers. Moreover, in 1913, when the FAA cargo-carriers 
recorded an average income of 468 Finnish marks (£18.5) per net 
ton, a Finnish tramp steamer was time-chartered to the coal trade 
at an annual freight of about 180 marks (£7) per net ton.10 
The relatively low income generated by tramp steamers is also 
evident from Norwegian shipping statistics. They record an 
average annual steamer income around 1895 equivalent to about 
	
9 	 According to the typical grain or coal freights of the time, these earnings had 
been smaller still. Since both loading and unloading of grain and coal were 
already quite well mechanized, the ton-mileages in these cases would 
probably have been substantially higher. 
	
10 	 Lindberg, Ångbåtssjöfart i Åbo, p. 348. 
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400 Finnish marks (£16), in other words, close to the average for 
the FAA fleet. This was just at the beginning of a massive import 
boom of second-hand steamships, which was soon to transform the 
Norwegian shipping-business. This large fleet of second-hand 
steamers was mainly used in tramp-trading and, perfectly 
reflecting the change, the average annual steamship income in 
Norway declined to the equivalent of 200 Finnish marks (£8), or 
less than two-thirds of the average income of Finnish cargo liners, 
during the next ten years.11 This kind of figure would bring the 
income ratio of steam and sail down to, say, 2.8-3.5, which 
conforms fairly well with the old steam-ton to sail-ton ratio. 
Another category for which there was hardly any accounting 
data at all was that containing the small, under 300-ton steamers. 
This group consisted on the one hand of passenger ships which 
sailed mainly on domestic coastal routes (but even sometimes 
visited St.Petersburg, Reval and other Baltic ports) and of 
relatively modest cargo-carriers (many of them built of wood and, 
by the end of the period, quite often equipped with a combustion 
engine) which sailed on the Northern Baltic. From the few 
scattered pieces of data it is possible to conclude that, in the 1890s 
and at the beginning of the 20th century, an annual gross income of 
400-600 Finnish marks per net ton was perfectly normal for 
passenger craft.12 This was also what the FAA-owned 190- net ton 
steamer normally earned, although she was unusual in often 
sailing 12 months a year.13 Small cargo ships, again, probably 
charged similar unit freights to Baltic sailing vessels. Given their 
higher transport capacity, their annual income could thus be 3.5-
4 times as high, and amount to 160-180 Finnish marks in the 
middle of the 1890s, and 130-150 marks during the depression of 
the next decade. This agrees tolerably well with the estimates 
given by the director of the FAA in 1908: according to him, small 
coastal steamers earned 0.55-0.6 marks per net ton per day, 
which in a normal sailing season would add up to about 120 
marks.14 The company's own motor coasters (116 and 160 net 
11 	 Gjölberg, Ökonomi, teknologi og historie, table 8,2. 
12 Lindberg, Ångbåtssjöfart, p. 308-315, 323, 332. 
13 The ledgers of FAA: s/s Tor (1904-1913). The vessel occasionally carried 
passengers. 
14 Krogius, "Sjöfart", p. 39:13. 
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tons), however, earned about double that at the end of the period, 
but they may not have been typical in this respect." 
Steamships and general freight development 
It was obvious that the average income of Finnish steamers 
fluctuated less than the income of sailing vessels. This also 
indicates that general freight development — international charter 
or tramp freight — had less impact on steam than on sail. There 
were at least four different, but intertwined, factors which 
contributed to this. First, the steamers only sailed on the Baltic at 
first, which was a minor sector of the international freight market. 
Second, most of them initially transported passengers, and the 
fares were determined by the local rather than the international 
market. Moreover, up until the turn of the century, the majority of 
steamers sailed on regular lines and freights always seemed to 
fluctuate less than tramp freights. Finally, steamship productivity 
developed positively in the 1870s-1890s, which probably 
counteracted the effects of the general decline in freight rates. 
These special features, however, were not unique in early steam 
shipping. Quite on the contrary, regular passenger/cargo services 
on coastal lines were typical, both in the Baltic and beyond the 
Sound. This is quite well demonstrated by the fact that Finnish 
steamship income was, at first, surprisingly similar to that in 
Sweden and Norway (table 4:8). Both in the mid-1870s and the 
mid-1880s, actual gross income was roughly at the same level in all 
three countries, and this trend continued in Finland and Norway 
until the 1890s. It is also interesting to note that average income 
fell substantially in the early 1890s in Sweden and, as has already 
been mentioned, during the latter part of the same decade in 
Norway. In both cases, it is tempting to see this change as the result 
of a "take-off" in steam shipping. This would have triggered an 
increase in international and, above all, in bulk cargo traffic and 
was also bound to cause a decline in average income per ton. It is 
clear that Finnish cargo-liners did not fare as well as passenger 
ships, and that tramp-steamers earned still less (but as ship-size 
15 	 The ledgers of FAA, m/s Ursus (1906-1913) and m/s Taurus (1911-1913). 
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TABLE 4:8. Average steamship gross income per net ton in 
Finland, Sweden and Norway, 1875-1913. Finnish 
marks. 
Time Finland Sweden Norway 
1875 416 397 483 
1885 338 360 321 
1895 378 287 405 
1905 338 225 200 
1913 418 2801  
1 	 1912. 
NB: The Finnish income rate is the average of column A and B in table 
4:7. A fixed exchange rate, 1 Sw. crown = 1.4 Finnish marks, has 
been used. 
Source: Table 4:7; Krantz, Historiska nationalräkenskaper för Sverige: 
transporter och kommunikationer 1800-1980, tables Ti and 
T8b; Gjölberg, Ökonomi, teknologi og historie, table 8.2. 
TABLE 4:9. The real value of Finnish steamer gross income (per 
year and net ton), 1865-1913. Indices, 1871/75 = 
100. 
A = Passenger/cargo ships sailing within the Baltic 
B = Cargo ships sailing regular lines beyond the Baltic and 
occupied all the year round 
C = Passenger ships sailing beyond the Baltic ("emigrant ships") 






a b a b a b 
1865/68 178 184 
1871/75 100 100 
1876/80 92 86 
1881/85 108 100 
1886/89 110 98 123 110 
1891/94 99 79 132 106 362 291 
1896/99 175 129 130 96 592 439 
1901/04 160 119 108 80 588 436 
1906/09 175 128 103 76 724 530 
1911/13 215 174 124 100 459 371 
Source: Table 4:7. 
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increased, there was not an inevitable negative effect on 
profitability). That Finnish steamship income remained high was 
simply a result of low tonnage; liner steamships remained in an 
undisputable majority until the War and the proportion of 
passenger vessels was also high. The difference would have been 
larger still had the "emigrant" ships of the FAA been included in 
the average income in table 4:8. Since emigration culminated 
(reached its maximum intensity) in Norway in 1881-85, and in 
Sweden in 1885-90, the take-off in steam shipping did not benefit 
from it there as it did in Finland. In 1913, according to the official 
statistics, passenger income amounted to a trifling 0.8 per cent of 
the total in Swedish foreign shipping, and the first Swedish 
passenger liner in foreign service beyond the Baltic was launched 
only during the War, in 1915.16 
The real value of sailing vessel income was previously 
estimated by using British wholesale prices as a deflator. This 
would not be as meaningful for Finnish steamships since, before 
the 1890s in particular, not much of their income was either 
generated or spent in pounds sterling. Therefore it seems 
reasonable to compare income development with Finnish 
wholesale prices as well (table 4:9). The main difference between 
Finnish and British price trends was that the former rose more at 
the end of the period. As far as Baltic passenger/cargo ships, for 
which the longest time-series exist, are concerned, both series 
indicate that real income per net ton declined in the late 1860s and 
the 1870s, but they also suggest that there was some improvement 
in the following decade, and after a temporary fall, a substantial 
rise in the late 1890s. Finally, from 1900 to 1913, real income rose 
by 35-50 per cent. 
"Emigrant" ship income fluctuated so much that the picture 
remains the same irrespective of whether it is expressed in current 
or fixed prices. For cargo-liners sailing beyond the Sound, 
developments from the early 1890s until the First World War were 
not uniformally good: compared with both British and Finnish 
prices, average real income declined between 1891/94 and 1906/ 
09 by about a quarter. Although gross revenue improved 
16 Krantz, Historiska nationalräkenskaper för Sverige: transport och 
kommunikationer 1800-1980, p. 20, 30 (note 34); De Geer, Migration och 
influensfält, p. 36-48. 
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substantially after that, its real value was still lower before the War 
than in the early 1890s. Cargo-liners, indeed, faced far tougher 
competition than other classes of steamers, and thus it is no 
wonder that the tonnage did not grow fast. With the exception of 
the very last years before the War, their average income 
development, however, compared favourably with that of sailing 
vessels. 
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3. The development of net result and 
profitability 
Net result, or operating surplus, is a far more complex concept 
than gross income. A co-product of a number of different economic 
variables which may fluctuate differently, it inherently involves 
large variation both over time and between different ships. As 
appendix IV:2 illustrates, despite a good number of observations, 
the standard deviation and error are often relatively large. Since 
there may be substantial national differences in some of the factors 
affecting the net result, such as wages, there are obvious 
limitations to how well the figures for one country's fleet represent 
international shipping in general. Yet, the total wage bill (master 
included) for Finnish deepwater sailing ships, for example, 
normally amounted to no more than roughly a quarter of all 
expenses,1 and for steamships it was less than a tenth. The 
overwhelming majority of other expenses were for stevedoring, 
ships chandlers and agents, and dock dues and other bills incurred 
in international ports. Thus, the net result of Finnish cross-traders, 
at least, was greatly affected by the general constraints of shipping. 
Sailing vessels 
Appendix IV:2 and figure 4:1 reveal that the operating surplus of 
Finnish deepwater sailing ships developed along much the same 
lines as gross income. Again, the worst periods were in the middle 
of the 1880s, the early part of the 1890s and 1906-09. However, it 
is interesting to note that the lowest point of this curve had already 
been reached in the 1890s; in contrast to general price trends, the 
ships in this sample produced better annual profits per ton in 
1906-09 than during the two earlier slump periods. Obviously 
some improvement in profitability (or rather, cost efficiency) had 
taken place since the turn of the century. 
1 	 In this material, the overall average was just below 24 %. Variations over time 
and across different sized ships were surprisingly small. Indeed, the standard 
deviation was only 4 percentage points. 
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The material is far too limited to allow a detailed analysis of 
how profitability correlated with ship size. It is possible, however, 
to make some very general observations. First, it seems clear that 
the smallest vessels, say under 400 net tons, regularly fared worse 
than others (cf. appendices IV:2A). Their crew/tonnage ratio was 
obviously so much larger that it disproportionately increased total 
costs. There is also a small, although irregular, correlation between 
net result and size for larger vessels. Ships over 700 tons were 
clearly more profitable from the mid-1860s (although there were 
few of them at first) until the early 1880s, and again around the 
turn of the century. During the worst years of depression, on the 
other hand, they yielded somewhat lower results. The reason may 
have been because, when there was a surplus in the supply of 
tonnage, larger ships were more difficult to "place", and 
accordingly had to wait for freight. Although it is possible that the 
material is not fully representative of size-classes, the correlation 
between size and profitability is smaller than might have been 
expected. 
Gross revenue and operating surplus did not always correlate 
very well. While some of these discrepancies obviously arose 
because the figures were produced from rather different samples of 
ships (there were always more vessels with owners' accounts than 
with masters' accounts), there were also systematic variations due 
to the differerent development of income and costs. 
The most important features of cost development are 
summarized in table 4:10 (note that decimals are used only to 
avoid distorting the relationships between different variables; with 
regard to the error of the estimate, decimals would be 
inappropriate). It gives the impression of a rather rigid cost 
structure: both wages and other costs remained stable at first and 
fell much less than gross income during the 1880s and 1890s. 
Obviously it was difficult to reduce sailors' wages from the levels 
to which they were accustomed, and the same obviously applied to 
stevedoring and dock charges. Only food costs roughly followed 
the trend of falling prices from the end of the 1870s to the turn of 
the century. Although average tonnage rose, clearly no real 
improvement in cost-efficiency was achieved. 
Such cost inflexibility was fatal during a period of falling prices. 
As the last column of table 4:10 shows, the real value of other costs 
(that is costs which were mainly incurred abroad) actually rose in 
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TABLE 4:10. Comparison of average gross income, net result and 
costs in the Finnish deepwater sailing fleet, ships 
over 400 net tons. Finnish marks (and fractions) per 
year and net ton. 
Period 	 Gross 	 Net 	 Total 	 Wages' 	 Other Other costs2 
income 	 result 	 costs (ex food) costs 	 real value 
1861/67 137.2 46.1 91.1 21.0 70.1 £2.19 
1871/77 109.4 23.4 86.0 19.8 66.2 £2.04 
1881/87 81.8 5.8 76.0 19.0 57.0 £2.26 
1891/97 68.9 6.0 62.9 15.7 47.2 £2.26 
1896/1902 77.1 15.6 61.5 16.0 45.5 £2.18 
1903/09 57.7 7.5 50.2 13.0 37.2 £1.66 
1911/14 79.8 19.8 60.0 15.6 44.4 £1.77 
1 Wages represented an average of 23 % of total costs during the first four 
periods, 25 % during the following two and 26 % during the final 
period. 
2 Deflated by the British wholesale price index (1913 = 100). NB: 
Conversions from Finnish marks to pounds were made according to 
exchange rates recorded in ships' accounts until 1876, and from 1877 
according to the Bank of Finland avista exchange rates, published in 
Suomen Pankki 1926 (Bank of Finland Yearbook 1926). 
Source: Accounts specified in appendix IV:1 (data file). 
the 1880s and remained at that level up to the turn of the century. 
It was only during the subsequent depression that owners and 
masters managed to reduce them; indeed, a no-less-than funda-
mental change occurred around the turn of the century. This was 
very probably connected with the transition from wooden to 
metal-hulled vessels which took place in the Finnish fleet at that 
time. Not only were the latter somewhat cheaper in upkeep per 
ton; they were also employed on longer routes with fewer port 
visits per year (and as every master knew, port was a costly place). 
It is, however, possible that the source material exaggerates the 
change; vessels in this sample substituted iron and steel for wood 
more abruptly than in the actual merchant marine. 
After the early 1870s, sailing vessels which trafficked on the 
Baltic and the North Sea produced somewhat higher net results 
than deepwater windjammers. This is not unexpected, since it was 
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TABLE 4:11. Comparison of average gross income, net result and 
costs in the Finnish Baltic and North Sea sailing fleet 
(ships laid up for the winter). Finnish marks (and 









Other Other costs' 
costs 	 real value 
1871/77 93.1 34.3 58.8 19.1 39.7 £1.44 
1881/87 60.5 15.3 45.2 13.7 31.5 £1.44 
1891/97 48.7 9.6 39.1 11.6 27.5 £1.52 
1901/07 39.9 2.0 37.9 10.7 27.2 £1.42 
1911/14 68.4 9.2 59.2 13.2 46.0 £2.12 
1 Deflated by the British wholesale price index (1868/72 = 100) and 
expressed in pounds (1913 values). 
NB: Conversions from Finnish marks to pounds were made according to 
exchange rates recorded in ships' accounts until 1876, and from 
1877 according to the Bank of Finland avista exchange rates, 
published in Suomen Pankki 1926 (Bank of Finland Yearbook 1926). 
Source: Appendix 4:1 and the data file of ships' accounts. 
seen that their gross revenue was also relatively high, taking into 
account the fact that they sailed for only seven to eight months a 
year. The tide turned only after the mid-1890s; while long-traders 
(now mostly consisting of second-hand steel and iron 
windjammers) turned in improved profits per ton, Baltic and 
North Sea sailing vessels went through very meagre years. This 
was an inevitable outcome of the decrease in gross freights which 
they experienced at that time. 
Since the accounting material is rather limited, and the 
variations caused by differences in the length of the actual sailing 
season were great, the cost development of Baltic and North Sea 
tonnage can be sketched only in a rather summary manner (table 
4:11; again, the decimals have nothing to do with the margin of 
error of the estimate). However, there seem to have been certain 
logical differences in costs compared with long-traders. It is 
obvious that the wage bill was relatively high for the Baltic and 
North Sea tonnage, simply because man/ton ratios were bound to 
be high in smaller vessels. However, a higher-than-average 
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reduction was brought about during the depression, mainly by 
reducing the master's pay. On the other hand, other costs were 
quite low and, before the turn of the century, represented 54-60 
per cent of the comparative amount for long-traders. This 
obviously was because these vessels mostly loaded in small, cheap 
Finnish or North Swedish ports and the crews did a good deal of 
the actual loading. Only during the last decade of the period did 
the scales turn in this respect. Apart from the general rise in prices, 
this change was mostly relative: big iron and steel long-trader costs 
were cut much more effectively. 
For coastal vessels, the data is again very limited. Complete 
accounts are rare, but Jan-Erik Börman was able to collect a 
substantial amount of material for coastal sailers from the 
Southern Turku archipelago. According to him, the average profit 
in Finnish marks per net ton was as follows:2 
jakts galeases 3  
1860s 12.2 21.9 
1870-75 16.6 15.8 
1876-89 9.2 8.0 
1890s 22.0 18.2 
1900-13 27.9 
These averages are in line with the few proper accounts which 
are available.' Nor do they differ very much from the net income 
series for Baltic and North Sea tonnage, which did, however, seem 
to fare better in the earlier half of the period; after the 1890s the 
scales seemed to turn. These differences in economic performance 
are not unexpected in the light of tonnage development; as was 
seen before, coastal sailing tonnage diminished in the 1870s but 
began to grow again at the end of the century. 
2 	 Börman, Åboländsk bygdeseglation, p. 137 (bilaga 12). 
3 Jakt was a single-masted and galeas a two-masted coastal vessel. In the late 
19th century both were fore-and-aft rigged. 
4 See Börman, Åboländsk bygdeseglation, p. 128-136; Kåhre, Den åländska 




Steam tonnage was heterogeneous and an equally incoherent 
picture of profits emerges (see figure 4:4 and appendix IV:2B). The 
differences were not too pronounced in the earlier data: in the 
1870s and 1880s, both cargo vessels and combined passenger and 
goods carriers earned, on average, an annual net profit of 90-100 
Finnish marks (£3.5 to £4) per ton. It also seems that the decline in 
freight rates which took place from 1875 diminished results by 
10-15 per cent. 
Although the FAA "raw" data for individual ships' profits 
present a reliable general overview of the fluctuations, it must be 
remembered that overhead costs are excluded and the picture is 
slightly too optimistic. Moreover, because of substantial changes 
in insurance accounting, the material contains two distortions in 
particular; compared with the level of about 1905, it gives about 
six marks per net ton more profit in the mid-1890s, and about 15 
marks per ton in the 1910s.5 By using both the "raw" data and the 
detailed (1885,1895,1905 and 1913) profit analyses, a realistic 
profit estimate is, however, possible. 
It seems that the normal net returns of cargo ships sailing to the 
North Sea and beyond (as the bigger ships of the company 
exclusively did) was about 50-55 marks per net ton in the middle 
of the 1880s. After a few very good years in the late 1880s, this 
declined slowly to slightly less than 40 marks (£1.5) per ton. There 
was a temporary improvement at the turn of the century, followed 
by a rapid decline which brought down the average profit level for 
the best part of the decade to only 27-28 marks (£1.1). Only after 
1908 did the figures improve markedly, reaching about 70 marks 
(£2.75) in 1913. 
The "emigrant" steamers of the FAA generated not only huge 
gross income but also such a good net result — peaking to over 350 
5 First, around 1895, the company was building up an insurance fund and 
transferred an average 7 marks per net ton to it (which resulted in a decrease 
in insurance costs, while payments to the fund were included in ships' 
profits). Later, when the fund was considered big enough, the annual 
payment diminished to a tenth of what it had been. Finally, in the 1910s, all 
insurance costs were drawn from the individual ships' accounts to a 
company overhead account. 
262 
Fig. 4:4. Steamship Net Result. 
1 = North Sea passenger (emigrant) ships 
2 = Baltic passenger ships 









1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 
Source: Appendix IV:2. 
Finnish marks (£13.8) per ton in 1896-98 and 1906-07 — that the 
investment can be termed very profitable. However, the 
development was quite unstable with really deep drops in 1899-
1900, 1903-04 and 1910-12. The first of these drops was 
somewhat artificial; as with gross income, it resulted mainly from 
the trebling of the tonnage in question. The second decline was 
produced by the tariff war with the Nord-company (seep. 196) and 
the third reflected the temporary drop in the number of emigrants. 
Most of the time, passenger ships were about five times as 
profitable per ton as ordinary cargo ships. It must, however, be 
borne in mind that they were also far more expensive. 
The Baltic passenger/cargo vessels of the FAA fleet usually 
generated only about the same net income per ton as the bulk-
carriers of the company. On the other hand, much better results 
were produced at the end of the 1890s, in 1906 and in the 1910s, 
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that is, when there was no strong competition and traffic 
agreements with the Bore-company were in existence. The brand-
new Bore ships turned in profits of about 50 and 110 marks (£2 and 
£4) per ton in 1898-99, in other words, they fluctuated within the 
same range as the FAA. After the turn of the century, the FAA-
Baltic fleet also included a couple of newly built ships, but their 
profitability depended only on how hard the competition was; 
technical modernity seems to have been of marginal importance. 
Unfortunately, with the exception of one auxiliary and one 
steamship of 159 net tons, there are no detailed accounts from the 
1860s or 1870s. Steamship cost structure and development can be 
assessed in general terms only after the mid-1880s. 
The accounts of the steamship Lloyd from Wiborg (1875-77), 
reveal a cost structure which is atypical in several respects. Wages 
(master included) represented an unusually high (57.5 %) 
proportion of all expenses, or 96 Finnish marks per net ton, while 
fuel and oil only accounted for 18%, or 30.2 Finnish marks per net 
ton. On the other hand, total expenses were only 167 marks 
(around £6.5) per ton, which was actually much lower than the 
corresponding figure for the auxiliary. It is probable that the Lloyd 
did not pay any port dues in either Wiborg or Lubeck and, 
moreover, she sailed only six months a year. On the other hand, 
she was heavily manned with a well-paid crew (obviously the men 
had extra high wages because they had to pay for their food in the 
ship's restaurant).6 The auxiliary, again (the Expressen from 
Turku/Åbo, 1871-73) recorded much lower wages (48 marks/nt) 
but higher fuel costs (sic.!: 36 marks/nt; but she was in business 
practically 12 months a year), and her total costs amounted to 228 
Finnish marks (around £9) per net ton.' Oddly enough, these 
figures seem to be more representative than those of the Lloyd; 
according to a Swedish estimate from 1871, wages (excluding 
food) could amount to 24 % and fuel expenses to 14 % of total 
running costs.8 
The cost structure of the FAA fleet was estimated for the same 
6 The accounts of s/s Lloyd (see appendix IV:1). The ship sailed between 
Wiborg and Lübeck. 
7 	 The accounts of the Expressen (see appendix IV:1). The ship was engaged in 
tramp trading to Western Europe. 
8 	 Krantz, Historiska nationalräkenskaper för Sverige, p. 23. 
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years (1885, 1895, 1905 and 1913) for which detailed data was 
collected from the ledgers. These figures agree relatively well with 
the ratios presented above, as far as fuel costs are concerned: 16-
17 % of total costs was typical in all FÅA vessels. Wages, on the 
other hand never exceeded the coal bill, in fact, they usually came 
to less than half of it. The explanation is the relatively high average 
tonnage, which naturally meant that man/ton ratios were low. The 
company had also been able to economize on earlier steamship 
manning standards (table 4:12). 
Differences in other costs were surprisingly large. Before the 
turn of the century, bulk-carriers managed with 200-250 Finnish 
marks (£8-10) per net ton, and Baltic passenger/cargo ships had 
only a slighly higher average bill. Big passenger ships ("emigrant" 
ships), on the other hand, recorded costs four to five times higher, 
mainly a result of feeding a high number of passengers; in 1905 the 
FÅA itself began to run the restaurants aboard the passenger 
ships.9 Moreover, these costs were on the increase and this clearly 
affected profits during the last decade before the War. Baltic 
steamer costs also rose steeply at the end of the period, mainly as a 
result of the introduction of new modern ships burning much more 
coal. However, the investment was not bad as net result in this 
group increased more than costs. 
At the end of the period, costs in general increased relatively 
quickly, more quickly than British wholesale prices, for example. 
However, for all groups of FÅA vessels except the big passenger 
ships, the increase was roughly the same as or less than the 
increase in net result. 
Again, the data does not apply to tramp steamers. Generating 
less gross income than liners, they probably also recorded a lower 
and less stable net result. On the other hand, data on the largest 
cargo-ships of the FÅA (their "tramp steamers", 1902—) clearly 
shows that total costs for such vessels were fairly moderate, 
substantially less per ton than for all other vessels belonging to the 
company. It must be remembered that chartered ships visited far 
fewer ports than liners, and port dues made up a very large 
proportion of total costs. In general, the net result of the company's 
9 Exerpts from the directory's minutes in so-called "historical material", the 
archives of the FAA. 
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TABLE 4:12. Comparison of average gross income, net result and 
costs of FAA vessels, 1885, 1895, 1905 and 1913. 
Finnish marks (and fractions) per year and net ton. 










Other 	 Other costs' 
costs 	 real value 
A. Cargo steamers 
1885 	 349.5 52.7 296.8 (22.7) 48.1 226.0 £9.67 
1895 	 359.6 40.1 319.5 (22.7) 49.7 247.1 £12.54 
1905 	 336.9 47.6 289.3 22.7 52.5 214.1 £10.05 
1913 	 499.7 69.7 430.0 27.2 74.3 328.5 £12.99  
b. Thereof ships over 1,000 nt 
1905 	 262.1 56.9 205.2 15.4 33.6 156.2 £7.33 
1913 	 361.0 70.3 290.7 17.5 45.8 227.4 £8.96 
B. Passenger ships over 500 nt ("emigrant ships") 
1895 	 1,243.5 202.0 1,041.5 (29.6) 161.9 850.0 £43.12 
1905 	 1,834.1 303.1 1,531.0 30.4 116.6 1,384.0 £64.94 
1913 	 2,244.2 229.7 2,014.5 32.1 155.0 1,827.4 £71.97  
C. Baltic passenger/cargo ships 
1895 	 375.0 36.4 338.6 (32.9) 58.9 246.8 £12.52 
1905 	 417.3 37.9 379.4 31.2 86.1 262.1 £12.30 
1913 	 768.2 104.7 663.5 46.6 173.8 443.1 £17.52 
1 Deflated by the British wholesale price index (1868/72 = 100) and 
expressed in 1913 pounds (and fractions). 
NB: Figures in brackets denote wages estimated using the known man/ 
ton ratios and average monthly wages. Conversions from Finnish 
marks to pounds were made according to exchange rates recorded in 
ships' accounts, until 1876, and from 1877 according to the Bank of 
Finland avista exchange rates, published in Suomen Pankki 1926 
(Bank of Finland Yearbook 1926). 
Source: Accounts as in appendix IV:1 (data file). 
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cargo fleet fluctuated around 15 % of gross revenue (e.g. 15.6 % in 
1905, 14.2 % in 1913), which was also regarded as a normal ratio 
in Sweden.10 There is no reason to believe that tramp steamers, 
with their lower average costs, fared worse. If the typical annual 
gross revenue of a tramp steamer amounted to 180-250 Finnish 
marks per ton (see p. 251), the corresponding profit would fall to 
about 27-38 marks (£1.1-1.5). Even so, it almost matched the 
profits of sailing vessels in the "golden" 1860s. 
As far as coastal cargo tonnage is concerned, proper accounting 
data exists (as mentioned before) only in the archives of the FAA 
and covers just one steam and two motor vessels. Although a 
reasonably good gross income was accumulated, the accounts 
mostly show negative net results.11 It is possible that the wage rates 
paid by the company were too high for such small vessels. In any 
case, as long as simple sailing vessels dominated the transport of 
cheap bulk cargo, the hard fact in coastal trade was that freight 
levels were low. Apart from passenger traffic, this trade could not 
offer real prospects for anything other than the most basic and 
cheap steam and motor vessels, such as the wooden "tar-steamers" 
which carried fire-wood from the Saimaa area to St. Petersburg. 
Return on capital 
One of the key problems dealt with in this study is the 
development of profitability, both over time and across different 
tonnage categories. Needless to say, a comparison between sail and 
steam is of special interest. 
It is obvious that there are certain technical difficulties in 
comparing steamships and sailing vessels. Since there are also 
considerable problems with data, great caution is required in 
drawing conclusions. That the net result for steamships was, in 
general, much higher than for sailing vessels was, however, 
established beyond any doubt, but this observation does not mean 
that steamships were more profitable by an equal margin. They 
were also much more expensive, and therefore they had to bring 
10 	 Krantz, Historiska nationalräkenskaper för Sverige, p. 24-25. 
11 	 The ledgers of the FAA, s/s Tor (1896-1913), m/s Ursus (1906-1913), m/s  
Taurus (1911-1913). 
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more income to the owner if he was to have a reasonable return on 
his investment. 
Of course, the best way to measure profitability is to compare 
operating surplus with the current value of the capital stock. 
Ideally, the capital stock should include not only ships but also 
circulating capital, such as stores and cash. In practice, the latter 
items are very often disregarded,12 and this can be done with the 
good excuse that they always played a minor role in shipping. 
From the 1860s to the end of the 1880s, a typical value for bosun's 
stores, food provisions and cash aboard Finnish long-trading 
windjammers seems to have been between 13 and 15 Finnish 
marks (£0.5—£0.6) per net ton (the lower value refers to the 1880s 
when prices were lower too), or much less than 10 % of the value 
of the vessel herself. At the end of the period, their actual value 
was probably a little lower, as ships were larger and more 
economical to run.13 On the other hand, as they were also much 
cheaper, the proportion was higher than before. It may be 
estimated that, at the beginning of the period, return on total 
capital may have been about one percentage point lower than that 
computed on fixed capital only, and at the end the difference was 
probably close to 1.5. For steamships, the value of circulating 
capital per net ton was probably higher (especially for passenger 
ships), but since the ships themselves were much more expensive, 
the proportion of total capital must have been smaller still than for 
sailing vessels. In any case, these are only rough estimates because 
data on circulating capital is very fragmentary.14 This is the main 
reason why return on fixed capital represents the principal 
parameter of profitability in this case. 
12 	 See e.g. Fischer and Nordvik, "From Broager to Bergen". 
13 Accounts specified in appendix IV:1. 
14 	 A reliable overview of the value of food provisions etc. can be formed only if 
both the master's and owner's accounts have been preserved and are fairly 
detailed. The number of such cases is practically the same as those with 
complete data on food expenses (excluding FAA steamers, for which no data 
on cash and bosun's stores exists). 
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TABLE 4:13. Average current value per net ton of Finnish sailing 
vessels and steamships, 1875-1913. Finnish marks 
(pounds and fractions). 
Year 
Sailing vessels 
200>500 nt 	 500— nt 
Steamships' 
200>500 nt 	 500— nt 
1865 201 (£7.9) 205 (£8.1) 
1875 214 (£8.2) 177 (£6.8) 813 (£31.3) 
1885 141 (£5.6) 135 (£5.3) 647 (£25.5) 632 (£24.9) 
1895 114 (£4.5) 92 (£3.6) 468 (£18.5) 510 (£20.2) 
1905 99 (£3.9) 111 (£4.4) 640 (£24.3) 546 (£21.5) 
1913 84 (£3.3) 83 (£3.3) 515 (£20.3) 471 (£18.6) 
1 Excluding auxiliaries. 
Source: Registers of Sjöassuransföreningen i Finland; Ledgers of Finska 
Ångfartygs Aktiebolaget (Åbo Akademi, Maritime archives). 
Table 4:13 presents the development of the average ton-value of 
Finnish sailing vessels and steamships (see p. 99-100). Although 
current values declined in all categories, steamers remained, net 
ton for net ton, much more expensive than sailing vessels. On the 
other hand, there were significant differences in the ton prices for 
different types of steamship. The average book-values of FAA 
ships were as follows (Finnish marks):15 
Year 
	 Cargo ships 	 North Sea 	 Baltic 
over 500 nt 	 pass. ships 	 pass. ships 
1885 681 . 
1895 524 1,003 727 
1905 438 917 710 
1913 362 857 694 
Before going further it must, however, be pointed out that 
operating result is a balance in which no account is taken of capital 
costs of any kind. Even if it could be supposed that the majority of 
steamships and deepwater sailing ships were insured and 
15 	 Ledgers of Finska Ångfartygs Aktiebolaget.  
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therefore "risk" was deducted from the result in the form of 
insurance costs, realistic depreciation should, at least, be 
accounted for. In reality, many North Sea and Baltic sailing vessels 
as well as the whole coastal fleet sailed uninsured and thus, in the 
long run (although accidents occurred at very different rates to 
individual owners), capital losses through wreckage and minor 
misfortunes were incurred on a fairly regular basis. 
In the chapter on capital formation, it was estimated that 
Finnish-built wooden vessels which were either sold or wrecked 
before the turn of the century normally lost about four per cent of 
their original building cost per annum, while later second-hand 
windjammers lost about seven per cent of their purchase price. 
Compatible rates for steamships were appreciably lower, on 
average 2.5 % a year. These rates were computed according to the 
19th-century practice of equal ("flat rate") depreciation on the 
newbuilding or purchase value, and percentage depreciation on 
the actual value may be very different depending, above all, on the 
average age of the fleet and on how long ships belonged to the same 
owners. Of course, it maybe said that a sensible depreciation is not 
necessarily one which conforms with the ideas of the time in 
question; it should rather take into account the technical "ageing" 
of ships as well as the actual selling prices or insurance values. 
Ageing, however, is impossible to gauge other than subjectively. 
Moreover, in the late 19th century, shipping business (at least as 
far as bulk cargo was concerned), there was still a reasonable 
market for "second"- or even "third"-best technology and technical 
obsolescence was not a risk of primary concern. Therefore, in all 
the following estimations, depreciation has been computed 
starting with the above-mentioned percentages of building costs 
and purchase prices, which are then expressed as percentages of 
actual (depreciated) tonnage value. To be on the safe side, sailing 
vessel depreciation was never allowed to fall below six per cent 
(for the 1860s, five per cent would have been the actual 
estimation). 
The big question mark in table 4:14 is the additional 
depreciation which was computed for the Baltic and North Sea 
fleet to compensate for the uninsured risk. Since even these net 
results include reparation costs, only total losses were accounted 
for in this deduction. While total losses normally fluctuated 
around 2.5-3.5 % of total sailing tonnage (see p. 94), it has been 
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TABLE 4:14. Estimated profitability of the Finnish sailing fleet. 
Average operating result, depreciation and return on 
capital in per cent of current ship value. 
a = operating result 
b = depreciation 
c = additional depreciation to compensate for 
uninsured "risk" (Baltic and North sea fleets) 
d = return on capital 
Deepwater vessels 	 Vessels sailing on the Baltic 
Time 	 over 400 tons 	 and the North Sea 
a b d a b a-b c d 
1861/67 22.5 6 16.5 .. 
1873/77 13 6 7 16 6 10 1.5 8.5 
1878/82 8 6.5 1.5 8 6 2 1.5 0.5 
1883/87 3 7 —4 7 6 1 2 —1 
1888/92 9 7.5 1.5 9.5 6 3.5 2 1.5 
1893/97 9.5 8 1.5 8 6 2 2 0 
1898/1902 16 8 8 9 6.5 2.5 2 0.5 
1903/07 7 8 —1 1.5 7 —5.5 2 —7.5 
1911/14 24 8 16 11 7 4 2 2 
(1913/14 38.5 8 30.5 16.5 7 9.5 2 7.5) 
Source: Appendix IV:2 and table 4:13. 
assumed that the figure was slighly lower for this tonnage which 
sailed mostly in moderate weather conditions and was laid up for 
four to five months; moreover, in the 1870s, many vessels were 
insured, although the numbers decreased substantially during the 
following decade.16 In any case, although the deduction may seem 
arbitrary, it is clear that accounting only a normal depreciation 
would produce an unrealistically high return on capital. 
Had it been possible to include circulating capital in the 
estimation, the returns would not be quite as high as merely 
16 Registers of Åbo läns enskilda sjöassuransförening, Provincial Archives of 
Turku. E.g. in the middle of the 1880s about 50, "peasant"-owned ships were 
insured by the association, while ten years earlier the number had been 
around 150. Even this figure was less than a third of all Finnish sailing 
vessels in Baltic and North Sea trades. 
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compared with fixed capital. In any case, the figures show that, at 
the beginning of the period, shipping undoubtedly gave a very 
reasonable return. Long-traders, especially, accumulated 
respectable interest on investment. By the middle of the next 
decade, however, the rewards were no longer so attractive; it was 
possible to achieve similar results simply by lending money 
(interest rates were quite high at that time). During the "long 
depression", returns diminished still further; by the middle of the 
1880s, net result was no longer enough to allow any decent 
depreciation. Although interest rates were also quite low at that 
time, sailing ships were obviously not a good investment. 
As indicated by the net result, Baltic and North Sea vessels were 
more profitable in the 1870s than long-traders. If depreciation 
proper had only been accounted for (see column a—b), they would 
have remained so until the mid-1890s. This good result, however, 
was achieved by letting the majority of vessels sail uninsured, and 
therefore the inevitable total losses lowered the actual average 
return on capital. Indeed, it seems that only in the mid-1870s and 
by the middle of the next decade, when the depression in the 
international freight market was deepest, was there a substantial 
difference in favour of the smaller tonnage, but even then it was a 
difference between smaller and larger losses. Since total losses of 
uninsured ships fell on relatively few owners, it is very likely that 
the majority of them (in particular "peasant" owners who often 
were not able to calculate the actual return on their investments) 
thought Baltic and North Sea tonnage more profitable than it was. 
If normal insurance costs (4.5-6 %) had been added to average 
expenses, the balance would have been decidedly negative after 
the end of the 1870s.17 
After the mid-1890s, Baltic and North Sea tonnage regularly 
produced a much less favourable return on capital than larger 
vessels. Not only did profitability in this area decline, but that of 
long-traders also slowly began to improve (mainly because the 
prices of second-hand ships fell further). By the turn of the 
century, big second-hand windjammers were bringing a 
moderately good return and, just before the War, booming sailing 
ship freight meant that old and cheap vessels earned over 20-per 
17 On the other hand, if all vessels had been insured, some proportion of 
accounted reparation costs would have been paid by the underwriters. 
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cent return on capital, in other words more than the average in the 
"golden" 1860s. It is, however, possible that the estimations for the 
1880s and 1890s are slightly too optimistic; many long-traders 
(old, wood-hulled ones, in particular) also sailed uninsured, or 
only partly insured. Although the profitability was very good in 
the 1910s there were, on the other side of coin, the very meagre 
years around 1905-08, and an owner who was in the business, for 
example, from 1903 to 1913, could barely average more than about 
six per cent per annum. That was, of course, quite enough to make 
business meaningful, but on the other hand it was six per cent on 
rather cheap assets. A big iron or steel barque could not earn such 
an impressive amount pound for pound, and to accumulate 
enough to buy a steamship must have seemed quite difficult for the 
average windjammer owner. 
It is not possible to compute similar estimations for coastal 
sailing vessels. Not only is the data all too scanty, but the coastal 
trade itself was so labour-intensive that return on capital was not a 
central measure of success. The ships normally represented pure 
family enterprises and were built with relatively small inputs of 
money. They were not regarded as investments but rather as tools 
which gave the crew the opporturnity of a decently-paid job. If a 
coastal galeas or jakt was built using timber from the owner's 
forest and farm labour (see p. 74), it would cost no more than 80-
100 Finnish marks per net ton. Compared with a net result of 15-
20 marks per ton this was not bad business. However, if a price had 
been put on timber and farm labour (as anyone planning to invest 
in a coastal sailer would have done), the cost would have leapt to 
150-200 marks per ton. The proposition no longer seems so 
attractive, especially as such small vessels normally had a very 
short life. Returns probably only corresponded with depreciation, 
in other words, during its lifetime a vessel earned just enough 
money to build the next one. 
For steamships, the picture of return on capital is again drawn 
from the ledgers of the FAA company. The data is presented in 
table 4:15. The estimations are based on the rather simplistic 
assumption that 4 % of current value represents a realistic level of 
depreciation for all the decades in question. This value may be 
rather low for tramp steamers and second-hand craft but, as was 
mentioned before, it was derived from existing Finnish price data. 
The data on steamships from the 1870s and 1880s is much more 
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TABLE 4:15. Operating result and return on capital in the Finnish 
Steamship Co (FÅA) fleet. Per cent of the recorded 
book-value of ships. 
a = operating result 
b = return on capital = operating result minus 4 % 
depreciation 
Year 	 North Sea 	 North Sea 	 Baltic pass/ 
cargo ships 	 pass. ships 	 cargo ships 
a b 	 a b 	 a b 
1885/86 8.5 4.5 . . 
1893/97 7.2 3.2 23.0 19.0 6.5 2.5 
1898/1902 9.6 5.6 23.2 19.2 3.8 —0.2 
1903/07 6.3 2.3 24.4 20.4 4.8 0.8 
1912/13 17.3 13.3 20.6 16.6 20.3 16.3 
NB: Moving averages of "crude" traffic results (appendix IV:2B:c) were 
reduced by the ratio of real net result to "crude" result for 1885, 
1895, 1905 and 1913, and for 1898/1902 by the average of the 1895 
and 1905 ratios. 
Source: Appendix IV:2; ledgers of Finska Angfartygs Aktiebolaget (Åbo 
Akademi, Maritime archives). 
superficial. Compared with ton values for all steamships of over 
200 tons, typical net results amounted to about 12 per cent of 
capital value during the 1870s and about 14 per cent during the 
following decade.18 If 4 per cent of current value is still regarded as 
a realistic depreciation, this would indicate returns on capital in 
the order of 8 and 10 per cent respectively. It may seem surprising 
that profitability improved during a time when freights in general 
fell, but if this really were the case, it may have been simply 
because steamers became cheaper. These figures are higher than 
the first FÅA new-built cargo vessels could produce, which is 
really no wonder since the actual value of the latter was rather 
high. It is also possible that the international depression in freight 
markets, which certainly affected steamships sailing to the North 
Sea and beyond, was not as serious for those carrying goods and 
passengers on the coastal and Baltic lines. 
18 Appendix IV:2Ba. 
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Since the earlier data on steamships is not totally reliable, 
comparisons must be made with due caution. In any case, it seems 
clear that in the 1860s, deepwater sailing vessels earned on average 
better returns than steamships ever did before the 1910s. 
Equivalent averages were recorded by steamships only in 1913, but 
at that time long-trading windjammers again surpassed them. On 
the other hand, it is equally clear that, in the 1880s, steamers were 
clearly more profitable than any kind of sailing vessel. 
Table 4:15 demonstrates that different steamships also 
produced very different returns on capital. The emigrant passenger 
ships of the FÅA were still in a class of their own and, in spite of 
great fluctuations in business, earned on average close to 20 per 
cent of their current value.19 Baltic passenger/cargo steamers of the 
FAA were far less successful. In certain periods they hardly earned 
enough to account for depreciation, and over two decades (1893-
1913) they produced a somewhat worse return on capital than 
cargo steamers. 
Differences between the cargo ships in the FÅA fleet and 
deepwater sailing vessels fluctuated in both directions. During the 
booms, from 1895 to around 1900 and in the early 1910s, 
windjammers seem to have been more profitable; cargo steamers, 
again, performed better during the other periods. Comparison with 
Baltic and North Sea sailing craft, on the other hand, shows that 
these could never match the economic performance of steamers. In 
general, the FÅA cargo steamers gave a steadier economic 
performance than deepwater sailing vessels; this was, naturally, 
because they were mainly engaged in regular services. Yet, from 
the early 1890s to the First World War, the average overall 
performance in both groups was remarkably similar: if the 
depreciation rates used here are realistic, a return on capital in the 
order of 5 per cent was accumulated. 
If depreciation had not been accounted for, however, the 
comparison would have been vastly different. Except in the 1880s, 
deepwater sailing vessels produced a higher net income as a 
19 This was on average slightly better than the results of the German Hapag's 
New York line, 1905-1913. On the other hand, during the same years, 
Hapag's Brazil and LaPlata line generated about the same return as the FAA's 
cargo liners. Kresse, "The Shipping Industry in Germany, 1850-1914," p. 
160-161. 
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percentage of their value than cargo steamers, and even medium-
sized sailing vessels compared favourably in the early 1890s. This 
is worth pointing out since there must have been many sailing-
vessel owners who did not compute depreciation on their assets. 
The opportunities offered by big windjammers may thus have 
seemed more attractive than they actually turned out to be. 
Although there is very little reliable data on tramp steamers, it is 
possible to estimate the approximate margins of profitability for 
them. By the turn of the century, normal ton-prices of decent 
second-hand cargo-steamers seem to have fluctuated around £14-
16 (350-400 Finnish marks, see p. 82). A comparison of this with 
the assumed average profit of 27-38 marks per net ton (see p. 267) 
suggests a gross return on capital of 7-11 per cent. Since realistic 
depreciation for a second-hand steamer would be close to 5-6 %, 
this would result in net returns which were hardly better than 
those accumulated by the cargo ships of the FAA in the 1890s. In 
the following decade, at least during the depression when tramp 
freights were low, their prospects must have been worse. The 
declining interest in tramp steamers at that time is certainly a hint 
at such a trend. 
The varying fluctuations in the profitability of different ships 
make it difficult to give an overall estimation of which ones 
actually fared best during the latter part of the period. Depending 
on the actual time period, similar ships often produced results 
which deviated substantially from each other. The most decisive 
factor in "life-time" profitability — at least in the case of sailing 
vessels — was probably not the annual net result, but the price for 
which the vessel was bought and sold. The existence of an 
international, and obviously very competitive, market for second-
hand ships, however, makes it reasonable to expect that ton-prices 
developed in accordance with profit expectations. Unfortunately, 
too little light is thrown upon this side of shipping by the 
accounting material. 
One thing stands out quite clearly. With the exception of the 
"emigrant" ships of the FAA, the differences in economic 
behaviour between sailing vessels and steamships were by no 
means clear-cut. Indeed, overall assessment depends all too much 
on how high the elusive cost items of depreciation and uninsured 
risk are estimated. This is at least proof that sailing vessels were 
still potentially viable, which is in accordance with certain 
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explanations of the developments in Norway which have been 
cited before.20 That reasonable economic results could be obtained 
in Finland with second-class shipping technology is perhaps not 
so surprising. It must be remembered that the country was then 
decidedly peripheral, with good supplies of cheap labour. In such 
conditions, the relative price of capital compared with the price of 
labour was inevitably higher than in the industrialized "core"-
countries of Western Europe. 
20 For a general discussion on the profitability of shipping in Norway see 
Nordvik, "The Shipping Industries of the Scandinavian Countries," p. 144-
145. 
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4. The macro view 
The extrapolation of income and profit data into national totals 
may, at first sight, seem merely a technical routine. It is true that, 
since the average economic performance of Finnish merchant 
vessels has already been established, the total figures cannot 
provide any drastically new insights into the development of gross 
income or profitability. However, it must be remembered that if the 
average net return of shipping changed by, say, a quarter, the total 
income effect of the change would depend on the total volume of 
affected business. Therefore, series of total income and profit do 
have a certain analytical value of their own. Moreover, the 
fluctuations in total profit provide a very interesting comparison 
with the series of total investments presented earlier. It can be used 
to find out whether there was any remarkable capital "emigration" 
from shipping. 
National shipping income and value-added are also useful in 
providing fairly reliable details, or data for cross-checking, for the 
estimates of the total gross domestic product. However, since this 
study deals mainly with structural changes, annual series were not 
computed, as interesting as they might have been in studying 
business cycles. Instead, estimates for shipping income and value-
added will be presented as averages for five years or so.1 This 
should be sufficient to reveal the main trends and big cycles which 
covered several years. 
1 	 This is because the basic series of gross income and net result were computed 
as five-year moving averages. Strictly speaking, all data did not cover similar 
periods: for example, sailing-vessel income was mainly based on estimates of 
transport output, which were derived from voyage data normally covering a 
couple of years, or from four-year averages computed from shipping 
statistics, and from freight data which could cover significantly longer 
periods. Thus, the periods shown in the tables should not be taken too 
literally; the averages always weight the middle years slightly more than the 
marginal years. 
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Total gross revenue 
Strictly speaking, only gross revenue earned in foreign traffic is 
relevant here. All estimations of transport output presented earlier 
excluded traffic between Finnish ports unless it belonged to a line 
going abroad. On the other hand, tonnage figures referred to all 
ships above certain minimum sizes and, particularly at the low 
end of the scale, sometimes included vessels which never crossed 
Finnish boundaries. Certain earlier estimations of shipping 
income, as well as current statistics, also include domestic 
shipping. For this reason, it was deemed useful to present an 
estimation of domestic coastal traffic. This will, however, be very 
crude and, moreover, only include steamship traffic.2 Since this 
figure is not very reliable (see appendix IV:3), the gross revenue of 
foreign shipping will be always used as the primary series. 
The results of the estimations are presented in tables 4:14-16. 
As mentioned before, it was possible to calculate the gross income 
for sailing vessels using two alternative methods. These yielded 
slightly different results in most cases. However, the variations 
were systematic: they arose mainly because of disparities in the 
chronological spread of the estimations. The first one was based on 
three-year freight averages (or, rather, the regression lines of three-
year freight observations) and the estimation of ton-miles from a 
sample covering almost two years on average. The second 
estimation, again, was drawn from average income series covering 
no less than five years. This difference implies that the first 
estimation, being more prone to short-term fluctuations, should 
suggest higher values for boom periods and lower ones for 
depressions, while in the second, fluctuations are partly smoothed 
out. Moreover, the second estimation was based on scantier and 
slightly less representative material; as previously mentioned, the 
accounts represent larger-than-average vessels, and in all 
probability, they could have been better run. Thus, for many 
purposes, the first estimation is to be preferred. The first 
observation of the series, for about 1864/66, should be used with 
some caution, since the data for Baltic and North Sea freight are 
very limited. 
2 There was also domestic traffic by sailing vessels; e.g. firewood was 
transported to Helsinki and burned lime to all the bigger towns by small 
coastal sailers. 
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TABLE 4:16. Estimated total gross revenue of Finnish sailing 
vessels. Million Finnish marks (mill. pounds 
sterling) 
A. Estimation by ton-miles produced in different trades 
1864/66 1874/76 1884/86 1894/96 1904/06 1912/13 
Cross-trade 13.8 13.2 6.4 4.9 4.4 8.0 
Export 6.1 5.5 3.0 2.5 1.85 2.45 
Import 1.2 1.0 0.7 0.55 0.25 0.45 
Coastal trade 2.0 1.75 1.3 1.3 1.7 2.0 
Total 23.1 21.5 11.4 9.3 8.2 12.9 
(£0.91) (£0.81) (£0.45) (£0.36) (£0.32) (£0.51) 
B. Estimation by tonnage 
1863/67 1873/77 1883/87 1893/97 1903/07 1911/13 
Long-traders 14.5 10.2 5.0 5.15 4.4 7.25 
Baltic and North Sea 4.8 10.2 6.4 3.45 2.6 3.25 
Coastal 2.0 1.7 1.3 1.3 1.7 2.0 
Total 21.3 22.1 12.7 9.9 8.7 12.5 
(£0.84) (£0.84) (£0.50) (£0.39) (£0.34) (£0.49) 
Source: Appendix IV:3. 
Table 4:16 shows that, in the 1860s and 1870s, foreign cross-trade 
generated no less than about 60 % of all income earned by sailing 
vessels. During the "long depression", this figure dropped to 53-
54 %, but it reached the 60 % level again in the early 1910s. The 
high level of freight in the "golden" 1860s is also very evident; 
although sailing vessel tonnage increased from 1865 to 1875 by 
more than 25 %, gross income hardly exceeded 1864/66 levels 
(although in 1871/74 it was probably close to 23 million marks). 
During the short depression at the end of the 1860s, total gross 
freight had already fallen to about 18 million marks,3 although the 
real decline began in the late 1870s. By 1885, total gross revenue 
was only a half of its former boom-period level, and two decades 
later it had dropped further by a quarter. The picture brightened in 
the late 1890s, and income probably exceeded 11 million just 
3 	 This estimation is based on the development of freights and income and it is 
supposed that long-trading sailing tonnage declined by some 5 %. 
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TABLE 4:17. Estimated total gross revenue of Finnish steamships. 
Million Finnish marks (mill. pounds sterling). 
Estimation by tonnage 
1863/67 1873/77 1883/87 1893/97 1903/07 1911/13 
- 1.7 7.4 7.5 
- 0.08 0.7 2.1 3.4 8.1 
- 0.52 0.072 0.4 2.3 2.75 
1.15 1.95 2.2 2.8 3.7 4.35 
1.1 
1.15 2.5 3.0 7.0 16.8 23.7 
(£0.04) (£0.09) (£0.12) (£0.28) (£0.66) (£0.93) 
0.2 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.6 
1.35 2.9 3.7 7.7 17.6 25.3 
Emigrant ships 
Long-tr. cargo-ships 









1 Including passenger/cargo vessels. 
2 Only auxiliaries. 
3 Special cargo vessels only after around 1900, before 1912/14 included 
in the preceding group. 
Source: Appendix IV:3. 
before the turn of the century. The pre-war boom brought it back to 
about the same level as at the beginning of the 1880s. If the war had 
not begun, the gross revenue of Finnish sailing vessels might well 
have been about 14 million marks in 1914. 
The estimation of steamship income is, in certain respects, 
cruder than that for sailing vessels. It suffers, above all, from a lack 
of data in certain tonnage categories, such as tramp steamers, 
passenger ships below 300 tons and small cargo vessels sailing to 
Russia and Sweden (which, however, became common only after 
the turn of the century). For all these cases there is insufficient 
infromation about both total tonnage and average income, nor was 
it possible to make a precise distinction between domestic and 
small-scale foreign-going shipping. Fortunately, all these 
unknowns concern rather small, low-income groups. On the other 
hand, there is a wealth of information about the shipping 
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categories which became important, such as liner services beyond 
the Sound: in 1913, for example, no less than 64 % of the estimated 
steamship gross income was generated by FAA ships, and 58 % of 
this sum was brought in by their emigrant steamers. This was 
fortunate, because these were also trades with great fluctuations in 
income, as indicated previously. In 1913, the new boom in 
emigrant steamers and cargo liners brought total steamship 
income, domestic traffic included, close to 30 million Finnish 
marks, while the average for 1911-13 was only about 25 million. 
Table 4:17 shows that steamship income grew almost 20-fold in 
five decades. It also indicates that the importance of shipping 
beyond the Baltic grew rapidly at the end of the 19th century, 
generating over three quarters of gross freight by 1905. On the other 
hand, most of this income originated from transport to or from 
Finland; cross-trade was negligible at first, and it was only by the 
turn of the century that it probably exceeded 10 % of all steamship 
income for a few years.4 As might be expected from all the earlier 
data, the growth in income was fairly continuous. It was, however, 
most rapid in the 1890s, while the first five or six years of this 
century witnessed a distinct stagnation. 
The development of total shipping income (table 4:16) does not 
produce any real surprises. It reveals the same decline after the late 
1870s and growth after the 1890s shown by both total tonnage and 
transport output. Across the whole period, however, growth was 
fairly modest. Depending on whether the total is gauged by British 
or Finnish fixed prices, the volume of gross income in the 1860s 
and 1870s was between 55 and 70 per cent of what it was in 1911/ 
13. This was much less than the growth of total production either 
in net tons or ton-miles and, once more, presents proof of how sea 
transport became cheaper. On the other hand, the proportions of 
steamship and sailing vessel income correlated rather well with 
transport share in net tons. Thus, gauged by both gross freight and 
loaded net tons, steamships passed sailing vessels some time 
during the latter part of the 1890s, while in ton-miles they only 
exceeded the 40-per-cent level by 1905 and stayed at that up to the 
4 Cross-trade was carried on mainly by tramp steamers, which could equally 
well carry cargo to or from Finland. Of course, many liner steamers also did 
some cross-trading in the winter. Income generated by tramp steamers 
probably represented the maximum income from cross trade. 
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TABLE 4:18. Estimated total gross revenue of Finnish shipping, 
1864-1914. 
Total I = total of foreign shipping; 
Total II= total incl. domestic traffic by steamships. 
Gross revenue, 	 Steamsh. Indices of total I, 
Time 
	
mill. Finnish marks 	 share of 1912/14=100  
S/V 	 S/S Total Total total I, Current Fixed prices 
I 	 II 	 % 	 prices Finn. Brit. 
1863/67 21.3 1.2 22.5 22.7 5 62 69 53 
1873/77 22.1 2.5 24.6 25.0 10 68 66 55 
1883/87 12.7 3.0 15.7 16.4 19 43 55 46 
1893/97 9.9 7.0 16.9 17.6 41 47 65 60 
1903/07 8.7 16.8 25.5 26.3 66 70 83 82 
1911/13 12.5 23.7 36.2 37.8 65 100 100 100 
NB: For the sake of consistency, the "B" estimate of sailing-vessel gross 
revenue (covering five-year periods) was used here. Index "Finn." = 
current price index deflated by Finnish wholesale-prices; index 
"Brit." = current price index deflated by British wholesale-prices. 
Source: Tables 4:16-17. 
end of the period. Ton-miles counted so little in income simply 
because, at the end of the period, windjammers sailed most of their 
ton-miles engaged in low-paying, long-distance tramp trading. 
Another important structural change, which almost 
automatically followed from the dwindling role of sailing vessels, 
was the declining importance of foreign cross trade. In the 1860s 
and 1870s, over 55 % of all shipping income (excluding domestic 
traffic) originated in transport between foreign ports. This dropped 
to around 30 % in the middle of the 1890s, and after the turn of the 
century it fluctuated around 27-29 %. 
Only one systematic estimation of Finnish shipping income 
during this period existed previously. It was published as part of a 
total assessment of transport and communication in Finland 
between 1860 and 1913 by Matti Peltonen.5 Although the author 
5 Peltonen, Liikenne Suomessa 1860-1913, table 1. There is also an earlier 
estimate which covers the years 1900-13; Leppänen, Liikenne Suomessa 
1900-1965, although these figures on shipping before World War I are more 
loosely based than Peltonen's. 
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had to be content with rather crude data — i.a. he lacked reliable 
information on actual freight earnings — his results fell relatively 
close to those presented above:  
Peltonen This study 
(total II) 
1863/67 17.8 22.7 
1873/77 24.5 25.0 
1883/87 16.8 16.4 
1893/97 16.7 17.6 
1903/07 25.3 26.3 
1911/13 43.4 37.8 
The greatest single difference occurs for the 1860s. It is obvious 
that shipping income at that time (which is not covered by any 
good freight rate index) has been generally underestimated. On the 
other hand, the decline in the 1880s was somewhat steeper than 
indicated by any tonnage figures or calculations of ton-miles.  
Peltonen probably overestimated the last boom of the period 
because he used the official tonnage figures as a starting point, thus 
counting more ships than existed in reality. However, it can be 
said that both sets of estimations generally correlate quite well. 
Value-added or net value of production 
It is generally understood that gross revenue (as any measurement 
of the gross value of output) does not present a correct picture of 
shipping's real contribution to the national economy. A large 
proportion of the costs involved were paid either abroad or to other 
branches of the economy and did not contribute to the income of 
Finnish shipowners or sailors. In modern economic history, the 
value-added of an industry surpasses the gross value of output as 
the standard macro-economic gauge. 
In manufacturing and other goods-producing industries, value-
added is very conveniently calculated by subtracting the 
purchaser's value of raw-materials, semi-finished goods and other 
bought-in services (including maintenance and repair) used in the 
production process from the gross value of output. This is not 
feasible when dealing with a service-producing industry like 
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TABLE 4:19. Estimated value-added of Finnish shipping, 1865-
1913. Million Finnish marks. 
1 = operating surplus 
2 = wages of crew, masters' salaries, cost of food 
provisions) 
3 = value-added 






1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
1863/67 5.03 5.22 10.25 0.45 0.67 1.12 0.21 0.12 0.33 
1873/77 5.60 6.25 11.85 0.44 0.67 1.10 0.59 0.39 0.98 
1883/87 1.41 4.28 5.69 0.23 0.51 0.74 0.63 0.54 1.17 
1893/97 1.36 3.12 4.48 0.46 0.59 1.04 0.99 0.92 1.91 
1903/07 0.73 2.76 3.50 0.46 0.71 1.17 1.92 1.90 3.82 
1911/13 2.24 3.14 5.38 0.81 0.87 1.68 3.47 2.41 5.88 
Time Total foreign 
traffic 
1 	 2 	 3 
Domestic traffic 
by steamships 
1 	 2 	 3 
Sum total 
(total II) 
1 	 2 	 3 
1863/67 5.69 6.02 11.71 0.03 0.07 0.10 5.72 6.09 11.81 
1873/77 6.63 7.31 13.93 0.07 0.17 0.24 6.70 7.48 14.17 
1883/87 2.26 5.34 7.60 0.08 0.26 0.34 2.34 5.60 7.94 
1893/97 2.81 4.63 7.44 0.13 0.51 0.63 2.94 5.14 8.07 
1903/07 3.11 5.37 8.48 0.15 0.50 0.64 3.26 5.87 9.12 
1911/13 6.52 6.42 12.94 0.27 0.79 1.06 6.79 7.21 14.00 
1 No food costs were included for coastal sailing vessels. 
Source: Appendix IV:4. 
shipping, simply because the residual between gross output and 
value-added consists of a rather complex collection of different 
cost items. It is far easier to sum up the "positive" items 
contributing to value-added, wages and salaries and operating 
surplus. Since value-added represents an industry's contribution 
to gross national (or domestic) product, it includes the 
depreciation of production capital. This inclusion is automatic in 
this study because operating surplus was calculated without 
taking capital costs into account. 
An estimation of the value-added of Finnish shipping is 
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presented in table 4:19 (for more details, see appendix IV:4). It 
includes two insufficiently-known sectors, coastal sailing vessels 
(sailing to Russia and Sweden) and steamers navigating domestic 
coastal waters, of which the former was, of course, included in the 
"primary" series concerning foreign traffic.6 Totals must, therefore, 
be used with caution. 
The figures reveal some interesting trends and fluctuations. 
First, it can be seen that the value-added of shipping was probably 
not greater at the end of the period than in the middle of the 1870s 
(since the level of wholesale prices in Finland was about the same 
at both times, this also applies to real values). At the same time, 
gross income grew by about 50 %, which means that the 
proportion of overhead costs, such as port dues and fuel, had 
increased. This was, of course, to be expected with the increase in 
steamship income: overheads featured more prominently in the 
cost structure of steamships than of sailing vessels. They are often 
estimated at two-thirds of gross income for steamers and about a 
half for sailing ships.' In practice, the proportions fluctuated a lot; 






1863/67 51.4 % 71.3 % 52.4 % 
1873/77 40.0 % 60.9 % 43.9 % 
1883/87 43.7 % 61.0 % 47.6 % 
1893/97 44.0 % 72.7 % 57.4 % 
1903/07 46.2 % 77.3 % 68.6 % 
1911/13 50.6 % 75.2 % 67.5 % 
The high percentage for steamships in the 1860s may, at least 
partly, arise from the fact that the respective gross income was very 
cautiously estimated; in any case, sailing vessel figures, which are 
relatively reliable, were also high at that time. At least as far as 
sailing vessels were concerned, the subsequent decrease resulted 
from the increase in wood exports on small and medium-sized 
6 	 Since a significant proportion of wages and food were consumed abroad, the 
value-added of shipping should be understood as a part of national rather 
than domestic gross product. 
7 See e.g. Peltonen, op. cit., p. 26. 
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vessels; as was mentioned before, these ships incurred lower port 
expenses than long-trading windjammers. The same probably also 
applies to coastal passenger steamers. Later, when the proportion 
of long-traders again grew, the percentages for sailing vessels also 
increased a little. Steamship overheads also grew at the same rate 
as the increase in shipping beyond the Sound. These differences 
account for the interesting fact that sailing ships contributed more 
to the national income than their gross income would indicate; 
still, after the turn of the century, steamship value-added 
(excluding coastal and domestic trade) exceeded that of sailing 
vessels with fairly modest margins. 
It is obvious that fluctuations in value-added closely followed 
the fluctuations in operating result. In the 1860s and 1870s, as far 
as sailing vessels were concerned, the latter was roughly equal to 
the total wages and food bill (which represented income for 
labour). Later it dropped to a third and only in the 1910s (and 
probably also during the boom of the late 1890s) did it regain a 
higher level at about two-thirds. Steamships, however, showed a 
very different distribution pattern among the main elements of 
value-added; operating result was constantly higher than the 
income for labour. This is perfectly understandable: since 
steamships were expensive, a far larger proportion of their value-
added was contributed by capital than in the case of sailing 
vessels. Irrespective of the actual man-ton ratios, steam 
represented a capital-intensive mode of production and sail a 
labour-intensive one. 
The value-added of shipping computed here differs 
significantly from the estimation presented in the previously-
mentioned study on the growth of the transport sector in Finland, 
1860-1913.8 In most cases, Peltonen's figures were lower but, for 
the end of the period, they surpassed the ones in this study: 
8 Peltonen. op. cit. 
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Peltonen  This study 
(total II) 
1863/67 8.8 11.8 
1873/77 12.0 14.2 
1883/87 7.2 7.9 
1893/97 7.7 8.1 
1903/07 11.2 9.1 
1911/13 19.1 14.0 
The differences probably resulted from the fixed ratios of value-
added to gross production which Peltonen used; the differences in 
estimated gross revenue also increased the disparity both at the 
beginning and the end of the period. In a few cases the differences 
are of such a magnitude that they affect the estimation for the 
whole transport sector. 
Shipping income and shipping investments 
Of all the items on the shipping balance sheet, the operating result 
is, in one respect, the most interesting: it was the main source of 
investment. For everything from old-fashioned one-ship 
companies to modern, joint-stock companies the assumption was 
that, if shipping was profitable, a high proportion (which, of 
course, depended on the standard of everyday consumption of the 
owner and/or dividends to shareholders) of the operating surplus 
was reinvested in shipping. 
There was also another "insider" source of capital which was 
quite often used for buying shares in vessels, namely the masters' 
salaries. Masters of big ships had fairly high earnings, half or even 
more of the total wage bill for the crew (officers included). This 
made them potential investors in shipping, and during the "long 
depression" in particular, they had a keen interest in buying shares 
in ships: being a shipowner secured their master's income which, 
in times of low freights, could easily exceed the profit from the 
ship herself. Of course, a significant amount of this income was 
taken up by the normal consumption of the master and his family. 
It is impossible to estimate how much masters invested in 
shipping. The cautious approach to this problem would be either 
to neglect their contribution altogether, or to count only a low 
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proportion, say 5 % of their total earnings, and thus largely to 
compare operating surplus with investments. This still leaves one 
more item which must be taken into account to make the balance 
realistic: income from sold ships always had some importance in 
the financing of new acquisitions. As previously observed, the 
selling of used tonnage was an irregular business which mainly 
depended on freight cycles and cycles of investment (see p. 92-
93). Unfortunately, there are no reliable data on sold ships before 
1887, when the foreign trade statistics began to incorporate figures 
on exported tonnage.9 This, of course, does not apply to ships sold 
in Finland, but as the investment estimations used were on a 
national level and did not include ships bought or sold within 
Finland, this series is a logical match. Unfortunately, the statistics 
do not allow for any distiction between second-hand and newly 
built ships which were exported directly by the shipbuilding 
industry; caution is therefore called for.'° 
It is possible only to make rough estimations for before 1887. 
The data on about 100 ships registered in the ports of Turku (Abo) 
and Oulu between 1855 and 1880 (see p. 92) indicated that about a 
quarter of them, or half as many as were lost in shipwrecks, were 
sold abroad. Since total losses of sailing vessels amounted to 2.5-
4 % of tonnage, assuming that Turku and Oulu were representative 
of the whole country, it seems that in the 1860s and 1870s, the 
normal export rate for other than coastal ships was between one 
and two per cent of the tonnage in question. This is, of course, a 
rough approximation which can only hold good for a period 
including at least one complete business cycle. 
Table 4:20 presents a comparison of entrepreneurial income and 
investments in shipping. Since no trustworthy estimations of 
newbuilding could be computed for 1886-1895, there is a gap for 
that period. The table does not include coastal shipping simply 
9 Finnish Official Statistics, ser. I and IA. 
10 New vessels (mainly small steamers) were exported above all to Russia. 
Small coastal sailing vessels were also sold there (usually to Estonia). Since 
the following comparison does not take coastal vessels into account, all 
export to Russia was excluded. As far as export to other countries was 
concerned, all sailing vessels were observed (practically all of them were 
second-hand craft), but exported steamships were counted only if their value 
per ton clearly indicated that they were not new. 
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TABLE 4:20. Entrepreneurs' income and investments in Finnish 
shipping (excluding coastal vessels), 1860-1914. 
Annual averages, million Finnish marks. 
Time A. Operat. 
surplus 
B. Income fr. 	 C. Total 
sold tonnage investments 
D. A+B-C 
1861/70 5.0 0.35 4.5 0.85 
- thereof urban 
shipowners 4.25 0.25 3.5 1.0 
1871/80 5.6 0.50 3.95 2.15 
- thereof urban 
shipowners 2.45 0.30 1.85 0.9 
1881/85 2.8 0.35 1.1 2.05 
1896/1900 2.85 0.3 4.0 -0.85 
- thereof steam 1.1 - 3.0 -1.9 
1901/10 3.60 0.60 2.05 2.15 
- thereof steam 2.65 0.45 1.5 1.6 
1911/14 6.5 0.95 2.15 5.3 
- thereof steam 4.25 0.8 0.9 4.15 
Source: Appendix IV:4; estimations of tonnage sold abroad 1860-1885 
and statistics of exported tonnage 1887-1914 (Finnish Official 
Statistics, ser I and IA); tables 2:19-22 (to exclude investments 
in coastal tonnage the total investments have been reduced by 0.3 
million for the 1860s, 0.25 for the 1870s and 0.2 million for 1881/ 
85; from 1896 onwards, only imported tonnage was observed). 
because neither income nor investments are accurately known. 
Certain distinctions have been made, however. Urban and 
steamship income and investments are separated from the total 
sum up to 1880 and from 1896 respectively. This kind of 
classification, however, has one inherent weakness: since there is 
no reliable data on domestic buying and selling of ships, capital 
movement between these groups remains unknown. 
Strictly speaking, it is impossible to ascertain the proportion of 
shipping investment which was made up of reinvested shipping 
income; as a matter of course, capital was frequently both 
withdrawn from the industry and imported by newcomers. 
However, the relationship between investment and income is 
indicative of the interest aroused by the shipping business. The 
comparison immediately shows one general feature: with the 
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exception of one single period, which only concerned steamships, 
income always exceeded investments by a relatively good margin 
(no estimation of masters' investments was included). Basically, 
this is not unexpected; the consumption of shipowners, who built 
large houses and imported foreign luxuries for their private use, 
was by no means modest. Yet, considering the low housing costs 
and the low level of wages for domestic servants in Finland, and 
the fact that, at least before the 1890s, many owners were also 
involved in other business, it does not seem probable that the 
entire difference between income and investments was accounted 
for by private consumption." 
In any case, it seems reasonable to suppose that a clear majority 
of shipping surplus was reinvested, both in the 1860s and 1870s. 
In the "golden" 1860s, when "peasant" shipping expanded, rural 
owners actually seem to have invested more in larger vessels than 
they earned from them. Obviously, they invested income from 
coastal traffic and from sales of coastal vessels, and, logically, the 
coastal fleet diminished at that time. In the following decade, the 
figures suggest that investments by rural owners had declined 
substantially. As wood exports to the North Sea ports were 
prospering at that time, this does not seem very probable. Indeed, 
they bought numerous ships from Finnish towns: at least 15 big 
vessels, for example, were bought for the southern Turku 
archipelago.12 Thus, investments by rural owners must have been 
much larger than the estimation suggests, while urban owners 
received more income from sold ships (which they did not 
reinvest). On the whole, it seems that no less than 35 % of all 
shipping income (if income from sold tonnage is included) was 
withdrawn from business during this decade. 
During the 1880s, the excess of income over investments rose on 
average to roughly the same real value as in the preceding decade, 
11 	 It maybe supposed that, in the 1860s and 1870s, there were 30-40 important 
shipowners whose private comsumption was probably around 10,000 marks 
a year (the total income of a senator or a governor was, at that time, about 
20,000 marks a year), but since many of them had substantial income from 
other sources, shipping probably contributed less than 0.3 million marks to 
their living. If the remaining, say 150, more modest owners of other than 
coastal craft (excluding those who only had some minor shares) consumed on 
average 2,000 marks a year, the total would end up at 0.6 million marks. 
12 	 Börman, Åboländsk bygdeseglation, p. 141. 
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but since profits had declined, this means that only a third of total 
income was reinvested. The latter part of the decade, up to 1888, 
was probably similar to the earlier part in this respect.13 It may be 
claimed that, in the whole period from 1871 to 1888 (or rather from 
the late 1870s to 1888), as much as about 40 million marks of 
shipping income was not reinvested. This is almost as much as the 
current value of the fleet by 1875. There is only one reservation: it 
is possible that masters increased their investment in shipping in 
the 1880s. 
A turnaround in investment activity started as early as 1889 and 
1890, but it was only during the latter half of the 1890s that 
investment outstripped shipping income. As already mentioned, 
this was due to investments in steam, while investments in sail 
again show a deficit of about 0.8 million (although part of this was 
probably invested in coastal vessels). This was a period when the 
state gave low-interest loans and even subsidies to shipping.14 
Existing steamship companies also increased their joint-stock 
capital, and new ones were founded. Thus, for the first time, there 
is an indication of noticeable sums of "outside" money being 
invested in shipping. By the next decade, however, the situation 
changed again and a good half of all income "escaped" from steam 
shipping. Investment in sail, on the other hand, remained 
surprisingly constant, although it fluctuated at the same rate as the 
operating surplus. The last few boom years before the war were a 
logical continuation of this: investments in sail still grew, but 
steamships produced far more than was reinvested in them. In the 
period from 1901 to the War, no less than 35-40 million marks of 
shipping income — most of it from steamships — seems to have 
been either consumed or (mainly) invested elsewhere. Considering 
that the current value of the whole Finnish merchant tonnage of 
1913 was estimated at less than 43 million marks (see p. 101), this 
was no small sum. 
An obvious conclusion seems to be that, for the best part of the 
period, shipping was not only self-supporting in terms of 
investments but also generated money which was invested in other 
13 In 1887-88, sailing vessels worth 0.38 million were exported and only 0.06 
million imported. During the same years, imports of steamships averaged 
0.52 million marks. 
14 See e.g.  Kaukiainen, "The Transition from Sail to Steam", p. 180-182. 
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industries. Even in the 1860s, it may be suspected that the excess 
of income over investments was not consumed entirely, but that 
some part of it went to the financing of new sawmills, for example. 
During the decade beginning 1875, money evidently went out of 
shipping and was invested elsewhere, and the "counter-current" 
in the 1890s could not nearly compensate for it. The final period is 
all the more remarkable in that most of the capital movement took 
place within steam shipping, which was bringing tolerable returns. 
This also indicates that the low investment rate after the turn of 
the century was rather a result of a lack of interest than of 
inadequate income. For the period 1875-1887, when the tonnage 
actually declined, the answer may not be equally obvious. The 
difference between actual investments and operating results, 
however, was so large — about 1.7 million a year in 1881/85 — that 
it clearly exceeded reasonable estimations of shipowners' private 
consumption. Another question is whether income was high 
enough just to support the existing level of tonnage, that is, to pay 
for actual losses and wear and tear. At that time, investments 
equalling about 6 per cent of the tonnage value were needed to 
retain the current volume (see p. 84). By 1875, 6 per cent of the 
current fleet value equalled about 2.8 million marks, or roughly the 
same as the estimated average operating result. It has already been 
established that, as far as sailing vessels were concerned, the 
operating result scarcely exceeded capital costs in the middle of 
the 1880s. All this means that, even if owners had believed in the 
business (that is: if there had not been better opportunities), 
shipping income would hardly have provided realistic 
possibilities of tonnage growth from the late 1870s to the middle of 
the 1890s. 
However, to put these facts into perspective, it must also be 
stressed that not even the "tolerable returns" of the last two 
decades would have enabled Finland to build enough steamships 
to bring her up to average European levels. In 1913, Sweden, for 
example, had about 130 net tons of steamships per thousand 
inhabitants. In order to achieve a similar ratio, Finland should 
have built over 350,000 net tons of steamshipping over two 
decades, a total investment of something between 150 and 200 
million marks. This would have required a massive contribution 
from outside traditional shipping circles. 
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V. Summary and conclusions 
Structural change and profitability 
Although the transition from sail to steam in Finnish shipping was 
much delayed, and far from complete at the outset of the First 
World War, there is no doubt that a profound structural change 
took place in the period 1860-1914. This change can be looked at 
from various angles and the technical one was not necessarily the 
most important. As was pointed out at the beginning of this book, 
the most outstanding feature was that Finnish shipping, with a 
slower growth rate than the national economy and international 
shipping in general, changed from being relatively up-to-date and 
competitive and became a backward or, at best, semi-modern 
industry. 
In the 1860s, the hard core of Finnish shipping consisted of a 
relatively uniform top stratum of urban shipowners. Geographi-
cally, it spanned, above all, the towns on the Bothnian and west 
coast, from Oulu (Uleåborg) to Turku (Åbo); excluding the small 
towns of Uusikaupunki and Rauma,1 most of the tonnage was 
occupied in international cross-trade, far away from Baltic waters. 
Around 1865, this "blue-water" shipping occupied about 55 % of 
the total Finnish merchant navy, accounted for almost 70 % of the 
total national shipping output in ton-miles and earned over 60 % 
of all Finnish shipping income and about two-thirds of its value-
added (excluding domestic coastal trade). 
1 Even in these towns, long-trader tonnage normally slightly exceeded the 
tonnage of North Sea and Baltic vessels, although the number of big ships 
was clearly below 50 %. 
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By 1913, the overall picture was very different. If "hard core" 
denotes something which was of importance in international 
shipping and, technically, up to date, the only category fitting into 
this frame was steamers on regular lines beyond the Sound and 
tramp steamers of, say, over 700 net tons. In the 1910s, these 
vessels were found mainly in Helsinki and, on a much smaller 
scale, in Turku (Åbo) and Vaasa. Although they comprised about 
70 % of Finnish steam tonnage (excluding the inland fleets) they 
represented only around 17 % of the total sea-going tonnage. Yet 
they accounted for about 30 % of all ton-miles sailed by Finnish 
ships and earned no less than 55 % of the country's estimated 
shipping income and about 35 % of the value-added.2 
At the same time, however, there was a second major category, 
long-trading sailing vessels, which were going through a kind of 
renaissance in the 1910s. At that time, they comprised 39 % of 
total Finnish merchant tonnage and logged no less than half of the 
total national output of ton-miles. However, they earned less than 
20 % of Finnish shipping income and accumulated about a quarter 
of the value-added. 
It is remarkable that neither of these internationally important 
fleets originated from the same area as the hard-core fleet of the 
1860s. The main centre of modern steam shipping, Helsinki, was 
never3 the number one base of sailing vessels. True, there was 
strong continuity from the sailing ship era in the fleets at Turku 
and Vaasa, and even the original owners of the FAA included 
members of a few families which had earlier been heavily involved 
in sailing vessels (for example, Wolff from Vaasa, later Wiborg and 
Hackman from Wiborg).4 It is also a well-known fact that most 
early coastal steamship lines were started by local, well-
established shipowners. Later, however, practically all "one-town" 
steamer companies (with the exception of those carrying strictly 
local coastal traffic) were either dissolved or incorporated into 
larger ones. Since big steamship companies attracted capital from 
2 No less than a quarter of all shipping income was earned by the four FAA 
"emigrant" steamers, which clearly shows how unsymmetrical the 
distribution of income was. 
3 	 Except for a short while in the beginning of the 19th century. 
4 Suviranta, Suomen Höyrylaiva Osakeyhtiö, p. 22-23. Hackman, however, 
had sold his long-traders in the 1850s. 
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various towns, it was convenient to place the office in the capital; 
accordingly, this was bound to lead to geographical discontinuity 
although it may have been more apparent than real. However, it is 
an indisputable fact that most of the earlier maritime centres in 
Ostrobothnia (including Pori, which still had a large fleet of cross-
trading windjammers in the 1860s) lost most of their shipping. In 
1913, for example, Oulu and Pori did not have a single sailing 
vessel left, while Raahe and Kokkola (Gamla Karleby) only had a 
couple of coasters. 
In 1913, no less than 80 % of all sailing vessels over 100 tons, 
long-traders and Baltic tonnage alike, were found in Aland and the 
towns of Uusikaupunki and Rauma. These were all localities with 
maritime traditions, but none of them were real ocean-trading 
centres in the 1860s; Rauma and Uusikaupunki were primarily 
known for their strong traditions in Baltic shipping, while Aland 
was just beginning to evolve from traditional "peasant" shipping to 
North Sea trade. Discontinuity, thus, also characterized the 
development of Finnish sailing tonnage. 
There was only one sector which did not undergo any major 
upheaval. The position of the traditional "peasant" shipping in 
coastal waters remained much as it was in the 1860s and, even at 
the end of the period, there was some growth in tonnage. No one 
would claim, however, that this balanced the shortcomings in 
hard-core shipping. 
The overall structural transformation resulted from a series of 
different changes. These changes were not necessarily inter-
connected parts of a single logical trend, although there were 
frequently apparent links with changes in profitability. This was 
obvious as early as in the late 1860s, when the decline in cross-
trade profitability resulted in a decrease in urban shipping 
investment. Since previous income levels were not reached again 
during the next boom, long-trading tonnage volume did not regain 
the earlier level. Although old tonnage was generally replaced 
with larger ships, this was more an attempt to solve profitability 
problems than an expression of further expansion. The total 
cessation of the building of big sailing vessels after 1879 was an 
equally rational response to continually declining prospects. Later 
on, when freight income began to improve, there were (with 
relatively short time-lags) two booms for big second-hand 
windjammers. 
296 
The rise in North Sea sailing trade was also connected with the 
rise in freights in the early 1870s. As long as these medium-sized 
vessels seemed to be more profitable than long-traders, tonnage 
decreased at a slightly slower rate than that of sailing vessels in 
general. At this point, however, one reservation must be made: 
these ships fared better than long-traders only if capital costs were 
not accounted for, but since they often sailed uninsured they were, 
on average, subject to fairly high depreciation. Although some new 
building of medium-sized sailing vessels took place in the late 
1880s, most of the fleet was nearing the end of its natural life in the 
1890s, when North Sea timber freights fell more than ocean 
freights. The owners had generally not been able to accumulate 
funds to replace (or rebuild) the ships and thus it was no wonder 
that this fleet rapidly diminished. 
The fact that all "peasant" owners were not capable of making 
accurate risk and depreciation estimates does not, of course, prove 
that there was not rational thought behind their actions; in 
principle, the evidence points to the contrary. There is also 
another example with a similar implication. If North Sea wood 
freights were more profitable in the 1870s than ocean freights, why 
were long-traders still used in their traditional activities in spite of 
rapidly worsening prospects? Big-ship owners, however, were 
facing two problems which made such a change impracticable. 
First, their vessels were, in many cases, too big to be handy North 
Sea traders; moreover, they were expensive and, in order to meet 
capital costs, they had to be employed all the year round, which 
was not possible with timber from the Northern Baltic. Thus, what 
may at first sight seem an example of inflexibly traditional 
attitudes was in reality rational behaviour, which was dictated by 
earlier investment decisions. 
Fluctuations in the development of steam tonnage profitability 
and investment do not seem as closely connected. This may be 
partly explained by deficiences in the accounting material, 
especially as far as the earlier half of the period is concerned. In 
any case, it was established beyond any doubt that Finnish-owned 
steamships (then consisting mainly of small and medium- sized 
Baltic vessels) were more profitable than sailing vessels in the 
1880s. Thus, the continuous increase in steam tonnage and the 
equally continuous decrease in large and medium-sized sailing 
tonnage were exactly to be expected. 
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The rapid growth in steam tonnage in the good years of the late 
1890s was also compatible with the improvement in profitability 
of large cargo ships, although this was a time when long-trading 
sailing vessels did even better. The slow tonnage growth during 
the last decade before the first World War, which seemed 
exceptional in international terms, was more understandable in 
the light of the economic returns. The FAA figures showed that 
cargo steamer profitability was in decline until about 1908; 
passenger vessels, on the other hand, developed extremely 
erratically. All this must have created an atmosphere of 
uncertainty which normally militates against long-term 
investment. 
This development obviously depended to some degree on 
certain non-market factors. First, in the mid-1880s, the Finnish 
state began to grant noticeable sums to shipping, in the form of 
both low-interest loans and direct subsidies, and both peaked in 
the late 1890s. From 1897 to 1899 these loans totalled 2.8 million 
marks, which corresponded to about 5,000 net tons of cargo 
steamers.5 Although this sum is only a fraction of all shipping 
investment during the decade, the availability of cheap public 
money obviously encouraged investment at the height of the boom. 
In the next decade, however, loans to shipping stopped 
altogether: only a few minor ones were granted in the 1910s. It has 
been assumed that this sudden decline was a result of worsening 
prospects, that shipowners did not dare to invest, not even with 
the additional incentive of public money. It is true that some 
companies were allowed to defer the amortization of state loans 
because of "bad times",6 but this does not tell the whole story. In 
violation of existing legislation, the Russian government had 
increased its direct influence in Finland since 1899. This led to a 
constitutional crisis known as the "first period of oppression", 
which lasted until the end of 1905. It is possible that some major 
shipowners, who were mostly very anti-Russian (one member of 
the FAA board was even exiled in 1903) lost confidence in the 
5 	 Increased loans and subsidies resulted from the recommendations of the state 
committee on shipping, which published its memorandum in 1884. See 
Kuusterä, Valtion sijoitustoiminta, p. 220-222; Kaukiainen, "The Transition 
from Sail to Steam", p. 181. 
6 Kuusterä, Valtion sijoitustoiminta, p. 222. 
298 
Senate (the government of Finland which also granted the largest 
loans), which consisted of politicians who were willing to 
collaborate with the Russians. These political antipathies may 
even have been a contributory factor when the FAA lost its former 
subsidies for maintaining winter traffic to Hull to the Nord 
company in 1902. Russification also caused direct economic 
losses: both the FAA and the Bore-company from Turku lost their 
subsidies for winter-traffic to Sweden, because they did not accept 
unlimited control by the gendarmerie aboard their vessels.' 
Moreover, since Russia was building up its own steam fleet, the 
government tried to limit traffic by Finnish lines to St. Petersburg. 
When shipping companies received subventions for foreign traffic, 
they had to promise not to go to Russian ports.8 Although the first 
period of russification came to an end late in 1905, a new one 
followed four years later. Indeed, the pessimistic first decade of the 
20th century in Finland was in sharp contrast to what was 
happening in Norway: Norway severed her remaining ties with 
Sweden in 1905, and although this expression of nationalism had 
virtually no direct influence on economic life, it certainly created 
an atmosphere of progress. 
As economic and non-economic factors were closely 
intertwined, it is difficult to show the primacy of the latter, but at 
least their coincidence with the shipping depression of 1903-04 
proved fatal. This was also a period when competition between 
Finnish steamship lines was becoming more intense than before. 
The fact that a new Finnish company was formed to compete with 
the FAA on the important Hull line shows that the previous, 
almost monopolistic market situation was being disturbed. 
Competition on the Stockholm line is further evidence of this. 
Finally, right at the end of the period, a somewhat special 
instance of competition seems to have retarded the growth of 
steam shipping. In the 1910s, the profitability of long-trading 
windjammers increased suddenly and they began to produce a 
larger return on capital than any other type of vessel, even 
including emigrant steamers. Although war brought a premature 
end to this renaissance, within a couple of years it had still made a 
strong impact on shipping investments. In 1911-13 the net 
7 Kaukiainen, "The Transition", p.181-182. 
8 Kaukiainen, op. cit., p. 182. 
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tonnage of imported sailing vessels was seven times as large as that 
of imported steamships, and even in monetary value the former 
clearly outstripped the latter. A typical example of this 
development is that even the FAA invested in windjammers by 
founding a subsidiary company, Finska Skolskeppsrederiet 
(Finnish Training Ship Company), in 1911.9 Since the preceding 
years had been a time of great uncertainty in shipping for many 
reasons, it is very understandable that even established steamship 
owners preferred short-term speculation with sailing vessels to 
strategic long-term investments in first-class technology. 
To sum up, it is obvious that, although sometimes affected by 
non-market factors, profitability offers the primary explanation of 
the general development of the Finnish steam and sailing fleets. 
This does not mean that there were not owners who acted 
irrationally, who, out of affection or ignorance, stuck to 
unprofitable sailing vessels, but as far as short-term decision-
making was concerned, they must have been in the minority. On 
the other hand, if the average level of know-how among shipping 
entrepreneurs really declined, as has been supposed (see p. 127), 
this might have affected long-term planning in two different ways. 
The inability to estimate realistic depreciation (including risk) 
may have led to an excessively optimistic view of the business, 
and the lack of planning skills probably made immediate profit 
seem better than investment which might bring better returns some 
time in the future. Of course, the uncertainty which prevailed in 
the freight market also favoured short-term speculation. However, 
in spite of certain reservations, the relatively slow transition from 
sail to steam mainly resulted from the fact that sailing vessels 
offered a competitive investment opportunity for longer than has 
generally been believed. 
Since developments in Finland differed so much from the 
general trend of transition, however, this explanation is not totally 
satisfactory. Whether Finnish-owned sailing vessels were more 
profitable than sailing vessels in general, or whether Finnish-
owned steamships were less profitable than steamships in general, 
is, at the moment, impossible to say, because there is very little 
9 	 The Ships of Our First Century, p. 197-198. In spite of the name, which may 
have indicated idealistic goals, the company's three ships operated at a good 
profit. 
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comparative data available. However, it is possible to show that in 
certain respects the principal factors of production were 
differently priced in Finland than in the industrialized "core" 
countries. It still remains to be seen whether such differences 
affected profitability to any significant degree. 
The question whether the profitability of shipping differed from 
that of other investment opportunities also remains open. The 
availability of comparative data imposes certain restrictions here 
too, but at least it should be possible to estimate whether 
opportunities in certain other industries were better enough to 
attract capital from shipping. The answer to this question would 
explain not only the differences between Finland and other 
countries but also local differences within the country. 
Finnish shipping and the international economy 
There is no doubt that, compared with Great Britain, for example, 
Finnish shipowners were at a comparative advantage because of 
cheap labour and, as long as wooden ships were being built, low 
capital costs. It remains to be seen how significant these 
advantages were and how much bearing they had on the tenacity of 
sail. 
Because of the lack of data, Finnish labour and capital costs can 
be compared with average North Atlantic levels only in 
hypothetical terms. Moreover, it is assumed that there were no 
substantial differences in gross income, or, at least, that Finnish 
vessels did not earn more than the average. As far as international 
cross-trade was concerned this is reasonable because, in principle, 
freights did not vary according to the home port of a ship. It has 
been claimed that Norwegian sailing-ship masters often agreed on 
freights which were lower than the market norms10 and it is not 
unreasonable to expect that masters from another low-cost 
country, Finland, did the same. Moreover, since the Russian 
tricolor was not one of the favourite ensigns in North Atlantic 
ports, Finns were occasionally at a disadvantage for flying it; for 
example, in the late 1870s when Russia and Turkey were at war, as 
10 See e.g. Hodne, Norges ökonomiske historie, p.  142. 
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well as during the Russo-Japanese war, Finnish vessels had 
difficulties finding cargo." 
That the income level of Finnish sailing vessels did not exceed 
the international average is also confirmed in both Swedish and 
Norwegian shipping statistics. Indeed, the average income of the 
Swedish sailing tonnage fell largely in accordance with the figures 
put forward in this study,12 while Norwegian statistics indicate 
that the average gross income for all sailing vessels per net ton was 
somewhat higher than the Finnish ocean sailers were able to 
generate.13 This may have been because there was massive 
emigration from Norway to America, peaking as early as 1881-85, 
and this probably gave westbound Norwegian vessels valuable 
income. However, contrary data also exists. For example, 
according to David McGregor, eleven fairly large British ships 
earned an average annual income "before voyage expenses were 
deducted" of about £3.6 per gross ton during the years 1863-75.14 
Even if allowance is made for the difference in tonnage, this 
income level is clearly below the corresponding rate in the Finnish 
sample. Estimates of the gross income of Saint John's (New 
Brunswick) ocean fleet put forward by Lewis R. Fischer, Eric W. 
Sager and Rosemary E. Ommer were also systematically much 
lower in value per ton than indicated in the Nordic statistics.15 
However, in terms of representativeness, the Nordic data is 
superior. 
Table 5:1 represents an attempt to estimate how differences 
between Finnish, British and Canadian labour and capital costs 
might have affected net result and return on capital. The 
comparison is hypothetical in the sense that all other costs were 
considered equal; in reality, masters' wages, for example, may 
11 See e.g.  Nikula, Åbo sjöfarts historia, p. 7; Suviranta, Suomen Höyrylaiva 
osakeyhtiö, p. 41-42. 
12 This is clearly demonstrated by the fact that Matti Peltonen made his 
estimation of Finnish shipping income starting with Swedish average income 
for sailing vessels and steamships (Liikenne Suomessa, p. 25). As was seen, 
in most cases this estimate fell quite close to the one presented in this study. 
13 See Gjölberg, "The Substitution of Steam for Sail in Norwegian Ocean 
Shipping," table 1. 
14 	 McGregor, Merchant Sailing Ships 1860-1875, p. 160. 
15 Fischer, Sager and Omner, "The Shipping Industry and Regional Economic 
Development," p. 38-43. 
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TABLE 5:1. Hypothetical wage and capital cost differentials in 
Finnish, British and Canadian long-trading sailing 
vessels. Percent of gross income. 










1861/67 F 9.3 33.6 9.0 24.6 
B 22.3 20.6 13.2 7.4 
C 19.1 23.8 9.0 14.8 
1871/77 F 10.8 21.4 9.7 11.7 
B 21.6 10.6 13.5 -2.9 
C 18.9 13.3 9.7 3.6 
1881/87 F 15.4 7.1 11.6 -4.5 
B 27.7 -5.2 15.1 -20.3 
C 21.3 1.2 11.6 -10.6 
1891/97 F 15.2 8.7 10.6 -1.9 
B 28.2 -4.3 10.6 -14.9 
C 22.8 1.1 10.6 -9.5 
1911/14 F 14.4 24.8 8.3 16.5 
B 26.6 12.6 8.3 4.3 
C 21.6 17.6 8.3 9.3 
Source: Tables 2:30, 4:9, 4:12, 4:13, indices of wage costs, p. II:18. It was 
supposed that all other costs (including masters' salaries) were 
equal. The estimation for 1911/14 is based on the assumption 
that wage differentials were the same as in the 1890s. Before the 
1880s, capital costs were supposed to be equal in Finnish and 
Canadian fleets, the differences between British and Finnish 
capital costs were calculated according to new building costs 
(p. 76). 
have dropped earlier in other countries than in Finland, and 
bigger, iron-hulled ships which were already common in British 
tonnage in the 1870s, were obviously more economical to run than 
smaller wooden vessels. The comparison, however, shows one 
important thing: wage differentials, as well as the differences in 
tonnage prices between Finland and Britain, were powerful 
enough decisively to affect the profitability of shipping. It is 
possible that, in the 1860s, Finnish sailing vessels, which showed 
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three times higher profit from assets one third cheaper, gave a 
return on investment four times as high as British tonnage. It also 
seems possible that at least small and medium-sized British 
windjammers experienced difficulties in covering capital costs 
after the mid-1870s, and in balancing running costs and income 
during the following decade. Thus, it is no wonder that a definite 
breakthrough in British steam shipping took place between 1875 
and 1885.16 
With their cheaper ships, Canadians had more in common with 
Finnish owners, but cheaper labour was still enough to produce 
substantial differences in profitability. That many Canadian 
wooden vessels were sold to Finland in the 1890s is direct proof of 
this. Of course, when more and more Finnish sailing vessels were 
bought from abroad at international market prices, the differences 
in capital costs, even compared with Britain, narrowed to 
practically nothing. It is also reasonable to suppose that owners in 
high-cost countries not only tried but even succeeded in reducing 
other costs. Thus British sailing tonnage, for example, declined 
fairly slowly in the 1890s. In France, the state directly subsidized 
sailing-ship owners. 
Interestingly, at the end of the period, Finnish sailing vessels 
enjoyed smaller comparative advantages than during the "golden 
ages of sail". Indirect proof of this is the fact that big fleets of deep-
sea sailing vessels, not only from Britain but also from other high-
cost countries, were still in business at the beginning of the 1910s. 
This is quite clearly seen in table 5:2, which only includes metal-
hulled and composite vessels (which were usually synonymous 
with ocean-going crafts at that time). With her 70,000 net tons or 
so, Finland was far from the top in 1910. Accordingly, it may be 
claimed that national differences in cost structure were not totally 
decisive for the viability of sail. Before the World War, there was 
still a section of the international freight market, the longest ocean 
routes, on which big sailing vessels of many nations were able to 
make a living. 
Finnish steamships also enjoyed the advantage of cheap labour, 
but crew wages (excluding master, including officers and 
engineers) amounted to only 4-5 % of gross income, much less in 
16 	 British steam tonnage amounted to 32 % of total tonnage in 1875, and 53 % 
in 1885. 
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TABLE 5:2. Composite, iron and steel sailing-vessels in selected 
national merchant fleets, 1910. Thousand net register 
tons. 
United Kingdom 	 684 
British possessions 	 53 
United States 	 134 




Norway 	 406 
Sweden 	 18 
Denmark 	 17 
Italy 	 206 
Source: Palmer, "The British Shipping Industry", table 4 (based on the 
Lloyd's register) 
passenger ships. Thus, the advantage was fairly marginal, even 
compared with British steamers, in the order of 2 % of total costs. 
Indeed, more could be saved by well-timed purchases of coal and 
other stores, but in this respect Finnish shipping companies could 
not expect similar discounts to those granted to bigger British and 
Continental lines. On the other hand, Finns were on a virtually 
equal footing in the purchasing of steamships; since there were no 
customs dues on large vessels," they paid normal world market 
prices. Because of higher transaction costs (commissions for bills 
of exchange, for example), a Finnish buyer probably had to spend 
marginally more than his British counterpart, but that could not 
have produced significant differences in shipping profitability. 
What was more important was the sheer lack of capital; 
irrespective of whether steamships bought for Finland were the 
same price as British ones, at the turn of the century, they were 
seven to eight times more expensive per ton than second-hand 
sailing vessels of iron or steel. As mentioned previously, shipping 
investment was typically financed by shipping income; the price 
difference, however, was so great that, after the 1870s, practically 
no large sailing vessel earned enough money during its entire 
17 Finlands författnings samling, customs tariffs of 29.7.1869, 19.5.1886, 
30.5.1888. 
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productive life to buy a medium-sized steamship. 
Thus, capital from outside was needed and, apart from state 
loans, the practical alternatives were raising joint-stock capital or 
bank-loans. The latter were more expensive in Finland than in 
Britain, for example: the difference in interest rates was normally 
two percentage points or more (even in Sweden the interest rates 
were marginally lower than in Finland). Since British discount 
rates fluctuated at about 3-4 per cent, the difference was fairly 
large.18 The high interest rate also made it more difficult to collect 
joint-stock capital. 
British capital was not imported into Finland as it was imported 
to Norway, for example. In the 1880s, certain British shipping 
agents and other businessmen began investing money in ships 
which were formally registered in Norway, because they could 
benefit from the local cheap labour. This British capital was 
important in Bergen, in particular, and probably accounted for the 
relatively rapid transition from sail to steam in that city.19 Finland, 
on the other hand, despite having even cheaper labour, never 
attracted any notable number of foreign shipowners before the 
War; this was probably because the Russian flag was not regarded 
as very convenient in other respects. 
Because of expensive capital, steamships were an attractive 
opportunity for Finnish owners only in areas such as liner traffic 
for which profit expectations were higher than for average bulk 
trades. The development of freight markets, however, made this a 
sector in which newcomers had difficulties in establishing 
themselves. Although the "freedom of the seas", or of maritime 
trade, prevailed in principle after the abolition of most navigation 
acts, competition in freight markets was far from free after the late 
1880s. The growth of steam created surplus tonnage and some 
governments began to support their national shipping by granting 
subventions or special reductions in shipping dues. What was 
probably more important, however, was that big, well-established 
liner companies agreed on the division of markets by tariff and 
traffic agreements, so-called conferences, which usually aimed at 
excluding new competitors from the area in question. Being late-
comers, Finnish liner companies had only limited possibilities of 
18 	 Pipping, I guldmyntfotens hägn, p. 149-151. 
19 	 Hodne, Norges ökonomiske historie, p. 147, 154. 
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establishing themselves in European waters and the Atlantic. That 
they were relatively successful in shipping between Finland and 
England and Finland and Sweden was obviously because there 
was little interest in these routes from British and Swedish 
companies; they fared worse in the Baltic. Extending regular 
services beyond the network which existed around 1900 was fairly 
difficult which, once more, leads to the conclusion that the only 
real prospects of expanding steam shipping in Finland lay in 
tramping. With the extremely limited data on tramp-traders, it is 
not possible to determine how profitable they were. However, 
because sailing vessels brought about the same return on 
investment as cargo liners, and growth in tramp tonnage after 1900 
was slow, plus the fact that Finnish owners faced higher financing 
costs, it seems that the prospects were not very good. The choice of 
a second-hand tramp steamer in preference to a second-hand 
sailing vessel was certainly far from obvious. 
It is clear that most of the comparative advantages which 
Finnish shipping still enjoyed at the beginning of the 20th century 
applied only to sailing vessels. This simply means that, in 
international shipping, Finnish windjammers did much better 
than Finnish steamers, and that the transition from sail to steam, 
both on a worldwide scale and within the domestic merchant 
marine, was probably the key factor undermining the 
competitiveness of Finnish shipping. However, it must be 
remembered that there was no way out of this situation: 
international sailing-vessel trade was a contracting market. It only 
brought decent returns because sailing tonnage was also 
diminishing 
Finnish shipping and the Finnish economy 
Although sail and steam were very real competing alternatives in 
shipping, it would be misleading to strech the dichotomy too far. 
In spite of dual freight markets, it was perfectly reasonable for a 
shipping boom to inflate the earnings of both, and for a depression 
to hit sail and steam equally badly. This should be taken into 
account in any comparison of shipping with landward 
opportunities; very often the choice was to abandon shipping 
altogether in favour of some other investment. 
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It is impossible to produce an overall profitability comparison of 
different industries in late-19th-century Finland: there is simply 
no data. What can be done is to document the most common 
alternatives to shipping chosen by shipowners and to estimate the 
profitability margins within certain branches of manufacturing 
industry, for which there exists a proper study of production 
growth.20 
Before going further, one important point must be stressed quite 
strongly. In the 1860s and 1870s, the "hard core" of shipowners, 
major trading-houses, did not only specialize in shipping. Many of 
them may at times have obtained the bulk of their income from it, 
but they also had many other business interests. The export and 
import trades were regarded as an integral part of their activities, 
as was the retail trade; what is more, by the 1860s, many houses 
already owned sawmills or other manufacturing plants, or shares 
in them.21 A good number of the firms which later abandoned 
shipping were not leaping into the unknown but rather 
restructuring their existing diversified business. 
In order to form an idea of how the ship-owning trading houses 
and firms revised their business strategies, information was 
collected on those which existed in the 1870s and which were still 
in business at the turn of the century (either run as private firms by 
the original owners or their successors, or reorganized as joint-
stock companies). The basic data was extracted from commercial 
calendars which were published at irregular intervals, beginning 
in 1871; whenever possible, this was supplemented by consulting 
local historical works and even archival material.22 The search 
yielded 35 "biographies" of, mainly larger, firms which were also 
major shipowners in the 1860s and 1870s, but a few smaller ones 
20 	 Heikkinen and Hjerppe, Suomen teollisuus ja teollinen käsityö 1860-1913. 
21 See e.g. Mauranen, "Kotimaankauppa," p. 436-441. 
22 Forselius, Finlands handelskalender, var. editions; Saarinen, Porin historia 
III; Hautala, Oulun kaupungin historia 1856-1918; Nikula, Malmska 
handelshuset i Jakobstad; Norrvik, Briggen Carl Gustaf; Nikula, Åbo sjöfarts 
historia; Lähteenoja, Rauma 1809-1917; Möller, Gamlakarleby stads 
historia III; Cederlöf, Lovisa stads historia III; Brick, Nykarleby stads historia 
III; Kaukovalta, Uudenkaupungin historia IV; Söderhjelm, Brahestad 1649-
1899; Ahvenainen, Kymin osakeyhtiö; Hoffman, Suomen sahateollisuuden 
kasvu, rakenne ja rahoitus, p. 133-156; the archives of Bergbom, Sovio and 
Snellman, Oulu Provincial Archives. 
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Viipuri (Wiborg)  
Paul Wahl & C:o 
Loviisa (Lovisa) 
Ars. Terichoff 
Porvoo (Borgå)  
Aug. Eklöf  
L. Simolin 
Turku (Åbo)  
C. M. Dahlström 
G. A. Lindblom 
A. B. Nordfors 
G. A. Petrelius  
J. G. Wikeström 
Uusikaupunki (Nystad)  





J. P. Seikow 
F. W. Wahlberg 
Rauma (Raumo) 
Gabr. Granlund 
were also included. The list may seem rather short, but it must be 
remembered that firms are set up and disbanded all the time and 
the average life-span, even excluding any structural changes, may 
be much shorter than thirty years. Nor can the list be 
comprehensive or accurate in detail, because in many cases the 
information in the calendars could not be cross-checked, and 
shares in joint-stock companies are difficult to trace.23 The list 
should, however, be representative enough to give an idea of some 
typical opportunities. 
Locality and firm 	 Activities around 1900-05 (by original firm or its 
direct successor) 
sawmills, iron manufacturing etc. 
sawmill, export 
sawmill, pulp mill, wholesale trade, shipping 
wholesale and retail trade 
commerce and manufacturing, shares in a pulp 
and paper mill 
shipping, manufacturing, shares in a pulp and 
paper mill 
wine and spirits trade 
manufacturing, retail trade 




shipping, spirits manufacturing 
shipping, export 
shipping 
shipping, export, tobacco manufacturing 
shipping, export 
23 For example, in many cases, commercial calendars indicated that firms still 
carried on shipping although it was known that they did not own a single 
ship. Obviously, the descriptions of activities were not accurate, or the firms 
wanted to mention shipping in their activities just in case of a revival. 
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A. W. Grundström 
H. J. Ridderstad 




shipping, export, salt trade, printing 
A. Ahlström 	 sawmills, iron manufacturing, export 
Rosenlew & C:o 	 sawmills, iron manufacturing, export 
Fr. W. Petrell 	 drinks manufacturing, wholesale trade 
Kristiinankaupunki (Kristinestad) 
G. Hydén 	 shares in a steamship company, agency, brewery 
L. W. Wendelin 	 export 
Vaasa (Vasa, 1855-1917 Nikolaistad) 
C. G. Wolff 	 pulp and paper manufacturing in South-eastern 
Finland (two joint-stock companies), shares in the 
FAA  
Uusikaarlepyy (Nykarleby) 
C. Nylund 	 retail trade 
Pietarsaari (Jakobstad) 
Petter Malm 	 sawmills, shares in tobacco and paper- mills, 
shares in the FAA (1892—, shipping until 1899) 
Ph. U. Strengberg 	 tobacco manufacturing, export and retail trade 
Kokkola (Gamlakarleby) 
G. W. Forsén 	 retail trade, tar export 
Raahe (Brahestad) 
Johan Lang 
J. G. Rein 
F. Sovelius 
Oulu (Ule&borg) 
G. & C. Bergbom 
J. W. Snellman 
wholesale and retail trade 
export and retail trade 
brick and spirits manufacturing, shares in 
sawmills (shipping until 1898) 
sawmills, tar export (shipping until 1896), shares 
in textiles industry 
sawmills, tar export, import (shipping until 1888) 
The list includes 15 firms which maintained their interests in 
shipping after 1900. However, no less than ten of these were from 
Uusikaupunki and Rauma, and if they are excluded, only one fifth 
of the earlier shipowners or shipping companies were still active 
in the business. On the other hand, at the turn of the century, 18 
firms had manufacturing activities, or at least owned shares in 
manufacturing companies. The most popular industry was 
sawmilling (9 cases) but involvment in iron, food and drink 
manufacturing and having shares in pulp and paper mill 
companies were also common. With just a couple of exceptions, all 
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the firms also had interests in foreign or domestic trade. In most 
cases these activities were not new but stemmed from the 1870s or 
earlier, the "golden days" of shipping. That firms were still 
occupied with such activities, and were even expanding them, 
suggests that they regarded them as more profitable than shipping. 
The list also includes examples of activities which were started 
after the 1870s, such as pulp and paper mills and various food and 
drink manufacturing plants. Perhaps it should also be mentioned 
that some shipowners participated in the building of local railways 
to Rauma, Uusikaarlepyy, Pietarsaari and Raahe.24 
Profitability in different manufacturing industries can be gauged 
only by comparing the volume of operating result (profit) with the 
gross value of production: since there are no proper capital stock 
estimations, return on capital cannot be calculated. The role of 
fixed capital was relatively large in the textile and iron industries, 
and also in the paper and pulp industries by the end of the century; 
in this respect, these industries were much like shipping. On the 
other hand, fixed capital was much lower for sawmills, but since 
they always had large stocks of both raw materials and finished 
products, they needed a lot of circulating capita1.25 This made it a 
relatively capital-intensive industry, at least compared with the 
volume of labour. 
Table 5:3 sums up the proportions of profit and labour costs of 
gross production. In total industry, the percentages were 
remarkably equal, and a natural conclusion would be that, in 
capital-intensive industries, profit normally outstripped labour 
24 The railway to Rauma was built by the town (-1899), which meant that all 
local shipowners materially contributed to it, although Söderlund was the 
primus motor in the business (Lähteenoja, Rauma, p. 230-231).  
Uusikaarlepyy and Raahe railways were built by local companies, also at the 
turn of the century, and Fredrik Sovelius (Sovio) donated 200,000 marks for 
the latter (Birck, Nykarleby stads historia, p. 363-64; 
 Söderhjelm,  
Brahestad, p. 275-76). The railway to Pietarsaari was built by the State 
(1886-87), but only after Otto Malm had donated 200,000 marks for the 
purpose (Nikula, Malmska handelshuset, p. 437). All these railways were far 
from good businesses, and therefore money spent on them was public 
consumption rather than investment. 
25 In the 1870s, the building costs of a steam saw-mill amounted to about 10 
marks per one produced standard. The costs of raw wood was about 40-50 
marks per standard at the same time. Hoffman, Suomen sahateollisuuden 
kasvu, rakenne ja rahoitus, p. 133-160, appendix table 11. 
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TABLE 5:3. The proportion of operating result and wage and 
salaries in selected Finnish manufacturing industries 
and in shipping, 1864-1913. Per cent of the gross 
value of production. 
1 = operating result, 2 = wages and salaries 
Industry 1864/66 1874/76 1884/86 1894/96 1904/05 1911/13 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
Total 
industry 22 22 24 19 19 20 18 19 20 19 19 19 
Beverages, 
tobacco 20 13 16 8 17 11 22 12 30 11 28 12 
Textiles 24 15 29 19 29 18 35 17 32 16 26 19 
Sawmills 33 14 32 13 15 16 5 19 13 18 14 18 
Pulp, paper 23 18 23 17 24 17 28 17 26 19 26 14 
Manuf. of 
machinery 30 26 36 30 43 31 9 29 37 35 35 35 
Shipping, ex. 
coastal 24 25 27 30 16 38 16 27 14 20 16 14 
Source: Heikkinen and Hjerppe, Suomen teollisuus ja teollinen käsityö 
1860-1913, appendix tables 2-4;  tables 4:18 and 4:19.  
costs. Shipping, however, at first sight, is an exception, since only 
at the end of the period did profit exceed labour costs. It must be 
remembered, however, that, in addition to the relatively high wage 
level, a high proportion of wages (4-5 per cent of gross 
production, after the 1890s slightly less) consisted of masters' 
commissions which, in fact, represented redistributed profit rather 
than normal labour income. 
The most interesting feature is whether the profit percentage did 
change. In many manufacturing industries such as textiles, tobacco 
and beverages and pulp and paper, a modest increase took place in 
the 1890s, which can be interpreted as improved rather than 
diminished profitability. On the other hand, both shipping and 
sawmills experienced a very similar decline and, even with 
sawmills, this seems to have been connected with decreasing 
profitability.26 In this light, the decision to abandon shipping in 
26 Hoffman, Suomen sahateollisuuden kasvu, p. 120-122. 
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favour of certain manufacturing activities seems to have depended 
on profitability differences. 
Many companies, however, stuck to sawmills although they 
sold their ships, which may not seem very rational behaviour. As 
far as can be deduced from the few accounts, shipping brought a 
better return on investment in the 1860s, while in the following 
decade the two were more even.27 Most shipowners who were 
involved with sawmills had been so for many decades or had 
invested in steam-driven ones in the 1870s. Since the fixed capital 
of the business was fairly modest compared with the total 
turnover, most of these were already "written off" in the 1880s 
when the sawmill business became less profitable. It is true that 
many sawmills incurred direct losses after the 1870s, but at that 
time they were not easy to sell either. Obviously, many owners did 
not stick to, but rather were stuck with, their sawmills, and it 
seems perfectly possible that income from shipping, small as it 
was then, had to be used to keep the sawmills running. 
Unfortunately, the most common alternative opportunities for 
shipowners, the wholesale and retail trades, are the least 
documented, at least as far as profitability is concerned. Of course, 
foreign and domestic trade with different articles resulted in 
widely differing profit, but there are examples of import, export 
and retail businesses generating income comparable with that of 
shipping during the "golden days" of sail.28 
 Moreover, unlike 
manufacturing, this was an industry which practically all urban 
shipowners knew very well. 
It is clear that there were local differences in the opportunities 
available. The sawmill industry is a good example of this: it 
developed mainly on or around coastal towns which were 
connected by rivers to the interior forest areas. Thus, it developed 
relatively early in the trading areas of Oulu, Pori, Wiborg and on 
the southern coast (Porvoo, Kotka, Hamina). On the other hand, it 
never achieved real prominence in South Ostrobothnia and, 
accordingly, many rich ship-owning families later invested in 
other local industries, or in paper and pulp mills in other parts of 
the country. Turku shipowners also invested in faraway forest 
industry enterprises (for example, Kymmene pulp and paper 
27 Hoffman, op. cit., p. 138-139. 
28 Hoffman, op. cit., p. 136, 139, 145. 
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company was originally controlled by them),29 obviously because 
such opportunities did not abound in the vicinity of their town. 
The lack of viable alternatives is also reflected in the fact that both 
in Turku and two South Ostrobothnian towns, Vaasa and 
Kristiinankaupunki, capital was invested in steamships. 
In this respect, the last sailing-ship area, the towns of  
Uusikaupunki and Rauma, and the province of Aland, are of 
special interest. These were all localities with little or no industry 
at the beginning of the 20th century. There were not good natural 
conditions for sawmills or other forest-based industries: only 
limited small-scale production of timber products, such as hewn 
planks and baulks, and of fire-wood was to be found. Nor were 
shipowners engaged in many activies other than import and export 
trade; this was the case in Uusikaupunki and Rauma both in the 
1870s and at the turn of the century.30 Aland shipowners, again, 
were usually farmers, although a few major ones were also engaged 
in retail trade. Against this background, it was not surprising that 
owners in these areas remained faithful to shipping. They simply 
had few other opportunities, shipping expansion was their 
"industrial revolution".31 Of course, it is remarkable that more 
distant opportunities were not taken up, at least not on a 
significant scale.32 
On the macroeconomic level, it is perfectly understandable that 
many industries developed more favourably than shipping. Based 
on local natural resources and cheap labour, and as long as there 
was demand abroad, they had distinct comparative advantages. 
Although there was a chronic dearth of capital, cheap labour made 
it possible to increase production by relatively small investments. 
Indeed, from 1860 to 1913, Finnish industrial growth was more a 
29 Ahvenainen, Suomen sahateollisuuden historia, p. 9-10. 
30 	 Forsell, Finland handelskalender, var. editions. 
31 Only one major shipowner in Uusikaupunki, Zachariassen, also owned a 
sawmill. The firm, however, was a newcomer to shipping: it started as an 
organ factory and the sawmill was also built before it became a major 
shipping company. 
32 For Uusikaupunki and Rauma, this may have been a result of the small 
average size of the finns. In the case of Åland, it was probably also connected 
with language barriers and local separatism. During the World War, localism 
was weakened to some degree when two major shipowners, Robert Mattsson 
and August Troberg, moved to Helsinki. 
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result of increased labour than capital input.33 This is also an 
indication of the optimal combination of the factors of production 
in an undeveloped country. The major obstacle to the development 
of these industries had been expensive transport, but this was 
removed by the development of both land transport34 and, 
paradoxically enough, shipping and the decline in freight rates 
after the 1870s. 
Compared with Finland-based manufacturing, the advantages of 
shipping were slightly diminished early on because long-trade 
wage levels were, of necessity, clearly higher than those paid in the 
country. The capital requirements of shipping were also relatively 
high and, moreover, they were increasing. As mentioned earlier, 
steamships represented even more capital-intensive shipping than 
sailing vessels. During the two last decades before the first World 
War (as the relative decline of labour costs, table 5:3, indirectly 
shows), the role of capital was further increased. The capital 
intensity of steam shipping is amply emphasized by the fact that 
the joint-stock capital of the Finnish Steamship Company (FAA) 
was five million marks after 1898, while before the turn of the 
century, a typical joint stock holding in a forestry industry 
company was worth from 500,000 to 1,000,000 marks.3s 
The problems of raising capital were exacerbated by the ending 
of domestic shipbuilding and the loss of any comparative 
advantage in tonnage prices. In fact, the change was greater than 
indicated by ship prices. In many cases, home-built, wooden ships 
were not paid for wholly in cash; for example, a merchant may 
have paid for timber delivered by peasants with iron, salt or other 
consumer goods, or by writing off debts they owed to him for 
earlier purchases; peasant shareholders, again, normally delivered 
most of the timber from their forests. This kind of in natura capital 
formation was out of the question with ships bought from abroad, 
even second-hand windjammers. Requirements for cash and credit 
33 	 See e.g. Hjerppe, The Finnish Economy 1860-1985, p. 108. 
34 	 At this point it is worth stressing that, in Finland, railways were built mainly 
with state money, loaned from abroad. Thus, railway building did not 
compete with shipping as an investment opportunity. 
35 Cederholm, Finlands bank och aktiebolag; Suomen höyrylaiva osakeyhtiö 
1883-1933, p. 145. In 1898, Wasa-Nordsjö company raised its joint stock 
from 0.8 to 2 million marks: Wasa-Nordsjö Angbåts Ab, p. 51. 
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thus grew somewhat more rapidly than actual prices and this often 
created additional transaction costs. The effect of all these changes 
was that the factors of production for shipping developed into a 
combination which was less and less optimal for a developing 
country like Finland. 
From golden days to twilight years 
The different elements of change combined to produce the same 
result: the importance of shipping in the Finnish economy 
declined. In quantitative terms, it never was a big industry. It 
contributed only about 3.5 % to the gross national product around 
1865, but accounted for 8.5 % of all non-primary (non-agrarian) 
production and about 40 % of the value-added of manufacturing 
industry. In the 1860s, investments in ships rose to about a third of 
all investments in production equipment (excluding investments 
in residential construction and the clearing of new fields, see 
p. 91), and this is the best proof of the dynamic nature of the 
industry. 
In the "golden days" of sail, Finnish blue-water shipping was 
unusual in its heavy dependence on foreign cross-trading. It could 
be said that it was only partially integrated with the national 
economy and, in fact, its backward linkages were rather tenuous. 
Most of the expenses were incurred, and a proportion of the wages 
spent abroad;36 profits were not always repatriated, and some 
owners had money permanently invested abroad.37 Since 
investments almost equalled profits, it is obvious that shipping 
income did not benefit other sectors to any great degree.38 The most 
36 How large this proportion was cannot be exactly determined. Normally, 1/3 
to 1/2 of married men's wages were paid to their wives and both married and 
unmarried Finnish sailors received a large proportion of their wages after the 
voyage at home. Masters spent, relatively speaking, still less of their salaries 




	 Otto Malm, for example, had large sums of money in the care of Rew, Kington 
& C:o (London), and he also bought Indian railway bonds and German 
securities. Nikula, Malmska handelshuset, p. 438-452. 
38 After the 1870s, the situation, of course, was different. Since investment 
declined, shipping income could, at times, be used for other purposes. 
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important linkage to the Finnish economy was through 
shipbuilding, which considerably boosted the development of the 
western coastal districts. 
In the sawmill industry, the backward-linkages to the national 
economy, wages and the value of domestic raw materials, probably 
amounted to three times more than the value-added. In the 1860s, 
investments in domestic-built ships plus seamen's wages 
consumed in Finland must have totalled less than 90 % of the 
value-added of shipping, which is less than in any manufacturing 
industry with the possible exception of the textiles industry, 
which used foreign cotton as raw-materia1.39 In many ways, 
Finnish shipping in the 1860s resembled certain "enclave" 
economies of the time, such as the cotton industry in Egypt. It may 
seem strange to call worldwide shipping an enclave, but being an 
exceptionally modern and very international sector in an 
undeveloped country, it was rather like a runner shooting out from 
the economy than an integral part of it. 
Cross-trading was not vital to the growing industrial sector, and 
it could easily have been disposed of if it did not bring a decent 
return on investment. When there was a good international supply 
of tonnage and freight rates were relatively low, it was more 
productive, both for entrepreneurs and the whole economy, to 
invest in industrial development. The interests of exporting 
industries were only connected with maritime transport to a 
limited extent, and these interests were promoted with the growth 
of regular liner services. The decline of shipping was thus a logical 
outcome. In the early 1910s, it contributed less than one per cent to 
the gross domestic product, and about 1.5 % to non-primary value-
added. 
It is obvious that, at least after the 1880s, this was more a result 
of the development of other opportunities than of the decline in 
shipping income. As previously shown, big windjammers sailing 
on long ocean routes were also profitable enough to offer perfectly 
sound business opportunities, at least for owners in low-cost 
countries. Even in Finland, however, this kind of trade remained 
the top choice only in limited, more or less peripheral areas, and 
thus sailing-ship trade ended up in a side road of economic 
development. In the early 1870s, a large number of first-rate 
39 See e.g. Kaukiainen, Finnland 1860-1913, p. 279. 
317 
businessmen still had personal interests in sail and even proudly 
regarded their biggest ships as symbols of economic success. After 
the turn of the century, in spite of the exceptionally high 
percentage of sailing tonnage in the Finnish merchant fleet, even 
the biggest steel windjammers counted for practically nothing in 
the big-business circles of the country. Although these ships were 
economically quite successful, the total development of shipping 
was far from being a success story; it was closer to being a failure. It 
is true that the Finnish golden days of sail outlasted the 
corresponding period in Western Europe, but by scarcely more 





Finnish National Archives (Helsinki) 
The Archives of the Secretary of State (Statssekretariatet)  
— Reports from the Finnish trade agents in Tallinn, Riga and Odessa. 
The Archives of the Finnish Senate:  
Finansexpeditionen 
— Ship lists from var. counties (Fartygsförteckningar), rolls of seamen (in 1860-
71 among letter acts (BD), although only partly preserved; in 1872-1887 ser.  
Et).  
Handels- och industriexpeditionen 
— Ship lists and rolls of seamen, 1888-1891. 
Inspector of Shipping (Sjöfartsinspektören)  
— Ship lists from sjömanshus, 1892-1914 (ser. Eb). 
— Lists of Finnish steamers, 1914-1915 (Ba:1, Ec:1). 
Board of Customs (Tullstyrelsen)  
— "Skeppsregister" 1895-1905 (Bg 1). 
— Shipping statistics (Merenkulkutilasto)1894-1916 (ser. Hh). 
Turku Provincial Archives (Turku) 
The Archives of the Private Marine Insurance Association for Turku Province (Åbo 
läns privata sjöförsäkringsförening) 
— Register of insured vessels 1866-90. 
The Achives of G. A. Petrelius 
— Balances 1868-80. 
— Ledgers 1885-90. 
 
Kustavi sjömanshus 
— Log, sksk Saari, 1903-06.  
Rauma sjömanshus 
— Logs: sko Aino, 1885-87; sko Amfion, 1894; sko Ankara, 1895; sko Ceralia, 
1885; sksk Daphne, 1912; sksk Delfin, 1895, 1905; sksk Dores, 1895, 1904-05, 
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1913-14;  sko Emerentia, 1875; sko Engla, 1905; sko Hedvig, 1875; sksk 
Suomi,1906; sksk Veni, 1912.  
Uusikaupunki sjömanshus 
— Logs: sksk Emmy, 1875, 1883, 1888, 1904; sksk Ingrid, 1875, 1885; sko Naema,  
1912.  
Jyväskylä Provincial Archives (Jyväskylä)  
The Archives of Paul Wahl & co. 
— Shipping accounts 1862-1877 (see appendix IV:1). 
The Archives of August Eklöf  
— Shipping accounts 1869-1916 (see appendix IV:1). 
Oulu Provincial Archives (Oulu) 
The Archives of the Antman trading house 
— Shipping accounts 1863-69 (see appendix IV:1). 
The Archives of the Bergbohm trading house 
— Shipping accounts 1865-93 (see appendix IV:1). 
The Archives of the Sovio trading house 
— Shipping accounts 1857-96 (see appendix IV:1). 
The Archives of the Snellman trading house 
— Shipping accounts 1857-86 (see appendix IV:1). 
Collection of drawings 
— Ship drawings from the 1860s and 1870s.  
Åland Provincial Archives (Mariehamn) 
The Archives of Gustaf Erikson 
— Shipping accounts 1911-15 (see appendix IV:1). 
— Copy books. 
National Board of Navigation (Sjöfartstyrelsen, Helsinki) 
The Archives of Koivisto sjömanshus 
— Ship-lists, 1904-1914. 
Helsinki City Archives 
Helsinki sjömanshus 
— Rolls of seamen (namnrullor, afmönstringsrullor), 1860-1914. 
Magistrate of Turku (Åbo stads magistrat)  
— Register of ships 1890-1914. 
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Pietarsaari (Jakobstad) Town Archives 
"Sjömansarkivet"  
— Shipping accounts 1852-90 (see appendix IV:1).  
Åbo Akademi, Maritime Archives 
Collection of var. shipping documents 
— Shipping accounts 1860-1914 (see appendix IV:1). 
The Archives of Finska Ångfartygs Aktiebolaget (FAA) 
— Ledgers 1884-1913. 
— Special ships ledgers 1905, 1913. 
— Position lists (Direktionens rese-bok), var. years. 
— "Historical documents": exerpts from the minutes of General Meetings and 
meetings of the Board. 
The Archives of the Finnish Marine Insurance Association (Sjöassuransföreningen 
i Finland) 
The Registers of "Första" assuransföreningen, 1863-1913. 
— The Registers of "Andra" assuransföreningen, 1863-1907. 
Correspondence.  
Ålands Sjöfartsmuseum (Mariehamn) 
 
The Archives of Robert Mattsson 
— Shipping accounts 1888-1914 (see appendix IV:1).  
The Central Archives of 
 Ahlström Oy (Noormarkku) 
— The Ledgers of Antti Ahlström 1860-1890. 
The State Archives of Leningrad Area, Vyborg (Leningradskogo 
oblastnogo gosudarstvennogo arhiv, Vyborg) 
Vyborgskoje gubernskoje pravlenie, opis no. 2 
— Ship lists for rural areas of the county of Wiborg, c. 1860-1875. 
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Statistics 
Finnish Official Statistics:  
Bidrag till Finlands Officiella Statistik: 
- Utrikes handel och sjöfart; Sjöfart (ser. I, IA and IB), 1856-1914.  
- Finlands ekonomiska tillstånd (ser. II), 1861-80.  
Swedish Official Statistics:  
Bidrag till Sveriges Officiella Statistik: 
- Utrikes handel och sjöfart; Sjöfart, 1860-1914.  
Historical Statistics of the United States. Colonial Times to 1970. Washington 1975.  
Historisk Statistik för Sverige - Historical Statistics of  Sweden. Statistiska 
översiktstabeller. Stockholm 1960.  
Historisk statistik för Sverige. Del 3. Utrikeshandel 1732-1970. Lund 1972.  
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Kristiania, 1871.  
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flaaderne 1886-1896. Kristiania 1897. 
Mitchell, Brian R., European Historical Statistics 1750-1975. Second revised 
edition. Frome and London, 1980.  
Sundbärg, G., Apergus Statistiques Internationaux. Stockholm 1908.  
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Statistics. Helsinki 1983. 
Published ship lists 
Wolff, Carl Gust., Finlands Skepps-Calender. 1860-65, 1867-69, 1871.  
Kjellman, Magnus, Finlands sjöfartskalender. 1874-77, 1880, 1882.  
Finlands skeppskalender. 1887, 1892, 1897, 1902, 1907, 1912; Supplement 1898-
1901, 1903-06, 1908-11, 1913-14.  
Sjöström, Otto, Kalender öfeer Landtmannafartygen i Finland 1865. Åbo 1865.  
Suomen kauppalaivasto -  Finland handelsflotta, 1930.  
Other 
Browns Nautical Almanac, Daily Tide Tables for 1986. Glasgow 1985.  
Cederholm, A., Finlands bank och aktiebolag. Helsingfors 1904.  
Finlands Författnings Samling, 1850-1914.  
Forselius, Victor, Finlands Handels Kalender. 1871-1903.  
Gebers handelslexikon. Redigerat av Seth Svensson. Stockholm 1927. 
Philips' Mercantile Marine Atlas. Second edition. George Philip & son 1905. 
Reeds Tables of  Distances between Ports and Places in All Parts of the World. 
Sunderland 1920.  
(Sjöassuransföreningen i Finland), Protokoll fördt vid allmän bolagstämma med 
delegaterne uti Sjöassuransföreningen i Finland. 1865-. Åbo 1865-.  
Veritas. Registre International de Classification des Navires. Paris 1876. 
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Suomen Pankki 1926 (Bank of Finland Yearbook, 1926).  
Ömsesidiga Sjöförsäkringsanstalten Sjöassuransföreningen i Finland, reports 
1907-1910 and 1911-1913. 
Literature  
Ahlström, Christian, "Hamnen i Odessa och Finlands redare 1862-1871." Nautica 
Fennica 2. Helsinki (1981).  
Ahlström, Christian, "Sjömän i Helsingfors 1819-1849. Iakttagelser om levnads- 
villkor och arbetsförhållanden." Historisk Tidskrift för Finland, 3: 1988. 
 
Ahonen, Kalevi, Joensuun kaupunki 1848-1920. Joensuun kaupungin historia I.  
Joensuu 1985.  
Ahvenainen, Jorma, Paperitehtaista suuryhtiöksi. Kymin Osakeyhtiö vuosina 
1918-1939. Helsinki 1972.  
Ahvenainen, Jorma, Suomen sahateollisuuden historia. Porvoo 1984.  
Alanen, Aulis J., Der Aussenhandel und die Schiffahrt Finnlands im 18.  
Jahrhundert. Unter Besonderer Berücksichtigung der Umbruchsperiode der 
Handelsfreiheit im Bottnischen Meerbusen und der Grossen Seekriege. 
 
Suomalaisen tiedeakatemian toimituksia B:103. Helsinki 1957. 
Alexander, David, "Output and Productivity in Yarmouth Ocean Fleet, 1863-
1901," in Alexander and Ommer (eds.), Volumes not Values. Canadian Sailing 
Ships and World trades. Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1979.  
Attman, Artur, "The Russian Market in the World Trade." The Scandinavian 
Economic History Review, vol. XXIX, no. 3, 1981. 
Bagwell, Philip S., The Transport Revolution from 1770. London 1974.  
Birck, Erik, Nykarleby stads historia 1620-1975. Del III, tiden 1876-1975. 
 
Jakobstad 1988.  
Björkenstam, Sven A., Svenskt skeppsbyggeri under 1800-talet. Marknad och 
produktion. Kållered 1989.  
Björkqvist, Heimer, Prisrörelser och penningvärde i Finland under guldmynt-
fotsperioden 1878-1913. En struktur och konjunkturanalys. Helsingfors 1958.  
Börman, Jan-Erik, Åboländsk bygdeseglation 1850-1920. 
 Farkoster, redare, resor 
och ekonomi. Helsingfors 1979.  
Börman, Jan-Erik, Under västnyländska segel 1840-1898. Helsingfors 1980. 
Cameron, Alan and Farndon, Roy, Scenes from Sea and City. Lloyds List 1734-
1984. London 1984.  
Cederlöf, Johannes, Lovisa stads historia III, 1855-1918. 
 Lovisa 1939. 
Craig, R. S., "Aspects of Tramp Shipping and Ownership," in Matthews and 
Panting (eds.), Ships and Shipbuilding in the North Atlantic Region. Memorial 
University of Newfoundland, 1978. 
Craig, Robin, The Ship: Steam Tramps and Cargo Liners. London 1980. 
 
Dahmén, Erik, "Kan den företagshistoriska forskningen bidra till den ekonomiska 
teoriens utveckling?" Historisk Tidskrift (Sweden), 3: 1979.  
Engman, Max, "Sjömän från Finland i Ryssland." Historisk Tidskrift för Finland, 3: 
1988. 
323 
Engström, Arne, Åbo sjöfarts historia IL1. Segelsjöfarten 1827-1856.  Åbo 1930.  
Finska statsjärnvägarne 1862-1912. Historisk-teknisk-ekonomisk beskrifning. I.  
Helsingfors 1912. 
Fischer, Lewis R., "The Great Mudhole Fleet: The Voyages and Productivity of the 
Sailing Vessels of Saint John, 1863-1912," in Alexander and Ommer (eds.),  
Volumes not Values. Canadian Sailing Ships and World trades. Memorial 
University of Newfoundland, 1979. 
Fischer, Lewis R., "A Dereliction of Duty: The Problem of Desertion on Nineteenth 
Century Sailing Vessels," in Ommer and Panting (eds.), Working Men Who Got 
Wet. Memorial University of Newfoundland 1980. 
Fischer, Lewis R., International Maritime Labour, 1863-1900: World Wages and 
Trends. Paper presented to the Conference on Sailing Ships and Sailing People, 
University of Western Australia, January 1987. 
Fischer, Lewis R. and Nordvik, Helge W., "From Broager to Bergen: The Risks and 
Rewards of Peter Jebsen, Shipowner, 1864-1892," Sjöfartshistorisk Årbok 
1985. Bergen, 1986. 
Fischer, Lewis R. and Nordvik, Helge W., "Maritime Transport and the Integration 
of the North Atlantic Economy, 1850-1914," in Fischer, McInnis and 
Schneider (eds.), The Emergence of a World Economy 1500-1914. Beiträge zur 
Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte, band 33, II. Bamberg, 1986. 
Fischer, Lewis R. and Nordvik, Helge W., "From Namsos to Halden: Myths and 
Realities in the History of Norwegian Seamen's Wages" (SEHR 1987:1). The 
Scandinavian Economic History Review, vol. XXXV, no. 1, 1987. 
Fischer, Lewis R. and Nordvik, Helge W., "Shipping and the Baltic Wood Trade to 
Britain," in Michinton (ed.), Britain and the Northern Seas. Some Essays. 
Exeter 1988. 
Fischer, Lewis R. and Sager, Eric W., "An Approach to the Quantitative Analysis of 
British Shipping Records." Business History, vol. 22, no. 2, 1980. 
Fischer, Lewis R., Sager, Eric W. and Ommer, Rosemary E., "The Shipping Industry 
and Regional Economic Development in Atlantic Canada, 1871-1891: Saint 
John as a Case Study," in Fischer and Sager (eds.), Merchant Shipping and 
Economic Development in Atlantic Canada. Memorial University of 
Newfoundland, 1982. 
de Geer, Eric, Migration och influensfält.Studier av emigration och intern migration 
i Finland och Sverige 1816-1972. Uppsala, 1977. 
Gjölberg, Ole, Ökonomi, teknologi og historie. Unpublished dissertation 1979,  
Norges handelshöyskole. 
Gjölberg, Ole, "The Substitution of Steam for Sail in Norwegian Ocean Shipping, 
1866-1914. A Study in the Economics of Diffusion." The Scandinavian 
Economic History Review, vol. XXVIII, no. 2, 1980. 
Hacker, Louis M., The Course of American Economic Growth and Development. 
New York 1970. 
Harlaftis, Gelina, "The Role of the Greeks in the Black Sea Trade (1830-1900)," in 
Fischer and Nordvik (eds.), Shipping and Trade, 1750-1950: Essays in 
International Maritime Economic History. Pontefract 1990. 
Harley, C. K., "The Shift from Sailing Ships to Steamships, 1850-1890: A Study in 
Technological Change and Its Diffusion," in McCloskey (ed.), Studies on a 
Mature Economy: Britain after 1840. London 1971. 
324 
Harley, C. K., "On the Persistence of Old Techniques: The Case of North American 
Wooden Shipbuilding." The Journal of Economic History, vol. XXXIII, no. 2, 
1973.  
Harley, C. Knick, "Issues on the Demand for Shipping Services, 1870-1913:  
Derived Demand and Problems of Joint Production," in Fischer and Sager 
(eds.), Merchant Shipping and Economic Development in Atlantic Canada. 
Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1982.  
Harley, C. Knick, "North Atlantic Shipping in the Late Nineteenth Century: Freight 
Rates and the Interrelationship of Cargoes," in Fischer and Nordvik (eds.),  
Shipping and Trade, 1750-1950: Essays in International Maritime Economic 
History. Pontefract 1990. 
Harmaja, Leo, Suomen tullipolitiikka Venäjän vallan aikana I. Taloustieteellisiä 
tutkimuksia XXIV. Helsinki 1920. 
Hautala, Kustaa, Suomen tervakauppa 1856-1913, Historiallisia tutkimuksia XLV. 
Forssa 1956. 
Hautala, Kustaa, "Merimiesten karkaaminen suomalaisilta laivoilta 1800-luvulla." 
Näkökulmia menneisyyteen. Eino Jutikkalan juhlakirja. Porvoo, 1967. 
Hautala, Kustaa, "From the Black Sea to the Atlantic: Finnish Merchant Shipping in 
the Late Nineteenth Century," The Scandinavian Economic History Review,  
vol. XIX, no.1, 1971. 
Hautala, Kustaa, Oulun kaupungin historia IV, 1856-1918. Oulu 1976. 
Heckscher, Eli F., Sveriges ekonomiska historia från Gustav Vasa II:1. Stockholm 
1949. 
Heikkinen, Sakari, Kortteinen, Timo, Soikkanen, Hannu and Soininen, Arvo M., 
Palkat, toimeentulo ja sosiaalinen rakenne Suomessa 1850-1913, Helsingin 
Yliopiston Talous- ja sosiaalihistorian laitoksen tiedonantoja 13. Helsinki 1983. 
Heikkinen, Sakari and Hjerppe, Riitta, "Den finländska industrins tillväxt och 
internationella kopplingar 1860-1940." Historica IV, Föredrag vid det XVII 
Nordiska historikermötet, Jyväskylä 1981. Studia Historica Jyväskyläensia 27. 
Jyväskylä 1983. 
Heikkinen, Sakari and Hjerppe, Riitta, Suomen teollisuus ja teollinen käsityö 
1860-1913. Suomen pankin julkaisuja: Kasvututkimuksia XII. Helsinki 1986. 
Hirvonen, Juhani and Hjerppe, Riitta, "Taloudellinen kasvu Suomessa 1880-
1980." Sata vuotta suomalaista kansan-taloustiedettä, Kansantaloudellinen 
yhdistys 1884-1984. Vammala 1984. 
Hjerppe, Riitta, Suomen talous 1860-1985. Kasvu ja rakennemuutos. Suomen 
pankin julkaisuja: Kasvututkimuksia XIII. Helsinki 1988. 
Hjerppe, Riitta, Peltonen, Matti and Pihkala, Erkki, "Investoinnit ja niiden rahoitus 
Suomessa 1860-1979." Suomen talous 2010, Erillisselvitykset. SITRA:n 
julkaisuja B 66. Helsinki 1981. 
Hodne, Fritz, Norges ökonomiske historia 1815-1970. J. W. Cappelens forlag a.s. 
1981. 
Hoffman, Kai, Suomen sahateollisuuden kasvu, rakenne ja rahoitus 1800-luvun 
jälkipuoliskolla. Bidrag till kännedom av Finlands natur och folk, H. 124. 
Tammisaari 1980. 
Hoppu, K. W., "Suomen merenkulkutilaston uudistaminen." Yhteiskuntataloudel-
linen aikakauskirja, 1915.  
Hornby, Ove and Nilsson, Carl-Axel, "The Transition from Sail to Steam in the 
325 
Danish Merchant Fleet, 1865-1910." The Scandinavian Economic History 
Review, vol. XXVIII, no. 2, 1980. 
Hoving, Victor, Finska Sjöförsäkrings Aktiebolaget 1898-1948. Helsingfors 1948. 
Huldén, K. J., Suomen Merivakuutuyhdistys, Turku - Sjöassuransföreningen i 
Finland, Åbo, 1.8.1850-1.8.1970. (1970). 
Isserlis, L., "Tramp Shipping Cargoes, and Freights." Journal of the Royal Statistical 
Society, vol. CI, 1938. 
Karttunen, K. I., Saimaan vesistön höyrylaivaliikenteen 100-vuotishistoria. 
Helsinki 1945. 
Kaukiainen, Yrjö, Suomen talonpoikaispurjehdus 1800-luvun alkupuoliskolla 
(1810-1853). Historiallisia tutkimuksia LXXIX. Loviisa 1970. 
Kaukiainen, Yrjö, Koiviston merenkulun historia. Koivisto I. Lahti 1975. 
Kaukiainen, Yrjö, "The Transition from Sail to Steam in Finnish Shipping, 1850- 
1914." The Scandinavian Economic History Review, vol. XXVIII, no. 2, 1980. 
Kaukiainen, Yrjö, "Merenkulku," in Jutikkala, Kaukiainen and Åström (eds.),  
Suomen taloushistoria 1. Helsinki 1980. 
Kaukiainen, Yrjö, "Finnland 1860-1913," in Fischer (ed.), Europäische Wirth-
schafts- und Sozialgeschichte von der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts bis zum Ers-
ten Weltkrieg. Handbuch der Europäischen Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte,  
Band 5. Stuttgart 1985. 
Kaukiainen, Yrjö, "From Days and Knots to Pounds and Dollars," Shipping and 
Trade in the Northern Seas. Yearbook of the Association for the History of the 
Northern Seas 1988. Ed. by Fischer, Nordvik and Minchinton. 
Kaukiainen, Yrjö, "British Timber Imports and Finnish Shipping 1860-1910," in 
Michinton (ed.), Britain and the Northern Seas. Some Essays. Exeter 1988. 
Kaukiainen, Yrjö, "Från jungman Jansson till Kalle Aaltonen. Sjömän i Finlands 
handelsflotta 1860-1914 - en kvantitativ översikt." Historisk Tidskrift för 
Finland, 3: 1988. 
Kaukiainen, Yrjö, "Laiva Toivo, Oulu - en röst från skansen." Historisk Tidskrift 
för Finland, 3: 1988. 
Kaukovalta, K. V., Uudenkaupungin historia. Neljäs osa 1875-1918. 2nd ed.,  
Uusikaupunki 1962. 
Kero, Reino, Migration from Finland to North America in the Years between the 
United States Civil War and the First World War. Turun Yliopiston julkaisuja 
B:130. Vammala 1974. 
Klamin suvun vaiheita. Historiaa, tutkielmia ja kuvasatoa. Lahti 1968. 
Knauerhause, Ramon, "The Compound Steam Engine and Productivity Changes in 
the German Merchant Fleet, 1871-1887." The Journal of Economic History,  
vol. XXVIII, no. 3, 1968. 
Kopisto, Aarne, "Laiva 'Toivo', Oulu." Kaltio 1971. 
Kovero, Martti, "Helsinki liikennekeskuksena." Helsingin kaupungin historia 111:1. 
Helsinki 1950.  
Krantz, 011e, Historiska nationalräkenskaper för Sverige: Transporter och 
kommunikationer 1800-1980. Skrifter utgivna av Ekonomisk-historiska 
föreningen i Lund, vol XLVIII. Lund 1986. 
Kresse, Walter, "The Shipping Industry in Germany, 1850-1914," in Fischer and 
Panting (eds.), Change and Adaptation in Maritime History. Memorial 
University of Newfoundland, 1985. 
326 
Krogius, Ernst, "Sjöfart." Atlas öfeer Finland 1910. Text II, befolkning och kultur,  
39. Helsingfors 1911. 
Kuusterä, Antti, Valtion sijoitustoiminta pääomamarkkinoiden murroksessa 
1859-1913.  Historiallisia tutkimuksia 149. Jyväskylä 1989. 
Kåhre, Georg, Den åländska segelsjöfartens historia. Helsingfors 1940. 
Kåhre, Georg, Under Gustaf Eriksons flagga. Mariehamn 1948. 
Lähteenoja, Aina, Rauma 1809-1917. Rauman kaupungin historia IV. Rauma 
1939. 
Lewis, W. Arthur, Growth and Fluctuations 1870-1913. Cambridge 1978. 
Lindberg, Ernst, Ångbåtssjöfart i Åbo 1836-1928. Anteckningar om Åborederier.  
Åbo 1928. 
Lybeck, Jari, "Sjöfolket i Raumo under sjöfartens expansionsår 1840-1870."  
Historisk Tidskrift för Finland, 3: 1988. 
MacGregor, David R., Merchant Sailing Ships 1850-1875. Heyday of Sail. 
Chichester 1984. 
MacGregor, David R., Fast Sailing Ships. Their Design and Construction, 1775-
1875. Second revised edition. Frome 1988. 
Maddison, Angus, Phases of Capitalist Development. Oxford and Hong Kong 1982. 
Matthews, Keith, "The Shipping Industry of Atlantic Canada," in Matthews and 
Panting (eds.), Ships and Shipbuilding in the North Atlantic region. Memorial 
University of Newfoundland, 1978. 
Mauranen, Tapani, "Kotimaankauppa," in Jutikkala, Kaukiainen and Åström (eds.),  
Suomen taloushistoria 1. Helsinki 1980.  
Möller, Sylvi, Gamlakarleby stads historia. Del III, tidskedet 1808-1878. Borgå 
1973.  
Möller, Sylvi, "Merkantilismin aikakausi," in Jutikkala (ed.), Suomen talous- ja 
sosiaalihistorian kehityslinjoja. Porvoo 1968.  
Nikula, Oscar, Åbo sjöfarts historia 11:2. Segelsjöfarten 1856-1926.  Åbo 1930.  
Nikula, Oscar, Malmska handelshuset i Jakobstad. Helsingfors 1948.  
Nordvik, Helge W., "The Shipping Industries of the Scandinavian Countries, 
1850-1914," in Fischer and Panting (eds.), Change and Adaptation in 
Maritime History. Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1985.  
Norrvik, Christer, Briggen Carl Gustaf 1875-1889. Under österbottniska segel i 
ångans tidevarv. Helsingfors 1981. 
North, Douglass C., "Ocean Freight Rates and Economic Development 1750-
1913." Journal of Economic History, vol. XVII, 1958. 
North, Douglass C., "Sources of Productivity Change in Ocean Shipping, 1600-
1850." The Journal of Political Economy, vol 76, 1968.  
Nuotio, Simo, Kuopion kauppamerenkulku vuosina 1856-1889. Saimaan 
kanavan avautumisesta Savon radan valmistumiseen. Snellman-instituutin B-
sarja 19. Kuopio 1990. 
Olin, Carl-Erik, Åbo sjöfarts historia I. Intill branden 1827. Åbo 1927. 
Palmer, Sarah, "The British Coal Export Trade, 1850-1913," in Alexander and 
Ommer (eds.), Volumes not Values. Canadian Sailing Ships and World trades. 
Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1979. 
Palmer, Sarah, "The British Shipping Industry 1850-1914," in Fischer and Panting 
327 
(eds.), Change and Adaptation in Maritime History. Memorial University of 
Newfoundland, 1985.  
Papp, David, Åländsk allmogeseglation 1800-1940. Rapport 1, 1971. Sjöhistoriska 
museet (Stockholm) 1971.  
Papp, David, "Sjöfolk i Vårdö under 1800-talets senare hälft och 1900-talets 
början." Historisk Tidskrift för Finland, 3: 1988. 
Pearsall, Alan, "Steam enters the North Sea," in Bang-Anderson, Greenhill and 
Grude (eds.), The North Sea. Stavanger 1985.  
Peltonen, Matti Tapani, Liikenne Suomessa 1860-1913. Suomen pankin 
julkaisuja: Kasvututkimuksia XI. Helsinki 1983.  
Persson, John E., Stimbåt. Om kolfyrade lastångare. Uddevalla 1984.  
Pihkala, Erkki, Suomen ulkomaankauppa 1860-1917. Suomen pankin julkaisuja: 
Kasvututkimuksia II. Helsinki 1968.  
Pihkala, Erkki, Suomen Venäjän-kauppa vuosina 1860-1917. Helsinki 1970. 
Pipping, Hugo E., Kultakannan turvissa. Suomen pankki 1878-1914. Helsinki 
1969. 
Pohjanpalo, Jorma, Suomen kauppamerenkulku ja erityisesti linjaliikenteen osuus 
siinä. Porvoo, 1949. 
Pohjanpalo, Jorma, Sata vuotta Suomen talvimerenkulkua. Helsinki 1978. 
Pollard, Sidney, European Economic Integration 1815-1970. London 1974. 
Ramsay, Henrik, I kamp med Östersjöns isar. En bok om Finlands vintersjöfart. 
Andra upplagan. Helsingfors 1947. 
Rice, Richard, "Measuring British Dominance of Shipbuilding in the 'Maritimes', 
1787-1890," in Matthews and Panting (eds.), Ships and Shipbuilding in the 
North Atlantic Region. Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1978.  
Rinman, Thorsten and Brodefors, Rigmor, Sjöfartens historia. Kungsbacka 1982.  
Saarinen, Juhani, "Rosenlew-yhtymän purjelaivanvarustuksesta." Historiallinen 
Arkisto 55. Helsinki 1955.  
Saarinen, Juhani, Porin kaupungin historia HI, 1809-1939. Kokemäki 1972. 
Sager, Eric W., "Sources of Productivity Change in the Halifax Ocean Fleet, 1863- 
1900," in Alexander and Ommer (eds.), Volumes not Values. Canadian Sailing 
Ships and World trades. Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1979. 
Sager, Eric W., "Labour Productivity in the Shipping Fleets of Halifax and 
Yarmouth," in Ommer and Panting (eds.), Working Men Who Got Wet. 
Memorial University of Newfoundland 1980. 
Sager, Eric W., Seafaring Labour: The Merchant Marine of Atlantic Canada, 1820-
1914. McGill-Queen's University Press 1989. 
Sager, Eric W., Fischer, Lewis R. and Ommer, Rosemary E., "Landward and 
Seaward Opportunities in Canada's Age of Sail," in Fischer and Sager (eds.),  
Merchant Shipping and Economic Development in Atlantic Canada. Memorial 
University of Newfoundland, 1982. 
Sager, Eric W. and Panting, Gerry, "Staple Economies and the Rise and Decline of 
the Shipping Industry in Atlantic Canada, 1820-1914," in Fischer and Panting 
(eds.), Change and Adaptation in Maritime History. Memorial University of 
Newfoundland, 1985. 
The Ships of our First Century. The Effoa Fleet 1883-1983. Ed. by Matti 
Pietikäinen and Bengt Sjöström. Keuruu 1983. 
Siegelbaum, L., "The Odessa Grain Trade: A Case Study in Urban Growth and 
328 
Development in Tsarist Russia." The Journal of European Economic History,  
vol. 9, no.1, 1980.  
Snellman, P. W., Oulun laivoja ja laivureita 1816-1875. Ed. Aarne Kopisto. Oulu 
1974.  
Sundqvist, Carola, "Kvinnor ombord. Åbokvinnor i sjöfarten före första 
världskriget." Historisk Tidskrift för Finland, 3: 1988.  
Suomen Höyrylaiva Osakeyhtiö 1883-1933. Helsinki 1933.  
Suviranta, Bruno, Suomen Höyrylaiva Osakeyhtiö 1883-1958. Helsinki 1958.  
Söderhjelm, Alma, Brahestad 1649-1899. Helsingfors 1911.  
Thue, Johs. B., "Bergen og sjöfarten II, 1800-1860," Sjöfartshistorisk Årbok 1979. 
Bergen, 1980. 
 
Tigerstedt, Örnulf, Kauppahuone Hackman. Erään vanhan Viipurin 
kauppiassuvun vaiheet 1790-1879. II. Helsinki 1952.  
Toivanen, Pekka, "Suomalainen laivakauppa Tukholmaan vuosina 1865-1808."  
Acta societatis historicae ouluensis, Scripta historica VIII. Oulu 1983.  
Torstveit, Johannes G., "Vår äre og vår makt. Ei näringsökönomisk undersöking av 
skipsfarten i Arendal i 1870-åra," Sjöfarts-historisk Årbok 1986. Bergen 1987.  
Törngren, Ralf, Ångfartygsaktiebolaget Bore 1897-1927. Åbo 1927. 
Unger, Richard W., The Ship in the Medieval Economy, 600-1600. London 1980. 
 
Wasa-Nordsjö Ångbåts Ab. 1873-1923.  Helsingfors 1923.  
Vehviläinen, 011i, Savonlinnan kaupunki 1876-1976. Savon-linnan kaupungin 
historia III. Savonlinna 1978. 
Villiers, Alan, The War with Cape Horn. London 1973. 
Williams, David M., "Crew Size in Trans-Atlantic Trades in the Mid Nineteenth 
Century," in Ommer and Panting (eds.), Working Men Who Got Wet. Memorial 
University of Newfoundland 1980. 
 
Åström, Sven-Erik, From Tar to Timber. Studies in Northeast European Forest 
Exploitation and Foreign Trade 1660-1860. Commentationes Humanarum 
Litterarum, 85. Tammisaari 1988. 
329 

















r~ O O O 
C+) 




CO O O 0 
N 
C O O 
M ey 
TY, N C 































































0  Cr, CO 
C CO N Cg •Cr CA ln 
Cn co 
r r 
N 	 Ln CO Le 
d' 	 ~--~ 
M 
Q) 
	 Co in 03 in d' 
 
6)  N r N O) N M 
co 	 CA CO ey l~ CO d' 


















C C C 


















M O cO CA 	 O) CO N 
co  
O O O  0 O O O 




e-1 N N in O O O 
CO CO O O 
N C 
C\ r  
tf) 	 ~ 
 .co  
d' 	 N [} N Q) 	 O CO in 
CO M N 
e-. 
CO CS) N 
N 





O 0 0 0 0 0 0 
V' O cA O O O a' 
c-) 	 0 	 N. 
a' 	 N 	 CO 
c-' 	 N 	 ,--i 
N O cM O 0 0 N 
N. O CO O O N O 
in M C N N N en 
O 	 c-' N cn C cO C) 
N. 
	 N N 	 N 	 e-i 
ey 
M 
M CO NTY' N O M 
CO 	 CM CO CO CO 	 In 
in 	 d CO C CO 	 N. 
N N e-, 	 N 
N 
CO 	 CO cn N N. CO N 
N 
N. O e-' O O O C 
M 	 M N. N c~ 
M 	 N N u7 N 
e-4 
cn 	 O e~ c-~ N O eti 
c~D 	 O 
O in 
c...) 
~ ~ ~ 
co 	 M M N In 
co 0 o M M e. a' 
N C O C C O n  
M C O a' 6) O  tf] 
	 N N e-' e-' 	 N 
N 
N. CO d' M M O M 
co 
C 
lf) M O 
C CO CO d' N in in 































































































OOMd, N.00i.  
M  dt  
c 	 O N 
d' N N M c-1 O.--I N 
c-~ 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
c.iOOOOCOO 
0 ( 0 0 0 0 0 0 
O C C O O C C C 
0000=000 
00000000  
m CO O CO O  
C+') 	 c-4 CD M 	 c-. CO 1. 
O N O CO N C.Li N O N m 
M 
LC) 	 N CD O O!3)  
c~ 	 r 	 M 	 N H c-i  
c-~ 
O 0 0 0 0 0 0 O 0 0 
O 000000 000 




CC) 0=0000 O O O 
O 00000 000  
tf) 
 
0,-10000  000  
00000 t. C O 
O 
M  




Ö ~ 	 rN) 


















O OCO o 	 c  
0 0 0( 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
00000000 
0 0 0 0  0 0 0 
CC cn d,  L. Cm O L. 
d' t. M M M N 
• 
Cf) ti 




C') 	 M N O O,--1  O 	 COT-10 
N 
CO 	 M  tf) C CC] N. O 	 M CO O 
O 	 M LC) 	 1.  tf) 	 le d'  
M 	 d• 0 	 63 L. 	 1.  N  
c-4 	 e-1 	 N 
N d, 
 0 d M O 	 C.7 k--i O  
M 	 d' M M tfl 6) M 	 N CO 
d' 	 CO C7) m 0 L. H 	 M N 
r 	 d' CO N CO d' c-i 	 G) N 
c-C 	 CO c. M LC) Cn O 	 6) C+'J 6) 
m 6) N (7) tn 	 LO O) 1. 
CO 	 N M 
d' In M O O N C in CT N 













~ 	 4 t~F b.()~:o,x 	
' 
	 Cs 	 0 
~ 
	
,-d m  4 R+ :o = 
 y 	 °
a   dc 	 5 CCå-ö ~ 
 
PT. ODCn,P-, › 44 fi. 
331 
332 
O N d' O ey 
N O C7) O CO 
CO 	 N d' N O N O M 
07 d' N N CO 
e-, M d' 
0 0 0 0 0 
00 M O O 
N 	 d'  
O O in M 	 c. 
CO O e- 0 N 
CCO O d' O O CO ey t~ 	 cti d e~ CD 
CO  
CO N co O N. 
CO N. co O CD 
e• CO CO 
O CO O N  
T.0 N Ni 	 di 
in cc tO O O 
r~ 
N C+J 	 O 
N 0 N. CO M 
N 0 O di CO 
e-0 N 	 N 
e~ d' CO N 0 
N O t, O 
	
M LO CO 	 M 
	
e, 





O O CO 
e~ r~ 
O M O O CO O N. O 
CO  
LO O O) O d' N N d' CO c-i N c-' M O O N CC  L-1 O L\ CO CO CO O N  CO LO LO N e-1 n  L\ N  CO 
N N nio N  O N N  CO CO O N  CO M N N N CC 
N 	 e-, 	 N N N e-i N 
d' 
N N N 	 CO M in d' N M N N. CO O e+ M 
C`•) 	 M 	 N N  
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
d' CO 
CO 0000000000000000  




0 0 0 0 0 0~ 0 0 0 0 0~ 0 0 0 
M 	 CO 
000000,-1 00000N000 
O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 r~ 0 0 N- e-1 M O tO O 
N 	 N 	 d' 	 CO O CC in e-i  
e. 	 n N 	 CO O N N N 
N. 	 c-1 
O O O O O O M O e-i O O N. d' e-i e-+ e~ O 
M 
O O O O n O O O O d, N 0 0 b. co O 
CO 	 N. CO N 	 N CO 0 
	
CO O 
e-1 	 N e-1 e-, 	 N O N 	 N e-1 
	
e-1 	 eti 
tO O N O O 
O co O CO CO d' CO CO ey CO N CO LO CO N. CD CO N. tC) O O d' e-i O LO N CO 0 CO CO 0 CO 
d' N N. e-1 M N 
	 O c-I N N M CO t\ CC 
O r~ co N N O d' M N N O O LO N e-1 
e~ 	 e-1  
O 









• 1-. c~ 
`4 F 	
C 	 CU~
P. p 	 C 	 y 	 C 	 n
'C  m.] 	 ~  F. 	 ~  a4 	 m 
 
	 :ca 
cOtl 	 › ~ c d 'k F., c~ .,. 	 ~ ~  a4 	 C Ö 	 ' ~  
r w 
 :C 'Ej O ~ x ~ y C~.0 >~~ A Ä G 
L. 0 	 '> 	 9,,..  	 cn 	 c.  7_", 
 cOd Ö cti  
~ p 
	 ~ T ~ C ~ d cd cd 	 d N :   
F o 
—, c >,-,0C 





















































ci 	 CD N O 
CO 	 to O N 
W 	 W c-t 6) O ~ N 
to 
Tr 	 d' cr) co 	 O 	 d' in a) 
co 	 c+ LC) CO 	 cs) 	 cc tr) CO 
O 	 c'C tf) tn 	 c-I N N 
O N 
c-i 
CO 	 O c0 (A 
N 	 d' 
N 
to 	 6) N CO 
CO 	 N e  
Cd CO O 
O O O 
l~ 	 d' O 6) 
L~ 	 O 	 CV O 	 CV 	 tf)  
CA 	 e 
O 	 CO N O N O O O O O O O 
N 	 N 	 O d' N d• 	 O 	 d' t~ N 
O 	 CO n O CO 





























N d N 
l~ N N N 
• CO N lf') 
c-~ 	 N 
L-1 
CO 	 N 
N CO N C,  
CO 	 CO 
N 	 N tf)  
O 




tn O CO 
CO ▪ N 
N O N 
[~ 	 N 
lo 	 N. tf)  
LC) 	 N 
t-~ 
N O O O O O O CO 
~--i 
6) O O O O O O O 
O O O O O O O O i--~ 
N 	 ey O tf) 	 .. 	 ... O O  
C) 	 tf) 	 N 
O 	 tf7 	 N 
t\ d O N 0 O O O  
N CO CO CO 	 CO 	 d' tf)  CO 
	
O 	 CO to to 	 OD 	 CA to CO 
	
cr 	 tf) tf) CO 	 c-' h N  
r r 
	
CO 	 tf) N CO 	 N 	 CO CO CP 
	





.,..~ ~ 	 ~  
	
CO 	
O coä 	 -s-Ci  ~ 	 m c. 	 .F  
	
~ 
	 al  .r7-7 	
~ a 	 å 
	
C 	 cti ~ 	 O C.-4 	 O.0  
	
C6 	 0 
.~ C 	 4  cC O +' ,~4 .m 
 Ö> C 
	
Cl) 
 3 	 ~ Ö ' `~ ~ ~ N O"'  Ö G~ 
	
° 	 H. P. ~ ci~ ~~ ci~ Q. R. 























































V' r C O CO CO O C 
r 	 r 	 O r a' 
N 	 T. 	 Co Co CO 
~•+ 	 M 
6) 	 r 	 O .4' V' Co C C 
LC) 	 LC) 	 O CO d' r O CO 
~ 	 CO 	 CD 
N M ~ n O Q, el' 


































N CO N 
co N N 
LC)  
to 	 ey CO 
ey 
CA 	 CO N 
CO 	 ey 
c-~ 
O C Co 
O  
N CO N 
M 	 d 




CA N N 
e~ N N 
nr N a  
0 N N 
CO CD O m t\ C\ O C 
O en 	 M CO N h 	 d' d' 
d' CO r~ M 
M Co d' C CO 
~••~ 	 N a' CO M 	 M N 
	
e-~ 	 e• 




N 0 000000 
0 0 000000 
0 0 000000 
Co 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cf) 
LC) 
T. 0 000000 
0 C 000000 
CD 
CO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
O O O M C M O O Q) 	 C CO 
co 	 N d' 
CO 0 0,-10N00  
(\ 	 Co 
CA 	 lc) 
















































































































































































cD CD N 
r N 
CD O O CD N 
.--, C O 
C Cfl Cb O r 
e--i e•1  
O 00 Cb 
N. N. 
N N 
e--L 	 ,--1 
O Lc, LC) 
'cr 	 CO N CO 
N 	 CO 
O 	 T. N CO 
O C O 
<--1 	 CY, N 
d O e-I 
C 	 in 






























L. LC d 
OD O N. N LLD CD C!) 	 Q)  
N. CD LO 
e. c- N O 	 LC') 
e~ 





Tr 	 03 
O CO CO 	 C.D N 
u O 
~ Cr 
O) 	 c'I Lc,  CD 	 C+7 c-1  d' Ln  In cti N  v) 	 r N 
00 O O ON. 	 N. Lc, C in CD 
g C". 	 N. 	 N N 	 Ni N 
A 







C/D 4  
< ~
~ O O 
 
O O O  Ln  
O ~C O C 	 ,-1 
<1•3 \  O 
  
\ O  
CD 
a 	 cm 
~ co en 	 r ~ r 
U  • 
W ~ A 
 
co 
''  ).7;z1 	 CO0 
	
N N  O e~ 	 e~ ,-4 O r. O 
~..CI 	 N 
ML^  M-I l:$  Cn 
C/D  O.()  
P-f a•' 
ao  
W ~ O O OD 
 N cc ~  O) O [r C N CO ~ 
UD :-E1 .--i C+ 	 c-L 	 N 
<
I 
 ~  
W  L, 	 C O e-1 	 e-, 	 ,-1e-i O N 	 ,--I r+ 	 N .:ti L 









--L p  
z ' 
~~ 	 O 	 [d a-+  ,1 











O 	 E-,  	 ~ 







Q) 	 N. CO CD M Lf> 
N 	 63 ct+ t\ N N 
Ln 	 r~ Q) 	 N. CO 
M 
CO 	 LO 
N 
CO 
 O n) 







c 	 c N N CO 
CO 	 c M 
co 
nr 
rn 	 O in d Ln 
K$ 
O O O O 0 O O O O N 
0 	 6) 
M 	 c-1 


































































~ M N 44 O in 
O 	 CO Q) CO co CXi 
O N N LO N 
N 




M 	 CO Q) 
N 











O 	 c-4 	 CO O 















































0 0000N.  
om 
Ln 
O O L\ O O N N 	 O 
M 	 M 	 CO 
CO 	 N 	 N 
0 0000 (fl N O CO O 
�  
r 	 N O O c-1 CO 
CO 	 .14 	 N 
c-1 	 c-1 	 r r~ 
0 C*> r~ 0 0 0 0 e. O O 
C: 
O  Ln O CO O 
M ▪ n n 
CO 	 e--1 c- 
O LO O n N 






CO 	 e-1 N N 
<-1 M 
tn 	 CO N 
LCD 












































O 	 M O 	 n 	 m c-, Lr) LC) 	 N N c-r 13, 
CO 	 N CD 	 CT 	 O N CA 0 	 a' Li) CO in 
in 	 CO M 	 0 	 O N N CO 	 e-, d' CD N 
e-i 	 tf) N. 	 N 	 CO M e-' Lo 	 d' N. d' 
M 	 c-i 	 e-' 	 d' 	 e-i 
CD 	 Cn CO 	 C) 	 CT N CT N N 0 in N 
CO 	 N N 	 CD 	 CO c•' 	 e~ 	 e+ CO 1' 
N 
a' 	 O O 0 	 0 0 0 0 0000 O Lo Lo 
Lo 	 O O O 	 0 0 0 O 0000 
CO) 	 O O CO 
	 000 O 00030 
Ö 	 ~ 00 d' 	 d' 
u] 	 O O O 	 000 O O c•, CO O 
N 	 O d' O 	 O O O d' CO M n O 
CD 
CO 	 ,I 
	
OM 	 Tr. 	 N e~ 
CO 
N 	 N 	 CO N N,-, 
N 
e-i 	 O N d' 	 0 0 0 CD nr N N O 
N 
M 	 CO N 	 N 	 N. C70 ['') c•' 	 LO CO CD O 
CO 	 N O 	 d' 	 c-' M c-, nr' 	 Q) co Lo  
co 	 (D CA 	 nr' 	 co M CO LC) 
CO 	 N. 	 N N 
c-, 
Li) 	 N. 0 	 CO 	 O e-, c•i D) 	 N Cfl N. O  
c-, 	 c-i 	 N 	 a' 
L~ 	 N d' 	 LO 	 co O co co 	 CO CO N O 
O 	 N C5) 	 a' 	 CO a' d' CO 	 e-t CO CO 
N 	 nt' 	 D) 	 in CO CO 
e~ 	 eti e~ 	 N 	 V' N 	 M 	 M 
e•' 
in 	 CO CO 	 e—, 	 O CA c-' C'9 	 N CO M O 
c•, 	 N 	 in 	 c•, 
e-~ 	 N. co 
	 CO 	 nt' CO M N 	 e-I CO N. M C) 	 M N 	 M 	 nr' O N N N CO O) CD 
N 	 d' N 	 e•+ 	 CA CO CO CO 	 1'  nr' CD eti 
e~ 	 ey 	 N 	 Ce') 	 (J) 	 N N 
ey 	 CS) N 	 C1) 	 to d' In 0 	 CO CO N e-, 
c-i 	 c-i 	 N 	 CD 	 c-i c-i 
a' 	 LO d' 	 N 	 CT d' ci 0 	 in O O c-, 
CO 	 C+•) N 	 h 	 in M c•' d' 
	
CO 	 Q) 
CO 	 e-I d' 
	 d' 	 c-i e-I c-' 	 d' 
	
eti 	 N 
N 	
M CON 	 V' d' N ~ 
	
~ e•' O O e- 
N a' CO 
tC) 
	 N M 	 M 
O  N. Q) O 































O O O 
O O O 
O O O 












'O 	 :0 C 'O C 
CO 	 "d 
5 > 4  b 
 
	








a CO CC 	 '5 
m y
ti




5 ~5 _ C 
	 •.. Ci1 
 
C) 	 'O C 















































































































1 dC 	 CO O CO O N d' Cb CO O CO (fl 	 (b c+ t~ O Cp O O(fl  O') u)  
c-r 	 cl 	 O M 	 O CO N  ~~  O t\ ~ ~ 
~ 	 h LO N N Cb M N 0cr'  c-1  
c-' 	 co  
O 0 	 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 
co 	 O 	 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 




O 	 co 	 CO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
M 	 (D 	 N O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
c-1 	 n 
lf) 	 CD 
 
LC) O 
CO 	 c-1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
c-' 
N 	 O 	 N CC co co co c-' O O in 0 
CO 	 N OM a' a' c-+ d' d' 	 CO O 	 N 	 N c-' 	 N 
c-i  
N 	 O 	 co c. c. N CO Cr. c. 0 CO 0 N 
e-C 	 d' 	 CO 0 00 CC Cfl CO O c. N co 
c-, 	 c. 	 c-i O e-+ O tn N 	 c-I O N 
in 	 CO 	 N N Lo N d0 M N N c-' N in 	 c. 	 c. 	 C+9 CO 	 n' 
N 	 (\ 	 n c. N c-i IN d' ,, M CO M N 	 c-1 c-' 	 c-i  
~<-,C 	 00  O CMc) O~ O O 00  ~O (0 	 co 	 O 	 C+') 	 N 	 c. N  Cfl 	 N 	 c-C 
O 	 N 	 CO O N Onr O O c. O a' M 
(D 	 CO 	 nr O n O N h 0(tU N. C') N 	 (b 	 nr 0 O 	 O e-, 	 LCD N c-C 
c-, 	 co 	 c. c. C) 	 co N 	 N LO N N 	 c-i  
N 	 d' 	 (b co n O c-i Lc, O CC) Onr 














~ ~ Xi 2 CC
:co
. 	 co 	 C,-i  




.~ CC "'	 C 	 ~ 	 +ti : 
F O O o a 	 cn 
~ =I-  ..-7 	 C ~ 	
05 
> C ö 	 a~ (ö ö 5 (d > 	 ~ ö 0 å, - :o :ö 
j ~. :co ~ ~ ~ N > > p. .-54 R i 
 i. 	 ~ 



























0 O O ~ 
A 







nr, tn r  
N. CD r  
C 	 c' 
dC 	 N 
~ 
O in co 
T 6) c' 
to co CD Nn in N 
C3 CO CT 
N 





O CC to  
CO nr m  
ci N r. 
LC) CD to 
C+') LC) N 
CO in N. 
N. N. Li") 
m m N 
O tf) O  
c-~ 
CO 
O to O  
N CO rn r o rn r m 
~--~ 	 N to 6) 	 m 	 t. O N 
CD 	 a) CD Kr 	 c. CO m Th' 	 N e 
c-~ 
co 	 n 	 N. in O  
tf) 	 m N  
O coo O 000 
O O O O O O O O 
O 000 O COO 
O 000 O 000  
[~ O O O O O O O  
nr 0 
m 
tn O O O 0 0 0 0  
to o to O 0 o O O 
m 	 m 
0 	 m t\ 
CO 	 C 	 ... Z1.^ ,.. 
~ 
t[) 	 O) N O 	 O  
O 	 CD 
co 	 N 
CO 00 d, O O O O O 
N. O O 
C) 	 N  ,--i  
c-i  
CD O N O O O O O 
P' 
o to 
~ 	 CD 
m nr 
t\ 
CT 	 c' 
c'. 
to• ▪ O O)  
<\ N 
 O nr 
e-.  
CO  
e-i 	 N N 
o rn  <-1 CO 
VD n o N  
r CO N) 














0 	 .. 
0 0 
C 0 
O 000, 00 
O 
O 
O 000,—.  0 0 
Ö O 
cf) 
O 	 O M cD C) O O  N r 0 CO  
nr O O N 
~--~ 
O 	 NNNC O C 
O O O 
n 
N 
O O O a' O C 
co 	 M N 
































































































CO M O CO CO h 
co 	 N N W M N M 
Kr 
 
	 14 M c0 07 O 
O CO M M d' 
N N M O cD 
O 0000 CC 
O 0000 CC 
O 0L)00 00 
n 

























C O O 0 0 O 
O 	 d' M O N M O 
O CO CO O 
• d' M r N N 
0 	 N N nr O M N 
N N O M 	 ,--I  O O N N C) nr 
M nr 	 N 
o a« Or~r) Mo 








































































































































O O O 
O O N 
t.CDM 
r~ r~ r 
~ r r 
6) L. N 
N. rn cr) 
r-" 
r-i N <-i  
O O O 
O O O 
O O C  
O 	 C+7 CD m 
O e+ d M 
ti7 
	
N N L. 
O M CD m Cm 

































































m m co 
N m 
tfl 	 ~ 
N 
D 	 H Tr, 
 
O) O O 
CO 
N O O 




tn o O 
O O O 
o ,cr M 	 M 
N O N 
N 	 O) 
l. 	 m CO 
L. 	 N--1 N  
,-i 	 o  cg o  
N in d' O) 
O 	 tf]  CO H  
M 	 e--4 
N  CO N  
CV 
O ~ in O 
cfl 	 m t\ 
N N N 
N O tn CD 	 O 
N N 
tf) 
	 O N O 
O 	 CO c1 N. 
~ N. CO m CO rmr 
x--i N K--i 
O O tn M CO 	 N tn 
CO 	 LCD 
CO 	 CO O M 
CV 




tn 	 r 
tn 	 d 
N N 
~ 	 N-1 
ct'  
co 	 'TM N. 	 .4", 
CV M 
tf) 	 V' m l. 
CO 	 r~ O c 
c. 0 00 
d O m L. C 	 tn O) 
• N c-4 


















































 O  
C/▪ D 




o ~  O 3 
0 0 O 0  O  
~ 
A 





































O O N. 
N V' N c-i  
H 









































co 	 tn 
O 	 O 
~ 
o tn 
O 	 0 O 
0 



























c-i 	 O 
c-1 	 co 
e-+ 
O O 	 c-~ CO 
N 	 (15 
N 	 ~ 
~ 
U 
0 0 0  N O 0 c-i  c-~ 
c7D 
W ~ 
0 0 0 	 0 O 'O N. å -;7.: in 	 O 
•cr' 	 c-,  
O ~ N 	 W — 
A r ct 5 
~ 
~~ 
O o O 	 CO 
N 	 C", ~ N 
z 	 a.) 
å :4 
¢ ~  
C/D 







. 	 ~ 
•:-~ 
x b~A 
_ O Ö 
-.-' 
	 U 
Ö 	 0,1  
U 	 GJ 
ö^ CD 	 c„ 
F CD 	 m 




cn 	 ¢w 
O Oi M O 
O N CO N C~ N. M O co 
a' 
N 
O CO N c d 
~' 	 CV 




r 0 0 0 0 
tn 0 0 0 0 
tn 	 r 0 	 ~ 
CO 







M O O O O 
N 
cD 	 O O 0. ~. d' 6) 




c 	 Q) M O N 
M N GO N O O CO O 


































































































ro f-4  Cd 	 CO 	
~ O 4 co 




M O CO O O O m 
o) 	 m 	 O 
c+ 	 O 	 O 
ey 	 N 	 N 
O 
e~ O N O O O N 
M O M O Cn O O) 
n CA n O 
CO 	 C 
r O H 	 ▪ O CID 
e-~ 
C7) 	 C N O N O CS) 
Cc) 	 O CO 	 N. 	 CO N. 	 in Cn 
	 N 	 Lc) 
M N e-I 
e-, 
M .-' C O N O ey 
N 
CO 	 O O O e-' O N. 
O) 	 CO• 	 CO C CO 
e'' 
N O N O C ey N 
O O O O O O m N. 
O 0 0 0 0 0 r'  
N O O O C\ O L; 
O 	 N n 
M 	 N c 
N O O O N O r~ 
Q) 	 C O O CD le Tr O  CV N 
co 	 N 	 e 
e-i 
C CD O N ey O r~ 
CO 	 CO N 
N 	 Cc) lf) N 
~ 	 in 
C7) K-4 




N. O O O 
N O O O 
e-1 
co 
CO O O O 
co O O 
N 	 C 
co 	 M 
M 
Q) 	 O e- O 
m O O O 
C~ CV 
ti O O O 
N O CO C) 
C) 	 O e-1 N 
Cc) 	 O 	 co 
M 	 Cc) 

















































































CO 	 CO CO C W O CO 
COCO 	
LCD C\ M ~ O d' O CO CO C CO 
N 
M [~ O N O e-1 M 











.-' O h C+') 
CT ey 







m O  
nr 

























































































O O O O 0 0 0 0 O O O 
... ▪ .. C O OCCC C C C 
C Ca N CO 
m O O CO 
N. CA n 0 
N LO ca ca 
N N M t\ 
M N ca N 
N CD LO 
N N CO O 
N d N M 
O N C t\ 
N N  
O 	 a' 
N N  
O N 0 N 
CO m d' N 
C CA nr 00 
CA N. d' M 
N N 
N N M C'7 
Ln nm m CO 
O CO Cc 
N. N LO o) N N N 
c') N N LO 
N. O a' N 
CO nr h N 
d' CO CO N 
N N N LO 
d' N. LO M 
N. 07 O d' N. el e') LO 
N 09 N. N 
N N 
N O N LO 
N N 
ca CO N N 
CO LO in CO 
N N OO N 
M  
Ni O LO N 
N 
N O cc O 
l~ 	 t\ N 
N O N N 
CA 	 d' M LO CO 	 O a' O 	 CD h 
- C'') M N 	 d' N 
~--~ 
m 	 OCCC 0000 000  
N. 	 0000 ONODN 000 
c~n 	
0
cOD ~ ~ 
cc 	 N 
N 	 O N D O O N N N O O O 
N 
m 	 O CA LO M N O M N N N 0 
N O N. CO N Mnr N N 
O LO ca N 	 cm 	 CO O 	 ca, O 
N 	 N N N 	 N N 	 C+) 
N 
CA 01 Tr N C+') 	 N 0 LO CD 	 N C O CV 
CA 	 CCc+'J 
 el O 
 N •	 O LO N CO 	 M a) CD 
tO 	 N CD 	 CT 	 N C+) 	 N 
CD 	 N N 	 M N 	 CD 
l~ 	 Cp CO O nr 	 O 	 N 
N 	 N N 	 N 
c0 	 O N d' a' 	 O e}' O) O 	 O O N 
LO 	 O N
CO CO 	 LC) 	 nr 
	
CO 	 N M 	 O N 
00 	 00 N N tO O N m 0 O N N 
N 
CO 	 O N N N. O N O M O O N 
L~ 	 O h d' N 	 M 	 rM 0 N. 
LO N N N 
	 C nr 	 N N N N 




























'~~ ~ cg . 	 ~ 
cg .0 5 ~ C c~ C ~ ~y 	 ÖO 
rs 
 O
O a  :O :O 0 









































LO N O) N 
CO LO C`9 !n  
t\ m Ln d' 
















































O C C 
O O O  
C C 
O O O 
CV 
M O O 
L~ N O 
O N 
tn 	 nr,  
tn 
tn 	 c. O 
CZ tr) 
~ O CO 
N N N 
c. 
O r O 
N 	 CC 
tn 	 c. 
c. 
c-~ 
t~ 	 t\ O 
N 	 CD 
C)J 
M 











nr C N N 
tf 	 CO CC ö Tr C) 	 N a'  t\ 
CO 	 ui CO C) 	 N C CO 
in 	 CO CO CO 	 N. in in 
CO 	 O CO N 	 CO C CO 
C) 	 CO 	 c-1 
o 	 C) 1.0 
L0 	 nr CO 
nt, 	 CO N 
tn 	 r  
M 	 N CD C) C~ 
M 	 c. 
CO N C) 
CO 	 N 	 N N c 





in 	 O O t, 
M 	 N 
Cli C)  
O (=ono 
N. 	 O ln CO CO 
to N 
~ 	 6) t\ 
M H N 












6  O M CO O CO r 
N N 
O CO r. C 
N C CO 
N 
co in co O 
O 	 CD 
M 	 CO 
co 
co 	 o a) O co 
co 
O 0 co 0 C C O 
O 000 000 
O 000 0 0 0  




LO 000 000 
M O O 0 0 0 lo 	 In 
c~ 	 M 
to 
N. O O C O 
O CO M 
to 	 C) N 
000 
O) -CC 000 
~ 	 CD 
in 	 CO 
d' CO O O O O O 
CO 	 t\ 
O
~  tC 
N 	 t\ c. N 
	 CO C CO 




O 	 O cti 	 ~ 	
Cl)
U 	 0.l -c: 	 O. 	 m cd 




~ m O -~ å o ~







	 E—. a. 	 w 
N 	 (f) d nr'
c0 	 nr 	 nr O
m 
	
nt' 0 N. in c0 m N 
N 	 tn cD CO (n d' 
O m(O Ln 
c-i 
O 	 0 0 0 0 cc 
O 	 CCCCCO  
O (=coo  0 0 
O 	 0 0 0 0 0 0 
rncooOOO 
l~ 	 CO N N 
cy 
O Onr CO O O 
Q1 	 N Ln Q) 	 N N 
lf) 	 O o N (D O O 
N 	 0 d' 
m 	 l~ N 
N 	 O O (0 N O O 
O 	 (D CO CO e--4 
cy 	 N. In 	 N tn d' 
N 	 C CO Od. CO 61 N LC) N cn 














































































m 	 Ln 
O 
M 
LC) 	 M 
O L~ 
O 




O O  
C 
0 0 






LC) 	 O 
O 
CO 












































CO 	 d, N. 
N CO C 




O O ~ 
Q) 
CD 































































































































































































































c-, 	 O O 
L. O C 
M N C 
c-~ 






















































































O  C 
C C 
C O 




















Ö ~ C 
O O O  
n 
C O C 
c+) 




co C ~ N 
A 
C O O 





d' O CO d' 
C) 	 d' '4 
d' 	 M C) 
r)  
d' O M 
c-~ 	 r 
CO 
C) 
N N N 
O C cD M 
▪ C) N. O C 
N 	 Cr) 
C 	 k--i V' cV 
C/J 
O C O 
N C C 
r O O 
.41 	 CC 




C C C CD C 
LC) 
O CONC 
O C C a' O 
C 	 C C 	 n 
N C C N 
co O in O 
C) 	 C) 	 LC) 
� N N 
N r. O N 0 
CO 	 C cD CO O C 	 n C 
d' 	 O <-1 co 
C O O C cc 
O 	 C C l~ 	 c 













































































N. O 0 
A 
O O O r,  
tf)  
O 0 




o 0 o m 0 
n O o 
O q 
O O O ~ 
A 
O O O G' 
O O 
,..~ O ~ 
A 
O O 
rn 	 nt4 w ~ 
cc 	 rn 
c9 N N 
c-~ 
O O O O 
O O O O 
CD 	 •ct' a' O 
d' 	 c-i cr 
<-( 	 H N 
r r N o 
m O O tA N 	 Q) 
tfl 	 e i  
d' O O N N-1 
m 	 tn 
N 6) 
tn 
tfl 	 c 
O O 
O 




Lo 	 Lo 
co 	 Q) 
N N 
O 	 c0 
tfl 




N 	 d' 
m t\ 
c-~ 
O N Q) 






















































if) N M V' 
~••~ 	 CO 	 e-i 	 CO 
N 6) c'r) 
c~ M 





O 	 6) N t\ 	 d' 	 r+ N O O L. L!'J 	 CO 
	
e-L N H O CO [. 	 0) 	 N 
m c O 	 M 
M~ N ln N 	 CO 	 CO 
H 




0 O O O 







O O O 0 O O 00000 	 cr 	 O N 
LCn 
~--~ Lt-3 N. 0 O N O CO O N O 	 O 	 C O 
O 
~O M in M 	 LC) O Lc, 	 C. r O r O 	 N. N. 
n 
N N 	 nt, 
 
CO 




O O O 
Ö O O O O O 0 0 O c-4 Tr L. 	 L. 	 O 6) c-L 
c/ 
O O i--~ 
A 
co N in 	 O C (0 L. 	 ,r N 	 N 
C L. Lf) 
O O O O O O O O O O 
L\ 
a CO O cc o O 
n 
CO O~ O~ O 	 ... 	 C N L\ o Ln Lf9 CO 	 Ln N 
n N N 





0000 O O N  O CO O 	 O 	 O M 	 CO 
















O e-i 0 ~  0 	 c-. 	 O  




n C/3 co a N N Gi 
CO A 
C O 





 CA 1--1  ti 
0 N 	 i".  
n 
0000 C 00000 	 0 	 O 
(1) 
C/D Ö 
0000 O 00000 	 O 	 O O 









N O O L. O 6) e-~ M O r t0 0 	















0 	 • 0 
g w o ° 
›, 
>, 







CO 	 et 	 cd 	
°' 	 C: 	 G 	 ö 	 Q) o ~ 
a4 cc: m y ~ ~ Op., U ti 



























































































































































r 	 r N 	 r N <1' CO 	 CO CO CO 	 d' 	 C 
C) 	 N tn 	 CO in N co 	 lf) N O 	 r 	 CD m 	 CO in 	 cD 0 tf) 	 CO N.  
O 	 N O 	 d' 	 • 	 N 	 O) 	 C) 
LO 	 N 	 ~•-1 H 
<1' 	 N. 	 t\ O N 
O) 	 tt) 	 CD N N 3 
O 	 C d' 00=0  O O O co 	 co 
to 
r 
O C r COCC COO C 	 O 
O 	 O Lf) C N O O Coo O 	 C 
r 	 CD 	 in 
in 	 a' 	 N 
N 	 d' 	 C'') 
N 	 O d' 00100  COC O 	 O 
e-' 
	
CO CO N CA O O O C O 0 	 O 




d' d' 	 n 
C'') 	 r 	 N C+7 
C'') d' O O 	 CCO 	 rl 	 O 
O 	 k--i CO 	 N C+') O O 	 O O O 	 N 	 O 
CO 	 r CD 	 CS) d' 	 N 
LO 	 CO CO 	 d' N 	 Ln 
C) 	 H 	 N .--1 
t\ 	 r CO a' N O O 0 0 0 c-' 	 O 
~-C 




C) 	 CO 	 CD m C 	 CO ~ Q) 
N 	 C' 	 d' N 	 N 	 CO 
r 
CD CO 	 c-' r 	 N CO N O 	 Lc) N O 	 '"1 
a' r r 	 r 
.-' 	 O W 	 CD Ln CO O 	 N O O 	 CO 
CD 	 O 	 O O H 	 113 	 CO 
<V 	 r Lf) N N 	 N 	 N 
O nr CO N 	 CO 
r 
c. 	 O L. 	 w rI CD 0 	 r' 0 0 CO 	 m 
V' r ,-4 	 N r 
Lfl 	 CD C) 	 a' n. Cfl O 	 LC7 O O 	 M 	 C) 
Lf) 
	 CD N 	 CO N. e--f 	 N 	 CA 	 C'•) 
CO N r CO N CO  
C+) 	 N 
N. 	 N C+) 	 LO N N O 	 N O O 	 '--I 	 C'') N 	 i--i 
N 	 O O 	 CC n CO CO 	 <V CO CO 	 r 	 C) 
LL) 
	
N. 	 Li') Cfl CT CO 	 C7) N O 	 O 	 C'') 
Lfl 	 r 	 N. N N 	 N 	 c-' 	 N. 	 CO N 	 Cy 
N 	 N O CD N. N. N C r CO CD 	 N 
O 	 N 	 r C.+') N N 
~ 	 CO 
~ 	 ~ ~ 
~,, 	 g 	 ra 
 ~ 	
O :CO 
 ~.1 	 C) 
~ 	 A"
• 
	 ' 3-..,..,"   CC '3->. '•' 	 0 "u 	 ' C. o 
 'd 	 ~ ?4 " O .O cc, cE C) :cti .,O_, O ¢„ -0 ~ •O 
	
~y 	 ~ Cb 	 F O M cc, ~ F-1 ~ `~ .~-, 1-1 F.1 ~ 0 ~ 'L~ .~ 














CO CO CO 	 Cr) 	 <1' 








































L, CO r r 














CO O CO 
c-4 r r 
Lfl L, O) 
N 	 N 
coo 































..  0 0 000 0 00 C 
A 0 O 
0 
<-4 








o o O C, 
c-+ 
C, 
0 O N O 
CO 
n 
0 O O N Q) 
.-~ 
A O O O q O O O O 0 O r O 0 O O r 
O O O O O) O O 6) O .. 0 0 0 O O CO O Q) O 0 O O 
c-I 
O LCD LCD 
A 













O O  O N O
to 
A 
~ O CO 
r 
d CO CO O 






cO O O O O nt' 
~ 
C 000 C CC O 
N CO 
A 
0 0 r CC CC M O O O O O O O O O G". 
0 O CO O O N cO 0 0 ci 'CM Lfl L,  r •ch O 6) N CO O ~ O) N. N ~+ r r r O N r r r M O7 
A 




























r 	 r 
,i,  M CO 



























0i f~. 	 ~ 
C,43 fad 
ca F 0 
	




CC .~ •m 
.--. 	
:~ ~
O 	 CU 
f-
c.i 	 c. .. m 	 G
~ 
N 	 (~I Cti ~ 






F°a x °~a0. å °~ å ~ 
ro+ 

































































































































Ö ~ O r~  
N n 









6) 	 N014 
6) 	 r~ O 6) 











o un 0 O 
Cr) 

















































00 CO N 
63 d Q) n 
~ O M 
c~ 	 N 
O O O N C 
a 	 CO 
CO 
O 	 c-i O N 






O 	 N o c-1 
N O O N 
M 	 (3) 
c N M 
cy N N M C 
t~ 	 O CA 'Cr. c-1  
CO 	 N O) l~ 
n 
N 	 C c-1 M 
c-~ 
6) O M 
O N C\ CC 
CD 	 lfJ CV 
M 	 c 
~--~ 
N 
0 o O O 
O O O C 
O O M 
lf') 
CD 
O O O C 
• O N O 
O 	 CO 
c~ 	 t\ 
cy 	 M 
M O O C 
c-i  
M O M 
Cfl 	 C  CD 	 tl) 
M O N O 




6) 	 d' cy 
C in O (P 	 N M 6) 
O 	 M 
CD 	 CO N 
c-~ 
x  
i~ 	 .-14 ti > 
g • 	 c~n 0 Ö 
° xx a 
a' 	 O CO N O) 
tr) 
	
c-i ct1 c-i d 
O 	 N 	 O c-,  
c-i  
c-1 
N. 	 CD N CO N M 	 r 












M O O O 
tr) 	 N 
jr) 
	 O CO d1 0) 
▪ c-1 C1  O a' 
d 	 N 	 t\ c- 
cy CD N 
















~ 	 L0 
0") c~ 	 cy C+'
~ c d 
~--~ 
O 	 e-i Tr' 
N  
O O O 
0 0 
o c o 
C O O 
O O O 
O O O 
CO O O 
N 
N 
c-, 	 O C 
O V CA 
c~ CO 
e~ C+') 
o r M 


































N tel 	 N. T-1 	 O ON OLO O) 
O) N 	 c 	 CV C 
N LO O N CO 
C ) O 	 O N 	 CO 
00 00 C 
CC 00 O 
O O O O C 
O CO 
,-1 0 00 C 
CO CO C 
0 0 CO O 
00 00 C 
00 00 C 
00 00 C 
00 00 C 
00 00 C 
00 00 C 
mra ~ra o  
~ N O) O O)  





j OLI ~ 

























































































































































































































C) O C O O O 
•ct' 
0 O C) 	 O C 
O C N C C C 
M 
O 
C C N O C C 
O O C C C C 
O O C O C C 
C C O O O 
0000 O C 
0000 
C O O C) 
0000 C C) 
C 	 a' 
O O 
0000 C) O 
CO CD N M 
CO CD O O 
M 	 CO 


























C\ N CO 
O 
3 O O O 
N 	 CO a' 
CO C 
N CO 
co 	 0 	 '4' 
N N N 
M CD M 
cn CD co O) 	 O 
M N Cr) l~ 	 N 




• MI F U 	 ~ 	 -s-, 
0 ^ co CO
,C'. 
2 CU 
O i-Fi F Xi Cb ..-i ~ ~ .S   
Cl) .-S4 C/3 •V) Cti .t ~ F .4 ll 	  	 F 
~ 6.: 	 › 	 ,-s4 › 2-, 
N O 





O N  










CI O O) 







N 	 O 	 .4' 	 ,--, 
N C) nr  CO  
Cr) 	 N O 
O) 	 O 	 'Cr  
ci 	 O O  
N 
O O a `CP 
N 
O) O C O 
co 
	 N ~ 
O 	 N 
CO O O 
C) 	 c-i 	 N 
CO 	 CA 	 CD 
CC 	 CO 
O C 
r N 




O O M 
N c 
co M co 


























































































CO k-1 	 CD 
N. CD 
~~ 
 O 0 cr  
	
CO M 	 N N C+') 	 In 	 O 	 CO C~ 
	




	 N a' CO 	 CO 	 O 	 CO N Fl 
O O 000 O O 0 0 
O O 
~ 
O N O O O 0 0 O O 
O d+ 000 0 0 0 0 
CD 
c-~ 
O r+ 000 O 0 00 




O O O O O M O N O 
CO c. r O O O O o) 
O [r O 	 O) 	 N 
	
CO N 	 LO 	 CD 	 O 
	
c-+ N 	 L-a 0 0 	 0 
O O  O 	 O 
CO 	 O) 	 d M 
H 	 r 	 r 
O O a' O O O  
O O N O O d+ O 0 0 
O 	 O 	 CD 
N 	 O 	 O C-+ 
00 ,100 N O COO 
O O O O O N N  O  
<\ 	 O CD 
- nr 









a+ r` CO N 
CO CO 0 N. 
N CO d+ 
e 	 ~ N 
~ N O 
N N n 
d+ O O O N. 	 O Tr 
O 
c-1 
CO O O O 0 





O O CO O 
CD 
r 
O O N O 
O O O t\ 
O 
0 O O N 
N M 0 0 
CD 	 0 	 ~- 
M M ~' 
r r r O 
O O co O  
N 
N 
O O r O 
M 0 0 0 
N CO 
CO 0 0 0  
LO N O) 	 t\ 	 O O CD 	 O  
N CO 
	
CO c-4 Fl 	 O 	 O 	 M CT 	 N 	 O) 	 CD 	 O 	 O 
cy 	 C+') c-1 CO 	 O) 	 O) 	 O) M 	 CD  
c-1  N. 	 a) d+ CO 	 M 	 CS) 	 CO c-+ 	 CO 	 0 	 c-~ 	 c-+ 	 co 
,-IM 














p. 5 	 . 	 CO CO 	 ~, ~ ~~ ~ ~~ 









o Q.° ~ 'O 
	








~~ 	 ~mti t .~ 2 °, 
	
9 ~ ~ ~~  	 ~ ~  ~
o  




















O q c-~ 






























































































































N • N 
~ a 
nr,  
tn 	 d 














O 	 CO 	 CO r Ln L. co  
cy 	 nr 	 V' c-1  d' N O CO 	 cti 	 cy N  O CO L.  
cti 	 N N  m 	 N 
c-i 	 ,-I  
O 	 c-~ 	 M c•~ 
c0
O CO 
O O O O O O O 
O O 00000 O O 
00 ... - O 
O  
c-~ 
O O O c-4 O O O O O 
O o 00000 O O 
Ln 
M 
0 00000 O O 
L. 
Ln 




r+ O O O O O N O O 




m O O  c-i O O O 0 O 
CO O O CO O CO N O O 
~ 	 co CO 
N 	 O N N 
	
m 0 <-+ c-i 	 O 	 O 
Cr) 
	 m O CO O in O 
N 	 O 	 CO co 	 CO co 
CD 	 LO 	 N M 	 e-1 m 
N 
m 	 ~ 	 N C+') O c•,  Q) 
c-i  
M 	 M 	 O O Ln nt, t'•~ 
O CO O Onr I. m 
co N Q) M 
Cfl 	 c 	 Q) 
O 	 6) V. CO CO CO 
r 
c: 




ocd y• :O N O~..
. c.~c s. 	 ~ 
~ O m x d)d ~ c»0 





°›v) -2, a 
m 
Ln m 




CV 	 O 
L. O 
O 	 c-~ 














N. N Lf)  
	
CO N 6) LC) 	 CO 
	
M c 	 Lf) 
nt1  
	
N N <-4 c-1 	 ci 
O O O 0000 	 CO 
LeD 
O O  O CCOO 	 e--~ 
O C O O C O O 	 C 
O O O O C O O 	 0 
0 O O O O0 O 	 O 
u  !  
O  O O  O 
C-1 
CONO 	 O 
CY) 
O C O O O CO O 	 0  
C)  
C/5  














O O N O 	 0 





O O O O O N O 	 0 
'C 
›-1  c~ 
PC1 	 C!) 
C/D 	 bO 
0 a-+ 
fti 




O O O C O d' C 	 0 
C/D 







E-1 	 Cl)  
O N O O O 	 C 
C/D 	 CD 
f-1 
C11 
O O O n N O O 	 O CO N N 
• •-o L'. 
LCD 
124 O O O ,+ 	 r O 	 O 
Cb 









~ -n 9,  .~ 	 ¢' ,-- CC 	 ~ ~ 
~ ~ 3 ~4 U ~ 
N CO N LO N 
N 	 CO 	 O CO CO 
N 	 V' LO 
CO 	 N M 
tt~ 	 N 	 CO M H 
N 




N C O O O 
O O CO O O 
O N 
0 	 0 	 .--1 O O 
co O co O O 
nr ~ 
N 
N O r 0 0 




N C O O 
nt, 	 o 	 oL.o 
•ct,  
CO 	 Ln 
r 
N 0 O a 
Lt 	 C 	 Ln O O 
c+ Q) 	 N L~ 
N O ~ N 
Lf 	 M  CP 
r C LC) 
• CC 	 O) N L~ 
<-1 	 C 	 c-1 d' CO 
N 	 N CO 




t~ 	 ?4 






















M d N. Le 
M ~M O) M 
a' N CO N 





C L. O C M 
L. 
O 
O Q) O O 
0  C+') 0 0  
n  
O c 0 C 
C C O C 
c-~ 
O Ln O O 
O N 0 0 
M M N O 
M N L. 
O Lr) CO Lr) 
‘71' N M 
M c-i  
O CO M N 
Q) 	 M CO In CO L. 
O r CO d' CO O 
rn 	 M 	 a) t-I r CO 	 c-I N 
M 	 c-i M Le') N N 
Lf) 00000 
O 
N 0 0 0 0 0 




rn O 0 0 0 0 
M 00000 
L. 




Lr) C C C C 
~ 
N 0 0 0 0 0  
nr 
c-+ 
C 00000  
c-~ 
In 00000 
H C O C O C 
L. 	 C C Cfl 00 
N CO 
O O O cO r C 
CO M O CA C 1. 





y  O 
~ 	
'c: 0 m 
~~>• 	
~~  ö cd :0 -4 Ö 




O) M M 
N Tr, 
 CO N M 
N N C+') 
LC) 
O O O 
O O O  
C C C 
C O O 
O O C 
0 C C 
O O O 
O O O  
C C C 
O O C 
O O O 
O O O 
M M 
D7 	 N a' CO N M 
L. 	 N CI 




























































































































































O O CO in rn 	 n O cD 	 cD 	 m N e-1 
nr 	 et. In  CO 	 CC 	 N  
m 	 N. m N. O 02 
co 	 in m co 	 m c.  
N O 	 N N CO 	 c1 e. 
O O O O O 	 O 	 O O O C ... 
O CO O O O 	 O 	 O O CO O .. 
e. 
0000 O 	 O 	 O O e-i O C 
0 0 0 0 O O 	 C e. C C O 
L; 
O O O O O O 	 O e. O O C 
0 0 0 0 O O 	 O O O C O 
0 0 0 0 C O 	 coo O o 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 O 
0 0 0 o O 
O CO O O o 
O Cl u] O) 	 l~ 
CD CD N  CO 	 m  
N e-1 
m m e. N e. 




ö cd  
E-.  
..  
0 CCC 0 0 
0 	 o O o 0 0 
O CCC O O 
0 	 C O O .. O 










     
	






	 ~ 	 ~ 	 å ' '1, 
 + 
	
~4 ~ O ? $ ~ c
ro 
~ g ~ -c~ 
o O  u o 
 
P. › -u 	 C4 
N ~ 
CO 
Ln 	 L~ 
m L~ 



























O 	 LC) 	 63 6) 	 6) CO CO 	 N. 	 O 	 N 
,--1 	 Cl) 
	
N. O 	 N. N in 
	 Cl 	 Cl 	 Cl 
in 	 d' 	 d' O 	 in r O 	 CO 	 d' 	 N.  
c-1 	 N 	 CO N. 	 N 	 c. 	 c. 	 N 
CO N N  
m 
O 
	 tn 	 c Co 	 L-4 L!) O 	 CO 	 d 	 LC) 
CO 	 LO  
N 
N. 	 N. O  CD O O O O O 	 O  
N 	 LO N CT 
c. 	 Cl) 	 N CO 
in 	 Cl) 	 c-, m 
N 	 N 
Cl) 	 Cl 	 Cl Cl 	 0 0 O 	 O 	 O 	 O  
c. 	 r 
O 	 Co O d, O O O O O 	 O 
in 	 CO 	 N CO 
d' 	 d' 	 N. m N. 	 c. 	 N c-i 
CO 	 N N c-, O C O O C 	 0 
Le 	 O O) 000 O O 
	
O) 
O 	 CO 	 LC) 	 O 
L~ 	 N 
co 	 m O r 000 O O  
H 	 d' LO O N O O O O 	 O 
N 	 N 	 6) LO 	 LO 
CT 	 N 	 LC) LO 	 LO 
Lc-) 
	 N 
O 	 d' 	 ,--1,--1 	 c. O O 	 O 	 O 	 C 
c. 
LO 	 LO N O LO O O O O 
	
CO 
CD N. 0 LO 	 N. 
CO CD LO N 	 N. 
Lc-) 	 CO 	 H 	 c. 
Lc-) 	 CO 	 Tr, 0 	 CO 0 0 	 O 	 O 	 N 
c-i 
O 	 CD in O O O O O O 	 O 
6) O CD 
d, 	 Cl 	 in 
Cl) 	 LO 	 c-, 
d' 	 N CO 0 .. O O O O 	 0 
N 
l~ 	 LO N N. O O N N 	 O  
CO 	 CO O Ln 	 O O 
C+) 
Cl) 
	 ci r N O o r m 	 O  
in 	 m 	 N CO 	 LO CO O 	 L[) 	 CO 	 in 
c0 in COO k-INLO N LO cn 
O 	 in O CO LC) N O 	 N. 	 O 	 N 
d' 	 c-i 	 c-i 	 c. 
m 	 In N 	 Ln L17  










	 . 	 •~n .-+~   N 	 O
: 
 å) 	 "+
~ 
ll 
~ F~s 	 cC ~ •~ 	 Ö Q. Ö .C4 :2 	 .',--,i  
' y 







LO 	 O 	 CO CO O 0 LO N 
k-4 n 	 N CO 	 a) 
to 	 N e-4 O C to 
r 
O O O O e+ 
N 	 C1 	 N c'' d' N CO 	 c-i 	 11) 
k-, 	 N 	 d' LC) r N. r 	 C) 	 N 
CO 	 CO 	 O O CO d' in 	 co 	 O  
tf) 	 r-i 	 k--i CO 	 Co) 	 CO 	 N  i-. 	 k--i  
O 	 N 	 O<\ tf) C)  CO 	 CO 	 c.') 
N N  CO 	 C) CO CO  
N 	 c+ 
a' O O C C C O O O CO 
CC 
LC) 
M o 0 0 0 0 0 C C 
N. O O CC O C C C C 
CO 
k-, 	 d' 
r 
r o or+000 0 0 
CI' 0 OCCoO C o 113 
rn 
r o 00000 O C 
C 00000 o C 
N 
to 
• o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 o M o 0 o O C N 
C 
c. 
O O O M C co O C 
CO 0 ooCoa' o co N 	 s. 	 to N 	 N 	 N. 
CO O c•' C C M O C 





	 M 	 l~ 
N N c-i  
CO 
	 ~ 	
CO CO 	 .4' 
Fi 
M 	 C) 	 CO CO d' l~ N a--4 lf) .--4 l~ 
~--~ 	 C) 	 N 	 CO d' 
t~ 	 e-,  
N N CO a) 

























oZ$ ~ •--• _ 	 c. o O 
c 
O CO 	 -p 
	 O 
44 ~r  > fn 
M • M v O N 
C) N N 
CO 	 k
--, 	 CO▪ 	 CO 	 d' 
O O 	 C CO 
CC 
C: 
0 0 CO C C 
0 o 	 C C 
0 o O co a' in 
a) 
0 0 0 0 0 
O 0 o C C 
0 o CO o C 
N 
N 












































































































   
366  


































Ci) 	 CO CA O 
a' 	 Ln m LC) 
1--1 
	 r~ CD e-1 
Lfl 
CD 	 m LID c-1 
eti 
O O O O 
O C O O 
O C C O 
N. 	 m 	 LS) N C~ 
CH N m N 
rn 	 ,--I 	 N m m 
In 	 N. 
O N m d' L~ 
N 	 C') 
O O 0 0 0 
O O C O N 
~ 
r 
O C O O  O O C N 
O O CO O 
W 
CA 
C O O 
O O C) O C) O 
K-4 
O C N O 
O O a' O 
a' 
CO 
0 o m C 
LC) 
LC) 
O O N 




C7) 	 CO N 
~ 	 ln Tt' 
O 	 m Lfl 
CD O O O O 
CT C) 
~ O O O O 
CT O C O d^ 
CA 	 ~' 
C 	 CD 
c-~ 
N O O O r~ 
Tr, 	 o 	 0 o v' 
~ 	 ~ ti 
N O C C in 
m O C O C 
Ln 	 r 
Lf) 	 CA 
O 	 co 	 d' nr' L~  
L1) 	 N 	 m  C) CA 
1-1 	 e-i 	 C-i e-0 CM  
c-I 
~ 
LID 	 lf) 	 eti CX) 
O ~ 	 O N Lfl 
m 	 r~ r m  





d b 	 5 • å 
O• 	 0 	 ö 0~ 
























 0 0 








































































ea e-I N 
d+ N M Cr) 
H N 
N N N N 
0000 
C O O o 
0000 
0000 
O C O C 
O o O O 
O O o O 
O O O C 
C C C o 
d N M M 
e-i N N 
 
tn 	 N 
O 	 CO O) co 
N 	 LO) N 
CO 	 CO M 
O CA d,  M 
LO) 	 tI) 
o L\oo 
0 
O 	 LO) O O 
N co O O 
r ~ O 
r N 




0 N O 
~ 	 e--1 O C O 	 (\ 
O) O 
c-~ 	 M 
O) 	 CA O 
CD N O O 
N 	 (7) CM 	 co 
nr, 	 M O  
LO) 
N▪ ▪ 	 Q) L\ 
CO 	 LO) c1 
d CA Cfl CO N lO) 
LO) e--O 
e--i  
l~ 	 CA C*) 
N  
0 co co CO cn 
L\ tO) LO) 	 O 
N nt, N 
O LO) N e-i  N 
r M 
00000 
0 0 0 0 0 
00000 
00000  
C C o 0 0 
N 00000 Q) 0 
M 	 ,--. ... .... C. 
M C C  
Cr) 	 C. 0 
CO 	 e-  
CO O O N O N 
c-4 	 O GO O em CO 0 	 N. Ln LO) N N 
L~ N M 
e--i 
nr. 	 O LO)  




0 0 O 
0 C 
0 C C 
0 C C 
O O O 
 
C O C 
0 C C 
0 O O 
in 	 co CO 
cn  ON N dr. 
N N d 




co O O 
~ 
o O O 0  
ti 





ö ro: ~ 
	

































































o :~  O 
 
cD 	 N 
~ 	 $2)., 
rn 	 ~ 
rn 	 L.') 3 ~ 
~ 	
ai  O ~ v~  







4  r. 
 
Q. cn 
� N ~ 
+ Z. 
c\1  ~ ~  
—(3 
 
nr. ~ ~  
O 	 O ci)  
1.J  PLE 
d • ~ 
"d 
• C"i  
O • '— 
~ 	 ci 
ål  
gm CO 
O  ..~ 
rå 
g .'r O 
~  
























APPENDIX II:1A. The current value of merchant tonnage by size-
class, according to the insurance sample. 
1 = number of cases 
2 = average tonnage 
3 = average value per net ton, Finnish marks 
1865 SAMPLE 
Size-class 	 1 	 2 	 3 
Sailing vessels 	 20>200 	 34 	 140 	 192.2 
200>300 	 35 	 248 	 210.1 
300>500 	 55 	 412 	 197.8 
500>700 	 45 	 563 	 198.9 
700>1000 	 9 	 761 	 216.8 
1000— 	 1 	 1,025 	 292.7 
1875 SAMPLE 
Size-class 	 1 	 2 	 3 
Sailing vessels 	 20>200 	 9 	 158 	 188.2 
200>300 	 19 	 258 	 240.1 
300>500 	 49 	 420 	 203.7 
500>700 	 70 	 602 	 171.5 
700>1000 	 21 	 819 	 189.9 
1000— 	 2 	 1,098 	 246.1 
Auxiliaries 	 200>300 	 2 	 276 	 366.6 
300>500 	 3 	 355 	 403.0 
Steamships 	 20>200 	 3 	 175 	 1,071.7 
200>300 	 6 	 243 	 909.5 
300>500 	 4 	 347 	 619.3 
369 
1885 SAMPLE 
Size-class 	 1 	 2 	 3 
Sailing vessels 	 20>200 	 7 	 143 	 145.0 
200>300 	 12 	 255 	 133.5 
300>500 	 31 	 415 	 143.7 
500>700 
	 31 	 598 	 134.2 
700>1000 
	 23 	 806 	 129.7 
1000— 	 6 	 1,121 	 154.6 
Auxiliaries 
Steamships 
300>500 	 1 	 368 	 243.8 




4 	 251 	 641.7 
300>500 	 7 	 355 	 650.3 
500>700 	 4 	 598 	 631.5 
1895 SAMPLE 
Size-class 	 1 	 2 	 3 
Sailing vessels 	 20>200 	 2 	 130 	 108.0 
200>300 	 9 	 254 	 101.7 
300>500 
	
12 	 417 	 123.8 
500>700 	 10 	 627 	 92.1 
700>1000 	 20 	 845 	 90.7 
1000— 	 14 	 1,254 	 92.9 
Steamships 20>200 	 2 	 146 	 702.6 
200>300 	 4 	 260 	 431.8 
300>500 	 11 	 366 	 461.4 
500>700 	 10 	 626 	 332.0 
700>1000 	 1 	 893 	 271.5 
370 
1905 SAMPLE 
Size-class 	 1 	 2 	 3 
Sailing vessels 	 20>200 	 — 	 . 
200>300 	 2 	 276 	 70.2 
300>500 	 8 	 393 	 103.2 
500>700 	 5 	 620 	 91.5 
700>1000 
	
12 	 910 	 75.3 
1000>1500 	 15 	 1,303 	 108.4 
1500— 	 8 	 1,726 	 143.4 
Steamships 20>200 	 1 	 130 	 422.8 
200>300 	 4 	 253 	 414.3 
300>500 	 10 	 407 	 701.1 
500>700 
	
4 	 573 	 529.9 
700>1000 	 2 	 745 	 449.3 
1000— 	 1 	 1,162 	 312.9 
1913 SAMPLE 




200>300 	 3 	 254 	 89.0 
300>500 	 4 	 392 	 80.2 
500>700 	 6 	 578 	 75.1 
700>1000 	 6 	 868 	 86.7 
1000>1500 	 7 	 1,329 	 91.8 
1500— 	 19 	 1,946 	 80.6 
Steamships 20>200 	 3 	 169 	 731.7 
200>300 	 5 	 256 	 384.9 
300>500 	 10 	 407 	 524.9 
500>700 	 5 	 574 	 462.1 
700>1000 	 3 	 751 	 444.6 
1000>1500 
	
2 	 1,287 	 231.5 
1500— 	 1 	 1,616 	 232.1 
NB: The 1905 and 1913 samples do not include FAA ships. 
Source: The registers of Sjöassuransföreningen i Finland. 
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APPENDIX II:1B. The accounting values of FAA ships. 
1 = number of cases 
2 = average tonnage 
3 = average value per net ton, Finnish marks 
1895 
1 2 3 
Passenger/cargo ships 300>500 9 372 491.7 
Cargo ships 500>700 8 644 523.9 
Passenger ships 500>700 2 650 1,003.5 
All ships 500>700 10 645 619.8 
1905 
1 2 3 
Passenger/cargo ships 300>500 7 418 684.1 
Cargo ships 500>7001  8 652 383.2 
Passenger ships 500>7002  3 637 811.0 
All ships 500>700 11 648 499.9 
Cargo ships 1000>1500 2 1,271 502.5 
Passenger ships 1000>1500 2 1,134 1,088.3 
All ships 1000>1500 4 1,202 795.4 
1913 
1 2 3 
Passenger/cargo ships 300>500 7 401 594.2 
Cargo ships 500>7001  12 637 396.1 
Passenger ships 500>7002  2 624 715.5 
All ships 500>700 14 635 441.7 
Cargo ships 1000>1500 2 1,271 393.5 
Passenger ships 1000>1500 2 1,134 922.1 
All ships 1000>1500 4 1,202 657.8 
Passenger ships 1500— 1 1,997 1,001.5 
1 Including one ship of 711 net tons. 
2 Including s/s Wellamo, 613 nt, which was used exclusively on the 
Baltic. The value per ton was FIM 943.4 in 1905 and FIM 848.3 in 1913. 
Source: The ledgers of the FAA. 
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APPENDIX II:2. The numbers of seamen, masters included, by 
size-class in the Finnish merchant marine, 1860- 
1913. 
Size-class 
under 100> 200> 300> 500> 700> 1000>1500- 
100 200 300 	 500 	 700 1000 1500 
Al. 1859-69, Large and medium-sized sailing vessels (accounting data) 
Number 
of ships 5 14 22 2 
Average tonnage 224 433 571 736 
Number of seamen 61 220 327 36 
Seamen per 
100 net tons 5.5 3.6 2.6 2.4 
A2. 1865, Sailing vessels (ship lists) 
Number 
of ships 	 169 	 160 	 41 90 26 
Average tonnage 	 60 135 285 412 526 
Number of seamen 727 1035 536 1384 412 
Seamen per 
100 net tons 	 7.1 4.8 4.6 3.7 3.0 
B. 1875, Sailing vessels 
Number 
of ships 	 14 118 119 104 32 9 
Average tonnage 	 34 151 242 368 581 789 
Number of seamen 	 39 919 1139 1219 478 150 
Seamen per 
100 net tons 	 8.2 5.2 4.0 3.2 2.6 2.1  
Cl. 1885, Sailing vessels 
Number 




44 153 243 381 581 821 1113 
Number of seamen 809 465 1028 1059 558 193 118 
Seamen per 





















17 4 3 4 2 
Average tonnage 	 55 152 250 346 678 
Number of seamen 121 52 46 68 37 
Seamen per 
100 net tons 	 12.9 8.5 6.1 4.9 2.7 
Dl. 1895, Sailing vessels 
Number 
of ships 	 455 60 92 97 29 14 12 1 
Average tonnage 	 44 140 250 380 588 835 1108 2154 
Number of seamen 1565 399 847 1047 366 204 206 24 
Seamen per 
100 net tons 	 7.8 4.7 3.7 2.8 2.1 1.7 1.5 1.1 
D2. 1895, Steamships 
Number 
of ships 	 27 5 5 11 10 
Average tonnage 	 47 138 230 382 652 
Number of seamen 168 47 69 184 185 
Seamen per 
100 net tons 	 13.3 6.8 6.0 4.4 2.8 
El. 1905, Sailing vessels 
Number 
of ships 	 149 13 43 54 14 16 11 5 
Average tonnage 	 36 139 257 378 576 865 1310 1761 
Number of seamen 399 85 413 593 174 250 209 113 
Seamen per 
100 net tons 	 7.5 4.7 3.7 2.9 2.2 1.8 1.5 1.3 
E2. 1905, Steamships 
Number 
of ships 	 12 9 4 14 15 1 9 1 
Average tonnage 	 59 139 233 403 640 743 1193 2045 
Number of seamen 	 80 82 56 244 273 17 220 28 
Seamen per 

















Fl. 1913, Sailing vessels 
Number 
of ships 	 156 8 27 29 11 9 6 8 
Average tonnage 	 34 128 253 378 590 855 1328 1804 
Number of seamen 413 54 258 317 139 128 115 186 
Seamen per 
100 net tons 	 7.8 5.3 3.8 2.9 2.1 1.7 1.4 1.3 
F2. 1913, Steamships 
Number 
of ships 	 18 11 4 9 15 2 9 3 
Average tonnage 	 51 154 229 412 638 728 1221 1886 
Number of seamen 113 121 52 167 277 36 203 101 
Seamen per 
100 net tons 	 12.3 7.2 5.7 4.5 2.9 2.5 1.8 1.8 
Source: 1859-1869 accounting data (see appendix IV:1); other sample 
years: ship lists of sjömanshus and local länsmän.  
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APPENDIX III:1. The structure of tonnage in the insurance 
(voyage) sample (Ships with voyage data from 
the registers of the Sjöassuransföreningen i 
Finland and from shipping accounts). 
1 = number of ships 
2 = tonnage (net tons) 
3 = average duration of observations (months) 
1 8 
Sailing vessels 
6 5 sample 
Steamships 
Size-class 1 2 3 1 2 3 
20>100 5 464 17.6 — — 
100>200 29 4301 17.8 — — 
200>300 35 8692 17.7 — — 
300>500 55 22646 19.0 — — 
500>700 45 25323 18.0 — — — 
700>1000 9 6851 18.3 — — 
1000+ 1 1025 19.0 — — 
Total 179 69301 18.2 
1 8 7 5 sample 
Sailing vessels Steamships' 
Size-class 1 2 3 1 2 3 
20>100 2 181 13.0 
100>200 8 1247 16.3 5 815 12.0 
200>300 21 5387 17.0 10 2544 11.0 
300>500 48 20380 18.5 6 2103 14.2 
500>700 70 42164 20.8 
700>1000 21 17203 25.0 
1000+ 2 2196 27.5 
Total 172 88758 19.2 21 5462 12.1 
1 Incl. auxiliaries (5 ships). This figure includes aux. Achtma from which 
the engine was removed during the year 1875 and which was classified 




8 5 sample 
Steamships2 
Size-class 1 2 	 3 1 2 3 
20>100 2 178 12.0 
100>200 6 980 16.4 5 837 12.0 
200>300 15 3695 14.7 4 1004 11.8 
300>500 31 12867 19.5 8 2856 11.4 
500>700 32 18973 20.7 4 2391 7.5 
700>1000 23 18528 21.5 
1000+ 7 7745 24.4 
Total 116 62966 19.6 21 7088 10.9 
2 Incl. auxiliaries (1 ship). 
1 8 
Sailing vessels 
9 5 sample 
Steamships 
Size-class 1 2 	 3 1 2 	 3 
20>100 1 78 12.0 - - - 
100>200 3 508 10.7 2 291 7.0 
200>300 11 2775 12.1 4 1038 9.5 
300>500 13 5312 17.8 11 4031 12.0 
500>700 12 7540 17.6 10 6263 6.5 
700>1000 20 16903 19.8 1 893 8.0 
1000>1500 12 13669 22.3 - - - 
1500+ 2 3884 22.5 
Total 74 50669 18.0 2812516 9.2 
1 9 0 5 sample 
Sailing vessels Steamships 
Size-class 1 2 	 3 1 2 	 3 
20>100 - - - - 
- - 
100>200 1 195 12.0 1 130 12.0 
200>300 3 782 12.0 4 1011 12.0 
300>500 9 3586 16.8 15 6092 11.5 
500>700 5 3098 20.4 14 8743 10.4 
700>1000 15 13580 21.4 3 2200 11.3 
1000>1500 16 20586 24.6 5 5970 7.8 
1500+ 8 13806 23.5 - - - 




1 3 sample 
Steamships 
Size-class 1 2 3 1 	 2 3 
20>100 — — — — — — 
100>200 1 186 12.0 3 	 506 12.0 
200>300 4 1013 12.5 5 	 1281 12.0 
300>500 5 1879 16.8 13 	 5292 12.0 
500>700 7 4026 19.3 17 10588 11.4 
700>1000 7 6170 15.6 4 	 2963 12.0 
1000>1500 9 11759 23.9 6 	 7382 10.3 
1500+ 21 40853 21.1 2 	 3613 8.5 
Total 54 65886 19.4 50 31625 11.5 
Source: Data file based on the registers of Sjöassuransföreningen i 
Finland (Mho Akademi, Maritime Archives), logs (Rauma, 
Uusikaupunki and Kustavi sjömanshus) and shipping accounts 
(see appendix IV:1). 
APPENDIX III:2A. Loaded voyages and transport by sailing ships 
in the insurance sample (excluding coastal 
voyages). 
This is the "raw" data which shows how many voyages, net tons 
and miles the ships in the insurance sample accumulated during 
the periods they were followed. The data for cross-trade cargo was 
used to estimate the total cross-trade transport production of the 
Finnish sailing fleet. Corresponding data for export and import 
cargo for 1865 and 1875 was used for estimating transport by urban 
vessels in these trades, 1865 and 1875. Coastal and Baltic export 
and import cargo, however, was estimated using the official 
shipping statistics as well, plus a few primary tables found in the 
"special archives" of the Central Statistical Office. As far as 
"peasant" shipping was concerned, respective data was computed 
directly from the ship-lists of the länsmän (see appendix III:2B). 
For subsequent sample periods, export and import cargo was 
recorded according to the official shipping statistics, totalling both 
urban and "peasant" ships. The insurance sample data was 
exploited only to compute data for cross-trade (and no distinction 
was made any more between urban and "peasant" vessels, except 
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for 1884/86 when transport in Baltic and North Sea cross-trade was 
estimated separately for urban and "peasant" ships). 
For all the sample years, the data which was used in 
extrapolating total net tons and ton-miles in different trades is also 
presented below as annual figures. For each ship, voyage data was 
reduced to represent one-year's sailing by dividing the net tonnage 
and ton-miles accounted on each voyage by the number of years 
(and fractions) it was followed. (For example, if a ship of 200 net 
tons recorded 2500 naut.miles on a voyage, and this was part of an 
18-month observation, 133.3 net tons and 333,333 ton-miles are 
recorded for this voyage.) The figures normally also include 
periods of lay-up (if the observation ended with the ship returning 
to its home-port, the observation period included refitting time). 
However, there were cases when this could not be determined, or 
when there was no data on laying up. Thus, it is possible that the 
figures are slightly inflated but the trend should be very slight, 
hardly exceeding the error of the estimate. Moreover, the 
extrapolation (see below) was fairly conservative, which should 
counteract any inflation tendency. 
The annual figures were extrapolated according to the 
percentage of sample tonnage to total (urban or total Finnish) 
tonnage in the size-class (or size-classes, "reference" tonnage class) 
within which the average or typical tonnage of the trade category 
in question fell (see also p. 144). At the beginning of the period, 
when variations in tonnage were fairly large within many trades, 
reference tonnage classes were wider than after the 1870s. If 
average tonnage in the sample fell between two tonnage classes, or 
in a class which significantly differed from the neighbouring ones 
in terms of representativeness, the class which produced a higher 
sample percentage was selected (usually this was the higher size-
class), so as to produce a conservative estimation. The figures 
below show the actual reference tonnage classes as well as the 
resulting sample percentages in the main trading categories: 
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1 = reference tonnage class 
u = urban ships: this implies that the figures for "peasant" 
ships were calculated separately from the respective ship-lists 
t = all Finnish ships 
"sh.stat" = the percentage was determined by comparing the 
sample with the total cargo registered in Finnish shipping 
statistics (this, of course, only applied to certain cross-trade 
estimates) 
"other" = the special procedure for estimating transport in 
Baltic and North Sea cross-trade, see below 







North Sea u 100>500 57 u 300>500 76 u 300>500 58 
Other European u 200>700 59 u 500>700 95 sh.stat. 78 
Atlantic u 200>700 59 u 500>1000 93 t 	 500>1000 78 
World u 500— 57 u 500— 89 t 700— 90 
1895 1905 1913 
1 2 1 2 1 2 
North Sea other .. other .. other 
Other European sh.stat. 99 sh.stat. 78 sh.stat. 41 
Atlantic t 700>1500 81 t 1000>1500 75 t 1000>1500 69 
World t 700— 82 t 1000— 84 t 1500— 69 
(For example, if the reference category was urban ships 300>500 
net tons and the sample amounted to 76 % of this reference 
tonnage, the reduced annual averages of net tons and ton-miles in 
this case are multiplied by 1.32.) 
The volume of transport in Baltic cross-trade was estimated by 
supposing that it was mainly carried on by "peasant" vessels. 
Thus, for 1865 and 1875 it was computed directly from the 
respective ship-list, and for 1885 by supposing that transport per 
net ton was roughly the same as in 1875. For subsequent years, the 
volume was assumed to be 10 % of Baltic export cargo, except in 
1913, when it was assumed to be the same as the total tonnage of 
loaded Finnish sailing vessels registered in the Swedish shipping 
statistics as clearing for or entering from Baltic ports. 
The volume of transport in North Sea cross trade was computed 
in a similar manner for "peasant" vessels for 1865, 1875 and 1885, 
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and for urban vessels according to the sample percentages 
presented above. For subsequent sample years the total volume 
(for all Finnish vessels) was estimated from a combined index, 
which took into account: (A) the volume of sailing vessel export 
cargo to North Sea ports, (B) the total tonnage of sailing vessels 
300>500 net tons and (C) the tonnage of loaded Finnish sailing 
vessels clearing six major North Swedish timber ports (according 
to the Swedish shipping statistics). The index was as follows 
(1884/86 = 100): 
1894/96 1904/06 1912/13 
A 99 75 49 
B 85 56 32 
C 94 54 35 
(A+B+C)/3 93 62 39 
The results of the estimations are presented in tables 3:5-15. 
Trade areas: 
Baltic ports = all Baltic ports and Kattegat ports south of the line 
from Skagen to Gothenburg (excluding Gothenburg). 
North Sea ports = North Sea and Skagerrak ports, all British and 
Irish ports, the South of Norway and the French Channel ports. 
Other European = ports north of Stavanger and south of 
Ouessant, including the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. 
Atlantic = down to the line from Cape Horn to the Cape of Good 
Hope (excluding the European coasts). 
Southern Atlantic (not extrapolated for total tonnage) = ports 
beyond the line from Cap Verde (Dakar) to Trinidad. 
World = the rest of the World. 
Outward = voyages from Northern Europe to other parts of 
Europe or the World, or from Europe to other parts of the World 
(e.g. westward over the Atlantic). Not extrapolated for total 
tonnage. 
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1 = number of voyages in the sample during the whole observation 
period 
2 = average tonnage of sample vessels 
3 = total sample cargo during the whole observation period, net 
tons 
4 = total sample nautical mileage sailed during the whole 
observation period 
5 = estimated annual total sample cargo, net tons 
6 = estimated annual total sample of net-ton-nautical-miles (1000) 
1865 SAMPLE 
a) Export cargo from Finland 
Trade area 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Baltic ports 25 124.9 3,124 17,880 2,294 1,657 
North Sea ports 118 384.9 45,415 161,540 29,682 40,574 
Other European 98 347.1 34,015 268,710 22,178 61,218 
Atlantic 3 188.7 566 19,080 357 2,238 
- thereof South Atl. 3 188.7 566 19,080 - - 
World - - 
b) Import cargo to Finland 
Trade area 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Baltic ports 27 129.0 3,484 19,070 2,515 1,786 
North Sea ports 22 338.8 7,454 28,990 4,938 6,716 
Other European 69 349.6 24,123 198,380 14,963 43,685 
Atlantic 8 320.4 2,563 42,440 1,409 8,704 
- thereof South Atl. 5 225.0 1,125 31,560 - - 
World 
c) Cross-trade cargo 
- - - 
Trade area 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Baltic ports - . - - - - 
North Sea ports 30 311.3 9,338 35,890 6,123 7,302 
Other European 274 415.4 113,812 671,560 70,940 172,807 
- thereof outward 130 422.8 54,961 330,980 - - 
Atlantic 143 384.6 54,999 603,480 32,776 139,206 
- thereof outward 68 396.6 26,970 294,740 
- thereof South Atl. 30 297.2 8,915 156,000 - 
- thereof outward 15 302.2 4,534 81,800 - - 
World 41 645.6 26,471 328,430 17,111 136,711 
- thereof outward 10 659.8 6,598 128,300 - - 
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1875 SAMPLE 
a) Export cargo from Finland 
Trade area 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Baltic ports 34 174.1 5,921 21,990 5,357 3,375 
North Sea ports 127 496.7 63,082 182,050 36,896 54,574 
Other European 62 390.3 24,197 165,260 14,657 38,437 
Atlantic 2 182.2 365 12,690 212 1,364 
- thereof South Atl. 2 182.2 365 12,690 - - 
World 1 654.9 655 12,780 302 1,852 
b) Import cargo to Finland 
Trade area 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Baltic ports 17 179.2 3,047 11,370 2,748 1,769 
North Sea ports 8 316.1 2,529 10,040 1,567 1,917 
Other European 74 430.5 31,854 215,150 19,300 57,014 
Atlantic 3 511.2 1,534 16,180 872 4,647 
- thereof South Atl. - - - - - 
World 
c) Cross-trade cargo 
- - - - - 
Trade area 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Baltic ports 3 281.9 847 1,810 - - 
North Sea ports 30 440.0 13,200 38,010 8,781 11,189 
Other European 89 419.4 37,327 216,750 25,237 60,720 
- thereof outward 47 447.2 21,018 122,060 - - 
Atlantic 287 586.0 168,185 1097,890 95,193 372,527 
- thereof outward 69 555.2 38,311 294,540 - - 
- thereof South Atl. 28 558.4 15,635 138,670 - 
- thereof outward 24 595.6 14,294 120,880 - - 
World 80 775.2 62,020 880,170 27,839 308,141 
- thereof outward 31 781.8 24,236 347,620 - - 
1885 SAMPLE 
a) Export cargo from Finland 
Trade area 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Baltic ports 55 220.3 12,114 33,740 - 
North Sea ports 38 473.9 18,009 53,260 - 
Other European 102 508.1 51,828 274,930 - - 
Atlantic - - - - - 
World - - - 
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b) Import cargo to Finland 
Trade area 1 	 2 3 4 5 6 
Baltic ports 12 	 161.5 1,938 9,790 
North Sea ports 6 	 550.0 3,300 8,150 
Other European 61 	 487.8 29,753 170,280 
Atlantic - - 
World 
c) Cross-trade cargo 
Trade area 1 	 2 3 4 5 6 
Baltic ports - - - - - 
North Sea ports 8 	 300.9 2,407 8,060 1,829 1,678 
Other European 29 	 498.6 14,459 63,260 8,437 19,603 
- thereof outward 9 	 430.8 3,877 17,220 - - 
Atlantic 177 	 684.6 121,168 700,320 67,686 274,733 
- thereof outward 41 	 725.7 29,753 173,900 - - 
- thereof South Atl. 13 	 563.0 7,319 69,110 - 
- thereof outward 10 	 567.2 5,672 56,400 - - 
World 27 	 947.0 25,570 265,350 12,018 117,581 
- thereof outward 9 	 965.9 8,693 106,630 - 
1895 SAMPLE 
a) Export cargo from Finland 
Trade area 1 	 2 3 4 5 6 
Baltic ports 48 	 242.4 11,634 27,800 
North Sea ports 22 	 508.8 11,193 27,680 
Other European 42 	 686.7 28,841 112,510 
Atlantic 1 	 404.0 404 6,470 
- thereof South Atl. 1 	 404.0 404 6,470 
World - - - 
b) Import cargo to Finland 
Trade area 1 	 2 3 4 5 6 
Baltic ports 4 	 383.8 1,535 2,490 
North Sea ports 5 	 612.3 3,061 5,730 
Other European 24 	 610.4 14,650 65,940 
Atlantic - - 
World 
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c) Cross-trade cargo 
Trade area 	 1 	 2 	 3 4 5 6 
Baltic ports 	 1 	 368.0 	 368 300 
North Sea ports 	 9 	 575.8 	 5,182 7,590 3,140 3,060 
Other European 	 11 	 626.2 	 6,888 23,180 5,056 11,347 
- thereof outward 	 4 	 537.2 	 2,149 11,300 
Atlantic 	 123 	 854.4 	 105,094 512,925 65,760 272,407 
- thereof outward 	 20 	 916.7 	 18,335 88,960 
- thereof South Atl. 23 1,014.0 
	
23,321 125,540 
- thereof outward 
	 9 1,149.0 	 10,341 48,450 
World 	 18 1,142.2 	 20,559 196,560 10,461 110,903 
- thereof outward 	 11 1,143.1 	 12,574 118,670 
1905 SAMPLE 
a) Export cargo from Finland 
Trade area 	 1 	 2 	 3 4 5 6 
Baltic ports 	 23 	 300.5 	 6,912 14,040 
North Sea ports 	 21 	 793.6 	 16,666 29,545 
Other European 	 17 	 506.3 	 8,607 44,560 
Atlantic 
World 
b) Import cargo to Finland 
Trade area 	 1 	 2 	 3 4 5 6 
Baltic ports 	 1 	 971.o 	 971 510 
North Sea ports 	 5 	 729.1 	 3,646 7,190 
Other European 	 16 	 588.6 	 9,417 43,170 
Atlantic 
World 
c) Cross-trade cargo 
Trade area 	 1 	 2 	 3 4 5 6 
Baltic ports 	 2 	 687.5 
	 1,375 1,650 
North Sea ports 	 16 	 678.7 	 10,859 15,340 8,347 8,037 
Other European 	 4 	 607.8 
	 2,431 11,610 0,728 2,032 
- thereof outward 	 2 	 814.5 
	 1,629 7,960 
Atlantic 
	 52 	 948.8 	 49,336 293,990 25,023 143,464 
- thereof outward 	 12 	 940.7 	 11,289 69,480 
- thereof South Atl. 32 	 993.1 	 31,780 197,960 
- thereof outward 	 8 1,019.8 	 8,159 53,640 
World 	 72 1,432.1 	 103,108 801,180 53,666 593,863 
- thereof outward 	 26 1,444.7 	 37,562 263,520 
13 - Sailing into Twilight 385 
1913 SAMPLE 
a) Export cargo from Finland 
Trade area 1 	 2 3 4 5 6 
Baltic ports 38 	 334.8 12,721 24,290 
North Sea ports 9 	 634.0 5,706 11,110 
Other European 7 	 443.4 3,104 18,190 
Atlantic - - - 
World 3 	 845.0 2,535 25,000 
b) Import cargo to Finland 
Trade area 1 	 2 3 4 5 6 
Baltic ports 5 	 294.8 1,474 3,240 
North Sea ports 2 	 540.0 1,080 2,150 
Other European 8 	 464.5 3,716 20,710 
Atlantic - - - 
World 
c) Cross-trade cargo 
Trade area 1 	 2 3 4 5 6 
Baltic ports 1 	 560.0 560 150 - - 
North Sea ports 10 	 702.7 7,027 11,400 5,373 5,728 
Other European 1 1,665.0 1,665 1,830 0,905 1,657 
Atlantic 44 1,030.8 45,355 235,130 23,069 123,669 
- thereof outward 19 1,114.2 21,170 100,890 - - 
- thereof South Atl. 28 1,144.5 32,047 165,400 
- thereof outward 17 1,093.0 18,581 95,850 - - 
World 87 1,795.0 156,162 869,030 87,035 860,918 
- thereof outward 28 1,859.5 52,065 316,060 - - 
Source: See appendix III:1. 
APPENDIX III:2B. Transport by "peasant" vessels, 1875. 
These are the total figures for the Finnish "peasant" fleet. In a few 
cases, missing data was extrapolated by using size-class-specific 
averages. Apart from supplying transport volumes for 1875, these 
figures were also used to compute the average cargo in different 
trades and size-classes (see appendix III:2C), which were used to 
complement the fragmentary voyage data of 1865, and, together 
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with the data in appendix III:2D, to estimate the volume of cross-
trade by "peasant" vessels in 1885. 
Baltic ports = all Baltic ports and Kattegat ports south of the line 
from Skagen to Gothenburg (excluding Gothenburg). 
North Sea ports = North Sea and Skagerrak ports, all British and 
Irish ports, the South of Norway and the French Channel ports. 
Other European = ports north of Stavanger and south of 
Ouessant, including the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. 
Atlantic = down to the line from Cape Horn to the Cape of Good 
Hope (excluding the European coasts). 
World = the rest of the World. 
Outward = voyages from Northern Europe to other parts of 
Europe or the World, or from Europe to other parts of the World 
(e.g. westward over the Atlantic). 
1 = number of voyages 
2 = average tonnage 
3 = total tonnage 
(all figures are per 12 months) 
a) Export cargo from Finland 
4 = total nautical miles 
5 = total net ton — nautical 
miles (1000) 
Trade area 1 2 3 4 5 
Baltic ports 139 164.5 22,930 78,645 12,937 
North Sea ports 218 268.3 62,319 276,850 74,279 
Other European — — — — 
Atlantic — — — 
World — — — 
b) Import cargo to Finland 
Trade area 1 2 3 4 5 
Baltic ports 8 139.1 1,113 4,900 682 
North Sea ports 27 281.0 9,910 31,860 8,953 
Other European — — — 
Atlantic — — — 
World — — 
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c) Cross-trade cargo 
Trade area 1 2 3 4 5 
Baltic ports 65 160.5 10,450 41,985 6,739 
North Sea ports 286 282.1 82,940 320,730 90,478 
— thereof outward 162 307.1 49,755 195,900 60,161 
Other European 10 381.9 3,819 32,990 12,599 
— thereof outward 3 401.3 1,204 10,000 4,013 
Atlantic 3 460.3 1,381 9,100 4,189 
World — — — — 
APPENDIX III:2C. "Peasant" tonnage and transport by size-class, 
1875. 
1. Tonnage by size-class 
Size-class 100>200 200>300 300>500 500>700 700— 
Total "peasant" tonnage 22,084 34,927 32,455 5,845 715 
2. Average amount of cargo (other than coastal) by trade, net tons per 
ships' net ton (or voyages per ship, averages weighted by ship size) 
Size-class 
a) Export cargo from Finland 
100>200 200>300 over 300 
Baltic ports 0.64 0.20 0.05 
North Sea ports 
b) Import cargo to Finland 
0.26 0.82 0.71 
Baltic ports 0.05 
North Sea ports 
c) Cross-trade cargo 
0.02 0.10 0.11  
Baltic ports 0.36 0.06 0.015 
North Sea ports 0.36 0.89 1.125 
Other European and 
Atlantic 0.02 0.11 
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3. Average length of voyage by trade, nautical miles 
a) Export cargo from Finland 
Baltic ports 	 560 
North Sea ports 	 1190 
b) Import cargo to Finland 
Baltic ports 	 610 
North Sea ports 	 900 
c) Cross-trade cargo 
Baltic ports 	 645 
North Sea ports 	 1090 
Other European and 
Atlantic 	 3240 
Source: Ship-lists of rural districts, 1875. 
APPENDIX III:2D. "Peasant" tonnage insured with the insurance 
association of Turku province: average annual 
length of sailing period by size-class, 1884-85. 
1 = Number of cases (insured vessels) 
2 = Average net tonnage 
3 = Average annual sailing period, months 
4 = Number of ships in year-round traffic (not laid up) 
5 = Average annual sailing period in main sample (urban vessels) 
1884/86, months 
Size—class 1 2 3 4 5 
<200 6 168.5 5.3 5.3 
200>300 19 255.3 6.6 — 9.2 
300>500 17 338.9 7.4 1 9.0 
500>700 6 606.8 8.7 2 11.3 
Source: Åbo läns enskilda sjöassuransförening, register-books 1884-85; 
data file of the insurance sample (column 5). 
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APPENDIX III:3A. Loaded voyages and transport by steamships in 
the insurance sample. (All foreign voyages in 
1875 and 1885 samples, subsequently only 
cross-trade voyages). 
This is the data for steamships found in the insurance sample, in 
principle corresponding with that for sailing vessels presented in 
appendix III:2A. It was used to estimate the volume of steamship 
cross-trading for all sample years, and also the volume of other 
steamship foreign traffic before the 1890s (from 1891 onwards, the 
information could be found from the working tables of shipping 
statistics; before this shipping statistics could not be used because 
of extensive double registering in steamship line traffic). For the 
1860s, the insurance registers included no steamships. 
Although the data was used in a similar manner, in principle, 
than that for sailing vessels there were, however, certain important 
differences. Above all, the insurance registers did not specify 
voyages for liner ships sailing within the Baltic but only indicated 
the route in question. Thus, for such vessels the data was first 
completed by estimating their traffic frequences (numbers of 
round-trips). This was done using both existing litterature (which 
often quotes time-tables) plus the statistics of 1894 (thus supposing 
that typical tour frequencies were roughly similar). For ships 
which sailed both to Russia and Sweden, the route was divided in 
two parts, Helsinki — Sweden (Stockholm) and Helsinki — Russia 
(St.Petersburg). 
Thus, a lot of data in this appendix did not solely depend on the 
insurance data but resulted wholly or mainly on other sources and 
estimations. These cases are indicated by an asterisk (*). 
On the other hand, the samples covered large steam tonnage so 
well that in many cases they were equal or practically equal with 
total figures. Such was the case with cross-trade before the turn of 
the century (samples 1875, 1885 and 1895) and liner traffic to the 
Southern Baltic and beyond the Sound in samples 1875 and 1885. 
It also seems possible that the sample of 1875 only missed two 
steamships sailing regularly to Russia and Sweden. 
The main problem, as far as extrapolation is conserved, was to 
estimate the volume of steamship traffic to Russia and Sweden. 
From the mid-1870s, typical sizes of ships on steamer lines to 
Russia and Sweden ranged from 150 to 350 net tons. Since the 
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lower end of this scale fell in sizes which were typical on domestic 
coastal routes (the traffic of which is not counted here) it was 
decided to use 300>500 net tons as reference tonnage class for the 
1885 sample. This resulted a sample ratio of about 80 %. 
Conserning the sample of 1875, only the estimated transport of two 
vessels sailing to St. Petersburg and Sundsvall, respectively, was 
added to the observations. In addition to permanent liners, there 
were also a few vessels which trafficked abroad less regularly, or 
did not sail on permanent lines. In order to keep the estimation 
conservative, these were omitted. 
Around 1865 no known steamship sailed beyond the Baltic, and 
the number of those trafficking regularly to Germany, Sweden and 
Russia is known fairly well from existing litterature. As before, it is 
possible that some occasional foreign traffic also was found, but 
again it was omitted. 
As mentioned above, until the turn of the century the total 
volume of cross-trading was regarded equal with the voyages 
found in the samples. For the samples of 1905 and 1913, the 
tonnage engaged in such trading was first estimated by subtracting 
the known liner tonnage from the total in relevant size-classes 
(over 500 net tons); also the 1914 data of steamships sailing abroad 
was used. Then the total volume was extrapolated in a similar 
manner as for sailing vessels. 
Because most steamers were followed for one full year only, all 
figures below are per year. 
1 = number of voyages in the sample 
2 = average tonnage of sample vessels 
3 = total sample cargo, net tons 
4 = total sample net-ton-nautical-miles (1000) 
1875 SAMPLE 
a) Traffic from Finland 
Trade area 	 1 2 3 4 
Russian ports 165.0 224.9 35,110* 10,320* 
Swedish ports 75.0 229.2 17,550* 6,320* 
South Baltic ports 43.0 277.0 12,080* 7,080* 
North Sea ports 10.0 290.0 2,900 3,730 
Other European 1.0 340.0 340 1,100 
391 
b) Traffic to Finland 
Trade area 1 2 3 4 
Russian ports 133.0 224.9 35,110* 10,320* 
Swedish ports 87.0 229.2 17,550* 6,320* 
South Baltic ports 44.0 277.0 12,100* 7,160* 
North Sea ports 3.0 295.0 810 1,030 
Other European 
c) Cross-trade cargo 
1.0 340.0 340 1,140 
Trade area 1 2 3 4 
Baltic ports 3.2 251.0 803 522 
North Sea ports 4.0 293.5 1,174 1,018 
Other European 9.8 319.9 3,135 6,484 
Atlantic 2.8 383.5 1,074 3,570 
World - - - 
1885 SAMPLE 
a) Traffic from Finland 
Trade area 	 1 2 3 4 
Russian ports 212.0 281.4 43,460* 16,930* 
Swedish ports 90.0 272.3 23,460* 8,450* 
South Baltic ports 57.0 290.3 16,920* 10,750* 
North Sea ports 19.0 598.0 11,430 13,770 
Other European 
b) Traffic to Finland 
1.0 664.0 664 1,930 
Trade area 1 2 3 4 
Russian ports 212.0 281.4 43,460* 16,930* 
Swedish ports 90.0 272.3 23,460* 8,450* 
South Baltic ports 59.0 290.3 17,840* 11,110* 
North Sea ports 21.0 598.0 12,820 15,200 
Other 1.0 664.0 664 4,350 
c) Cross-trade cargo 
Trade area 1 2 3 4 
Baltic ports 2.0 558.0 1,116 614 
North Sea ports 12.5 569.7 7,121 6,667 
Other European 4.0 649.0 2,596 4,879 
Atlantic 1.0 664.0 664 3,685 




Trade area 1 2 3 4 
Baltic ports — — — 
North Sea ports 3.0 478.7 1,436 434 
Other European 33.0 676.1 22,312 43,528 
Atlantic 1.0 649.0 649 3,109 
World — — — 
1905 SAMPLE 
(Cross-trade only) 
Trade area 1 2 3 4 
Baltic ports — — — 
North Sea ports 6.0 1250.8 7,505 8,177 
Other European 23.0 998.5 22,966 56,695 
Atlantic 5.0 783.8 3,919 13,408 
World — — — 
1913 SAMPLE 
(Cross-trade only) 
Trade area 1 2 3 4 
Baltic ports — — — 
North Sea ports 4.6 1055.6 4,856 3,433 
Other European 5.2 648.6 3,373 11,168 
Atlantic 3.6 1162.0 4,183 26,047 
World — — 
Source: See appendix III:1. 
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APPENDIX III:3B. Loaded voyages and transport by steamships on 
regular lines, 1894. 
1 = number of round trips 
2 = total cargo (out and home), net tonsl 
3 = total net-ton-nautical-miles (1000) 
Trade area 1 2 3 
Russian ports 389 130,656 53,180 
Swedish ports 219 80,998 31,380 
Baltic ports 85 58,190 43,640 
North Sea ports 95 122,712 141,840 
Other European 7 9,512 35,440 
Atlantic — — — 
World 
1 No reduction for emigrant ships' return cargo. 
Source: Finnish Official Statistics I: p. II, 86. 
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APPENDIX IV:1. Shipping accounts used in this study. 
The data is in the following order: name of ship, tonnage, years for 
which data exists on gross income, ditto on net result (any gaps in 
the material are indicated by "fr" = fragmentary) and, in the case of 
larger collections, archival signa. If the collection in question 
includes vessels of different domiciles, the domicile of each vessel 
is given after its name (in brackets); otherwise the domicile is given 
after the name of the archive. The names of steamships are printed 
in bold. 
Oulu Provincial Archives 
Archives of the Sovio trading house (Raahe)  
Ahto 640 67-78  
Aino 503 72-88 61-88 
Hera 1037 93-96 91-98 
Ilpotar 624 64-80  
Impi 638 68-95 67-95 
Iris 753 83-94 86-94 
Jenny 448 57-75 56-75  
Kalervo 580 74-85 64-85  
Lempi 600 68-73  
Matts August 628 74-98 73-98 
Oscar&Georg 509 82-83 
Roska 616 67-87 66-87  
Saama 624 73-93 69-94 
Unto 624 70-73 68-80 
Archives of the Snellman trading house (Oulu)  
Freden 436 57-73 57-73 
Grefve Berg 598 64-72 
Helios 524 69-86 60-77  
Toivo 945 71-85 70-88 
Archives of the Bergbohm trading house (Oulu)  
Birger 742 91-92 
Karl 755 81-93 87-93 
Oulu 147 65-81 
Archives of the Antman trading house (Oulu)  
Seura 	 111 	 63-69 63-69 
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Pietarsaari (Jakobstad) Town Archives ("Sjömansarkivet")  
Jacobstad 583 62-72 Sign. Jc:4 
Mainio 377 52-90  " Jc:1-2 
Rauni 376 60-73  " Jc:3  
Superb 468 60-63  " Jc:5  
Vanadis 
 
1020 82-92  " Jc:37  
Vesta 781 66-75  " Jc:5-6 
Nikula, Malmska handelshuset i Jakobstad, p. 374— 
Rapide 	 545 68-72  
(Vidén), Wasa—Nordsjö Ångbåts Ab, p. 26, 38-39 (Vaasa/Vasa)  
Fennia 205 74-81, 85-88 74-81,85-88  
Patria 526 85-88 85-88 
Clio 558 85-88 85-88 
Iris 261 85-88 85-88  
Norrvik, Briggen Carl Gustaf (Kristiinankaupunki/Kristinestad) 
Carl Gustaf 	 342 	 75-87 
Ahlstrom Oy, central archives, Noormarkku 
Ledgers of A.Ahlström (Pori) 
Garibaldi 	 773 	 71-73 
Lankoski 	 620 	 66-75  
Saarikoski 	 611 	 70 	 88 




	 60-62  
Saarinen, "Rosenlew—yhtymän purjelaivanvarustus" (Pori) 
Veritas 	 554 61-90 	 61-90 
Kåhre, Under Gustaf  Eriksons flagga, p. 55— 
Lochee (Uusi- 
kaupunki) 	 1654 09-13 
396 
Ålands Sjöfartsmuseum  










Finland 546 88-08  
Gessner 619 95-96 88-00  
Hera 1037 98-01.08-09 
Hermes 1012 01-14 00-14 
Iris 753 01-06 
John Gill 931 00-08,14 01-14 
Lima 971 04,06-07  
Mercur 657 98-00  
Mermerus  1671 04-09 00-13  
Pehr Brahe 560 97-00,10-13  
Roxane 544 99  
Satama 476 99-00  
Slamat 889 12-13 12-13  
St.Julien 1042 04 
Åland Provincial Archives 
Archives of Gustaf Erikson (Mariehamn) 
Borrowdale 	 1191 11-15 
Kåhre, Den åländska segelsjöfartens historia (all the following vessels 
were either from Mariehamn or other parts of Åland)  
Altai 397 03 91-07 
Bachus 1234 97-02 
Borrowdale 1191 00-09 
Cedia 397 06-13 
Emelia 284 93 
Isabel Brown 1231 04-10 
Lotos 1197 98-03 
Ocean 1239 02-08 00-11 
Pera 1647 11-14 
Prompt 1381 09-14 
Silemi 132 98-04 
Thomasina 1665 07-14 
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Turku Provincial Archives 
Archives of G. A. Petrelius, led gers (Turku/Åbo) 
Aimo 780 85-90 
Arvio 775 85-89 
Jalo 1273 85-87 
Lennätär 598 85-87 
Neptun 416 85-89 
Rurik 829 85-90 
Turku 492 85-88 
Åbo Akademi, Maritime archives 
Amur (Turku) 207 62-69 62-69 Sign. 216 
Astraea (Turku) 611 66-68 67-68 163 
Atka (Turku) 373 60-73 60-73 221-224, 
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Esmeralda (Turku) 765 93-04 96-01 234-5 
Express (Turku) 259 71-73 71-72 99 235-6, 323 
Finland (Turku) 540 61-73 61-73 99 239-40 
Marion Light—
body (Turku) 2136 13-14 " 282 
Pampa (Turku)  1633 13-14 " 282 
Skandia (Turku)  272 79 78-80 " 260 
Siivo (Turku)  324 91 " 249 
Storfursten 
(Turku)  586 95-00 95-00 " 260-1 
Aino (Luvia)  256 99-00 " 23 
Kosack (Rauma) 244 97-98 " 23 
Ystävät (Uusi- 
kaupunki)  654 89-95 " 209 
Europa 
(Mariehamn) 984 99-00 KK7  
Ada (Hitis)  215 73,75, 32,263 
76-80 
Albert (Vfjärd) 225 76-85 " 32 
Alma (Vfjärd) 207 87 73-78, 23,32 
82-85 
Amanda (Vfjärd) 205 74-85 " 32 
Amur (Nagu) 207 74-75 " KK7 
Anna (Vfjärd)  350 74-84, " 32 
95-97 
Ele (Vfjärd) 210 81-97 " 32 
Elsa (Korpo) 222 73-74, 73-74, " 132 
76 76-77 
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Emelia (Vfjärd)  323 69-80 " 32 
Emma (Vfjärd) 215 77-83,97 " 32,363-4 
Erika (Vfjärd) 238 71-96 (fr)  " 32 
Gustafva 
(Vflärd)  310 83-85 32 
John (Vfjärd) 348 75,77,96 363-4 
Lina (Vflärd) 348 73-97 (fr)  32 
Nyfart (Kimito)  269 81-85, 99 32 
93-97 
Orient (Korpo)  442 	 05 412 
Oskar (Korpo)  528 00-02 98-02 162 
Lina (Vfjärd)  281 	 81-82,95 79 249-50 
Selma (Vfjärd)  152 70-73 32 
Veni (Kimito)  312 93-97 32 
Viktor (Vfjärd)  204 75-78 363-4 
Finska Skolskepps Rederiet (Helsinki)  
Favell 1309 	 11-14  11-14 Sign. 337 
Fennia 2262 	 11-14  11-14 " 338 
Glenard 1728 	 11-14  11-14 " 337 
Finska Ångfartygs Ab (Helsinki) 
Sirius 664 84-13 84-13 
Orion 698 84-13 84-13 
Capella 607 88-13 88-13 
Argo 643 	 89-91 89-91 
Regulus 649 89-05 89-05 
Vesta 590 89-13 89-13 
Ceres 587 89-13 89-13 
Pallas 691 	 90-13 90-13 
Rhea 666 91-13 91-13 
Urania 664 91-13 91-05 
Astraea 635 	 91-13 91-13 
Uleåborg 404 92-13 92-13 
Jakobstad 392 	 92-13 92-05 
Wasa 392 92-99 92-99 
Von Döbeln 413 
	
92-13 92-13 
Torneå 497 	 92-13 92-13 
Norra Finland 340 92-09 92-09 
Åbo 283 	 93-97 93-97 
Finland 376 93-98 93-98 
Express 255 	 94-01 94-01 
Titania 1210 	 96-01 96-01 
Oberon 1214 	 96-01 96-01 
Tor 190 96-13 96-13 
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Ariadne 1223 97-01 97-01 
Wellamo 613 98-13 98-13 
Castor 564 98-01 98-01 
Oihonna 470 98-13 98-13 
Pollux 711 98-13 98-13 
Virgo (I) 413 98-05 98-05 
Arcturus 1117 99-13 99-13 
Polaris 1150 99-13 99-13 
Algol 1270 02-13 02-13 
Leo 1271 02-13 02-13 
Juno 651 06-13 06-13 
Virgo (II) 572 06-13 06-13 
Vega 514 06-13 06-13 
Ursus 116 06-13 06-13 
Leda 693 08-13 08-13 
Titania 1997 08-13 08-13 
Prinsessan 
Margareta 781 09-12 09-12 
Taurus 160 10-13 10-13 
Mira (ex. Virgo) 413 12-13 12-13 
Poseidon 406 12-13 12-13 
Lyra 205 12-13 12-13 
Lindberg, Ångbåssjöfart i Åbo 1836— 
Aura 	 211 
Bore I 	 723 
1928, ch. VII—VIII (Turku) 
83 	 83 
98-99 
Finland  357 83,85-86 83, 85-86 
Grefve Berg 148 67,72 67, 72 
Nordkusten  281 96 96 
Pehr Brahe 323 81 81 
Suomi  240 67 67 
Åbo 283 83, 85-86 83, 85-86 
Österbotten  246 67,72 67, 72 
Börman, Åboländsk bygdeseglation, app. 11 
Ada (Hitis)  217 81 81 
Agent (Nagu) 263 72-96  72-96 
Agio (Nagu) 325 83-86  83-86 
Aimo (Nagu) 780 89-94 89-94 
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Alma (Vfjärd) 207 85,87,96 85,87,96 
Anna (Nagu) 519 82-86 82-86 (fr)  
Bertha (Dfjärd) 316 75-92 (fr)  75-92 (fr) 
Veni (Kimito) 312 84-85,00-08 95-08  (fr)  
Jyväskylä Provincial Archives 
Archives of August Eklöf Ab. (Porvoo)  
Hilda 291 69-74 69-74 
Regina 594 74-16 71-16 
Archives of Paul Wahl & Co (Wiborg) 
Ahkera 122 62-68  
Auguste 398 62-69 
Ilmatar 259 62-69 
Lloyd 163 75-77 75-77 
Martin Luther 1025 64-66 
Velox 130 62-67 
Klamin suvun vaiheita, p. 80,96 (Virolahti) 
Avu 389 67-70 67-70  
Philemon 356 73-78 73-78 
14 — Sailing into Twilight 
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APPENDIX IV:2A. Gross income and net result per year and net ton 
in the Finnish sailing fleet, 1860-1914. 
N = number of cases 
Aver. = Weighted average 
Dev. = Standard deviation (s) of unweighted arithmetic average 
Err. = Standard error of estimate (shIN) 
£ = Pounds sterling and fractions 
FM = Finnish marks and fractions 
NB: Year denotes here total accounting time, incl. eventual laying up. 
a. All vessels sailing through the year 
Period Gross income 
N 	 Aver. 






N 	 Aver. 





1858-62 4 4.34 119.8 12.6 6.3 8 1.71 47.2 11.4 4.0 
1861-64 8 5.30 142.9 42.7 15.1 18 1.63 43.9 26.2 6.2 
1863-67 13 5.82 153.5 45.2 12.5 29 1.41 37.3 31.1 5.8 
1866-69 13 4.52 115.2 35.2 9.8 33 0.89 22.8 21.0 3.7 
1868-72 22 4.39 111.2 26.6 5.7 53 0.95 24.1 19.2 2.6 
1871-74 21 4.40 111.0 24.5 5.3 43 1.02 25.8 16.1 2.4 
1873-77 23 4.04 115.8 19.9 4.2 41 0.72 18.7 21.0 3.3 
1876-79 13 3.57 93.8 22.8 6.3 28 0.41 10.6 11.4 2.1 
1878-82 14 3.51 88.9 17.1 4.6 25 0.39 9.9 11.6 2.3 
1881-84 17 3.41 86.3 14.1 3.4 22 0.25 6.3 11.2 2.4 
1883-87 21 3.00 76.1 14.5 3.2 33 0.15 3.7 9.0 1.6 
1886-89 14 3.15 79.9 14.1 3.8 32 0.34 8.8 12.7 2.3 
1888-92 22 3.10 78.5 15.3 3.3 30 0.37 9.4 14.6 2.7 
1891-94 14 2.71 68.7 13.6 3.6 16 0.13 3.2 9.5 2.4 
1893-97 15 2.73 69.0 20.7 5.3 17 0.35 8.8 8.8 2.1 
1896-99 16 3.10 78.5 24.5 6.1 19 0.52 13.2 10.3 2.4 
1898-1902 11 3.03 76.9 22.0 6.6 19 0.71 17.9 14.8 3.4 
1901-04 8 2.37 60.1 12.8 4.5 18 0.59 14.9 15.5 3.6 
1903-07 9 2.24 56.9 7.1 2.4 24 0.32 8.1 7.4 1.5 
1906-09 6 2.30 58.5 12.0 4.9 18 0.27 6.8 6.4 1.5 
1908-12 8 2.70 68.4 12.1 4.3 28 0.42 10.6 7.8 1.5 
1911-14 13 3.13 79.8 26.3 7.3 21 0.78 19.8 15.1 3.3 
1913-14 5 4.29 109.9 24.2 10.8 8 1.25 32.1 17.7 6.2 
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b. Long-trading vessels over 400 net tons 
Period Gross income 
N 	 Aver. 






N 	 Aver. 





1858-62 3 4.19 115.7 11.3 6.5 5 1.75 48.3 13.8 6.9 
1861-64 5 4.96 133.8 48.2 21.5 9 1.87 50.4 24.4 8.1 
1863-67 8 5.34 140.6 38.9 13.8 15 1.58 41.8 22.0 5.7 
1866-69 10 4.06 103.5 30.4 9.6 22 1.01 25.8 18.8 4.0 
1868-72 16 4.41 111.8 22.2 5.5 40 1.03 26.1 14.7 2.3 
1871-74 17 4.46 112.5 19.1 4.6 36 1.05 26.4 13.2 2.2 
1873-77 20 4.06 106.3 19.5 4.4 33 0.78 20.3 19.4 3.4 
1876-79 13 3.57 93.8 22.8 6.3 24 0.44 11.5 10.1 2.1 
1878-82 14 3.51 88.9 17.1 4.6 20 0.49 12.4 9.1 2.0 
1881-84 17 3.41 86.3 14.1 3.4 19 0.29 7.3 10.2 2.3 
1883-87 19 3.05 77.3 12.5 2.9 28 0.17 4.2 7.8 1.5 
1886-89 14 3.15 79.9 14.1 3.8 29 0.39 10.0 12.1 2.2 
1888-92 22 3.10 78.5 15.3 3.3 29 0.40 10.2 13.8 2.6 
1891-94 14 2.71 68.7 13.6 3.6 16 0.13 3.2 9.5 2.4 
1893-97 15 2.73 69.0 20.7 5.3 17 0.35 8.8 8.8 2.1 
1896-99 15 3.08 77.8 24.8 6.4 19 0.52 13.2 10.3 2.4 
1898-1902 10 3.01 76.4 22.2 7.0 19 0.71 17.9 14.8 3.4 
1901-04 8 2.37 60.1 12.8 4.5 18 0.59 14.9 15.5 3.6 
1903-07 9 2.24 56.9 7.1 2.4 24 0.32 8.1 7.4 1.5 
1906-09 6 2.30 58.5 12.0 4.9 18 0.27 6.8 6.4 1.5 
1908-12 8 2.70 68.4 12.1 4.3 28 0.42 10.6 7.8 1.5 
1911-14 13 3.13 79.8 26.3 7.3 21 0.78 19.8 15.1 3.3 
1913-14 5 4.29 109.9 24.2 10.8 8 1.25 32.1 17.7 6.2 
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c. Vessels laid up for the winter (sailing on the Baltic and the North Sea) 
Period Gross income 
N 	 Aver. 






N 	 Aver. 





1858-62 0 0 
1861-64 1 (3.8) (101.5) 1 (0.66) (17.8) 
1863-67 3 3.81 100.3 18.8 10.8 3 0.39 10.2 8.9 5.2 
1866-69 3 3.57 90.9 19.9 11.5 3 0.60 15.3 12.5 7.2 
1868-72 2 (4.3) (107.8) 8.2 4.1 3 0.95 24.1 18.8 10.9 
1871-74 4 3.80 95.8 23.6 11.8 11 1.43 36.2 16.2 4.9 
1873-77 8 3.45 90.3 18.3 6.5 28 1.24 32.4 14.5 2.7 
1876-79 7 3.09 81.9 17.9 6.8 20 0.69 18.2 16.2 3.6 
1878-82 8 2.72 68.7 11.6 4.1 22 0.55 14.0 11.6 2.5 
1881-84 8 2.61 66.1 13.0 4.6 17 0.82 20.9 6.9 1.7 
1883-87 8 2.16 54.9 11.1 3.9 22 0.38 9.7 6.0 1.3 
1886-89 6 1.79 45.5 10.7 4.4 8 0.47 11.9 7.1 2.5 
1888-92 8 2.04 51.8 11.9 4.2 10 0.48 12.2 6.3 2.0 
1891-94 6 2.06 52.2 10.7 4.4 13 0.40 10.1 5.5 1.5 
1893-97 10 1.78 45.1 7.0 2.2 24 0.36 9.1 5.3 1.1 
1896-99 7 1.69 42.6 9.6 3.6 18 0.39 9.8 5.3 1.3 
1898-1902 9 1.66 42.0 10.3 3.4 15 0.38 9.7 6.7 1.7 
1901-04 9 1.62 41.2 10.2 3.4 11 0.10 2.5 12.8 3.9 
1903-07 12 1.52 38.6 11.9 3.4 14 0.06 1.5 10.4 2.8 
1906-09 6 1.45 37.0 15.7 6.4 7 0.29 7.3 3.7 1.4 
1908-12 4 1.98 50.2 19.6 9.8 5 0.22 5.7 6.5 2.9 
1911-14 3 2.68 68.4 5.8 3.4 6 0.36 9.2 9.8 4.0 
1913-14 2 (2.7) (68.4) 8.0 5.7 3 0.55 14.0 8.7 5.0 
Source: Data file collected from the accounts specified in appendix IV:1. 
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APPENDIX IV:2B. Gross income and net result of Finnish 
steamships, per year and net ton, 1860-1913. 
N = number of cases 
Aver. = Weighted average 
Dev. = Standard deviation (s) of weighted arithmetic average 
Err. = Standard error of estimate (s/ iN) 
£ = Pounds sterling and fractions 
FM = Finnish marks and fractions 
NB: Year denotes here total accounting time, incl. eventual laying up. 
a. Data from diverse accounts before 1900 
1 = all vessels 
2 = passenger vessels 
3 = bulk cargo vessels 
Period 	 Gross income 
N 	 Aver. 






N 	 Aver. 





1865-68:1 4 28.33 719.5 299.7 149.9 3(-0.5)(-11.8) 
1871-80:1 12 15.27 394.6 163.2 42.1 10 3.91 101.0 55.2 17.5 
:3 713.06 337.0 .. .. 7 4.36 112.6• 
1880-86:1 715.31 388.1 52.4 18.5 8 3.36 85.4 34.2 12.9 
:3 1(16.81 426.4) .. .. 1 (5.48 139.0) .. • ..) 
1885-89:1 10 12.78 324.2 78.2 24.7 10 3.56 90.2 31.5 10.0 
:3 812.52 317.7 .. 8 3.55 89.8 
1896-99:1 1(24.37 616.3) 3 (4.32 109.3) 60.6 35.0 
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b. Data from the accounts of Finska Ångfartygs Ab : detailed 
calculations. 
1 = Cargo ships over 500 nt, sailing beyond the Sound 
2 = Passenger ships over 500 nt ("emigrant ships") 
3 = Baltic passenger (passenger/cargo) ships 
Period Gross income 
N 	 Aver. 






N 	 Aver. 





1885: 	 1 2 13.78 349.5 89.4 63.2 2 2.08 52.7 34.6 24.5 
1895: 1 8 14.98 378.5 76.0 26.9 8 1.92 48.4 35.1 12.4 
:2 2 49.21 1243.5 12.9 9.1 2 7.99 202.0 3.7 2.6 
:3 9 14.84 375.0 165.4 55.1 9 1.74 44.0 87.3 29.1 
1905: 	 1 10 13.28 336.9 60.7 19.2 10 1.88 47.6 29.4 9.3 
:2 4 72.29 1834.1 500.1 250.1 4 11.95 303.1 107.6 53.8 
:3 7 16.98 430.9 171.9 65.0 7 1.66 42.1 66.2 25.0 
1913: 	 1 12 18.45 468.3 109.7 31.7 12 2.72 69.2 47.7 12.8 
:2 4 88.39 2244.2 722.0 361.0 4 9.05 229.7 178.2 89.1 
:3 5 33.74 856.7 218.7 97.8 5 6.83 173.5 75.0 33.6 
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c. Data from the accounts of Finska Ångfartygs Ab : gross income 
(cash) and profits (excluding company overhead costs) of 
individual ships. 
1 = Cargo ships over 500 nt, sailing beyond the Sound 
2 = Passenger ships over 500 nt ("emigrant ships") 
3 = Baltic passenger (passenger/cargo) ships 




1 	 2 






2 	 3 
MK MK 
1885-87 340.2 2.1 . 57.7 
1886-89 363.4 2.5 . 87.6 
1888-92 398.3 2.2 - - . 73.5 - - 
1891-94 382.4 2.4 1049.7 44.6 285.2 40.8 40.7 86.3 5.2 
1893-97 365.7 2.3 1339.8 40.9 386.8 41.3 45.0 234.2 72.4 
1896-99 344.7 1.5 1565.8 45.9 460.8 39.1 44.4 301.7 91.7 
1898-1902 331.8 1.0 1641.1 62.1 453.0 35.4 51.8 224.3 36.8 
1901-04 308.0 1.3 1666.4 70.2 453.5 32.9 28.6 181.7 23.0 
1903-07 326.6 2.4 2064.8 72.7 494.1 34.5 28.9 257.3 40.3 
1906-09 314.8 1.9 2203.5 75.0 533.8 43.1 28.4 290.0 55.2 
1908-12 343.0 - 1468.1 72.5 580.1 52.1 45.9 143.8 74.9 
1911-13 415.1 0.0 1538.9 68.7 721.7 52.2 76.2 162.3 150.4 
1912-13 427.8 0.0 1724.4 71.1 760.1 50.3 84.4 190.0 156.5 
Source: Data file collected from the accounts specified in appendix IV:1. 
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APPENDIX IV:3. Estimates of gross income. 
a. Sailing vessels 
1863/67 











Long-traders 103,000 141 14,523 
Baltic and North 
Sea traders 48,600 98 4,763 
Coastal traders 33,400 60 2,004 
Total 21,290 
2. According to tons and the regression of nautical miles to income per ton 
(y=20.93+0.010x, net tons and ton-miles according to table 3:7) for cross 
trade, and average freight per ton in principal export and import transport; 
for coastal trade as in table 1. Thousand FIM. 
Cross-trade: Baltic 	 165.5 
North Sea 	 1,029.8 





Total 	 13,796.1 
Export: 	 Baltic 	 1,764.4 
North Sea 	 2,546.6 
Other 	 1,864.7 
Total 	 6,175.7 
Import: 	 Baltic 	 432.0 
North Sea 	 116.6 
Other 	 638.0 
Total 	 1,186.6 
Coastal trade 	 2,004.0 
Grand total 	 23,162.4 
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1873/77 
1. According to tonnage and average income for different shipping 
categories 
Tonnage 	 Aver. 	 Resultant 
in 	 income gross income 
question 	 FIM/nt 	 1000 FIM 
Long-traders 95,900 106.3 10,194 
Baltic and North 
Sea traders 112,740 90.3 10,180 
Coastal traders 29,030 60 1,742 
Total 22,116 
2. According to tons and the regression of nautical miles to income per ton 
(y=13.43+0.001x, net tons and ton-miles according to table 3:7) for cross 
trade, and average freight per ton in principal export and import transport; 
for coastal trade as in table 1. Thousand FIM. 
Cross-trade: Baltic 	 215.6 
North Sea 	 2,299.0 
Other European 	 1,205.8 
Atlantic 	 5,543.8 
World 	 3,944.9 
Total 	 13,209.1 
Export: 	 Baltic 	 1,019.2 
North Sea 	 3,842.0 
Other 	 656.0 
Total 	 5,517.2 
Import: 
	 Baltic 	 370.0 
North Sea 	 72.0 
Other 	 575.0 
Total 	 1,017.0 
Coastal trade 	 1,741.8 
Grand total 	 21,485.1 
409 
1883/87 
1. According to tonnage and average income for different shipping 
categories 
Tonnage 	 Aver. 	 Resultant 
in 	 income gross income 
question 	 FIM/nt 	 1000 FIM 
Long-traders 64,300 77.3 4,970 
Baltic and North 
Sea traders 117,260 54.9 6,438 
Coastal traders 26,510 50 1,326 
Total 	 12,734 
2. According to tons and the regression of nautical miles to income per ton 
(y=21.2+0.0033x, net tons and ton-miles according to table 3:7) for cross 
trade, and average freight per ton in principal export and import transport; 
for coastal trade as in table 1. Thousand FIM. 
Cross-trade: Baltic 	 105.0 
North Sea 	 2,046.7 
Other European 	 343.5 
Atlantic 
	 3,187.9 
World 	 755.5 





North Sea 	 1,184.0 
Other 	 1,120.0 
Total 	 2,954.0 
Import: 	 Baltic 	 108.0 
North Sea 	 132.0 
Other 	 416.0 
Total 	 656.0 
Coastal trade 	 1,325.5 
Grand total 	 11,374.1 
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1893/97 
1. According to tonnage and average income for different shipping 
categories 
Tonnage 	 Aver. 	 Resultant 
in 	 income gross income 
question 	 FIM/nt 	 1000 FIM 
Long-traders 74,700 69.0 5,154 
Baltic and North 
Sea traders 76,940 45.1 3,470 
Coastal traders 29,720 45 1,337 
Total 9,962 
2. According to tons and the regression of nautical miles to income per ton 
(y=9.4+0.0054x, net tons and ton-miles according to table 3:7) for cross 
trade, and average freight per ton in principal export and import transport; 
for coastal trade as in table 1. Thousand FIM. 
Cross-trade: Baltic 	 92.8 
North Sea 	 1,155.8 
Other European 	 111.8 
Atlantic 	 2,710.6 
World 	 867.4 
Total 	 4,938.4 
Export: 	 Baltic 	 884.8 
North Sea 	 1,177.6 
Other 	 420.0 
Total 	 2,482.4 
Import: 
	 Baltic 	 60.0 
North Sea 	 176.0 
Other 	 304.0 
Total 	 540.0 
Coastal trade 	 1,337.4 
Grand total 	 9,298.2 
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1903/07 
1. According to tonnage and average income for different shipping 
categories 
Tonnage 	 Aver. 	 Resultant 
in 	 income gross income 
question 	 FIM/nt 	 1000 FIM 
Long-traders 78,100 56.9 4,444 
Baltic and North 
Sea traders 68,220 38.6 2,633 
Coastal traders 37,960 45 1,708 
Total 8,785 
2. According to tons and the regression of nautical miles to income per ton 
(y=11.6+0.0027x, net tons and ton-miles according to table 3:7) for cross 
trade, and average freight per ton in principal export and import transport; 
for coastal trade as in table 1. Thousand FIM. 
Cross-trade: Baltic 	 94.7 
North Sea 	 729.3 
Other European 	 19.7 
Atlantic 	 948.7 
World 	 2,651.3 
Total 	 4,443.7 
Export: 	 Baltic 	 828.0 
North Sea 	 858.0 
Other 	 163.8 
Total 	 1,849.8 




Other 	 99.0 




Grand total 	 8,257.7 
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1911/13 
1. According to tonnage and average income for different shipping 
categories 
Tonnage 	 Aver. 	 Resultant 
in 	 income gross income 
question 	 FIM/nt 	 1000 FIM 
Long-traders 91,100 79.8 7,270 
Baltic and North 
Sea traders 47,760 68.4 3,267 
Coastal traders 40,470 50 2,024 
Total 12,561 
2. According to tons and the regression of nautical miles to income per ton 
(y=20.9+0.0026x, net tons and ton-miles according to table 3:7) for cross 
trade, and average freight per ton in principal export and import transport; 
for coastal trade as in table 1. Thousand FIM. 
Cross-trade: Baltic 	 135.6 




Atlantic 	 1,221.9 
World 	 5,874.4 
Total 	 8,032.4 
Export: 	 Baltic 	 1,440.0 
North Sea 	 864.0 
Other 	 140.0 
Total 	 2,440.0 
Import: 	 Baltic 	 195.0 
North Sea 	 187.0 
Other 	 82.5 




Grand total 	 12,960.4 





Shipping 	 Tonnage 	 Aver. 	 Resultant 
category 	 in 	 income 	 gross income 
question 	 FIM/nt 	 1000 FIM 
A. Over 100 nt 	 2,110 	 545 	 1,150.0 




NB:Foreign traffic = category A. 
C. 1875 
Shipping Tonnage Aver. Resultant 
category in income gross income 
question FIM/nt 1000 FIM 
A. North Sea liners 251 309 77.6 
B. Auxiliaries 1,960 250 490.0 
C. Baltic ships 
over 100 nt 4,695 415 1,948.4 
D. Under 100 nt 1,295 290 375.6 
Total 2,891.6 













A. North Sea liners 2,450 297 727.5 
B. Auxiliaries 370 200 74.0 
C. Baltic ships 
over 300 nt 3,280 340 1,115.2 
D. 100>300nt 3,940 340 1,339.6 
E. Under 100 nt 2,080 220 457.6 
Total 3,713.9 
NB: Foreign traffic = category A + B + C + 0.8x(category D) = 2,988 
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1893/97 
Shipping Tonnage Aver. Resultant 
category in income gross income 
question FIM/nt 1000 FIM 
A. Emigrant ships 
(FAA) 1,300 1,340 1,742.0 
B. Liners sailing 
beyond the Baltic 5.650 370 2.090.5 
C. Tramps sailing 
beyond the Baltic 1,570 240 376.8 
D. Baltic ships 
over 300 nt 5.620 370 2,079.4 
E. Baltic ships 
100>300 nt 4.995 200 999.4 
F. Baltic ships 
under 100 nt 2,815 150 422.1 
Total 7,710.2 
NB: Foreign traffic = category A + B + C + D + 0.7x(category E) = 6,988. 
1903/07 
Shipping Tonnage Aver. Resultant 
category in income gross income 
question FIM/nt 1000 FIM 
A. Emigrant ships 
(FAA) 3,570 2,065 7,372.1 
B. Liners sailing 
beyond the Baltic 10,500 325 3,412.5 
C. Tramps sailing 
beyond the Baltic 14,500 160 2,320.0 
D. Baltic ships 
over 300 nt 7,100 400 2,840.4 
E. Baltic ships 
100>300 nt 5,645 200 1,128.4 
F. Baltic ships 
under 100 nt 3,270 150 490.7 
Total 17,564.1 
NB: Foreign traffic = category A +B + C + D + 0.8x(category E) = 16,848. 
415 
1911/13 
Shipping Tonnage Aver. Resultant 
category in income gross income 
question FIM/nt 1000 FIM 
A. Emigrant ships 
(FAA) 4,900 1,540 7,546.0 
B. Liners sailing 
beyond the Baltic 19,450 415 8,071.8 
C. Tramps sailing 
beyond the Baltic 14,500 190 2,755.0 
D. Baltic ships 
over 300 ntl 6.900 580 4,009.0 
E. Baltic ships 
100>300 nt' 6,045 333 2,015.7 
F. Baltic ships 
under 100 nt 4,540 200 908.2 
Total 25,305.7 
NB: Foreign traffic = category A + B + C + D + 0.65x(category E) = 23,692. 
1 Including 1,360 nt of cargo vessels in category D and 2,820 nt in 
category E; respective average income was estimated at 300 and 250 
FIM/nt. 
Source: Tables 3:10-15, appendix IV:2B, accounts specified in appendix 
IV:1. 
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APPENDIX IV:4. Estimation of value-added. 











Tonnage in question 103,000 48,600 33,400 
Net result: 
Value per net ton, FIM 41.8 15.0 13.5 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 4,300 729 450 
Wages:' 
Value per net ton, FIM 14.1 11.5 10.7 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 1,455 560 357 
Masters' salaries:2 
Value per net ton, FIM 9.1 11.5 9.5 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 937 561 317 
Food costs:3 
Value per net ton, FIM 12.0 9.8 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 1,237 476 
Total value-added: 
Value per net ton, FIM 77.0 47.9 33.7 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 7,929 2,326 1,124 
1 Wages were computed using the known average wages per man and 
man-ton ratios. For long traders, the working year was computed at 12 
months, for Baltic and North Sea traders at 7 months and for coastal 
traders at 6.5 months. 
2 Masters' salaries were been computed according to the known average 
monthly salaries (working year as for wages) and average kaplake. On 
coastal vessels they were assumed to total 60 FIM/month. 












Tonnage in question 95,900 112,740 29,030 
Net result: 
Value per net ton, FIM 20.3 32.4 15.0 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 1,947 3,653 436 
Wages:1  
Value per net ton, FIM 13.1 11.4 12.5 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 1,259 1,280 362 
Masters' salaries:2 
Value per net ton, FIM 8.8 8.5 10.5 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 847 956 305 
Food costs:3 
Value per net ton, FIM 9.8 8.6 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 946 957 
Total value-added: 
Value per net ton, FIM 52.1 60.7 38.0 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 4,999 6,846 1,103 
1 Wages were computed using the known average wages per man and 
man-ton ratios. For long traders, the working year was computed at 12 
months, for Baltic and North Sea traders at 7 months and for coastal 
traders at 6.5 months. 
2 Masters' salaries were computed according to the known average 
monthly salaries (working year as for wages) and average kaplake. On 
coastal vessels they were assumed to total 70 FIM/month. 












Tonnage in question 64,300 117,260 26,510 
Net result: 
Value per net ton, FIM 4.2 9.7 8.5 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 270 1,137 225 
Wages:1 
Value per net ton, FIM 10.9 9.8 10.0 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 700 1,145 266 
Masters' salaries:2 
Value per net ton, FIM 5.0 6.8 9.3 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 324 803 247 
Food costs:3 
Value per net ton, FIM 7.7 7.0 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 497 813 
Total value-added: 
Value per net ton, FIM 27.9 33.2 27.8 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 1,791 3,898 738 
1 Wages were computed using the known average wages per man and 
man-ton ratios. For long traders, the working year was computed at 12 
months, for Baltic and North Sea traders at 7 months and for coastal 
traders at 6.5 months. 
2 Masters' salaries were computed according to the known average 
monthly salaries (working year as for wages) and average kaplake. On 
coastal vessels they were assumed to total 60 FIM/month. 












Tonnage in question 74,700 76.940 29,720 
Net result: 
Value per net ton, FIM 8.8 9.1 15.0 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 657 700 446 
Wages:' 
Value per net ton, FIM 9.5 9.6 10.7 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 711 739 318 
Masters' salaries:2 
Value per net ton, FIM 4.7 5.8 9.1 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 350 450 270 
Food costs:3 
Value per net ton, FIM 5.7 5.8 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 426 443 
Total value-added: 
Value per net ton, FIM 28.7 30.3 34.8 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 2,144 2,332 1,034 
1 Wages were computed using the known average wages per man and 
man-ton ratios. For long traders, the working year was computed at 12 
months, for Baltic and North Sea traders at 7 months and for coastal 
traders at 6.5 months. 
2 Masters' salaries were computed according to the known average 
monthly salaries (working year as for wages) and average kaplake. On 
coastal vessels they were assumed to total 60 FIM/month. 












Tonnage in question 78,100 68,220 37,960 
Net result: 
Value per net ton, FIM 8.1 1.5 12.0 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 633 102 456 
Wages:1  
Value per net ton, FIM 8.4 9.4 9.7 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 654 640 367 
Masters' salaries:2 
Value per net ton, FIM 3.2 5.6 9.1 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 249 379 344 
Food costs:3 
Value per net ton, FIM 5.4 6.1 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 425 416 
Total value-added: 
Value per net ton, FIM 25.1 22.5 30.7 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 1,961 1,537 1,167 
1 Wages were computed using the known average wages per man and 
man-ton ratios. For long traders, the working year was computed at 12 
months, for Baltic and North Sea traders at 7 months and for coastal 
traders at 6.5 months. 
2 Masters' salaries were computed according to the known average 
monthly salaries (working year as for wages) and average kaplake. On 
coastal vessels they were assumed to total 60 FIM/month. 












Tonnage in question 91,100 47,760 40,470 
Net result: 
Value per net ton, FIM 19.8 9.2 20.0 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 1,804 439 809 
Wages:1  
Value per net ton, FIM 9.5 13.0 11.2 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 861 622 455 
Masters' salaries:2 
Value per net ton, FIM 3.4 8.1 10.3 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 306 386 415 
Food costs:3 
Value per net ton, FIM 6.1 8.5 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 560 404 
Total value-added: 
Value per net ton, FIM 38.8 38.8 41.5 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 3,531 1,851 1,679 
1 Wages were computed using the known average wages per man and 
man-ton ratios. For long traders, the working year was computed at 12 
months, for Baltic and North Sea traders at 7 months and for coastal 
traders at 6.5 months. 
2 Masters' salaries were computed according to the known average 
monthly salaries (working year as for wages) and average kaplake. On 
coastal vessels they were assumed to total 70 FIM/month. 
3 Food costs were computed at 65 % of wages. 
Source: Net result: appendix IV:2A; wages, masters' salaries and food 










Tonnage in question 2,114 555 
Net result: 
Value per net ton, FIM 100 60 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 211 33 
Wages:' 
Value per net ton, FIM 26.3 57.7 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 56 32 
Masters' salaries:2 
Value per net ton, FIM 11.8 29.4 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 25 16 
Food costs:3  
Value per net ton, FIM 17.1 37.5 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 36 21 
Total value-added: 
Value per net ton, FIM 155.2 183.8 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 328 102 
1 Wages were computed using the known average wages per man and 
man-ton ratios. For all steamships the working year has been computed 
at 6.5 months. 
2 Masters' salaries were computed according to the known average 
monthly salaries (working year as for wages) and average kaplake. 3 











Tonnage in question 4,947 1,960 1,297 
Net result: 
Value per net ton, FIM 100 50 50 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 495 98 65 
Wages:1  
Value per net ton, FIM 28.5 64.8 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 197 84 
Masters' salaries:2 
Value per net ton, FIM 9.6 26.3 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 66 34 
Food costs:3 
Value per net ton, FIM 18.5 42.1 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 128 55 
Total value-added: 
Value per net ton, FIM 142.5 183.5 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 984 238 
1 Wages were computed using the known average wages per man and 
man-ton ratios. For all ships except auxiliary steamers the working year 
has been computed at 6.5 months. 
2 Masters' salaries were computed according to the known average 
monthly salaries (working year as for wages) and average kaplake. 3 






Over 100 nt 





Tonnage in question 2,456 368 7,211 2,080 
Net result: 
Value per net ton, FIM 47.0 20.0 70.0 40.0 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 116 7 505 83 
Wages:1  
Value per net ton, FIM 27.1 56.5 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 272 118 
Masters' salaries:2 
Value per net ton, FIM 9.3 29.6 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 93 62 
Food costs:3 
Value per net ton, FIM 17.6 36.7 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 177 76 
Total value-added: 
Value per net ton, FIM 116.6 163.0 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 1,170 339 
1 Wages were computed using the known average wages per man and 
man-ton ratios. For North Sea liners and auxiliaries the working year 
has been computed at 12 months, for others at 6.5 months. 
2 Masters' salaries were computed according to the known average 
monthly salaries (working year as for wages) and average kaplake. 











Tonnage in question a)  1,300 9,120 4,310 
b)  5,650 
c)  1,570 
8,520 
Net result: 
Value per net ton, FIM a)  231.0 47.6 30.0 
b)  37.5 
c)  30.0 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM a)  300 434 129 
b)  212 
c)  47 
559 
Wages:1  
Value per net ton, FIM 24.1 24.9 52.4 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 206 227 226 
Masters' salaries:2 
Value per net ton, FIM 8.9 11.6 29.9 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 76 106 129 
Food costs:3 
Value per net ton, FIM 16.9 17.3 34.8 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 144 158 150 
Total value-added: 
Value per net ton, FIM 115.6 101.4 147.1 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 985 925 634 
a = emigrant ships (passenger ships sailing beyond the Baltic) 
b = liner cargo ships 
c = tramp cargo ships 
1 Wages were computed using the known average wages per man and 
man-ton ratios. For long traders, the working year was computed at 12 
months, for Baltic and North Sea traders at 7 months and for coastal 
traders at 6.5 months. 
2 Masters' salaries were computed according to the known average 
monthly salaries (working year as for wages) and average kaplake. 




North Sea & 
long traders 
category 
Baltic 	 Coastal 
traders 	 traders 





Value per net ton, FIM a)  257.0 34.0 30.0 
b)  27.8 
c)  23.0 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM a)  917 380 147 
b) 292 
c)  334 
1,543 
Wages:1  
Value per net ton, FIM 20.0 26.5 36.9 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 572 296 181 
Masters' salaries:2 
Value per net ton, FIM 7.5 14.5 36.7 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 215 162 180 
Food costs:3 
Value per net ton, FIM 15.0 19.9 27.8 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 429 222 136 
Total value-added: 
Value per net ton, FIM 96.6 94.9 131.4 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 2,759 1,060 644 
a = emigrant ships (passenger ships sailing beyond the Baltic) 
b = liner cargo ships 
c = tramp cargo ships 
1 Wages were computed using the known average wages per man and 
man-ton ratios. For long traders, the working year was computed at 12 
months, for Baltic and North Sea traders at 7.5 months and for coastal 
traders at 6.5 months. 
2 Masters' salaries were computed according to the known average 
monthly salaries (working year as for wages) and average kaplake. 










traders 	 traders 
Tonnage in question a) 4,900 d) 6,930 6,790 




Value per net ton, FIM a) 151.0 d) 125.0 40.0 
b) 56.4 e) 30.0 
c) 45.0 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM a) 740 d) 866 271 




Value per net ton, FIM 20.9 34.6 44.2 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 812 370 300 
Masters' salaries:2 
Value per net ton, FIM 6.4 9.2 39.5 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 247 98 268 
Food costs:3 
Value per net ton, FIM 15.7 25.9 33.1 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 609 277 225 
Total value-added: 
Value per net ton, FIM 106.9 161.1 156.7 
Total quantity, 1000 FIM 4,155 1,724 1,064 
a = emigrant ships (passenger ships sailing beyond the Baltic) 
b = liner cargo ships 
c = tramp cargo ships 
d = Baltic passenger ships 
e = Baltic cargo ships 
1 Wages were computed using the known average wages per man and 
man-ton ratios. For long traders, the working year was computed at 12 
428 
months, for Baltic and North Sea traders at 7.5 months and for coastal 
traders at 6.5 months. 
2 Masters' salaries were computed according to the known average 
monthly salaries (working year as for wages) and average kaplake. 
3 Food costs were computed at 75 % of wages. 
Source: Net result: appendix IV:2B; wages, masters' salaries and food 
costs: tables 2:25-29. 
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